“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...”
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
“We will always carry out a criminal record check on anyone who applies for a licence. If you have a criminal record, it does not necessarily mean that you will not get a licence. However, if you do have any convictions, warnings, cautions or charges awaiting trial for offences we will make our decision according to: • Whether the offences are included in the list of offences between pages 55-65 • The classification of seriousness of the offences (the list between pages 55-65 classifies offences according to degrees of seriousness) • How recent the offences were You will not get a licence unless you have been free of the effects of a conviction, caution or warning for at least two years before your licence application or for at least five years where we consider the offence to be serious (subject to the limited exceptions listed in the section on Cautions and Warnings on page 44). Relevant offences include those involving violence, offensive weapons, drugs, sexual offences, serious criminal damage, theft and dishonesty. We also consider any offences under [the 2001 Act] to be serious. By ‘free of the effects of a conviction, caution or warning’ we mean that we will start counting the time elapsed from the end of the caution or warning, or from the end of the sentence or penalty as appropriate - not from the date when you were sentenced or when the offence or offences were committed. One example would be, if you have been convicted of an offence and spent any time in prison, the date for deciding whether the offence is still relevant for licensing purposes is the date the sentence would have ended. Even if you were released early we will still regard the offence as relevant up until the final date when the sentence would have ended.”
“(1) whether we as the appellate Court were wrong in law or acting in excess of jurisdiction to hold that we had the discretion to consider the merits of the matter in determining the appeal (2) whether [the SIA] is under a duty, as set out in the... criteria, to consider the relevance of any offence to an applicant’s fitness to hold a door supervisor’s licence.”
“By no stretch of the imagination can an offence for [sic] making a mistake about a court date for which a fine of£25 is imposed be regarded as serious dishonesty. The fact that such an offence is included in the automatic disqualification for five years is a nonsense.”
“Given that the criteria seeks [sic] to protect the public from people who have convictions for, inter alia, serious dishonest[y], we consider that it is wholly unreasonable for [the SIA] to refuse to grant the appellant a licence to work as a doorman based on the conviction he has.”
“The question for the opinion of the High Court is whether we as the appellate court were wrong in law or in excess of jurisdiction to hold that we had the discretion to consider the merits of this application in determining the appeal.”
“(a) Do I have, under s.11(5) of [the 2001 Act], jurisdiction to determine whether the denial of the licence in this case to the Appellants constitutes a breach of Article 6, 8, 1 First Protocol and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and if I do, is the denial of the licence to each Appellant incompatible with these Articles? (b) Do I have, under s.11(5) of the Act, jurisdiction to determine whether the Appellants should have a licence to be door supervisors if they are fit and proper persons to hold a licence, apart from their convictions? (c) Are the Appellants entitled to a licence on the ground that the Appellant Rahim’s conviction does not affect his honesty and the Appellant Bakr’s conviction was before he was subsequently authorised to act as a door supervisor by the City Council [this latter point, relating to Mr Bakr, must be a reference to the fact that he remained accredited as a door supervisor by the Birmingham City Council, under the old regime, until a date after his conviction]? (d) Is the decision of the SIA unlawful?”
“In determining whether or not to grant a licence the Authority shall apply the criteria for the time being applicable under section 7.”
“The general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a statutory discretion must not ‘shut his ears to an application’... What the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at all”
“49. I have taken pains to emphasise the precise nature of the claimants’ case. At the hearing of this application I expressly put to Mr Cragg that what I described as a more nuanced and less extreme attack on the Published Criteria might at first sight appear more credible. Such an attack would be more specifically directed at the particular offences listed in the Published Criteria. Consider, for example, Category – Firearms, which includes the offence undersection 2 of the Firearms Act 1968 of possessing a shotgun without a shotgun certificate. A person might have had a certificate for a long period and be of extremely good character both in relation to firearms and generally. On one occasion, perhaps distracted by a family bereavement or the like, he fails to renew the licence, is convicted under section 2 and receives a relatively light punishment. Such a person is automatically debarred for at least 5 years from applying for a licence to be a door supervisor. I can envisage that a claimant in that position might more credibly argue that to treat the simple conviction for that specific offence, without any examination of the circumstances and seriousness of the conviction, and without regard to other matters touching upon his suitability for holding a licence, would tend to defeat the purpose of the Act on the ground that it would automatically rule out persons who, on an objective and fully explored basis, were not in truth ‘serious criminals’ (cf. R v Nottingham CC ex p. Howitt [1999] COD 530). 50. My example is purely hypothetical, and I express no view as to the final merit of any such argument. However, I must make clear, particularly if this application were to be considered by a higher Court, that Mr Cragg did not advance any such argument and expressly disavowed, notwithstanding my reference to it, any intention to do so. His attack was a root-and-branch one of the nature that I have described: no offence was so serious that the Authority could treat it as an absolute bar to obtaining a licence.”
“The Magistrates’ Court is not bound by the decision of the Authority in circumstances where for example the claimant’s conviction (e.g. Rahim) was not in truth a serious criminal conviction or where the minor/conviction did not disable him from undertaking the doorman’s job on grounds of probity or competence: Nicholdsat [49].”
“In these circumstances, any automatic bar based solely on the conviction, however minor or without regard to extenuating circumstances, would be ultra-vires the purpose of the Act and clearly liable to be impugned on grounds of unreasonableness... or on grounds that the criteria runs counter to the policy and object of the Act...”
“... No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
“69. There must... be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. The means chosen to cure the social mischief must be appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse impact... 70. In approaching this issue, as noted in R v Johnstone[2003] UKHL 28 para 51, courts should have in mind that theirs is a reviewing role. Parliament is charged with the primary responsibility for deciding whether the means chosen to deal with a social problem are both necessary and appropriate. Assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the various legislative alternatives is primarily a matter for Parliament. The possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified: see the Rent Act case of Mellacher v Austria(1989) 12 EHRR 391 , 411, para 53. The court will reach a different conclusion from the legislature only when it is apparent that the legislature has attached insufficient importance to a person’s Convention right. The readiness of a court to depart from the views of the legislature depends upon the circumstances, one of which is the subject matter of the legislation. The more the legislation concerns matters of broad social policy, the less ready will be a court to intervene.”
“103 However much one may sympathise with the plight of these and other witnesses, we do not consider that article 8 is engaged even in these cases. The last 50 years have seen the destruction, for various reasons, of many people’s way of life in this country, often by deliberate decisions by the Government. The collapse of the heavy manufacturing and the coal-mining industries are just two cases in point. What tipped the scales in the Sidabras case 42 EHRR 104 was that the applicants were prohibited by a blanket ban on employment from a wide swathe of alternative employments. In Niemetz’s case 16 EHRR 97, once the applicants’ law office was treated as their home, the state’s intrusion undoubtedly showed want of respect for their privacy. In the sexual orientation cases the state shows disrespect for an applicant’s right to conduct personal relationships in private in the way he/she chooses. No such special factors apply to the present case. Even if the feared consequences do arise... they will not be caused by any lack of respect in article 8 terms for the claimants’ private or family life or for their homes. We do not consider that any question of respect for their private or family life or their homes comes into play.”