“(A) In all cases of new development, on whatever scale, the City Council will expect the highest standards of design.”
“(A) Architectural Quality, Local Distinctiveness and Sustainability Development should: (1) be of the highest standards of sustainable and inclusive urban design and architectural quality (2) improve the quality of adjacent spaces around or between buildings, showing careful attention to definition, scale, use and surface treatment; (3) use high quality, durable and, where possible, indigenous and recycled materials appropriate to the building and its setting”
“(iv) Planning policies should promote high quality inclusive design in the layout of new developments and individual buildings in terms of function and impact, not just for the short term but over the lifetime of the development. Design which fails to take the opportunities available for improving the character and quality of an area should not be accepted.”
“34. Planning authorities should plan positively for the achievement of high quality and inclusive design for all development, including individual buildings, public and private spaces and wider area development schemes. Good design should contribute positively to making places better for people. Design which is inappropriate in its context, or which fails to take the opportunities available for improving the character and quality of an area and the way it functions, should not be accepted.”
“Westminster City Council’s support for redevelopment of this brownfield site is long standing and well documented. WCC recognises, and wishes to realise, the land use planning benefits that would flow from the implementation of a suitable scheme. There have been a number of previous attempts to promote schemes designed to achieve these benefits, though none has so far proved fruitful.”
“It is not relevant in the sense that the decision to be made does not involve a choice between that scheme and either of the appeals schemes. The appeals must be decided on their merits. If either is acceptable on its own merits, then a comparison with the Sainsbury’s scheme is unnecessary. However, if there are concerns that aspects of the appeals schemes are not to the standards one ought to expect, then I consider that the Sainsbury’s application could be helpful if it showed that a different and better solution were possible.”
“ Building E1 13.137 I conclude that the mass, design and building line of Building E1 are inappropriate in the context of the listed buildings to the north on Paddington Green and the character and appearance of the Conservation Area. I see no compelling reason why this building (or, indeed, Building E2) should be designed in very much the same idiom as the buildings along the Edgware Road frontage when the context is very different. I conclude that the design and building line of Building E1 conflict with the aims of Replacement UDP Policies DES 9 and DES10. The design concept 13.138 The traditional character of this part of Edgware Road derives from three- or four-storey terraces with ground floor shops. In places, notably Sheldon House and Parsons House, there has been modern redevelopment. The buildings in Paddington Green are generally older than those in Edgware Road and, together with the green itself, I consider the area rightly designated a conservation area. 13.139 I have serious misgivings about imposing into this context a development based on the concept of the mansion – more particularly, one in which a number of mansions or buildings seem to be moulded almost into one single building by a uniform style and height very different to the character of the surrounding buildings. There are mansions to the south of Harrow Road and to the north of Maida Avenue – but that does not seems to me to justify introducing them here, in an area with its own distinctive character (and, in fact, with a character in Paddington Green different to that in Edgware Road). 13.140 In addition to the principle, the mansion concept seems to raise particular problems with regard to Buildings E1 and E2 (which I have considered above) and the Church Street façade, where I consider that Building C [It is agreed he meant Building B] would be overbearing in relation to the existing buildings in the conservation area. My concern is with the concept, not with the quality of the more detailed aspects of the architecture. Nor does my concern extend to the tower. I find that a 22 storey tower would sit comfortably in relation to Hall and Braithwaite Towers and Paddington Green Police Station. Also, the design of the tower is rather different to the mansions around it, which indicates that it is not visually dependant on the architectural concept adopted over the rest of the site. 13.141 Despite it not being an objection raised by WCC, and despite CABE’s support for the principles of the composition, I conclude that the design concept is inappropriate for the site and runs contrary to what is sought by Replacement UDP Policy DES 1. Sainsbury’s application 13.142 Sainsbury’s proposals are not fully evolved. In general terms, I agree with CABE’s views on them. At the same time, they indicate clearly to me how an alternative design approach could produce what I would consider a better urban design solution for the site, or how variations within the concept of the appeal proposals could do so. I have indicated above where or why I think improvements could arise. The architectural and urban design criticisms I have raised are based on objective assessment of the points raised by others and not on personal design preference or prejudice.”
“The Secretary of State considers that development of this brownfield site would offer significant regeneration benefits, would promote and enhance the vitality and viability of this District Centre and would provide much needed housing to an area which currently is in need of provision. He has accorded significant weight to these benefits in his consideration of the appeals. The Secretary of State concludes therefore that the site is a suitable one for housing and retail development and would comply with the aims of PPG3 and PPS6.”
“… the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the Sainsbury’s application has little relevance to the consideration of these appeals because the appeals must be decided on their own merits [IR 13.7] and, in any case, for the reasons given below, he concludes that Option A is, overall, an acceptable scheme for this site.”
“On balance … the design concept does not run contrary to what is sought by Replacement UDP Policy DES 1, which looks for the highest quality of form and design …”
“31. The Secretary of State concludes that the proposals would bring significant regeneration benefits to the area, would enhance the vitality and viability of the District Centre and would provide much needed housing, including affordable housing, to this part of London. He has accorded significant weight to these benefits in considering these appeals. 33. The Secretary of State has also given careful consideration to the impact of the proposals on the character of the Paddington Green Conservation Area and the listed buildings situated adjacent to the site. He concludes that the protection of the settings of conservation areas is a material consideration of considerable weight and he has therefore given particular attention to any deficiencies of the proposals in this respect. For the reasons set out in this letter, he accepts that both proposals would have some adverse impact on the Paddington Green Conservation Area although he does not share the inspector’s concerns about the use of the mansion-block concept for the appeal site. He agrees with the Inspector that the proposals must be judged on their merits (IR 13.91) and not on the basis that an alternative proposal might produce a better urban design solution. 35. The Secretary of State has concluded that the scheme proposed in Option A is in line with the development plan and national guidance in terms of retail and housing policies. He also considers that the overall design concept is acceptable and complies with the aims of Replacement UDP Policy DES1. However, it does not fully comply with local plan policies DES 9 and DES 10 and he accepts it will have an adverse impact on the Paddington Green Conservation Area. Nevertheless, having weighed up all the arguments for and against Option A, the Secretary of State has concluded that the shorter tower coupled with the benefits of the scheme in the form of regeneration of a brownfield site and the provision of affordable housing are, on balance, sufficient to outweigh the concerns he has identified with regard to conflict with the development plan and his reservations about some aspects of the design of the scheme and, particularly, its impact on the Paddington Green Conservation Area.”
“The Inspector doubted the appropriateness of the mansion-block concept and he also doubted whether the mansion-block concept had been achieved. The Secretary of State did not share the first doubt, but accepted the second. There was, however, no criticism of the design and architecture per se. The “highest standards of sustainable and inclusive urban design and architectural quality”, as set out in DES 1, can be met by a range of designs that will not necessarily achieve complete success. I prefer the submissions of Miss Lieven QC and Mr Elvin QC on this aspect of the application. These were in my view clearly matters of planning judgment. The Secretary of State was entitled to reach the decision he did. His reasons in the paragraphs which I have cited sufficiently explained why he reached that decision.”
“The word “acceptable” in this context must mean that the scheme ought in all the circumstances to be accepted, in accordance with relevant principles and policies. It should not in my view be used to imply some lower standard of the merely tolerable.”
“(1) Land (irrespective of whether it is owned by the applicant for planning permission) may be developed in any way which is acceptable for planning purposes. The fact that other land exists (whether or not in the applicant’s ownership) upon which the development would be yet more acceptable for planning purposes would not justify the refusal of planning permission upon the application site.”
“The law has always made a clear distinction between the question of whether something is a material consideration and the weight which it should be given. The former is a question of law and the latter is a question of planning judgment, which is entirely a matter for the planning authority. Provided that the planning authority has regard to all material considerations, it is at liberty (provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality) to give them whatever weight the planning authority thinks fit or no weight at all. The fact that the law regards something as a material consideration therefore involves no view about the part, if any, which it should play in the decision-making process. This distinction between whether something is a material consideration and the weight which it should be given is only one aspect of a fundamental principle of British planning law, namely that the courts are concerned only with the legality of the decision-making process and not with the merits of the decision. If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local planning authority or the Secretary of State.”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
“I hope I am not over-simplifying unduly by suggesting that the central issue in this case is whether the decision of the Secretary of State leaves room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt as to what he has decided and why. This is an issue to be resolved as the parties agree on a straightforward down-to-earth reading of his decision letter without excessive legalism or exegetical sophistication.”
“If there is a dispute about the meaning of the words included in a policy document which a planning authority is bound to take into account, it is of course for the court to determine as a matter of law what the words are capable of meaning. If the decision maker attaches a meaning to the words they are not properly capable of bearing, then it will have made an error of law … If in all the circumstances the wording of the relevant policy document is properly capable of more than one meaning, and the planning authority adopts and applies a meaning which it is capable as a matter of law of bearing, then it will not have gone wrong in law.”
“The test to be applied by the court was that it should only interfere where the decision-maker’s interpretation was perverse in that he has given to the words in their context a meaning that they could not possibly have or restricted their meaning in a way that the breadth of their terms could not possibly justify.”