H (Family Adoption), Re [2026] EWFC 186 (B)

[2026] EWFC 186 (B)Case No ZE/26/25
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Date 19 June 2026
SITTING AT EAST LONDON
11 Westferry Circus
London E14 4HD
Before
Her Honour Judge Reardon
Between
Mr JApplicantMrs JRespondentsMRespondentFRespondentH, through her children’s guardian Olivia DaviesRespondent
Re H (Family Adoption)
The applicant and first respondent appeared in person for in personMr Pugh for second respondent motherMs Burley for third respondent fatherMr Littlewood for fourth respondent childHearing Hearing dates: 8, 9 and 19 June 2026
JudgmentThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.Introduction
[1]This judgment follows the final hearing of an application for an adoption order. The child – although she is now aged 18 – is H. H has lived with the applicant, who is her maternal uncle, since she was two years old.[2]The application is opposed by both birth parents. It is supported by H, by her children’s guardian, and by her maternal grandmother, Mrs J, who together with the applicant is her special guardian.[3]The hearing took place over two days. A substantial part of the first day was lost due to the absence of an interpreter. For that reason the evidence and submissions did not conclude until the afternoon of the second day of the hearing, and it was necessary for this judgment to be reserved. In the end there were some advantages to that: if the evidence had concluded when it was supposed to I would have felt under pressure to give judgment more or less immediately. As it was, I have had just over a week to reflect on the very difficult issues in this case and to come to a decision.[4]The applicant and Mrs J appeared in person. The other parties were represented. H attended the first day of the hearing, together with her children’s guardian Olivia Davies. She did not come on the second day, as she is currently in the middle of her A-level examinations and Ms Davies explained that she had found the first day very draining. She has, however, remained closely engaged with the hearing and has provided ongoing instructions to her counsel.

Background

[5]H’s mother, M, is from a British Indian family. Her father, F, is British Bangladeshi. The maternal family is Hindu but the mother converted to Islam before she married the father, who is himself Muslim. They married in 2005 and divorced in 2015. H is their second child. Her older full sibling, K, is now aged 20.[6]Sadly both parents have a history of drug misuse. In the mother’s case this dates back to her teenage years, with periods of abstinence and relapse. She is currently engaging with drug treatment services and is prescribed methadone.[7]The mother had an older child before she met the father. He was removed from her care and subsequently adopted. She also has a younger child, born in 2018, who has also been made the subject of a placement order and later adopted.[8]The father successfully completed drug rehabilitation in or around 2014 and has been abstinent for over 10 years. He has remarried and has two younger children of primary school age.[9]H was known to the local authority before birth due to parental substance misuse and domestic abuse. She remained in her parents’ care until December 2010 when she was removed under police protection, and placed with her maternal uncle and grandmother. At around the same time, I believe, her older brother K went to live with a member of the paternal family. A special guardianship order was subsequently made for him.[10]H’s placement in the maternal family home was not initially supported by any court order, public or private, and was not completely stable. Her main carer at that stage was Mrs J, the applicant being just 21 years old. Also living in the home was H’s aunt, who has Down’s Syndrome and significant care needs. Mrs J struggled to put in place boundaries around H’s relationships with her parents and H moved between the households, spending periods in her parents’ unsupervised care. The local authority became concerned, and H spent a couple of weeks in foster care (I assume with consent, as no court application seems to have been made) before returning to the maternal family home.[11]In 2014 the applicant, together with his mother Mrs J, applied for a special guardianship order, and this order was made in November 2014 when H was six years old. The parents opposed the application. At that time M was still using drugs and F was undergoing treatment.[12]The expectation when the special guardianship order was made was that H would have fortnightly contact with her parents. Her contact with her mother continued until 2016 when it broke down. The maternal family’s case is that this happened because M was coming to the home late at night, asking for money to buy drugs, and the contact arrangements were becoming disruptive. F’s contact ceased in 2017, for reasons that are less clear.[13]In July 2019 H's uncle and grandmother both applied to adopt her. They were informed at an early stage that the application could not be made jointly as they were not a couple. The applicant withdrew, and for a period the application proceeded as a sole application by Mrs J. In September 2020 Mrs J withdrew the application after an Annexe A report did not support it.[14]The present application was issued by the applicant in June 2025. H was joined as a party and an Annexe A report directed.[15]During the course of these proceedings, in July 2025, a one-off contact took place between H and each parent, arranged with the help of the local authority at the applicant’s (and H’s) request. No further contact has taken place since then.

The law

[16]This is an application by a sole adopter under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 51. The requirements in s 49 as to domicile/ habitual residence are met.[17]Under s 47(9), provided that the application is issued before a child reaches 18, the court may make an order thereafter provided the young person has not reached the age of 19.[18]Under s 47, the consent of all of those with parental responsibility is required unless dispensed with by the court. The court may dispense with consent under s 52(1) if the welfare of the child requires it.[19]The child’s welfare throughout her life is the court’s paramount consideration. The court will consider the factors in the welfare checklist in ACA 2002, s 1(4) although as I will explain, because H is now an adult some of those factors are less relevant than others.[20]Adoption is a profound and transformative order with lifelong consequences. The court must accordingly be satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate: see Re B [2013] UKSC 33. This requires a balancing exercise in which the advantages and disadvantages of the realistic options are weighed side by side: Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.[21]I also bear in mind, however, the authorities which suggest that the degree of interference with Article 8 rights, and therefore the degree of justification needed, is lower where the order reflects an established family reality. In the leading case on this point, Re P (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1174, McFarlane LJ said:
“46. In an adoption application the key to the approach both to evaluating the needs of a child’s welfare throughout his or her life and to dispensing with parental consent is proportionality. The strong statements made by the Justices of the Supreme Court in Re B and taken up by judges of the Court of Appeal in subsequent decisions to the effect that adoption will be justified only where ‘nothing else will do’ are made in the context of an adoption being imposed upon a family against the wishes of the child’s parents and where the adoption will totally remove the child from any future contact with, or legal relationship with, any of his natural relatives.Although the statutory provisions applicable to such an adoption (in particular ACA 2002, s 1 regarding welfare and s 52 regarding consent) apply in precisely the same terms to a step-parent adoption, the manner in which those provisions fall to be applied may differ and will depend upon the facts of each case and the judicial assessment of proportionality. 47. By way of example, in a child protection case where it is clear that rehabilitation to the parents is not compatible with their child’s welfare, the court may be faced with a choice between adoption by total strangers selected by the local authority acting as an adoption agency or adoption by other family members. There is a qualitative difference between these two options in terms of the degree to which the outcome will interfere with the ECHR, Art 8 rights to family life of the child and his parents; adoption by strangers being at the extreme end of the spectrum of interference and adoption by a family member being at a less extreme point on the scale. The former option is only justified when ‘nothing else will do’, whereas the latter option, which involves a lower degree of interference, may be more readily justified.”
[22]He went on to say:
“62. The reason why context is important is that, in each case, it is necessary to evaluate the proportionality of the intervention in family life that is being proposed. For the child, and for the child’s welfare throughout his life, there will be a qualitative difference between adoption by strangers, with no continuing contact or legal relationship with any member of the birth family, on the one hand, and an adoption order which simply reflects in legal terms the reality in which the child’s family life and relationships have been conducted for some significant time. In ECHR terms, no adoption order will be justified in terms of its interference with family life rights unless it is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’, but in assessing those factors the degree to which there is an interference will be relevant. […] 66. … In assessing proportionality it is surely essential that some evaluation is undertaken of the scale of what is being lost by the making of an adoption order. On the facts of this case, what is to be lost is of a modest order. This father and daughter relationship exists as a matter of law, but it has had neither life nor reality in it for most of A’s life and there is no indication that that situation will change in the years to come.”

The evidence

[23]The written evidence in this case includes witness statements from the applicant, M and F; the Annexe A report; the guardian’s report; and key documents from the earlier special guardianship and adoption proceedings. Mrs J, who was H’s special guardian until that order expired on her 18th birthday, and is therefore an automatic respondent to these proceedings, did not file a witness statement but made her support for the application clear in her discussions with the adoption social worker and H’s guardian.[24]I heard oral evidence from Penny Chalmers, the author of the Annexe A report, the applicant, the parents, and the children’s guardian Olivia Davies.

The professional witnesses

[25]The evidence of both Ms Chalmers and Ms Davies was thoughtful, balanced and clear. I am very grateful to both for the very high standard of analysis contained in their reports and oral evidence. They could not have given more care and attention to this case.[26]The application is supported by both professional witnesses. However neither regarded it as straightforward. In the Annexe A report Ms Chalmers identified the complicating factors as being the history of disputes between the adults, the division within the family and H’s lost relationship with her parents. As she pointed out, if this were an adoption following a placement order the local authority would have ensured that the prospective adopters were thoroughly trained and provided with an understanding of the importance, for an adopted child’s sense of identity, of supporting birth parent relationships, through contact if that is safe. Ms Chalmers referred to the evidence filed in the 2019 adoption proceedings, including concerns expressed in the Annexe A report and the then guardian’s analysis about the ability of the maternal family to portray the parents in a positive light, and their limited support for H’s cultural and religious heritage on her paternal side. She also referred to evidence that suggested that at times in past, although less so recently, the applicant has sought to exert control over H’s relationships with her parents.[27]It transpired at the outset of Ms Chalmers’ evidence that she had not been able to access the full bundle filed in these proceedings. I am confident that this did not affect her evidence. The local authority is not a party to these proceedings and Ms Chalmers’ involvement, as one would expect of an adoption social worker, was limited to the preparation of the Annexe A report in August last year; she has had no recent contact with family members or involvement with the case. I bear that in mind when evaluating her evidence.[28]In her oral evidence Ms Chalmers said that she was worried about H’s evident and strong loyalty to her uncle and her apparent struggles to feel a similar sense of loyalty and love for her parents. In Ms Chalmers’ view that was unusual: most adopted children, if carefully supported, can feel love and loyalty towards both their birth parents and their adoptive parents. Ms Chalmers thought that H might in future regret the lost opportunities to maintain a relationship with her birth parents: as she put it, H may regret that her parents were “turned away”.[29]Nevertheless Ms Chalmers formed the view, taking all factors into account, that H’s welfare would best be served by the making of the order. She pointed out that H’s potential future regret about the loss of her parents would be a relevant factor whether or not the adoption order is made: in this as in other respects, and order will not change what happens on the ground. She said that, having thought about it a lot, she thought that if H really wanted the adoption to go ahead her wishes should be respected and it would be more harmful to her if the order was refused.[30]Ms Davies, H’s guardian, described the decision as finely balanced. In her written report she had struggled to identify any factors pointing away from adoption in the welfare evaluation. She pointed out that many factors that would ordinarily carry weight in an adoption application were not relevant, and that an adoption would make no difference to H’s ability to form or maintain relationships with any family members in future. H’s wishes and feelings were the stand-out welfare factor.[31]In her oral evidence Ms Davies said that she had reviewed her recommendation several times since writing her report, and had discussed the case with others in Cafcass. She remained of the view that the order should be granted. She explained that she gave a high priority to H's autonomy, and thought that it was important for the court to validate what was, after all, H's own life history and experience. She acknowledged Ms Chalmers’ view that the maternal family could have done more to keep H’s relationships with her parents alive, but said that it was also important to acknowledge the background of really serious safeguarding concerns, and that for much of H's childhood her special guardians would have been in receipt of strong professional advice that they needed to protect her against the risks posed by her parents. She did not think that H had been alienated from her parents: there was balance in the way she spoke about her uncle, and Ms Davies did not pick up any sense that she felt controlled by him.[32]Ms Davies has spent considerable time discussing the application with H, and was able to convey her wishes and feelings powerfully to the court. She said that H felt that her parents had always been against her living with her uncle. They had not, in her mind, always been honest about their own problems. If she had felt that there was a level of acceptance by them of her lived reality, and if she had been better protected by them, things might have been different. Ms Davies said that she thought that if the adoption order were made it might reduce H’s resistance to her parents, by validating her experiences. She would feel that she had been listened to.

The family members

[33]There are many disputed issues that form part of the background to this case, and much of the cross examination of the lay parties concerned aspects off the background. I have thought carefully about the extent to which it is necessary to make findings about those issues. This application is unusual, in that H is now an adult. It is no longer necessary to consider issues of safeguarding or parenting capacity. For that reason any fact-finding exercise will require a light touch approach. It is an also undoubtedly the case that there is some truth in all perspectives.[34]It is, however, necessary to express some views about how the adults have acted over the course of H’s childhood, because that bears on her lifelong welfare which is the focus of my decision-making.[35]I do not consider that the applicant or Mrs J can reasonably be criticised for stopping contact between H and her mother in 2016. The evidence makes it clear that M’s actions at that time were causing significant disruption, both in the context of the contact arrangements and on the occasions when M turned up unexpectedly at the family home. With the background of risk in mind, and especially considering the mistakes the family had made during the early period of H’s placement, which had led to a period in care, it was obviously necessary for the applicant and Mrs J to put in place robust boundaries.[36]F’s contact ceased in 2017, after he returned from a trip to Bangladesh. It seems that the mother told him that both parents had been barred from going to the family home. That information was not accurate, but the father did not take any steps to find out for himself where the truth lay. He said that he attempted to contact the applicant and/ or Mrs J via social media, but neither used it as a primary form of communication; and that he tried to contact the local authority but they did not respond. The father’s own evidence suggested that the efforts he made to remain in contact with his daughter were very limited.[37]After that, the adoption proceedings in 2019/ 2020 were an opportunity, ultimately missed, to review the parents’ health and presentation and the safety of contact arrangements. The Annexe A report within those proceedings suggests that the applicant could have been more proactive in promoting H’s relationship with her birth parents, and certainly he did not go out of his way to re-establish contact with either. However there is no real indication, again, that either parent was actively seeking contact: neither applied for a contact order, although there is a recital in the order made in September 2020 that there was a possibility that either might do so.[38]I bear in mind that this has always been a family placement, with very limited local authority support. It is, in my judgement, understandable that the applicant prioritised H’s stability. Ms Davies observed during her evidence that special guardianship carers can often face criticism from both directions, in that they may be accused on the one hand of allowing too much contact (as the applicant and Mrs J were in the first few years of the placement), and on the other of failing to promote the birth parent relationship.[39]Within these proceedings both parents, understandably, sought to emphasise the changes they have made since H’s removal from their care. In the father’s case, of course, there is solid evidence of his success in addressing his addiction and turning his life around. Despite that, the written and oral evidence of both parents suggested a profound lack of understanding of the impact their past behaviour has had on H.[40]When some of H's early experiences were put to her, M said that H did not witness what she says she did, and that she was being brain-washed:
“what she's been told is a load of lies”
. F’s evidence was similar. I was particularly troubled that when he was asked if he thought the applicant had done anything positive for H he said no, nothing “other than putting the wrong information into her head”.[41]It is necessary to make it clear that I do not find the parents’ complaints about the applicant to be well-founded. The fundamental reality in this case is that both parents were unable to care for H because when she was born they were both suffering from a serious drug addiction, and she was harmed. As Ms Davies pointed out, H’s childhood could have followed a very different trajectory and her placement with her uncle, who has sacrificed a great deal to care for her, meant that she avoided both a childhood characterised by abuse and neglect and a childhood in care. If her parents want to improve their relationship with her in future it is essential that they accept and take responsibility for that.[42]For those reasons, it does not seem to me that H’s understanding of her history and the actions of her family members is significantly, or at all, distorted. H has set out that understanding in a letter to me. The following extracts are particularly powerful:
“Throughout my life, I never truly felt what “home” meant until I lived with [the applicant]. He has shown me love, safety, stability, and the unwavering support that I believe every child deserves. Where others left gaps, he filled them without hesitation. From teaching me how to speak as a toddler to guiding me now as I step into adulthood, [the applicant] has stood by me through every challenge and triumph. He is not just a parental figure; he is the foundation of the life I have built and am continuing to build.” “In contrast, my biological parents have not been present, emotionally, physically, or mentally. My childhood was surrounded by arguments, instability, and trauma that no child should have to endure. My mother struggled, and continues to struggle, with substance abuse. I had constant weekly visits with my mother which used to be my favorite day of the week only for me to discover she only used seeing me as an excuse to take money from my grandma. Despite trying to stay connected to her, even visiting her multiple times in rehab across the country, I eventually had to make the heartbreaking decision to cut contact for my own mental wellbeing. I was not persuaded by anyone to do so. It was my own choice, and it was one of the most painful yet necessary decisions I’ve ever made. She could not be the parent I needed, no matter how much I hoped she might change.” “My biological father chose not to be in my life, I have not seen him since 2014. His absence shaped much of my childhood, but it’s the lies and excuses that have hurt the most. He claims [the applicant] cut off contact, but the truth is, he simply moved on, and that’s fine. But that choice should not stop me from moving forward in my life.” “[The applicant] is my real dad in every way that counts. I am proud of the man he is and of the father he has become. I love him deeply, and I know without doubt that he loves me just as much. I am so proud of how much he has changed and become the best parent for me, he has shown me that if you truly love someone, especially your child, you are capable and willing to change. There is no one else I would want to call “Dad,” legally or otherwise.”
[43]H ends her letter by thanking me “for taking the time to read my letter and to hear my voice”.

Welfare evaluation

[44]I remind myself that my paramount consideration is H’s welfare throughout her life.[45]H is now a fully autonomous adult. Many of the factors ordinarily relevant in an adoption application carry little or no weight. A feature of this application is that whether or not an adoption order is made, there will be no effect on H’s day to day life. Parental capacity and decision-making is irrelevant, because nobody in future will be exercising parental responsibility. H is free to travel, to change her name, and to follow any religion she likes (as it happens, she is firmly non-religious). The order will not change her home or her environment, and although the applicant will undoubtedly provide her with invaluable support indefinitely and far into the future, whether or not an order is made, she does not require care and parenting in the way that a child does. Similarly, although H’s mother, in particularly, may exhibit risky behaviours if she relapses into drug use, H is now an adult and able to protect herself: an adoption order will make no difference to her ability to do so.[46]H is a bright, articulate, thoughtful and polite young woman. She has thrived throughout her education, and is now doing A-levels. She has offers from universities which she is in the process of considering. She has ambitions and hopes for the future, and a positive and optimistic outlook. None of these things, in the light of the history, should be taken for granted.[47]I have already set out key passages from H’s letter, in which she sets out her wishes and feelings in her own words. I have received those wishes and feelings also via Ms Davies, who has got to know her well and explored and tested her views over several months. H has a strong desire to be adopted by the applicant so that she can know that he is legally, as well as psychologically and emotionally, her Dad. She has held that as a settled view for at least the last few years.[48]H’s parents believe that her views have been influenced by the applicant. Again Ms Davies gave helpful evidence on this issue. She pointed out that a degree of influence is normal and natural within a family: people who live together and love each other influence each other. However she was clear that H was not unduly influenced by the applicant: she was, for example, able to describe her uncle’s weaknesses as well as his strengths and to express disagreement with him. Importantly, as Ms Davies sets out in her report and I have found, H’s views are grounded in her own direct experiences.[49]H’s wishes and feelings are strongly held. Although not entirely black and white, there is perhaps a degree of one-sidedness. She has described a wish to be “emancipated” from her parents. That is a strong word. It is not impossible that her views may develop further during the course of her adult life, and that she may soften towards one or both of her parents in future. Ms Davies thought there was a real possibility that H may seek, in time, to re-establish a relationship with her mother.[50]The family dynamics in this case are complex. The relationships that matter to H are, primarily, her relationships with her uncle and grandmother who have brought her up, and with other members of the maternal wider family. She has recently connected with her brother, K, and may seek to develop that relationship. She has no existing relationships with members of her paternal family, including her younger siblings.[51]Adoption will change H’s paternity and leave her with no legal mother; the person who is now her mother will become her aunt. An adoption will create less distortion in this case than in some others, because it does not cross the generations (and so, for example, H’s grandmother will remain her grandmother). But she will be legally cut off from her paternal family, and her legal relationships not only with her birth father but with the other members of his family, including her siblings, will be severed. These relationships have the potential to become more significant for H later in life and I would be surprised if she were to choose never to know her younger paternal half-siblings. However I agree with Ms Chalmers and Ms Davies that it is difficult to see how the making or refusal of an adoption order would be likely, in real terms, to affect the prospects of these relationships developing in future.[52]Alongside H’s wishes and feelings, and closely linked, the main welfare factor in this case is her psychological and emotional wellbeing, both now and in the longer term. H’s early life experiences, and the fact that her uncle, as she sees it, “saved her”, are settled features of her life story and her understanding of herself. These are unlikely to change, and will resonate for H throughout the rest of her life. No one else, not even her family and certainly not me, has the direct knowledge of what those experiences have meant to her. What is clear, however, is that H’s experiences have left her with a profound craving for a legal endorsement of her lived reality. If that is denied her, she is likely to experience this as a loss and there will be an enduring psychological impact.[53]In the long term, the consequences of each decision for H’s welfare are impossible to assess with any certainty. If an adoption order is made and H comes to develop a different perspective in future, perhaps one which is a bit more rounded in terms of her family background and the actions of her parents, she may view her “emancipation” and the loss of a legal relationship with them in a different light and the adoption may be something she comes to regret. If an order is not made, she will lose forever the chance of aligning her legal identity with the reality of her life to date, and the man whom she relates to as her father will never become her legal parent; assuming her views remain as they are now, this may leave her with a lifelong sense of instability and loss. Both of these are possible outcomes.

Decision

[54]Adoption is a transformative and irrevocable order. The Article 8 rights of all family members are engaged, to differing degrees. Under domestic and international law, where those rights conflict it is H’s rights, seen through the lens of welfare, which prevail.[55]The concept of proportionality is central to any adoption application. Although on the authorities the threshold for an order is lower in circumstances such as these, where the adoption will reflect the reality of the child’s existing family life, the order must nevertheless be justified. The court cannot dispense with the parents’ consent to adoption unless the child’s welfare requires it.[56]On behalf of M Mr Pugh says that adoption cannot be justified in this case, because it is not necessary to make the order to meet H’s needs and protect her from harm. He argues that the special guardianship order, considered by the court in both 2014 and 2020 to be a proportionate response, has served its purpose very successfully. He points out, and I accept, that it is very unlikely that the court would have made an adoption order if asked to do so in 2014 when it was first considering the legal framework under which H was going to grow up. In those circumstances, Mr Pugh asks rhetorically, what possible justification could there be for severing H’s legal relationship with her parents now? It is not enough, when the law requires a positive justification, to say simply that there is no good reason not to make the order.[57]This is not a case where there is a long list of advantages and disadvantages to be weighed. H’s day to day life will not change as a result of this decision. The long-term consequences, in terms of her psychological wellbeing, are difficult to predict and she may come to regret either outcome.[58]Like Ms Davies, I see this case as finely balanced. I have, however, concluded that H’s welfare requires that an adoption order is made. I reach that decision for the following reasons.[59]The law allows capacitous adults a wide freedom to choose how they live their lives. H will make many decisions over the course of her life. Some of them she will regret, some not; some will be wise, and some unwise. Her decisions will have a variety of consequences. That does not mean that H’s free choice should replace the judicial evaluation of her welfare, but it does mean that the court will give significant weight, within the welfare evaluation, to her wishes and feelings, as the views of an autonomous adult about a decision that will affect her more than anyone else.[60]In later life, H may come to regret her decision to press for an adoption order. But she may also feel loss if the order is not made. The balance tips, for me, because in the former case H will at least be able to say that this was her decision, and not one that was imposed on her. There is a significant value in the court respecting the autonomy of a young person who has experienced loss and disruption. The consistent messages that the Family Justice System receives from children who have been the subject of proceedings is that their voices need to be heard. In her letter and through her guardian and legal team H has made that very clear to me.[61]For those reasons, there is a need for an adoption order now that I accept was not present when the court considered H’s living arrangements in 2014 and 2020. I make that order, dispensing with the birth parents’ consent on the grounds that H’s welfare requires me to do so.