S v B [2026] EWFC 139 (B)

[2026] EWFC 139 (B)Case No FD24P00331IN THE FAMILY COURT AT WEST LONDONWest London Family CourtGloucester House, 4 Duke Green Avenue,Feltham, TW14 0LRDate 1 June 2026
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILLANS
Between
SApplicantBRespondent
The applicant acted as a litigant in person for in personJanet Bazley KC and Olivia Magennis (instructed by Goodman Ray Solicitors) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 11-12 & 14 May 2026
JUDGMENT No.2 (WELFARE)HHJ WILLANS:

Introduction

[1]This judgment is concerned with A. She was born on [ ] and is aged 4 years.[2]On 22 August 2025 I handed down judgment following a fact-finding hearing in this case. This is reported anonymously as Re A (A Child) (Fact Finding Hearing) [2025] EWFC 280 (B). That judgment should be read alongside that judgment which it directly informs. I do not intend to repeat matters set out within that judgment.[3]I now turn to resolve the welfare issues in the case.[4]The primary dispute between the parties relates to a s13 Children Act 1989 application made by the respondent mother, B, in which she seeks permission to permanently remove A from the jurisdiction with the intention of returning to live in her native country of XX. As a consequence, I have approached her as being the chief applicant at this hearing. Her application cuts directly across the related application made by the applicant father, S for child arrangements.[5]In addition to the relocation B seeks the following additional orders: i) For permission to apply without the father’s consent for the issuing of an Argentinian passport for A and related national identification documents ii) For a change of surname for A to A [ ] to reflect both sides of her heritage iii) For primary decision making with respect to A if she relocates.[6]B argues contact following relocation should be limited to indirect contact in the first instance with development over time to include direct contact. I will explain S’s position on contact later.[7]S commenced the proceedings seeking various orders. At final hearing he argued for a shared care lives with order under which A remained in this jurisdiction and with a stepped progression over time towards A spending alternate weekends and holiday periods in his care.[8]To help me decide these issues I have had regard to the three hearing bundles supplemented by some limited additional documents filed during the hearing. I have also considered with care the live evidence of both parents, ES (ISW) and HJ (Consultant Forensic Psychologist). The parties have permission in accordance with the rules to provide this judgment to the experts. It is important judgments are shared with experts so that they can understand how the Court has considered and applied their work. Finally, I have regard to the submission made on behalf of B and directly by S.[9]The hearing proceeded over three days and I reserved judgment. During the hearing I applied participation directions largely in accordance with those applied during the fact-finding hearing. In contrast to the fact-finding S acted in person. At an earlier hearing he confirmed he would be represented for the purposes of cross examination of B. On that basis a QLR was not appointed. However, shortly before the hearing S confirmed he would not be instructing any representative. In those circumstances I asked questions of B on his behalf and at his request.

The Background and Procedural History

[10]I will not repeat the full background to the case which is comprehensively detailed within the fact-finding hearing judgment. I set out my findings below. In brief summary the parties were in a relationship between late 2020/early 2021 and July 2024. They met in ZZ and were engaged in a relatively short relationship before B fell pregnant. The parties came to this country for the birth of A before returning to ZZ. They then remained there for a period before returning to this country with B and A living in the home of the paternal grandmother. The relationship ended when B fled the family home alleging domestic abuse. My fact-finding judgment fully details extensive findings made against S (and the grandmother) but also allegations made by S against B which were not proven.[11]The ISW was identified in advance of the fact-finding to avoid delay. Unfortunately delays arose in reporting as additional evidence was gathered including an autism assessment of A which was considered (by the ISW) to be important in investigating welfare issues. This in part led to the vacation of an earlier final hearing listing in December 2025. Close to the final hearing I approved the instruction of HJ to report on B’s mental health condition. As part of the ISW assessment I directed contact to be supervised and observed. Initially this timeline was contained but with delay in provision of the ISW report I heard argument for extended contact pending the final hearing. I ordered the same and S has been having direct supervised contact with A on a fortnightly basis during the later stages of the proceedings.

The Findings Made

[12]The findings made are as follows:(i) In August 2022 to February 2024 on at least three occasions S has physically abused B: - (a) In August 2022 S broke B’s computer equipment and physically assaulted her by holding by her neck against the wall. During the assault the paternal grandmother was present but did not intervene. B was physically hurt and shocked. (b) In December 2022 S forcibly pushed B onto the sofa and, in the course of the assault, struck her face. The paternal grandmother was present but did not intervene. B was in pain and distressed. (c) In February 2024 S lost his temper and was verbally abusive to B. He pushed B over a stair gate and caused bruising to her legs and then slapped her face causing marking to her face. B was significantly distressed. On each occasion S excused his behaviour by deflecting responsibility onto B. The paternal grandmother has joined S in maintaining a false account of what took place. A was present in the home on each occasion.(ii) 11/12 April 2023: On this occasion S was verbally abusive in a deeply unpleasant and demeaning/controlling manner. No fault or error on the part of B could possibly explain or justify this.(iii) In Summer 2023: S was aggressive, abusive, and threatening to B in a contained space (a car) with a third-party employee present. This was a highly intimidating situation for B and was significantly aggravated by the presence ofa. A.(iv) On 11 July 2024: whilst B was staying with A at the paternal grandmother’s home in London, the paternal grandmother assaulted B by hitting her with a closed fist and calling her a ‘piece of shit’ and a ‘whore’. A was in B’s arms and was crying. The mother was very frightened and fled from the house with A but later returned, being driven back by S’s sister.(v) Later that day, the paternal grandmother threatened to kill B, saying “I will kill you and I will keep your daughter”. The paternal grandmother also made a motion of drawing her finger across her own throat by way of emphasis. This occurred in A’s presence. These events caused B to inform S she would leave the paternal grandmother’s home, taking A, to ensure their safety. S responded that B could leave if she wished but was not permitted to take A.(vi) In April 2022: the paternal grandmother sought to secretly obtain information about B from her friend, a natural consequence of which was that B became isolated from her only friend in ZZ.(vii) In general S was significantly controlling and abusive in his relationship withb. B. Paternal family members, particularly the paternal grandmother, were also involved, in circumstances in which B was significantly isolated. Matters were poor in ZZ but worsened significantly once B came to London with A in Summer 2024.(viii) A was present during most of the abusive behaviour towards B and has been emotionally harmed as a result of witnessing it.

The relevant legal principles

[13]I am making decisions about the upbringing of A. As a result, her welfare is paramount. I will in due course assess this through the welfare checklist. The law continues to hold as a presumption that a child will benefit from a continuing relationship with both parents unless the contrary is shown to be the case.[14]To the extent issues of fact-finding arise in this judgment they remain to be resolved in line with the detailed case law set out within the fact-finding judgment.[15]The relevant law pertaining to relocation is succinctly summarised by Cobb LJ.in Re O (Domestic Abuse: International Relocation) [2025] EWCA Civ 888: (80) An application for permanent leave to remove…is a private law application in respect of which the indisputable “and only authentic” test is that set out in section 1(1) CA 1989; the child’s welfare is paramount, and the evaluation of where the child’s interests truly lie is to be determined …having regard to the ‘welfare checklist’ in section 1(3) CA 1989… (81) There is no presumption in favour of the applicant parent in a case which is governed by section 1 CA 1989. The circumstances in which these difficult decisions are made vary infinitely and the judge in each case must be free to weigh up the individual factors, and make whatever decision he or she considers to be in the best interests of the child… (82) While section 1(2A) CA 1989…does not formally apply to an application under section 13 CA 1989, there is no doubt that its provision generally heightens the court’s scrutiny of the proposed arrangements on an application for permanent international relocation. Notably…section 1(2A) Re Simon (Proposed Relocation) CA 1989 expressly requires the court to consider whether a “contrary” picture is “shown”, which would indicate that involvement of each parent in the child’s life (in the manner proposed or at all) will not in fact “further the child’s welfare”. (83) …For over a decade, there has been no, or no material, judicial annotation of this straightforward approach. As it happens, this approach now accords fully (in a way which it did not at the time of its creation) with the principles of the Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation (2010) to which the courts of England and Wales, through Thorpe LJ, subscribed fifteen years ago. (84) Borrowing the philosophy from other areas of child law…it is now widely accepted to be important for a judge determining a relocation application to undertake “a global, holistic evaluation” of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare. In reality, this is “no more than shorthand for the overall, comprehensive analysis of a child’s welfare seen as a whole, having regard in particular to the circumstances set out in the relevant welfare checklist… (85) One area where there is less clarity is whether, and if so how, the court should apply a proportionality evaluation in the determination of an application for permanent international relocation….. (86) In Re C (Internal relocation), Black LJ expressed the view that the welfare principles enshrined in domestic law (i.e., section 1(1) and 1(3) of the CA 1989) were entirely compatible with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and observed that international or internal relocation cases were approached in a way which was “broadly in line with what is expected by the European court”…she rejected counsel’s submission that the welfare evaluation should then be “subjected to a cross-check by considering whether such interference with the Article 8 rights of the parties as it involves is proportionate.” She added: … I am afraid that there also seems to me to be a real danger of the parties and the court getting so tangled up in the strands of the two separate exercises that they lose sight of what really matters for the child. All in all, therefore, in my view, matters should be approached as an analysis of the best interests of the child, whether the relocation is internal or external. Given the potential for the impact of the decision on the parents to affect the child as well, this necessarily involves a careful examination of the parents’ wishes and their interests”. (87) …Vos LJ…reinforced the point, observing that the ‘left behind’ parent will always be able, in some measure, to pray in aid their Article 8 ECHR rights necessitating a consideration of the proportionality of any proposed interference with those rights; he added that “that consideration should be an essential part of the balancing exercise itself and should not be undertaken separately so as to disrupt a joined up decision-making process”[16]Having made findings of domestic abuse I must assess any proposed contact arrangements through the prism of the Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 12J §§35-37: 35 When deciding the issue of child arrangements, the court should ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm and will be in the best interests of the child. 36(1) In the light of- (a) any findings of fact, (b) admissions; or (c) domestic abuse having otherwise been established, the court should apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist with reference to the domestic abuse which has occurred and any expert risk assessment obtained.(2) In particular, the court should in every case consider any harm- (a) which the child as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse; and (b) which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering, if a child arrangements order is made.(3) The court should make an order for contact only if it is satisfied- (a) that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact; and (b) that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent. 37 In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider – (a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living; (b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents; (c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent; (d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and (e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.

My impression of the witnesses

[17]HJ is a highly experienced clinician. Her CV is a testament to this. She gave her evidence in a fair and balanced manner. She answered all questions put to her with care and fully. There was no evasion, deflection or dogmatism on her part. A significant part of the questioning of her by S (which was done with skill and appropriate courtesy) went to the process of analysis. I felt she took care to explain the logic of the assessment process in a helpful manner. Whilst I may disagree with her conclusions, as I am entitled to do, it would not be as a consequence of the approach she brought to her assessment and the giving of evidence. S’s apparent challenge to her independence entirely missed the mark.[18]ES is also highly experienced in the field of child welfare. At a point when he was represented it was S who advocated for her particular skillset. I found her to be a careful and cautious witness. My first attempt at a final hearing was derailed by her support for the need for an autistic assessment of the child. At the time this was supported by both parents and I agreed the same with a degree of reticence. With hindsight it has not had the central role that might have justified the delay it caused. Her report is full and reasoned and she has shown a willingness to modify her thinking as the evidence changes. This is expected of all witnesses but particularly professional witnesses. When answering questions, she was clear and gave reasoned responses. I found her a helpful and professional witness.[19]B gave relatively short evidence given the list of questions prepared by S, even supplemented by associated questions from me, did not extend beyond 30 minutes. She was emotional in a manner consistent with the expert evidence and my findings. But as before I found her an essentially honest witness although I am very conscious as to the potential for her to shape her evidence (consciously or otherwise) to obtain the outcome she seeks.[20]S had the challenge of representing himself. This is always a difficult task as it puts the litigant on show throughout the hearing and provides no filter to protect their feelings and attitudes from the Court. This means that my assessment covers not only the evidence given but also the questioning process. Bearing this in mind he was courteous and appropriate in his manner albeit at times I sensed his emotions fraying. This is to be expected. I have made findings against him of a serious nature but this should not be taken to mean he does not love his daughter and I accept this process has been hard for him. The reality is that very few if any people are one-dimensional in character and the Court needs to be alive to the fact that the court process does not reveal all aspects of personality. That being said it is clear to me he continues to struggle to manage questions around his levels of acceptance and future planning. I found him keen to express remorse and understanding but at many points (including within case management building up to the hearing) his approach has suggested otherwise. It is clear to me he has found this very difficult and has not settled on a clear approach. As with B there is a very real likelihood of evidence being shaped to influence the Court. In his regard I have a stronger sense this shaping is conscious.[21]All of the above being said this is not a case in which my decision making derives from these impressions although they support my conclusions.

The evidence given

[22]This section is highly summarised identifying the key aspects of evidence. ES[23]It appears clear ES experienced a marked change in assessment of S during the assessment process. This can be seen by the clear re-evaluation which followed the filing of his 8th statement. It seems prior to that point she had been impressed by his apparent remorse and recognition of the role undertaken by B.[24]On receiving the 8th statement, she was struck by the extent to which his plans did not reflect this apparent insight but appeared to marginalise B from A’s life ‘almost to the point of exclusion’. Indeed, in evidence she went further and explained she had been disappointed and concerned when reading his final statement. It led her to conclude he had not truly accepted the harm he had caused or the importance of the relationship between the mother and child. She questioned his sincerity in interview and found the statement ‘cold, heartless and arrogant’. She agreed it would have had a likely impact on the mother. She felt the proposals were ‘devoid of compassion’ with S on his own trajectory.[25]She was questioned further about insight and explained S has not justified his behaviour and was consistent in expressing sorrow and shame at his behaviour. But at the same time, he continued to identify points of blame against B and struggled to accept her mental ill health derived from his abuse of her. She felt he had gone backwards from the fact-finding.[26]She had considered S’s proposals: at the time of the statement, he had proposed a scheme under which A lived supported by his own mother and a nanny/governess. She would attend a specialist therapeutic setting. This would provide space around the mother’s mental health as he explained: While I am committed to the maternal relationship, I am gravely concerned by the documented risk of indirect emotional harm posed by the mother’s currently unstable mental health. Although I have consistently raised concerns to the Court regarding her mental stability from the outset of these proceedings, the Mother has only recently made a formal admission of the debilitating nature of her anxiety and its impact on her ability to care for A….[T]his clinical evidence suggests that A’s recent and distressing self-harming behaviours (biting, hitting and screaming) are contextually triggered by the Mother’s emotional state. Therefore, a "Lives With" order serves as a safety measure for A. By placing A in my primary care, an environment where she is consistently observed by professional supervisors to be happy, calm, vocal and regulated, we provide her with the emotional protection she needs. It also allows the mother the necessary space to focus on her own clinical recovery, while ensuring that A is no longer directly exposed to, or triggered by, themother’s acute episodes of anxiety. It was clear the ISW felt S had fundamentally missed the importance of the mother to A and his own responsibility for the harm he had caused the mother and was effectively ‘weaponising’ the impact of his abuse against the victim of the same.[27]ES commented on the mother’s lived environment, which is wholly unsuitable for the child in any event but especially having regard to her individual needs. When she saw B and A together the mother was ‘appropriate, loving and caring’, she had ‘managed very well in the circumstances which would be difficult for anyone’. She told me A needs a very different environment in which to flourish and ‘deserves this but doesn’t have it’. If B remains in this jurisdiction she is wholly unsupported and dependent on benefits and ‘her ability to recover will be enhanced by being within the folds of her family’. She was clear A’s welfare was associated with this being achieved.[28]When asked about contact she accepted this would have been triggering for B. She was asked about S’s stated position that he would not take up contact in XX as he would be at risk of personal harm and would ‘come home in a body bag’. She commented he had consistently said this and she had no reason to believe he did not genuinely hold this view however far-fetched it was. She agreed the direct contact she had viewed had been positive after a shaky start. A was comfortable in S’s care and she observed no distress. ES had picked up no sign of distress in B to the extent she was involved in facilitating contact but she had noted distress when they spoke together away from the child for the purposes of the assessment. She felt S’s preparation for the contact sessions was ‘excellent’ and he had made effort to make it work. She considered the ease with which A engaged in contact after a period of separation suggested their bond was closer than suggested by B. ES consistently reported B was supportive of contact occurring so long as it is safe and supervised.[29]ES did not know the exact details proposed by the mother on relocation. This had been kept from S for confidentiality purposes. She accepted this created a gap in understanding and her ability to thoroughly assess aspects such as schooling and health care. Various aspects of the planning and a lack of detail over the same were put to her. She agreed in all regards it would have been helpful to her to have the same and that this ‘did not sit comfortably with her’ although it was clear this did not impact on her conclusion that:
‘I cannot recommend shared care or in father’s care…she should be with her mother…she cannot remain here as there is no real future…it is clear there is family support…this provided with me good enough information to suggest she is supported…my views are pragmatic with a number of items missing…but I believe this is the best solution notwithstanding the gaps in information.’
[30]S drew the expert’s attention to some limited occasions around contact in which there was a form of indirect contact between the parents (A arriving with a gift for the father/A returning to her mother with a Mother’s Day present). The expert agreed B engaged with this process without obvious distress. ES agreed the mother’s proposals had the impact of marginalising the father. However, she considered this was a consequence of what had happened in the case.[31]ES set out her views as to contact were relocation to be granted. It should continue until the date of relocation on the current basis. Thereafter she was in difficulties as S had steadfastly refused to engage with consideration of contact arrangements with A in XX. If relocation was refused contact should continue on the current basis.[32]I can confirm I have had regard to ES’s full report [656], her answer to questions raised post-report [637] and her live evidence. HJ[33]HJ carried out a conventional assessment including reading the case papers, a structured interview and psychometric testing.[34]The expert concluded B was presenting with complex post-traumatic stress disorder (‘CPTSD’) concluding: …this is entirely attributable to the prolonged, severe, and multi-modal abuse perpetrated by S across the course of the relationship as determined in the Finding of Fact Judgment. B's clinical presentation is characterised by pervasive and severe intrusive re-experiencing (including recurrent and vivid intrusive imagery triggered by ordinary sensory cues, acute physiological and dissociative responses to trauma-associated stimuli, and a documented non-epileptic episode in the context of court proceedings) alongside chronic hypervigilance maintained at near-constant levels, extensive avoidance of both internal and external trauma-related stimuli, significant disturbances in self-organisation including profound affective dysregulation, deep disruption to identity and self-concept, and impairment of relational trust, and depressed mood at the 99th population percentile. These findings are corroborated by psychometric assessment yielding a PCL-5 total score of 53, substantially above the diagnostic threshold, and by independent contemporaneous clinical records documenting PTSD, depression and functional restriction across multiple treating clinicians between May and October 2025. Exposure to trauma triggers is ongoing. Whilst proceedings are ongoing B remains actively embedded within a traumatic context - in proximity to her abuser, subject to protracted litigation, and without access to the environmental safety and natural support network that characterised her pre-trauma life. In my opinion her symptoms are therefore best understood not as evidence of a chronic or fixed disorder but as a proportionate response to an unresolved traumatic environment, and this distinction is of direct relevance to prognosis.[35]HJ felt the prospects for recovery were good but contingent upon(1) the resolution of the active threat environment and,(2) access to trauma focused therapy by specialists familiar with recovery from coercive and controlling behaviours.[36]Based upon this the expert considered relocation has a therapeutic benefit and would permit meaningful recovery to begin whereas maintained location in this jurisdiction runs the material risk of causing a significant deterioration in psychological functioning and thus caring abilities.[37]In the opinion of HJ B had internalised the controlling behaviour patterns of S and explained: This is entirely consistent with …model of coercive control…which conceptualises coercive abuse not as discrete incidents but as a system of domination that reshapes the victim’s internal world. In this case, S’s behaviour has resulted in a profound internalisation of control, whereby B continues to anticipate his scrutiny, disapproval or retaliation even in his physical absence. ..describe this as the shift from external coercion to internalised governance, in which the victim regulates their own behaviour in accordance with the perpetrator’s perceived expectations. According to this model, recovery is dependent on the removal of ongoing threat, because continued exposure reinforces the coercive schema and impedes psychological stabilisation. In B’s case, any ongoing involvement by S would perpetuate this internalised coercive dynamic and maintain the conditions under which her Complex-PTSD developed, while psychological distance and safety would be necessary preconditions for improvement.[38]In live evidence the expert felt B’s composure around contact meetings was not indicative of anything meaningful as trauma is not consistent in regard to presentation. She was clear it was not S himself who was the active threat but rather the environment of which he was part. She felt his maintenance of allegations against the mother, notwithstanding the fact-finding will have been impactful for B as the lack of acceptance reinforces the risk. She told me the planned relocation was primarily a therapeutic step and was relevant for the child’s welfare as their interests were symbiotic. She considered it important for B, that having left a controlling relationship she be able to regain autonomy around decision making.[39]S spent significant time examining the principles underpinning the assessment process. HJ dealt with these points thoroughly and made clear any related concerns held by S did not invalidate her conclusions. She appreciated the reports made by B extend beyond the findings made but was clear as to the basis on which she carried out her assessment.[40]I have considered HJ report [596], her answers to questions [642] and her live evidence. B[41]B gave limited live evidence. I have particular regard to her post-fact-finding statement from September 2025 [283] in which she outlined her proposals on relocation and her final statement from May 2026 [SB2].[42]In her May statement she summarised a feeling on her part that A was suffering as a result of her lived environment and set out the absence of support for her as mother. She repeated her case as to the benefits that would attach to relocating in respect of a better lifestyle and family support alongside enhanced emotional wellbeing. B set out the history of her coming to London and her position that this is something she never sought but which was forced upon her by S, both with respect to coming to London to give birth to A but also the second return which continues into these proceedings. She contends she has no support network here and is wholly isolated.[43]B accepts the conclusions reached by the experts and drew on HJ conclusions with respect to her day-to-day living experience. She contrasts her functional experience here with the opportunity she will have if she returns home. She then sets out her proposals around residence, schooling and health needs. All of this is provided without detailed reference to facilities given her wish to preserve confidentiality.[44]In live evidence she confirmed her case. She struggled, emotionally, to engage with what she would do if she was refused permission to relocate. She accepts A is on an EHCP pathway and B receives state benefits and would need to pursue long term options given at the moment she is unable to do so whilst pursuing relocation. Whilst she challenges the contact notes to a degree she accepts A appears to enjoy her time with her father. She identifies facets of the contact which show this. She was aware S was offering financial support but did not wish to take support from him. She was then questioned about a particular trip in 2021 which she agreed she took without accepting the inferred premise of the question. S[45]S provided a statement at my direction setting out his position with respect to the fact-finding judgment. In it he raised a level of complaint that the Court had not adjudicated on a series of allegations raised by him against B. I would simply reference my judgment which fairly adjudicates on the key allegations of neglect raised against B (see in particular §60-63). In addition, he referenced his complaint of coercive and controlling behaviours. I would simply draw attention to my overarching conclusions as to the nature of the relationship as set out in my findings. It would be fair to say to the extent there is a level of acceptance of the findings on the part of S this is significantly caveated by related observations and explanations for behaviour. I am not persuaded an objective bystander considering the statement would conclude S had fundamentally accepted the findings made.[46]S provided his statement relating to the relocation plan and his own proposals in October 2025. Once again S took the opportunity to be critical of B. Early on in the statement he suggested she had deliberately lied in her leave to remain application noting that this could be punished by imprisonment. My recollection of the case is that earlier in the proceedings S was pushing for B to make as fulsome an application as possible criticising a perception that her application was somewhat half hearted with the intention of causing it to fail.[47]As regards the practicalities of the relocation plan S observed: The entire relocation proposal for A’s housing, financial security, and daily care rests on shifting narratives and fabricated evidence. It demonstrates B’s lack of transparency and her disregard for A’s long-term welfare. [§22] The Court should consider whether B’s overall conduct demonstrates any ability to prioritise A’s needs. The evidence shows a consistent pattern of misrepresentation and self-interest, often at the expense of A’s welfare. [§23][48]S remained critical of B’s family describing her mother as a having a history of ‘substance abuse’ and her father as a ‘violent ex-military man’. He questioned the fact that ‘no information has been provided regarding his identity, criminal record, or checks against any sexual offender register’ and commented that if they could support B ‘why do they continue to let her live off food from food banks and wear donated clothes?’. Shortly after this he returns to the suggestion that B’s father ‘groomed her’ and acted as her agent, returning to the suggestion of her as a sex worker [an allegation I rejected at fact-finding].[49]I find it noteworthy that S continues to hide his criticisms behind the suggestion that B told him these things whereas B denies ever saying the same.[50]S then spent some time carrying out a socio-economic critique of XX. He is an intelligent man who works in the finance sector and provided a detailed overview which from his perspective supported his objection to A relocating to XX. At §46 of his statement he considered it appropriate to reference an article in the Guardian headed:
‘The 10p cocaine byproduct turning XX's slum children into the living dead’
. At the conclusion of this section of his statement, he refers to his fear of A being ‘groomed and exploited’.Later in the statement he returned to a previous theme of alleging the XX Consulate had fabricated documents and involved itself in a plan to abduct A. Leading on from this S raised argument around XX being a non-compliant Hague Convention country.[51]S then moved onto a critique of the fact-finding judgment relating to the assessment of injuries suffered by A and commented: These inconsistencies are highlighted not for the purpose of re-litigating the findings of the fact-finding hearing. Rather, they are raised so the Court can fully appreciate the established pattern of B’s lack of transparency when assessing the future risks to A.[52]At §91 S sets out a fundamental disconnect between his own case and the Court’s findings in commenting: It is apparent that the B’s grievances with the adults in A’s life have taken precedence over A's own fundamental need and right to a relationship with her father and her paternal family. As with many aspects of this statement this illustrates S has simply failed to come to terms with the facts of the case as found by the Court. S then raised concerns as to whether reported self-harming behaviours on the part of A might instead have been used to conceal injuries caused to A by B when A is dysregulated. He moved on to reference B’s mental health as a matter of concern[53]He then set out his proposals describing A as being ‘born in England, which is both her birthplace and her home nation. Although she spent a short period living in XX as a British child abroad, this was in an environment heavily influenced by British culture and language. England is the only home she knows, and it is where she feels safe, secure and connected.’ [§105].[54]S then turned to the suggestion that he in fact lives outside of the UK himself. He made clear he would make changes to his career to play a full and active part in A’s life. He explained how in the months A lived with his mother her spent around 60% of his time in this country and continues to travel thousands of miles for an hour of supervised contact. He made clear his proposals for A were ‘concrete, aspirational and fully resourced’. This would be at ‘leading schools’ with fees at £25-30,000 per annum.[55]In his 8th statement (February 2026) S identified an ‘alarming deterioration in A’s wellbeing under [B’s] sole care’ [§4]. S developed his proposals which now included a ‘high specification’ home close to a ‘designated specialist school’ in Surrey/Berkshire. He considered this was now a clinical necessity and would include ‘a dedicated sensory regulation suite’ and ‘private therapy spaces.’ S set out how he would adapt his working patterns including a sabbatical during the initial period of the lives with order. The paternal grandmother would be ‘an active and loving part of A’s daily life’ and there would be a full-time ‘nanny/governess’ and a live-in housekeeper.[56]He then went on explain, under the heading ‘Happiness and development’ that he was motivated to ‘help A recover from the emotional dysregulation, regression and self-harming behaviours documented during the mother’s current sole care.’ [§30]. He explained he was, in contrast to B committed to a relationship with both parents but noted he is: …gravely concerned by the documented risk of indirect emotional harm posed by the mother’s currently unstable mental health. Although I have consistently raised concerns to the Court regarding her mental stability from the outset of these proceedings, the mother has only recently made a formal admission of the debilitating nature of her anxiety and its impact on her ability to care for A…Th[e] clinical evidence suggests that A’s recent and distressing self-harming behaviours (biting, hitting and screaming) are contextually triggered by the Mother’s emotional state. Therefore, a "Lives With" order serves as a safety measure for A. By placing A in my primary care, an environment where she is consistently observed by professional supervisors to be happy, calm, vocal and regulated, we provide her with the emotional protection she needs. It also allows the mother the necessary space to focus on her own clinical recovery, while ensuring that A is no longer directly exposed to, or triggered by, the mother’s acute episodes of anxiety.’[57]He turned to co-parenting and cautioned against the use of any direct communication as this might expose him to the risk of further false allegations. Instead, he proposed a funded social worker to safeguard communications and suggested A should spend alternate weekends with B and half the holidays.[58]I have the benefit of S’s 9th statement which sets out his response to the ISW report. In this he argues for shared care and acknowledge that B has ‘with the involvement of professionals’ been able to care fora. A. He denied the suggestion of ES that his proposals indicated a focus on status and denied his earlier proposals marginalisedb. B. He highlighted the issues with the relocation plan as set out in his questioning of ES, around housing, funding and related issues. He then set out in detail his critique of the provision within the likely area of relocation. This is separately found in a detailed document filed by S headed as a ‘Due Diligence Report’. This amounts to a compilation of internet searches undertaken by S.[59]In live evidence he was questioned as to his acceptance of the findings of the Court together with the points raised by him and rejected by the Court. In many respects he stood by his previous reports whilst making clear he was remorseful as to his previous conduct. When questioned he accepted the mother’s mental health position was a function of his conduct. He was questioned as to his failure to provide a document from his employer HR department confirming his place of work. This had been directed some time before but he explained he simply could not obtain this. He told me he was looking to make career changes and to transition his workplace back to the UK. The document had been sought as B alleged he was required to be in XX for a set period of time each year to fulfil his contractual obligations.[60]As to B’s diagnosis he explained his engagement with her had been very different to what he was being told. I understand this references her ability to facilitate contact and to engage at a light touch level with him around contact. He explained if permission to relocate were refused then he would be uncomfortable with A travelling to XX until she was old enough to speak out if abducted. He confirmed he would not travel to XX as his life would be at risk although he had the ability to travel there fortnightly if that were not an issue. In his view it was better for A to have a father who was alive. He would want there to be indirect contact, would not object to the continuation of the non-molestation order and would accept B largely exercising decision making as she has been doing.

Analysis

[61]Before turning to my welfare analysis, I would first set out some conclusions I have reached which are central to my determination. Progress re domestic abuse[62]Whilst I give S credit for his willingness to engage in both anger management and DAPP related works I am disappointed they have not yet had a meaningful impact in reshaping his insight and understanding as to the impact of his behaviours on B and indirectly on A. Throughout his written evidence S demonstrates he has moved on to a very limited degree since the fact-finding hearing. He is of course entitled to stand by his allegations but in doing so he demonstrates a total lack of reflection and insight on the objective and independent assessment undertaken by the Court, which was itself founded on clear evidence.[63]This is shown by his continuing attack on the maternal family which is wide ranging and wholly unevidenced other than by turning to suggested reports made by B. It is also found in his statement evidence concerning B which might aptly be described as ‘gaslighting’ her when explaining his case as to the need to care for A whilst B recovers, without any reference or acknowledgment of his own responsibility for the position she finds herself in. Finally, one finds the repeated criticisms of her care of A (whilst ostensibly offering positive statements) including the possibility that she is alleging self-harming to cover up her own abuse. Even when a positive is noted this is then undermined by a negative observation: see B providing good care when supported by professionals.[64]The difficulty this poses is establishing any confidence as to safe future contact in circumstances in which behaviour patterns are entrenched and likely to resurface. This circumstance additionally impacts on B by providing her with little basis on which to engage with contact in the belief that matters will be different for her.[65]I find it difficult to assess when there will be change. S has had a strong incentive to make change and has deployed his resources to obtain appropriate support. Yet it seems his strong views and general mindset have left him a poor candidate for change. Within the litigation process it has been evident to me that he has struggled to marry his obvious need to evince change in attitude with his underlying case and what it tells him. The upshot has been an at times confused approach under which he is with one hand expressing remorse and praising the mother whilst with the other indicating little has changed and being highly provocative in his criticisms of her and her family. The socio-economic case advanced by S[66]I have to say in general terms I found this aspect of the case rather unattractive. I have throughout these proceedings been left with a strong sense that S is seeking to obtain strategic leverage from the improved financial position he has when compared with B. To an extent this underpinned the coercive nature of the relationship and it appears to me it continues to be an aspect of the case. Whilst I recognise there are many positives that can be found in a parent being able to offer a child advantages that other children cannot obtain, my sense of the evidence is that this has been used to gain a perceived comparative advantage. I also agree with the ISW as to there being a status related element to much of this.[67]The effect of this on a fair reading is to talk down the environment available to B and to elevate the options available to S. What this fails to bring into the balance is the core essentials required by every child of solid and consistent love and care. In reality this is the foundation that successfully allows a child to thrive to the best of their ability. Some of the additional options advanced by S are bolt-ons to this but are insufficient without the core requirements. Again, this approach has a strong association with the controlling behaviours found within my fact-finding and I suspect B will have continued to be impacted by the manner in which S advances his case. S’s argument references the aspirational approach he takes with specialist schools and heavily resourced support. In contrast B’s case is based on a much simpler approach to keeping A safe and happy.[68]In reality this critical analysis of XX v UK missed the mark when considering what was best for A. Although the Court must give appropriate regard to the relocating party’s plans there is a significant distinction to be drawn in those cases in which a party is effectively returning to their home country and thus fully able to embed themselves back into life there. Such cases do not demand all aspects of the plan to be fixed to the ground (schooling etc) any more than one would expect that in the case of a British national returning to live in this jurisdiction. One would accept that the key requirements are ones that can be obtained.[69]This means that XX may have a lower GDP level than the UK and there may be many socio-economic challenges faced in that country but it is no part of my role to carry out such a comparative analysis in determining which country is best. Rather the key question is as to whether a parent can establish the child will receive good and consistent safe care if relocating with all key needs met. B’s association with this country[70]It is also appropriate to keep in mind my conclusion from my fact-finding judgment [§122] that: It is not lost on me that B had only limited connection with this jurisdiction prior to June 2024. She had travelled here for A’s birth but the plan was always to return to XX and this occurred in strained circumstances. I can only guess at the emotional impact on her of the plan of returning to live with the paternal grandmother. As can be seen this also fell apart relatively quickly and subsequent to this B has been effectively stranded in this jurisdiction. During this period S has come and gone to pursue his international career. I am sure this sense of isolation will have had further impact upon her. This continues to be a relevant consideration. In my assessment B has no ties to this jurisdiction and it is arguable she is only in this jurisdiction as a facet of the control exercised against her. She was brought here to give birth to A. She was later brought back in very strained circumstances and placed into the care of the paternal grandmother. Since separation she has been tied to this jurisdiction as the proceedings continue. This is far from a scenario in which parties choose to make their life together in a new jurisdiction and in which they become tied to that jurisdiction as a result of that decision making. As a result of this not only has B been effectively stranded as I pointed out but she is largely without any meaningful support network and wholly dependent on benefits. It is difficult to overstate the combined impact of all of this on her and thus on A. I am in no doubt she experiences this as a further feature of the abuse she has suffered. At the end of the hearing S was arguing B should not be able to leave with A for a considerable period of time. This has to be contrasted with his own freedom to travel, a feature which he exercises very regularly. A’s neurodiversity[71]I accept the assessments provided and the benefits to A of receiving focused support as she travels through childhood. It may be this can be better provided in this country within the mainstream health sector. It may be that XX is less well-resourced in such regard. However, this is to return to the socio-economic aspects of the case and I repeat my view as to the essential core factors that take precedence.[72]Put simply A will not prosper if she obtains premium health care whilst receiving sub-standard care at home. One needs to start with the key necessities and work from there rather than the other way around. It is clear B is and will remain A’s primary carer and so the focus should be on those factors that enable her to provide good, consistent and sustainable care not to throw those requirements out in pursuit of health excellence. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not saying A cannot receive appropriate care in XX or that the XX state does not offer such services. Rather, I am questioning the centrality of this issue to the decision I have to make. Criticisms of the maternal family[73]These criticisms are unevidenced and play no role in my assessment process other than in raising concern as to S’s litigation approach. I was unimpressed by S’s scattergun approach to the family members as I was to his reliance for his claims on having been told all of this by B. Elsewhere he thought it appropriate to suggest the maternal grandfather is effectively a form of ‘pimp’ and evidenced this by wholly redacted photographs which left me none the wiser. I remind myself of S’s deployment of a similar strategy at the fact-finding hearing which fell apart on being probed. There is no evidence on which I could possibly act to conclude the grandmother is a substance misuser or that the grandfather is a violent man likely to send S home in a body bag if he enters XX. It was convenient for S to be able to make such allegations without having to back them up. However, this leads me to reject them in their entirety. The Psychological evidence[74]I considered this evidence and accepted the conclusions reached by the expert. I am entitled to draw on my fact-finding conclusions and the opinion of the expert makes sense in the context of that lived experience. I accept B remains significantly impacted by the domestic abuse she experienced and this is having a continuing profound impact upon her on a daily basis. It is in both B’s and A’s interests to navigate a route to addressing these issues. The expert evidence is strong evidence in favour of relocation. A key question will be as to what it will mean for A if she and her mother are required to remain within this jurisdiction. It is clear HJ has real concerns in this regards and views the move as a therapeutic necessity. The relevance of Hague Compliance[75]I have XX legal advice setting out the extent to which the XX Court system properly and promptly applies Hague Convention principles. It is said this leaves XX as a non-compliant state. Whilst this would have relevance to any decision to permit travel following a refusal to relocate it is less clear as to how relevant this is if permission is granted. In such circumstances B would not be planning to return to this jurisdiction and on his case S would not be looking to travel to XX to exercise contact rights. In such a situation it is difficult to understand the relevance of non-compliance where there would be little if anything to comply with. Welfare Analysis[76]A is too young to be able to express wishes and feelings which carry weight with the Court. There will be aspects of her life here which are important and positive for her including contact with her father. Other events will bring her happiness in the time she spends with her mother. But she cannot reasonably hold or express a view on relocating to a country she has never visited. The evidence does tell me she is well cared for by her mother and gains positively from that relationship. She would likely want it to continue without fundamental change given B’s role as her primary carer.[77]A has many standard needs shared with children of her age. A need for settled, consistent and sustained loving care. A need to be kept safe and a need to have an emotionally available primary carer who provides expected care when called upon. This will be a foundation for a good attachment style carried into later life. Linked to this she has a need to have a primary carer who is free from abuse and is able to devote her time to A free from overbearing anxiety and intrusive thoughts. Such a situation is debilitating and wholly contrary to good consistent care.[78]She has a need for a relationship with both parents so long as this can be safe. It is clear to me S genuinely loves A and wants the best for her although he often allows side issues to cloud his approach. The contact he has had with A has been warm and well planned. The photographs I have seen suggest A has benefitted from this time and would continue to do so. This has to be considered in the light of any impact it has on B with a need for an evaluation of the net benefits to A of such contact.[79]A has neurodivergent needs which call for support and appropriate resources to permit her to achieve to her maximum. I am confident that the prospects of successful outcome in such regards first requires a stable home environment in which her basic needs are being met. I agree her current accommodation is poorly suited to a child with her needs. There is a high level of speculation as to how this point will play out whether here or in XX. It is not uncommon for disputes to arise in this jurisdiction as to the provision of such services and it would be unwise to simply assume A would get all she needed if remaining here.[80]There are benefits to A of establishing broader family connections so long as they are safe. This will ground her as to her identity and culture. As a result of the fact-finding hearing A has not spent time with her paternal family. I read the grandmother has engaged with therapy to enable her to reflect. I have not had sight of any document on her behalf addressing my findings or the implications for A of the same. A has in fact been able to spend time with her maternal family who have, despite the distance, travelled to this country to offer what support they can.[81]I have regard to A’s age, her mixed cultural background, her neurodivergence and her other broad characteristics. I accept it is important for A to understand her mixed [ ] background and the rich cultural diversity this brings. It is importance she is able to develop full respect for both aspects of her identity to ensure she is comfortable in her own skin. I can see that relocation may tend to diminish the importance to her of her paternal family culture. This would be harmful in my view. There are means of maintaining such links although I cannot overlook S’s decision in this regard. This is a decision which falls outside of my assessment of risk.[82]Any relocation argument brings a profound proposed change of circumstances and there can be no doubt this will have a fundamental impact on A. If she were to leave this country then this would likely be a life-long consequence with her growing up and living on a different continent, speaking a different language and experiencing a markedly different culture. At her young age I have no doubt this could be successfully achieved particularly as this is already a key aspect of her identity. I also accept there is in fact family support available to A in XX and I am satisfied there is sufficient available resources open to the family to meet her needs. I am not saying there are no good points made by S as to the opportunities in XX but I am satisfied the support and options available to B in XX are ones which at least match but most likely significantly exceed her lived experience in this country.[83]But this change would come with losses. This country is now in a sense A’s home and all she is familiar with. A move would estrange her from her father with an obvious emotional loss flowing from the same whether or not this needs to be the case. It is too early for her to have built peer relationships but she will have a familiarity with her lived environment and that will undergo a huge change if permission is granted. She would go from living in a bustling capital city to living in a far more rural environment. Her accommodation is currently cramped and unsuitable. The evidence of B, which I accept, is of appropriate accommodation in XX. There is no need for it to be luxurious simply appropriate.[84]Tied in with this is the practicality of the planning. I have commented on this above. For confidentiality reasons this has not been shared in detail with S. But I remind myself this is B’s home country in which she lived until adulthood. She has a number of supportive family members who are available to support her. I accept there is available housing. B and A will undoubtedly have all the rights which are available to other XX citizens. Viewed in this way the plan is plainly practical if lacking in some of the options available to A in London. But that would not be a reason for keeping her in London as set out above.[85]This application is plainly genuine in its nature. B wants to return home. In my fact-finding judgment I explained my assessment of the substance of each party’s case. B committed to a relationship which was abusive and which has left her trapped in this country. Her wish to return home is not difficult to appreciate in such circumstances.[86]Whether the plan is motivated to break the relationship with S is a more challenging point. Viewed from one perspective B is entitled to be critical in her assessment of the value of the relationship to A given her own experiences and the manner in which S linked this to A. This will naturally colour her view. As such I am wary about accepting her suggested openness to contact in future and question whether this observation is something she is willing to now say to achieve her ultimate outcome. There is a real likelihood that freed from this jurisdiction she will totally re-evaluate this point. The relevance of this is however questionable in circumstances in which S does not seek direct contact.[87]There remains a very real risk of harm to A as found within fact-finding and which continues (as set out above). I am very troubled by the behaviour patterns exhibited by S in this case. This was a paradigm example of a case in which the coercive and controlling behaviours were far more significant in impact than individual actions. I can see elements of this continuing within the litigation and I have no foundation on which to plant a basis for likely change based on true insight, reflection and acceptance of responsibility. As such it is likely to continue as a meaningful risk. It also means that any contact continuing would have to be supervised. But by simply occurring it would have a potential continuing negative impact on B. Such contact is a not consistent with recovery in the view of the expert.[88]These risks are risks for A to the extent they undermine the care being given by her mother. At their highest they could cause that care to fracture with highly negative consequences for her. In any PD12J welfare analysis I must continue to keep in mind the risks from such behaviour and the motivations that underpin the application. I must pay regard to insight and change as this has relevance to continuing risk. Most importantly I should only make an order for contact if I am satisfied ‘that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured both before, during and after contact and that that parent will not be subjected to further domestic abuse.’[89]These risks are very real when viewed through the prism of the expert report and in the light of the evidence I have received and heard. To the extent things have not moved on there is the potential for contact to be impactful on mother and child and for her to experience this as continuing abuse.[90]I have no reason for questioning the competency of B as a mother to A. This has been confirmed by all professionals working with her notwithstanding the difficult living circumstances which she faces. I do have a concern as to the sustainability of this care if she is subjected to continuing stressors around her CPTSD. S has shown himself a competent parent within contact and is committed to his daughter. He is able to provide happy contact which she very much enjoys. The issues in this case touch on more subtle but important aspects of parenting around respect and insight and how children are impacted by adult behaviours, needs and priorities. Holistic / Proportionality Review[91]A relocation case will nearly always bring competing stark positives and negatives. They are among the hardest cases to resolve in the private law sphere. This is particularly so where the underpinning wish is for a party to return home or face being ‘trapped’ within a foreign country throughout their child’s minority.[92]In this case it is easy to identify the positives of relocation. Principally it will free B from the threat environment identified by HJ and allow her the space to regain her autonomy and make therapeutic progress. By doing so she will be the best mother she can be for A.[93]Second, relocation will address the concern around presence in this jurisdiction being a facet of control. To the extent that is the case there is some importance in the Court recognising the same and considering what steps are needed to address the issue.[94]Third, there is cogent evidence to suggest that whereas relocation may not provide as wide ranging a package for A around her clinical needs it will provide a suitably resourced and supported package around daily life. I am satisfied B will receive a heightened level of support and emotional support to assist her in meeting A’s particular needs. There is something to be said for the role of loving care and support as a basis for meeting the neurodivergent needs as opposed to clinical and other supports.[95]Fourth, this will undoubtedly free A of her currently wholly unsuitable living circumstances.[96]The sole downside to relocation, in my assessment is the impact of the same on contact given S’s stated position. However, even that has to be balanced against the expert evidence as to the significant negative impact on B of maintained contact within this jurisdiction. There is a solution under which B is not given permission but contact is suspended to enable her to recover. I find it difficult to favourably balance that outcome against permission to relocate though.[97]The positives of refusal largely repeat the points above taken in opposite direction. The key positive is the heightened potential to maintain a relationship between A and her father. However, as I make clear there are good arguments to counter this in any event. Further, on the evidence I heard there is no practical reason as to why S could not maintain equivalent contact in XX should he wish to take it up. He told me about the thousands of miles he travels to this jurisdiction for supervised contact but he also told me he could in principle equally travel to XX on a fortnightly basis. On the facts of this case, I would struggle to expect B and A to travel to this jurisdiction for supervised sessions.[98]The downsides of this outcome are that very little would change for A. She would remain in unsuitable accommodation and would continue to live a second-rate existence as a function of the need for supervised contact given at this time I struggle to identify a clear route map to unsupervised contact. Conclusions Relocation

Conclusions

[99]I have reached the very clear conclusion that permission to relocate should be granted and that B should have permission to relocate as soon as she is able to do so. I understand this is a matter of obtaining suitable documentary evidence (national ID and passport) which will take about 4-weeks given it is expected the XX Embassy will be supportive. In reaching this conclusion I adopt and accept the firm recommendations of ES and the supporting evidence of HJ. I prefer the evidence of B over S where it is in conflict but have drawn on S’s evidence in support of my conclusions.[100]I am in no doubt this will be best for A for the following reasons:• It will provide her with a natural home life surrounded by a loving family• This will enable B to focus on rebuilding her personal strength and autonomy to make her the best mother she can be to her daughter• It will provide her and A with important emotional support and a suitable lived environment• It will separate B from the domestic abuse which continues to blight her whilst she remains in this country• It will meet A’s needs by focusing on day-to-day basic care needs as a foundation for giving her the best opportunity to thrive• It will draw a line under the domestically abusive relationship which has stranded her in this country[101]I appreciate it will at the same time bring contact with her father to an end. Sadly, I consider this is a price which has to be paid to give A the best life chances. Keeping her here for what would be occasional supervised sessions would be wholly contrary to her welfare and would likely have a wholly disproportionate impact on B and thus on A. That is unacceptable and particularly so when one considers the need to apply PD12J. Finally, I am not persuaded it would free B from the history of domestic abuse she has suffered. I fear it would simply continue it by other means. Travel Documents[102]It therefore follows that I grant permission to B to obtain the necessary passport and national identification documents for A required to relocate to XX. I grant permission to seek the same without the consent (written or otherwise) of S. This can be pursued immediately and prior to handing down. However, any documents obtained prior to handing down must be retained by the solicitor for B pending handing down. Name Change[103]I also have no hesitation in modifying A’s surname as requested. This was the original name chosen for her but it was then changed in disputed circumstances. I have resolved the issue of whether B was a sex worker and therefore objections based on this can carry no weight. I do not need to determine whether the change was agreed. In the context of the controlling relationship evidence of agreement would carry little weight. I give permission for a double-barrelled usage of A [ ]. This has the benefit of respecting both parts of her identity and in my judgment is welfare positive. The fact it was initially selected as her name is a strong factor in favour of the decision. Non-Molestation Order[104]I will continue the non-molestation order in its current form for a further period of 6 months but it will lapse on B leaving the jurisdiction. Contact[105]As to contact I will direct the provision of quarterly updates including information from school (reports) and related medical updates (re neurodivergence). The updates should be accompanied by at least three photographs on each occasion. Relevant details may be redacted to preserve confidentiality.[106]As to contact between now and departure (possibly no more than 2 sessions) I have found this a very difficult decision. There are obvious benefits to A of these occurring rather than simply ending without explanation. In terms of her life story there are benefits of this being managed to a sensible conclusion. I bear in mind contact has been positive to date and there have been no safeguarding issues. I appreciate the contact is professionally supervised.[107]Against this I have to keep in mind PD12J and the impact of any contact on A and B. I accept the evidence of the expert in this regard which references the negative impact of such contact on B. I of course appreciate the high emotions around such contact and this is likely to exaggerate the perception of risk in the mind of B. I think it is unlikely S would act as feared by B but my views are unlikely to help B in attempting to emotionally cope with this.[108]Sadly, I consider the balance is against further direct contact. Instead, I would order 2 sessions of video contact to be professionally supervised at the same point in time as the supervised contact would have occurred. These will be structured for 1 hour and will not involve B. I appreciate even this may impact B to an extent but it is the right balance in all the circumstances of the case. Handing Down[109]These are my conclusions. I will now forward this judgment to both parties. It can be shared with B. I intend to hand it down electronically at 10am on 1 June 2026 without need for attendance. If there any residual points requiring determination then these should be raised in line with the paragraph below.[110]Can I have any proposed corrections, requests for clarification and redactions (beyond names) by 4pm on 28 May 2026. Can I also have any additional points the parties might seek to raise had the handing down been attended by the same time.

Clarification

[111]Clarification has been sought as to unilateral decision making once in XX whereas absent the same principles of parental responsibility would require appropriate consultation. I will provide for this in my order as(1) S accepted in evidence that he was content for B to make these decisions without his agreement and(2) I consider it will be very difficult and may compromise confidentiality if B is obliged to supply to S the information required to enable full engagement. In any event I have provided for key information to be updated to S. His Honour Judge Willans