“[The rule change] in train created the probability that the wife and children of a Gurkha with ILR/E would also obtain leave in line with that granted to the Gurkha. The [rule] change was in its terms retrospective. About 90% of the 2230 eligible Gurkhas discharged after1st July 1997 have taken advantage of that provision, along with their qualifying dependants.”
“Irrationality The Judge in his full and careful judgment considered the irrationality argument at length. His reasoning amply supports his conclusion in para 54 that “the GOTT comes well within the range of responses available to a reasonable decision maker”, even without regard to the particular need for caution before making a finding of irrationality in a case of the present kind for the reasons mentioned in para 55. Discrimination The selection of1 July 1997 as the date of the optimal transfer from the GPS to the AFPS Scheme was not irrational and had, of itself, nothing to do with the Gurkhas’ ages. The valuation of benefits earned by that date under the GPS was done actuarially. Of course, its effect varied according to the number of years prior service, but that does not make the approach age discriminatory. The argument was that there was nevertheless indirect age related discrimination. The judge considered whether the effect of the scheme was “disproportionately prejudicial”, taking into account the basis of the differentiation between different cases. He concluded that it was not, and I can see no real prospect of a successful appeal against that conclusion”
“54. For present purposes, I accept that flawed logic, more readily shown than a decision which simply defies comprehension, may breach the principle of rationality. That principle also requires a rational connection between the problem to be solved or aim to be advanced and the means chosen to solve the problem or to advance the aim. The GOTT comes well within the range of responses available to a reasonable decision-maker. I also accept that where human rights are interfered with, the greater the scrutiny to which the reason for the interference will be subjected before the Court can be satisfied that the decision is reasonable, ie within the range of responses open to a reasonable decision maker. I shall deal with those rights later when I deal with the next head of arguments. 55. I also accept Mr Singh's more general submission that, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR said in Smith v MoD[1996] QB 517 at 556 A, the greater the policy content of a decision, the more remote the subject matter of a decision from ordinary judicial experience, the more hesitant the Court must be in holding a decision to be irrational. This is especially so in the context of the allocation of public resources, as he also said in R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority ex p B[1995] 1 WLR 989 at 905. This is I accept a case which does involve the allocation of resources, including how far an exception to the principle of non-retrospectivity in public sector pension improvements should go. But all that said, the decision seems to me quite rational without any special tests.”
“7. In very brief summary however. Gurkhas were not in an analogous position to the rest of the British Army before1 July 1997 . They were overseas based, in Hong Kong and elsewhere in the Far East, and had little or no opportunity to develop the close physical ties needed to satisfy the immigration regulations. This changed from 1 July when the Gurkhas became UK based. This clear distinction is behind the different treatment of service either side of this date. Service on or after1 July 1997 was given a year-for-year value in the AFPS, while service before this date was given a value by the scheme actuary broadly the same as the pension benefits earned in the GPS. 8. I should make clear that the MoD wrote to the first and third Claimants in December 2005 to invite their participation in the MoD’s review of the Gurkhas Terms and Conditions of Service (the “GTACOS Review”), the background to which I also explain in my earlier statements. That letter made clear the Review would not generally look at the TACOS of those who had retired. However, it also made clear that exceptionally it would consider the arguments for changing the TACOS for those Gurkhas who left the Army on or after1 July 1997 . The Government made this position clear in a Parliamentary debate in the House of Commons on7 June 2006 when the Minister said: “As part of the [GTACOS] Review, The Department is looking again at the pension position of Gurkhas back to1 July 1997 , when the Gurkhas first became a UK-based force. We remain of the view that the position of Gurkha veterans discharged prior to1 July 1997 remains exactly as it was when the judicial review [Purja in 2003] reached its conclusions.” (Official Report cols 93-94) 9. The responsible MoD Minister wrote letters to Tikendra Dewan, the third Claimant and Chairman of the British Gurkha Welfare Society (BGWS), the first Claimant, in the first half of 2007 to explain the basis of the GOTT. There was also a meeting with the Minister on28 March 2007 . The third Claimant was therefore fully apprised of the Government’s position not to include in the Review those who left the Army before1 July 1997 . 10. The fact that Gurkhas who left the Army before July 1997 were not covered by the Review meant, for pensions, that the target group for the GOTT was relatively small: there were 3,400 serving Gurkhas and 2,200 who retired on or after1 July 1997 . There are around 25,000 retired Gurkhas in receipt of GPS pension, so the eligible group of retired Gurkhas was less than 10% of the total group. 11. As far as I know, this was the first time a public sector pension scheme had offered to change the terms on which some of its pensioners had left service. Such an exercise to amend past terms and conditions is fraught with difficulty and is not usually done. 12. The GOTT exercise would of course have been very different if all 25,000 retired Gurkhas, most of whom live in Nepal, had been included. The idea of a GOTT for all retired Gurkhas would have been called into question for two reasons – namely significantly increased cost and the difficulty of communications with retired Gurkhas. I deal with each of these below. The cost of equalising pensions for all retired Gurkhas “As part of the [GTACOS] Review, The Department is looking again at the pension position of Gurkhas back to1 July 1997 , when the Gurkhas first became a UK-based force. We remain of the view that the position of Gurkha veterans discharged prior to1 July 1997 remains exactly as it was when the judicial review [Purja in 2003] reached its conclusions.” (Official Report cols 93-94) The cost of equalising pensions for all retired Gurkhas 13. The main reason that MoD would not have agreed to give GOTT to all retired Gurkhas, rather than only those who retired on or after1 July 1997 , is because the cost would have been too great. A pre-1 July 1997 retiree would, of course, have been better off only if the terms of the GOTT had been improved to value all their service as equivalent to AFPS. This offer would then have had to be extended to the serving brigade for their service before1 July 1997 . The cost of giving year-for-year to the eligible group for all their service would have increased from around£150m to£320m (see paragraph 46 in JF1). Further, and depending on the assumptions made, for example how far back improved terms were offered, the cost of extending the GOTT in the way described for serving and retired Gurkhas would have run to many hundreds of millions of pounds. It should also be noted that the further back in time any approach is taken the more technically difficult it would be to construct something which is fair to any transferees. These retired Gurkhas would have been drawing their pension over many years. Providing a fair value option is likely to be significantly more complicated than the existing GOTT option which needed to consider only leavers since1 July 1997 .”
“So far as pay is concerned, for so long as they are in an analogous situation to a British soldier whilst they are serving in the United Kingdom or abroad outside Nepal, elementary fairness would suggest that they should receive the same treatment, including the same take home pay. They will be undertaking the same duties in the same circumstances as their British counterparts. Since the introduction of UA in 1997, the TACOS have recognised this. But the position of the ex British soldier and the ex Gurkha soldier on retirement is not analogous. While there will be a few exceptions, the former will have been born in the United Kingdom and will expect to retire in the United Kingdom. He may choose to retire to a more or a less expensive country, but in that respect he would be no different from any other United Kingdom pensioner. By contrast, the Gurkha, born in Nepal and a citizen of Nepal, will retire to Nepal. It would be wholly irrational to fail to have regard to the very different circumstances that exist in Nepal and Great Britain when making provision for pensions on retirement.”
“We are left, therefore, with Mr Blake's core argument that because Gurkhas and British soldiers live and die together in the field, there should be no distinction made between them as to the amenities and benefits of their service. [50]”
“56. Domestic legislation cannot, of course, override the UK's obligations under ECHR. In the final analysis the decision for this court is whether, the 1976 Act notwithstanding, it is unlawful to engage soldiers on two quite different bases, the consequence of which is that in various respects British soldiers enjoy certain advantages over the Nepalese nationals who comprise the Gurkha Brigade. 57. With that thought in mind let me return to Michalak question iii), or rather to Laws LJ's reformulation of that question in Carson: "Are the circumstances of X and Y so similar as to call (in the mind of a rational and fair-minded person) for a positive justification for the less favourable treatment of Y in comparison with X?" 58. If one asks this question in relation to British and Gurkha soldiers' respective pension entitlements I am in full agreement with Sullivan J's conclusion at paragraph 55 of his judgment (see paragraph 25 above). Indeed not only are Gurkhas, as the judge there observed, "leaving the United Kingdom and returning to Nepal, where their pensions will be paid, and conditions in Nepal are markedly different from those in the United Kingdom", but it must be borne in mind too that these pensions are generally payable from a much earlier age. Whether that consideration - that the Gurkhas' pensions become payable immediately after 15 years whereas British soldiers only receive theirs after 22 years or (in 83% of cases) at the age of 60 - is to be regarded as a) demonstrating that the two groups are not "in an analogous or relatively similar situation" or b) providing "reasonable or objective justification" for the distinction between their respective pension rates, or perhaps even c) suggesting that British soldiers are not after all enjoying "preferential treatment" (all these phrases being taken from Stubbings - see paragraph 43 above), seems to me a matter of choice and ultimately immaterial. 59. The question directly raised by article 14 is whether the Gurkhas' pension rights are "secured without discrimination on [the] ground [of] national … origin", which to my mind translates into the question whether, in regard to their pension rights, they have been unjustifiably less well treated than others because of their being Nepalese. 60. It can of course be said that it is only because they are Nepalese that the Gurkhas will be retiring to Nepal and living there more cheaply than their British counterparts. But I reject entirely the proposition that they are therefore to be regarded as unjustifiably less well treated on the ground of their nationality. It is, of course, only because they are Nepalese that they are recruited into the Gurkha Brigade in the first place. Nor am I impressed by Mr Blake's argument that because, say, an Irish or Jamaican (dual) national will be discharged from the British Army with a pension calculated without reference to wherever he may be intending to retire, so too should a Gurkha. I simply cannot recognise the two groups as being in "an analogous or relevantly similar situation" looking at the nature of the Gurkha Brigade as a whole - the basis and circumstances of the Gurkhas' recruitment, service and discharge.”
“The manner in which the treatment of the appellants under Gurkha TACOS differed from the treatment of non-Gurkha soldiers serving in the same Army - and the manner in which the characteristics of Gurkha soldiers relevant to terms and conditions of service differ from the characteristics of non-Gurkha soldiers - have been fully set out both by the judge and in the judgment of Lord Justice Simon Brown. It is unnecessary for me to rehearse those matters in any detail. It is enough to draw attention to the following: (i) Gurkha soldiers are recruited, exclusively, from Nepal, under arrangements to which the governments of Nepal and India have given approval; (ii) Gurkha soldiers are, invariably, discharged in Nepal at the end of their service, and have no right of abode in the United Kingdom; (iii) Gurkha soldiers will, almost invariably, complete 15 years service and retire on pension (payable with immediate effect) at or about the age of 35 years; (iv) there is an obvious, and recognised, need in those circumstances to foster and maintain links between Gurkha soldiers while in service and the country (Nepal) to which they will return on retirement; and (v) that need is enhanced by the wide social, economic and cultural differences between Nepal and the United Kingdom - and between Nepal and the other countries throughout the world in which Gurkha soldiers have been, or are likely to be, required to serve. Taking those matters into account I find it impossible to reach the conclusion that the characteristics of soldiers serving in Gurkha units in the British Army are so closely analogous to the characteristics of soldiers serving in non-Gurkha units in the same Army that the circumstances call for a positive justification for the different treatment, in relation to basic pay and pensions, for which Gurkha TACOS provide. Once it is appreciated that there are good reasons for the payment of an immediate pension to Gurkha soldiers after 15 years service – as, plainly, there are, given the fact that Gurkha soldiers will return to Nepal on completion of their service - rather than a deferred pension payable at age 60 on retirement after less than 22 years service, or an immediate pension only after 22 years service, it seems obvious that the amount of the immediate pension payable to Gurkha soldiers will differ from the immediate, or the deferred, pension payable to non-Gurkha soldiers. Further, once it is appreciated that there are good reasons for Gurkha soldiers to enjoy periods of extended home leave during service – as, plainly, there are, given the need to maintain the links with Nepal – it seems obvious that the amount of pay during those periods of extended leave will be different from the amount paid to non-Gurkha soldiers in respect of the substantially shorter periods of paid leave to which those soldiers are entitled. It is important to keep in mind that the difference in basic pay has practical effect only during periods of extended home leave, when no "universal addition" is payable. It follows that I am satisfied that, in relation to the challenge to basic pay and pensions, the judge was entitled to answer Michalak question (iii) in the negative. In relation to basic pay and pensions the judge was correct to reject a challenge based on article 14.”
"For my part, in company with all your Lordships, I prefer to keep formulation of the relevant issues in these cases as simple and non-technical as possible. Article 14 does not apply unless the alleged discrimination is in connection with a Convention right and on a ground stated in Article 14. If this prerequisite is satisfied, the essential question for the court is whether the alleged discrimination, that is, the difference in treatment of which complaint is made, can withstand scrutiny. Sometimes the answer to this question will be plain. There may be such an obvious, relevant difference between the claimant and those with whom he seeks to compare himself that their situations cannot be regarded as analogous. Sometimes, where the position is not so clear, a different approach is called for. Then the court's scrutiny may best be directed at considering whether the differentiation has a legitimate aim and whether the means chosen to achieve the aim is appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse impact."
"3.2 Four principles should govern public authorities' efforts to meet their duty to promote race equality: (a) promoting race equality is obligatory for all public authorities listed in schedule 1A of the Act. (b) Public authorities must meet the duty to promote race equality in all relevant functions. (c) The weight to be given to race equality should be proportionate to its relevance. (d) The elements of the duty are complementary (which means they are all necessary to meet the whole duty). 3.16 To assess the effects of a policy, or the way a function is being carried out, public authorities could ask themselves the following questions. a. Could the policy or the way the function is carried out have an adverse impact on equality of opportunity for some racial groups? In other words, does it put some racial groups at a disadvantage? b. Could the policy or the way the function is carried out have an adverse impact on relations between different racial groups? c. Is the adverse impact, if any, unavoidable? Could it be considered to be unlawful racial discrimination? Can it be justified by the aims and importance of the policy or function? Are there other ways in which the authority's aims can be achieved without causing an adverse impact on some racial groups? d. Could the adverse impact be reduced by taking particular measures? e. Is further research or consultation necessary? Would this research be proportionate to the importance of the policy or function? Is it likely to lead to a different outcome? … Arrangements for assessing, and consulting on, the likely impact of proposed policies 4.16 Public authorities must set out in their race equality scheme arrangements for assessing, and consulting on, the likely impact of their proposed policies on race equality (see 4.6). 4.17 Public authorities are expected to set out their arrangements for: a. assessing the likely impact their proposed policies will have, including their arrangements for collecting data; b. consulting groups that may be affected by the policies. 4.18 Public authorities may find that they can use the arrangements they already have in place to carry out the necessary assessments and consultations. Assessment 4.19 Assessing the likely impact of a proposed policy should help to identify whether that policy might have a different impact on some racial groups, and whether it will contribute to good race relations. The assessment may involve using: a. information that is already available; b. research findings; c. population data, including census findings; d. comparisons with similar policies in other authorities; e. survey results; f. ethnic data collected at different stages of a process (for example, when people apply for a service); g. one-off data-gathering exercises; or h. specially-commissioned research. Consultation 4.20 Public authorities already consult people in a number of different ways. However, an authority will raise confidence in its services and improve the way it develops policy if it uses clear consultation methods and explains them to its staff and to the public. 4.21 Public authorities could consult people through: a. consultation meeting; b. focus groups; c. reference groups; d. citizens’ juries; e. public scrutiny; or f. survey questionnaires. 4.22 Whichever consultation method they use, public authorities should try to make sure that: a. they use people’s views to shape their decision-making process; b. the exercise represents the views of those who are likely to be affected by the policy; c. the consultation method is suitable for both the topic and the groups involved; d. the exercise is in proportion to the effect that the policy is likely to have; e. the consultation’s aims are clearly explained; f. the consultation exercise is properly timetabled; g. the consultation exercise is monitored; and g.[sic] the consultation’s findings are published. 4.23 If the assessment or the consultation shows that the proposed policy is likely to have an adverse impact or harm race equality, the public authority will want to consider how it is going to meet the general duty to promote race equality. The authority might ask itself the following questions. a. If one of our policies leads to unlawful racial discrimination, can we find another way of meeting our aims? b. If one of our policies adversely affects people from certain racial groups, can we justify it because of its overall objectives? If we adapt the policy, could that compensate for any adverse effects? c. If the assessment or consultation exercise reveals that certain racial groups have different needs, can we meet these needs, either within the proposed policy or in some other way? d. Could the policy harm good race relations? e. Will changes to the policy be significant, and will we need fresh consultation?"
“It will be apparent from the evidence given above and in my earlier witness statements that the main driver leading to the GTACOS Review and the GOTT was the MoD’s wish to address issues of inequality between the Gurkhas and the wider Army. Thus the MoD considers that in arriving at the decisions now under challenge, due regard was had to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups, as required by section 71. However, the MoD did not undertake a formal equality and diversity impact assessment (EDIA) at the time of the Review. Whilst section 71 does not require such a formal assessment to be undertaken, the MoD has considered it appropriate, since the present litigation has arisen, to carry out an EDIA focussed on pension issues. I attach a copy of the formal assessment.”
“a systematic way of finding out whether a policy (or proposed policy) affects different racial groups differently. This may include obtaining and analysing data, and consulting people, including staff, on the policy.”
“8. During the development of the survey, AMCS and the Review Team concluded that due to the complexities of pension issues, meaningful responses on that subject were unlikely to be obtained through a multi-choice answer questionnaire. An external agency was therefore commissioned to conduct a series of focus groups specifically to find out the attitudes of Gurkhas towards pensions issues. The methodology used was to set out the likely changes to pensions in the future and what options were likely to be available and to explain the key differences between the Gurkha Pension Scheme (GPS) and the AFPS 1975 (AFPS 75) and 2005 (AFPS 05). 9. AFPS 05 was the preference amongst most Gurkhas with the higher monthly payouts and larger lump sums after the age of 60/65 being considered in the context of living and working in the UK after retirement. 10. Some of the more junior soldiers (LCpl and below), however, held to the view that for them the GPS was a better scheme, noting that in actuarial terms it was worth about the same for many junior ranks as the AFPS, and that it would be more beneficial to receive payment of pension at an earlier stage. 11. The most significant issue to arise was how past service credit from GPS to AFPS 05 would be treated with a clear preference for transfer to be done on a one for one basis. This is addressed in detail in Chapter 10.”
“The exception is the position of ex-Gurkhas who retired before 1997, although their position fell outside the scope of the Review.”