“PLANNING POLICY 12. The Development Plan includes the North West of England Plan Regional Spatial Strategy to 2021 (RSS) (CD5), and the Congleton Borough Local Plan Review (LP) adopted in 2005 (CD7.1). 13. The policies in the RSS that I consider to have the most relevance to this appeal are as follows: • DP 4 — development should accord with a sequential approach to make the best use of existing resources and in infrastructure. • DP 5 — development should be located so as to reduce the need to travel, especially by car. • RDF 1 — development plans and strategies should accord with the 4 priorities of the Regional Spatial Framework. Crewe is listed as a third priority. Sandbach is not mentioned. • RDF 2 - development in rural areas should be concentrated in}Key Service Centres (the Council considers Sandbach to be a Key Service Centre, see LDF background report paragraph 6.16, CD17). • L 4 — Table 7.1 lists the distribution of regional housing provision, and includes an indicative target proportion of housing on brownfield land (80% for the former Borough of Congleton, 60% for Crewe). • MCR 3 — relates to the southern part of the Manchester City Region in which Cheshire East lies. Plans and strategies should sustain and promote economic prosperity consistent with the environmental character of the area and the creation of attractive and sustainable communities by, amongst other things, allowing residential development to support local regeneration strategies and to meet identified local needs particularly for affordable housing in sustainable locations which are well served by public transport. • MCR 4 — plans and strategies should support sustainable economic growth in Crewe. 14. The saved policies in the LP that I consider to have the most relevance to this appeal are as follows: • PS8 — in open countryside (the appeal site is outside the settlement boundary) development will be permitted only if it is for certain specified purposes, none of which relates to the appeal proposal. • H6 — residential development in open countryside will not be permitted unless it falls into certain specified categories, none of which relates to the appeal proposal. • H2 — Sandbach should get 25% of new housing in the 5 sub- divisions of the former Congleton Borough.”
"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."
"I hope I am not over-simplifying unduly by suggesting that the central issue in this case is whether the decision of the Secretary of State leaves room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt as to what he has decided and why. This is an issue to be resolved as the parties agree on a straightforward down-to-earth reading of his decision letter without excessive legalism or exegetical sophistication."
"In any particular case involving the interplay of a policy indicated in a development plan and other material considerations, there may be more than one acceptable interpretation in planning terms of a policy indicated by the plan, and more than one 'correct' application of it when set against the other considerations. A planning decision maker's approach to policy will only be interfered with by the court if it goes beyond the range of reasonable meanings that can be given to the language used: see R v Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Woods [1997] JPL 958, CA, per Brooke LJ at page 967 968. If there is a dispute about the meaning of the words included in a policy document which a planning authority is bound to take into account, it is of course for the court to determine as a matter of law what the words are capable of meaning. If the decision maker attaches a meaning to the words they are not properly capable of bearing, then it will have made an error of law, and it will have failed properly to understand the policy (see Horsham DC v Secretary of State for the Environment[1993] 1 PLR 81 , per Nolan LJ at 88). If there is room for dispute about the breadth of the meaning the words may properly bear, then there may in particular cases be material considerations of law which will deprive a word of one of its possible shades of meaning in that case as a matter of law."
"One important reason why previous decisions are capable of being material is that like cases should be decided in a like manner so that there is consistency in the appellate process. Consistency is self-evidently important to both developers and development control authorities. But it is also important for the purpose of securing public confidence in the operation of the development control system. I do not suggest and it would be wrong to do so, that like cases must be decided alike. An inspector must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free upon consideration to disagree with the judgment of another but before doing so he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and to give his reasons for departure from the previous decision. To state that like cases should be decided alike presupposes that the earlier case is alike and is not distinguishable in some relevant respect. If it is distinguishable then it usually will lack materiality by reference to consistency although it may be material in some other way. Where it is indistinguishable then ordinarily it must be a material consideration. A practical test for the inspector is to ask himself whether, if I decide this case in a particular way am I necessarily agreeing or disagreeing with some critical aspect of the decision in a previous case? The areas for possible agreement or disagreement cannot be defined but they would include an interpretation of policies aesthetic judgments and assessment of need. Where there is disagreement then the inspector must weigh the previous decision and give his reasons for departure from it. These can on occasion be short, for example in the case of disagreement on aesthetics. On other occasions they may have to be elaborate."