The Local Authority v The Mother & Ors [2026] EWFC 122 (B)

[2026] EWFC 122 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT IN CHESTER & CREWE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

AND IN THE MATTER OF A

BEFORE HER HONOUR JUDGE HESFORD

Between

THE LOCAL AUTHORITYApplicant

THE MOTHERRespondent

THE FATHERRespondent

(BY HIS CHILDREN’S GUARDIAN)

3rd Respondent

_______________________________________________

FACT FINDING JUDGMENT

28 MAY 2026

_______________________________________________

Daniel Currie for Applicant Local Authority

Kathryn Hughes for First Respondent (instructed by Stephensons)

Jonathan Buchan for Second Respondent (instructed by Farleys)

Megan Gilchrist for Child via his Guardian (instructed by Paul Crowley)

This judgment was handed down in private on 29 May 2026. It consists of 35 pages. The Judge has given permission for judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the adult members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties and the child will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.

Her Honour Judge Hesford :

Date 2026-05-28

THE INJURIES

[1]INTRODUCTION This judgment concerns A, a very young male infant.

[2]I have not set out all the evidence which I have heard and read (the complete bundles including photographs, medical records of approximately 4000 pages, plus police forensic evidence and phone analysis of 13000 pages) but have highlighted particularly relevant matters. Where evidence is not expressly referred to, it has nonetheless been considered.

[3]This judgment is structured as follows: Section 1: Introduction Section 2: The proceedings and the background Section 3: The nature of the hearing and participation Section 4: The parties’ positions Section 5: The Local Authority evidence and findings sought Section 6: The timeline relevant to the injuries Section 7: The mother’s evidence Section 8: The father’s evidence Section 9: Submissions Section 10: The legal principles regarding fact finding Section 11: Analysis and findings Section 12: Decision

[2]THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE BACKGROUND

[4]The application before the court is the Local Authority’s application for a care order. This is a finding of fact hearing with the Court tasked with determining whether A has suffered non-accidental/inflicted injuries and if so, then to determine the perpetrator of the injuries if possible. Depending upon my findings and the parties’ positions thereafter, I will consider the welfare of A at a future hearing.

[5]On [a date] 2025, A was taken to hospital by his parents after reportedly vomiting blood during the early hours of the morning. While A was being reviewed, nursing staff observed a linear bruise on his upper back. On further examination by the paediatric team, multiple bruises were noted across various areas of his body, which were unexplained by the parents. An urgent strategy discussion took place and A was admitted under the care of paediatrics. Given his presentation, age (a few weeks), and the pattern of injuries, both sepsis and non-accidental injury were considered. A Child Protection Medical Examination was undertaken followed by a second strategy discussion the following day.At that stage, preliminary imaging had identified possible fractures to A’s ribs and a potential femur injury (which was later ruled out). Due to the seriousness of the injuries and lack of plausible explanation, both parents were arrested and interviewed by the Police. They were released on conditional bail, prohibiting unsupervised contact with A or any other child under 18. On [a date] 2025, a discharge planning meeting was held following confirmation from the hospital that A had sustained posterior rib fractures (right 9th and 10th). These injuries were confirmed to be acute (less than 12 days old) and not consistent with accidental or birth-related trauma. A underwent a second skeletal survey which confirmed healing fractures.

[6]A was released into the care of extended family carers and he has remained in their care to date. Prior to his hospital admission, A had lived with his mother and father and was not known to children’s services.

[7]The parents deny being responsible for the injuries and have not been able to offer credible explanations. They had claimed to no longer be a couple but this was not true: they merely do not live together. Consideration was originally given as to whether the paternal grandmother or the maternal grandfather should be in the pool of perpetrators but they were ruled out as suspects by the police. Having considered the timeline and the totality of the evidence, the Local Authority reached the conclusion that the only people who had a reasonable opportunity to cause the injuries to A were his parents. The Local Authority did not seek findings against any other person and this approach was endorsed by the court. The parents remain under criminal investigation.

[8]This matter was scheduled for hearing in March 2026 but shortly beforehand, the parents were further interviewed in respect of phone analysis undertaken by the police, which included potentially incriminating material. The hearing was therefore adjourned so that further disclosure could be obtained.

[3]THE NATURE OF THE HEARING AND PARTICIPATION

[9]The hearing took place as an attended hearing over five days. No special measures were required.

[10]I had the opportunity of seeing the parents give evidence in the witness box and to form my own opinions about their evidence and credibility. It was extremely useful to do so. Alongside the medical evidence, their evidence was crucial for me in coming to my decisions. Much of the evidence was not controversial and it serves no purpose to repeat it. I have addressed only the most pertinent issues and further analysed the most relevant evidence in detail in the “analysis” section. In view of the particular relevance of this to my decisions, I have of course considered “Lucas” and all other relevant law throughout.

[11]So far as the medical evidence was concerned, Dr Karl Johnson’s evidence was accepted and he was not required to attend to give evidence. Dr Rose’s evidence was challenged by the parents and he gave evidence remotely. Dr M and Ms S, treating clinicians, were also challenged and gave evidence remotely.

[12]The proceedings for A are now at week 45, beyond the 26 week target and delays were caused by the need to obtain independent expert medical evidence, thereafter to list the hearing when the required witnesses were available and then it being adjourned due to the police forensic evidence and phone analysis. There will be further delay for A following this hearing as there are a number of possible outcomes; the parents’ responses to my judgment and findings made together with reflection by the Local Authority and Guardian will be crucial within final care planning.

[13]Oral submissions were provided by all parties.

[4]THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

[14]The Local Authority initially sought findings against both parents in relation to the injuries and other matters as set out in the original schedule of findings. Their case was straightforward: in relation to the event that led to A’s hospital admission only his parents know what happened. One or both was being untruthful. The injuries cannot be explained by rough handling or Ehlers Danlos Syndrome Type 3 (EDS). There were factors which pointed in favour of either parent being the perpetrator: the mother had a history of difficulties with her mental health; the father became overwhelmed when caring for A, bursting into tears and having to step away from him to calm down. Both were new parents under significant stress with a baby that struggled to settle, more so than usual on the day before he presented to hospital according to The father. They both became ‘overwhelmed’ at times. They had both been keen to minimise those and other risk factors. The Local Authority’s position evolved during the hearing as I will address.

[15]The mother accepted the expert medical evidence that A sustained non-accidental injuries, including rib fractures caused by excessive compressive force, and ultimately accepted that there was no accidental or medical explanation for those injuries. She denied causing any injury to A and asserted that she had never applied excessive force or witnessed anyone else do so. She accepted the medical consensus that at least some of the bruises were non-accidental. She could not rule out The father having caused the injuries during periods when he was alone with A and stated that this acceptance, together with the expert evidence, led to her decision to separate from him. She raised the issue of EDS as a potential explanation until the final hearing.

[16]The father accepted the expert medical evidence that A’s injuries were caused by excessive force and that there was no accidental explanation for the rib fractures or bruising. He denied causing any injury to A and maintained that he never applied excessive compressive force to A’s chest. He explained his earlier references to “rough handling” as relating to holding A more firmly during feeds due to feeding difficulties and accepted that such handling could not account for the injuries.

[17]Both the mother and the father denied failure to protect or failing to seek appropriate medical advice or treatment.

[18]The Guardian broadly supported the Local Authority’s position. She agreed that the threshold was met on the basis of the non-accidental injuries and accepted the expert medical evidence. She recognised the parents’ strengths, positive engagement and the quality of contact; however, she was clear that these factors did not outweigh the seriousness of the injuries or the parents’ lack of insight and inability to account for how the injuries were caused. Her welfare recommendation would depend upon the outcome of this hearing.

[5]THE LOCAL AUTHORITY CASE AND FINDINGS SOUGHT

[19]The Local Authority provided a very useful written opening and forensic chronology for this hearing. They relied on the whole of the evidence in the bundle, but particularly the expert and electronic evidence. The findings they sought were: THE INJURIES 1). A sustained the following injuries identified as a result of medical examinations taking place on [a date] 2025 (‘the injuries’): a) Acute fractures to the posterior aspects of the right 9th and 10th ribs (‘the rib fractures’); and b) Multiple bruises as follows (‘the bruising’):(i) A 2cm linear bruise over the left cheek (‘bruise 1’);*

(ii) A 0.5cm circular bruise on the tip of the nose, extending to the left (‘bruise 2’);*

(iii) Two 0.5 x 0.2cm discreet oval marks over lateral aspect right knee (‘bruise 3’);

(iv) A 1.5 x 0.5cm irregular bruise over the right inner thigh (‘bruise 4’);

(v) A <0.5cm circular bruise over the posterior right shoulder (‘bruise 5’);

(vi) A 2.5cm linear bruise to the left shoulder extending to the upper arm (‘bruise 6’);

(vii) A 2cm linear bruise to the lateral left shoulder (‘bruise 7’);

(viii) A 2.5cm horizontal linear bruise to the left upper back (‘bruise 8’).

(ix) A 2 x 3cm faint irregular bruise to the left upper arm (‘bruise 9’). 2). The injuries were caused as follows: a) The acute fractures to A’s ribs were caused by a single episode of chest trauma, involving the application of severe excessive inappropriate compression force to A’s chest beyond that of normal or rough handling. That compression force was created by someone squeezing A with their thumbs over his sternum (breastbone) and fingers over his back near his spine; and b) The bruising was caused as follows: i) Bruise 1 may have been caused by A knocking the mother’s phone out of her hand and it landing on her cheek;* ii) Bruise 2 may have been caused by A scratching his nose;* iii) Bruises 3 and 4 were caused by blunt force trauma via fingertip pressure; iv) Bruise 5 is unexplained; v) Bruises 6, 7 and 8 were caused by trauma/pressure from a linear object and have not been explained by the parents; and vi) Bruise 9 was caused by pressure from a thumb. c) Therefore, bruises 3-9 were inflicted injuries (‘the inflicted bruising’). Bruises 3-9 and the rib fractures are hereafter referred to collectively as ‘the inflicted injuries’. 27. THE INFLICTED INJURIES 3). The rib fractures occurred between [dates] 2025. 4). The inflicted bruising occurred between [dates] 2025, prior to A’s presentation at Hospital on [a date] 2025. 5). No underlying medical, metabolic or bone fragility condition caused or predisposed A to the inflicted injuries. 6). A was a non-mobile infant and could not have self-inflicted any of the inflicted injuries. 7). The inflicted injuries were inflicted by the mother via one or multiple events from [dates] 2025. 33. FAILURE TO PROTECT 8). At the time the rib fractures were inflicted, A would have experienced significant pain and distress, lasting for up to 10 minutes. The mother would have been aware she had squeezed A with excessive force and that A was in significant pain as a result. 9). At the time the inflicted bruising was caused, A would have suffered pain and would have been in distress for a few minutes. The mother would have been aware she had caused pain and bruising to A. 10). A reasonable carer who was not the perpetrator of the inflicted injuries but was present at the time they were caused would have been aware that a significant and memorable event had occurred. 11). The inflicted bruising would have been obvious to the father if he was not present at the time the injury was caused but later observed it. 12). The father failed to protect A from physical harm or knowingly put him at risk of physical harm in that the father was aware a) That the mother was in a poor state of mental health; b) That the mother was frustrated with A; c) That the mother was struggling to cope with caring for A; d) That the mother was becoming increasingly quick to violence; and e) That the mother had lost control of her emotions on multiple occasions since A was born. Yet the father did not intervene to prevent harm being caused to A, despite knowing there was a risk of such harm arising. 13). The father actively increased the risk to A by failing to respond to the mother’s declining mental health and by verbally abusing her as below. 14). The father knew or ought to have known that a significant injury had been caused to A either because: a) He was present at the time the injuries were caused; or b) He observed or heard the pain and distress evidenced by A; or c) He observed the inflicted bruising to A. 15). The parents failed to protect A in that they: a) Failed to seek medical attention in response to the injuries inflicted, only attending hospital due to vomiting blood, rather than recognition of the bruising or distress caused by the traumatic event(s); and b) Concealed the truth about the circumstances in which the injury was inflicted. 16). In the alternative, and in the event the father is found to be the sole perpetrator of the inflicted injuries, and in addition to the above, the mother was aware the father had a history of becoming frustrated and/or overwhelmed when caring for A and using excessive force when handling him. The mother therefore failed to protect A from physical harm as she did not intervene to prevent harm being caused to A, despite knowing there was a risk of such harm arising. 43. DOMESTIC ABUSE 17). The parents’ relationship is domestically abusive, placing A at risk of physical and emotional harm, in that: a) On [a date] 2025, the mother pushed the father into the road; b) The father verbally abused the mother on multiple occasions as follows: i) On [a date] 2025 by calling her a ‘pussy’ and telling her to ‘shut the fuck up’; and ii) On other occasions, by calling her a ‘bitch’ and using other verbally abusive language. c) On [a date] 2025, in the early hours of the morning, the mother physically abused the father.

THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE

[20]As well as the documentation from the hospital and treating experts, independent reports were obtained in relation to A’s health and the injuries. These experts were Dr Karl Johnson, Consultant Paediatric Radiologist, and Dr Stephen Rose, Consultant Paediatrician.

[21]On admission to hospital, A was referred to paediatrics. SN H noticed a bruise on A’s back and approached Dr M who assessed A with HCA Ms S and SHO Dr B present in the treatment room, A was ‘very irritable and difficult to console’. He initially noted ‘a linear bruise on his left upper back’ (which appears to be bruise 8), ‘a linear bruise on his left shoulder’ (which appears to be bruise 7), ‘a small red mark on the tip of his nose,’ (bruise 2), ‘and a small mark on his right inner thigh’ (bruise 5). During this assessment, Ms S noticed bruises 1 and 2 to A’s nostril and cheek. A lumbar puncture was carried out and marks were noted to A’s shoulder, thigh and neck prior to the cannulation procedure (bruises 1,2,4,5,7 and 8). They recorded no bruising or injury caused to A by the procedures. When examined for the Child Protection Conference, the bruises numbered 1 to 9 were noted and recorded. Some photographs were taken. The skeletal survey was suspicious for right-sided posterior ninth and tenth rib fractures. The second skeletal survey undertaken on [a date] 2025 confirmed the fractures to A’s posterior right 9th and 10th ribs.

[22]Dr Karl Johnson prepared one report and answered further questions. He confirmed that:

“A has suffered fractures of the posterior right 9th and 10th ribs which, in my opinion, are no older than 11 days of age on [a date] 2025”

. He further stated that:

“Each fracture is the result of significant force applied to the bone. The amount of force required to cause these fractures is unknown, but in my opinion, it is significant, excessive and greater than that used in the normal care and handling of a child. The fractures would not have occurred from normal domestic handling, over-exuberant play or rough inexperienced parenting. Rib fractures are typically the result of severe excessive squeezing compressive force applied to the chest. The amount of force required to cause these fractures is unknown, but in my opinion, it is significant…. In my opinion, the level of force required to cause the rib fractures is beyond that of rough heavy handedness. I note that the father has commented that he was relatively heavy handed with A. In my opinion, there needs to be severe excessive inappropriate squeezing of the chest to cause the rib fractures. This action with this level of force has not been described. I have not been provided with any suitable explanation of significant force applied to A’s chest to account for the fractures which he has sustained. In the absence of any suitable history, unexplained fractures of this nature in a child of his age raises concerns regarding possible inflicted non-accidental injury. It is the absence of any suitable history rather than the radiological appearances of the fractures which raise these concerns.”

[23]Dr Johnson confirmed that A would have been in pain and shown signs of distress “which would have lasted for some moments. Following this initial distress, the signs and symptoms related to these fractures could have been variable”. He deferred to the paediatricians in relation to both A’s clinical presentation and the significance of hypermobility but stated that “In my opinion, hypermobility is not associated with inherent bone fragility”.

[24]Dr Johnson further stated:

“Radiologically there is no evidence of any underlying bone disorder… It Is my understanding that EDS alone does not increase bone fragility. Children with cIEDS and hypermobility can have an increased propensity to fracture, but these fractures occur as a result of significant events. They do not occur as a result of lesser forces being applied to the bone.”

He confirmed that having read the report of Dr Rose, his position was unchanged.

[25]Dr Johnson’s evidence was not challenged and it is accepted by the court.

[26]Dr Stephen Rose also filed one report and answered questions. In relation to the degree of force required to cause rib fractures to A, Dr Rose noted that:

“The degree of force required to cause fractures in a three week infant is unknown, however, during cardiac compressions, when the infant's chest is compressed to around 30% of its normal anterior/posterior diameter, fractures are rarely reported. Force therefore at least equivalent to that used during cardiac compressions, must have been used to cause the rib fractures in A. Such force is not used in normal or even rough handling.”

[27]In relation to the bruising, he noted that accidental bruising tended to be circular or have no pattern rather than linear bruising. He accepted that bruises 1 and 2 could have been caused accidentally. Bruises 3 and 4 were caused by blunt force trauma via fingertip pressure; bruise 5 was unexplained; bruises 6, 7 and 8 were caused by trauma/pressure from a linear object and had not been explained by the parents; and bruise 9 was caused by pressure from a thumb. They were not pressure marks. The bruising was between approximately one hour and seven days old prior to presentation. A’s bone biochemistry was normal and radiologically there was normal bone mineralisation and no evidence of bone disease, or skeletal dysplasia. There was therefore no underlying medical cause for the injuries.

[28]Dr Rose further opined that whoever caused the rib fractures would have been aware they had squeezed A with excessive force and that A was in significant pain lasting for up to 10 minutes as a result but may not have known they had fractured the ribs. At the time the bruising was caused, A would have been in pain and distress for a few minutes. Someone present who did not cause the rib injuries would not have been aware they had been caused but bruising would have been obvious.

[29]In relation to EDS, he agreed with Dr Johnson that hypermobility was not associated with increased bone fragility, nor with easy bruising and stated that even if the mother had EDS 3, this was not relevant to A. “Hypermobility does not equate to Ehlers Danlos hypermobility type 3. EDS is specific diagnosis which includes hypermobility, but demands more than hypermobility for the specific diagnosis. iv. There is considerable controversy as to the role of EDS, and bone and blood vessel fragility, medical opinion ranging from an acceptance that EDS is associated with increased bone and blood vessel fragility, through to the opposite view. v. A has been in foster care for almost 5 months. If there have been further episodes of unexplained superficial bruising or unexplained fractures that would lend clinical evidence to suggest that he has an underlying problem which does indeed lead to increased bone and blood vessel fragility. vi. Alternatively , if there has been no unexplained superficial bruising and no further fractures that lends credence to the opinion that A is an entirely normal infant with no underlying medical problem.”

[30]Dr Rose received various pieces of research literature and studies regarding EDS but was clear that even if the mother had EDS 3 this was irrelevant to A. “He was 3 weeks of age at presentation, at that age all babies are hypermobile so differentiating those that will be hypermobile from those who will be stiffer is not possible. I can find no generally accepted medical papers in which neonatal bruising was proven to be related to EDS 3.” Put simply, none of the research papers changed his opinion and they were neither of assistance nor relevant to A.

[31]Dr Rose gave oral evidence, but this was much briefer than was originally planned since challenges relating to the issue of EDS/Hypermobility and research literature were not pursued. He gave clear oral evidence consistent with his written report and was an impressive and thoughtful witness. He concluded that A’s rib fractures were caused by force at least equivalent to cardiac compression and therefore significantly in excess of normal or even rough handling. As to timing, he accepted that taking account of oedema, the time frame for the injuries could be slightly shortened to being from approximately seven days prior, although he emphasised that this was not definitive.

[32]In relation to the bruising, the linear marks to the left shoulder were in his view the result of trauma and highly suggestive of non-accidental injury, as linear bruising was not typically caused accidentally. Fingertip-type bruising could explain marks to the knee and upper arm, but he remained concerned there was no plausible explanation for the same. The parents’ explanation of an injury from a dropped phone could not be ruled out in respect of the mark to A’s nose, or it could be a scratch, but he categorically rejected their suggestion that A had injured himself since a three-week-old infant cannot self-inflict injury.

[33]He was clear that he could identify no reasonable alternative explanation for the marks other than bruising caused by pressure sufficient to rupture capillaries. He explained that transient pressure marks would fade within a few minutes, normally at most 15 minutes (but maximum 30 minutes), whereas marks still visible later (as here) would represent true bruising. Dr Rose considered accidental causation highly unlikely. The events would be memorable to a third party involved, and a third party must be involved as A was non-mobile and therefore incapable of causing injury to himself. There was no satisfactory account of any accidental mechanism for any of the various injuries. He regarded it as improbable that the injuries could have been caused during medical procedures such as the lumbar puncture, noting that such procedures are routinely performed by highly trained medics and do not ordinarily cause bruising; He had never seen it in practice. Further, they would not account for bruising to the knee, as the knee was not involved in the puncture procedure at all.

[34]He addressed the mother’s suggested diagnosis of Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome (EDS). He was sceptical as to the reliability of such a diagnosis and, in any event did not, along with Dr Johnson and the majority of medical professionals, consider EDS to be a cause of bone fractures. He further explained that bruising results from capillary rupture, and as capillaries do not contain collagen, any potential EDS related collagen disorder would not account for the bruising.

[35]He attached considerable weight to the fact that A, since entering foster care [x] months ago and becoming more mobile, had sustained no further fractures or bruising, which he considered inconsistent with an underlying medical vulnerability.

[36]Dr Rose was a highly persuasive and authoritative witness, whose evidence in my judgment, carried significant weight. His evidence was clear, consistent, and firmly expressed, both orally and in writing. He demonstrated expert knowledge, providing reasoned explanations grounded in clinical science (e.g. mechanism of bruising, capillary rupture, and injury causation). He was analytical and balanced, acknowledging where possibilities existed (e.g. timing of injuries, theoretical accidental causes) while explaining why they were unlikely.

[37]He also engaged critically with alternative hypotheses, including the issue of EDS, showing considerable knowledge of the same - both sides of the arguments and generally - and gave rational reasons for rejecting them. His views on EDS reflected a degree of scepticism in a controversial area, which, while reasoned, may be seen as expressing a firm professional stance in an area of some medical debate. He, however, preferred to rely on the established science and the objective and evidenced features of the case, including the pattern of injuries, lack of explanations and the absence of further injury in foster care. He was aware that Professor Holick (mother had originally been seeking to rely on his research papers) had been completely discredited. Overall, Dr Rose’s evidence was compelling, carefully reasoned and scientifically grounded as well as being firmly in line with that of Dr Johnson who was not challenged. Any limitations go to the inherent uncertainties of medical science rather than to his reliability. His conclusions - that the injuries were unlikely to be accidental and were not explained by medical conditions or procedures - were expressed with appropriate caution but with considerable confidence.

[38]Ms S, Health Care Assistant, was one of the medical staff in attendance when A was admitted to hospital and she assisted with the lumbar puncture. She filed one statement which addressed the marks on A and her role with the puncture. She was clear that she noted six bruises, those numbered 1,2,4,5,7 and 8, before the lumbar puncture took place and that none of them were caused by the procedure.

[39]Ms S gave oral evidence and this was consistent with her written statement and the medical records, suggesting reliability. She confirmed that, upon removal of A’s baby-grow shortly after his arrival, she observed bruising to his back, shoulders, inner thigh and below the neck, in addition to earlier-noted marks to his cheek and nose. She was clear that these injuries were identified before any invasive procedures, including the cannula insertion, blood tests and lumbar puncture. Her evidence was that she and Nurse J had both been present with the parents and A when the bruising was observed, and both agreed that a paediatrician should be involved. She identified a number of the injuries in photographs taken for clinical purposes, some of which she had personally taken. Ms S explained that her fuller note, prepared three days later, was completed from memory as standard practice due to the practical impossibility of making detailed notes during the shift. She remained confident in its accuracy. She was firm that the bruising was present prior to the lumbar puncture, notwithstanding that the procedure involved handling A’s body. She confirmed that she, Nurse J and Dr M all observed the bruising during the course of treatment. She accepted that there was no photographic record of a bruise to the right shoulder in the bundle. Finally, she described the parents’ presentation as entirely normal and of no concern.

[40]She gave clear and firm evidence on key issues, in particular that bruising was observed before any invasive procedures. She provided a plausible explanation for the timing of her notes and maintained confidence in their accuracy. There was no indication of exaggeration or partiality; she raised no concerns about the parents’ behaviour, which supports an impression of objectivity, as would be appropriate for her role.

[41]Dr M was the treating paediatrician at the hospital. He carried out an initial assessment of A, undertook the lumbar puncture and prepared the Child Protection Medical. His opinion was:

“Following initial assessment and review, I was concerned of multiple unexplained bruising seen on the child along with concerns of infection. I discussed my concerns with the on-call consultant and suggested for referral to social care and for a child protection medical to be undertaken along with initial blood investigation and a septic screen as described above. Medical photography was performed and documented as above and in body charts as attached. I remained concerned because of how unsettled the child was, and I could not exclude non-accidental injury despite my assessment occurring prior to radio imaging and their significant findings.”

[42]In his oral evidence Dr M identified nine areas of bruising on A and cross‑referenced these with photographic images. These included marks to the face (nose and cheek), knee, inner thigh, left shoulder (including linear marks), upper back and arm. There was no photograph of the right shoulder. The photographs were taken by the Trust and not by himself. He accepted Dr Rose’s view that certain injuries - particularly the linear and fingertip-type marks - would have been caused by trauma or pressure and would have been painful for A. He was clear that nothing during his medical examinations or treatment would have caused any of the injuries. He stated that he first observed the marks during his initial assessment for suspected sepsis, which involved a skin assessment and again during the subsequent child protection medical and cannula/lumbar puncture procedures. He deliberately described them as “marks” or “skin differences” at the time to avoid implying non-accidental injury before consulting with a senior clinician, although in evidence he firmly accepted that they were bruises. The marks were visible at the outset of his second examination after A’s clothes were removed, prior to invasive procedures. He had been alerted initially by nursing staff to a bruise high on A’s back. He did not raise the bruising in detail with the parents at that stage, pending discussion with the consultant.

[43]In relation to the lumbar puncture and cannulation, he described the positioning and handling of A, who was held firmly but appropriately. While he accepted that handling could theoretically produce some fingertip marks, he did not consider this explained the pattern or location of the injuries, particularly the linear marks. He was adamant that the procedures did not cause the bruising he observed.

[44]He acknowledged gaps and inconsistencies in the documentation. In particular, he could not locate nursing notes he believed he had seen referring to bruising; the admitting nurse’s record made no reference to injuries, and another medical report recorded only one mark. He also noted that some photographs were taken later and might not fully reflect the appearance of the marks at the time, and that some images he himself took were not available at the time of his evidence.

[45]He presented as a generally careful and measured witness and gave clear and consistent evidence that multiple marks were present at the time of his initial assessment, before procedures. His cautious use of terminology, explaining his use of the word “marks” to avoid premature conclusions suggests a professional awareness of the implications of his evidence. He made appropriate concessions, including that some handling could theoretically cause marks and that some bruises may have faded before photography and he accepted limitations in his recollection and the evidential record, including missing photographs and documentation gaps. OTHER EVIDENCE

[46]POLICE EVIDENCE: a significant bundle of police forensic evidence and phone analysis was provided including extensive phone downloads and transcripts of interviews. There were also video recorded interviews. This has been considered and addressed throughout this judgment as appropriate.

[6]THE TIMELINE RELEVANT TO A’S INJURIES

[47]In line with the medical evidence, the Local Authority assert that one or both of the parents hurt A as follows: The rib fractures occurred between [dates] 2025 (Dr Rose, oral evidence). The inflicted bruising occurred between [dates] 2025, prior to A’s presentation at the hospital on [date] 2025.

[7]THE MOTHER’S EVIDENCE

[48]The mother filed five statements including a response to the final threshold. She maintained her position of denying responsibility and being unaware of any cause for the injuries. By the time of her evidence, she no longer challenged the medical evidence and accepted that the injuries were inflicted. As she was not responsible, then it must be the father who was responsible but this was expressed reluctantly.

[49]I have considered the evidence of the mother in light of her oral evidence, her written statements, and the contemporaneous documentary and digital material, particularly that provided by the police. My overall assessment was that I found her to be an unreliable and unconvincing witness whose evidence was difficult to accept unless supported by independent material; it was frequently contradicted by the same. She displayed very little emotion throughout the hearing, giving an impression of detachment and emotional distance, however I treat demeanour with caution. My findings are based on inconsistencies, documentary evidence and inherent probabilities rather than presentation alone. She significantly lacked credibility. Her evidence was characterised by a consistent pattern of minimisation, evasion and inconsistency, together with a number of clear instances of dishonesty. She frequently avoided answering questions directly and instead sought to qualify or reinterpret her responses. This was particularly evident when she was confronted with material that did not support her previous or present accounts. In terms of her presentation, she appeared very well prepared with what she wanted to say and the impression she wanted to give, particularly in relation to the new police forensic evidence and phone analysis and particularly in evidence in chief. She commenced her evidence as confident and composed when giving evidence in chief or when matters aligned with her case. However, when challenged she became evasive and resistant, often requiring repeated questioning before making any concession. This behavioural shift led me to conclude that her account had been carefully managed and, to some extent, reconstructed by her in line with her final statement following the police evidence, rather than being a candid and honest description of events and issues.

[50]A central feature of her evidence was the systematic minimisation of difficulties within her relationship with the father. She repeatedly characterised arguments as “disagreements,” “differences of opinion” or merely situations where they did not “see eye to eye,” despite clear contemporaneous evidence of a relationship marked by conflict, volatility, verbal abuse and on her part, physical abuse against the father. This followed her clear denial of any relationship issues to both the police and social workers, with nothing of concern revealed until confronted with the police evidence. They had both painted a false portrait of an idyllic relationship. That minimisation extended to her own conduct. She accepted that she had been physically aggressive towards the father on two occasions, but initially downplayed both incidents, although saying she apologised and was ashamed. In relation to the incident on 31 May, she described a minor push before later accepting, when pressed, that she had acted out of frustration and had lost control. Similarly, she admitted slapping the father (because they did not see “eye to eye”) but sought to justify this as arising from stress. In each case, the progression of her evidence demonstrated a tendency to dilute her actions until confronted with contradictory material.

[51]There are a number of clear examples in which the mother misled professionals. She informed the social worker undertaking a parenting assessment that her relationship with the father was “extremely positive”, later asserting that she had not even recognised the relationship as abusive until the police became involved and provided their disclosure. I find that explanation to be implausible and untrue, particularly in light of the contemporaneous evidence. She also provided false or inconsistent accounts regarding her mental health. She denied having self-harmed for many years to the social worker despite having disclosed a relatively recent history (months) of self-harm in a recent maternity assessment. Similarly, she told the police that she had experienced no postnatal distress and felt “absolutely fine”, later accepting that this was not true. These are not minor discrepancies but demonstrable falsehoods on matters of relevance to her presentation and credibility.

[52]The mother was also misleading in her account of her ongoing relationship with the father. She initially denied that she remained in a relationship with him, but later accepted when challenged that the relationship continued and was sexual in nature. This was not volunteered but extracted slowly by questioning with her attempting to minimise it and provide as little information as possible. She was deliberately evasive and dishonest. This was not a peripheral issue but one going directly to the dynamics between the parties, and her reluctance to give a straightforward account further undermines confidence in her evidence. She sought to contend that there was no real shortage of money, notwithstanding contemporaneous text messages which demonstrate that even an expenditure of £20 was regarded as problematic. When pressed on this inconsistency, her position shifted; she ultimately accepted that the messages indicated “a bit of friction” and that matters were “a bit tight”. I do not accept that characterisation. In my judgment, this represents a continuing attempt to minimise the true financial position and does not assist her credibility.

[53]Her evidence contained numerous internal inconsistencies. She asserted at one stage that she and the father had not discussed their problems, as one of the reasons why they were not in a relationship, yet in her final statement there is clear reference to them having discussed the “push” incident. Her descriptions of A’s presentation also shifted; contemporaneous messages referred to him “screaming”, whereas in her oral evidence she suggested that this was exaggeration and that he was merely crying. On one particular occasion she claimed in oral evidence that A had only been crying “off and on” despite her own contemporaneous text message saying that he had been crying nonstop at the time. It was clear that she was unable to recall what she had said previously so as to maintain the version she now sought to portray.

[54]A significant feature of her evidence was the recurring formulation that her messages or conduct might “look like that” or “come across that way”. In context, this amounted to an attempt to shift responsibility from the substance of her words onto the interpretation of others, rather than accepting what she had in fact said or done. The contemporaneous digital evidence, including text messages and internet searches, is in my judgment of considerable importance and provides a more reliable insight into the circumstances at the time. That material demonstrates a relationship that was strained and conflictual, together with a mother experiencing significant stress, anxiety and frustration. It also includes messages in which she attributed responsibility for difficulties within the relationship to A and expressed herself in a manner which was, at times, inappropriate and resentful. The mother sought to dismiss such material as exaggeration, humour or misunderstanding. I do not accept those explanations. The natural reading of the messages is clear, and they were created with no expectation that they would ever be seen again (Snapchat) let alone scrutinised in proceedings. They therefore provide a more reliable account than her later oral or written evidence.

[55]One issue of particular significance was her internet search for “why has my baby got bruises all over his back”. The mother denied observing multiple bruises, claiming to have seen just one and was unable to provide any plausible explanation for that search. In my judgment, the search reflects what she had in fact seen, and her denial is indicative of continued minimisation and lack of candour. It also reflects the evidence from the medics and the photographs of what actually happened to A.

[56]Her account of the events prior to A’s admission to hospital was inconsistent and lacking in credibility. She gave differing versions of the timing and sequence of events and was unable to explain a significant delay between the discovery of blood and seeking medical attention, and as to why she did not wake her father who she said was supportive and whom she had consulted previously. Certain aspects of her account were inherently implausible, including her suggestion that she communicated with The father by text message whilst he was in the same room right next to her, during an argument on the night of the admission to hospital. She was also unable to recall details of what was plainly a significant and distressing event and should have been memorable. This further undermines the reliability of her account.

[57]There were further inconsistencies regarding key events, including whether A was placed in his cot immediately following the 1am feed, or after a period of 30 minutes, who was caring for him at particular times during the feeding, and the full sequence of events on the night before he was taken to hospital. There had been no mention of a contemporaneous argument prior to disclosure of the text messages She accepted, when pressed, that she had given different accounts to different professionals, but was unable to provide any satisfactory explanation for this. In my judgment, this reflects a pattern of alteration of her account over time.

[58]The mother had introduced late explanations for certain matters, including a suggestion that a facial injury may have been caused by a phone. This had not been raised with police, medical professionals or anyone else at the time of discovery of the injuries. She was unable to explain that omission. Again I find that this is indicative of a developing account rather than a genuine recollection.

[59]I am satisfied that the mother withheld and minimised much relevant information, including the true nature of her relationship with the father and the extent of the difficulties she was experiencing. This was, in my judgment, done in order to present herself in a more favourable light and to reduce the likelihood of criticism, indeed she admitted that she was concerned about what people would think.

[60]Drawing these matters together, the mother’s evidence is substantially undermined by proven dishonesty, repeated inconsistency, minimisation of significant matters, and conflict with reliable contemporaneous material. As a matter of analysis, her evidence demonstrates a clear tendency to adapt her account to meet the evidential picture as it emerged, rather than to provide a full and truthful account from the outset. In those circumstances, I place little weight on her uncorroborated evidence. Where her account conflicts with the contemporaneous digital material, professional evidence or inherent probability, I prefer that other evidence without hesitation. I remind myself that dishonesty alone cannot prove responsibility for the injuries. My findings on causation are based on the totality of the evidence.

[8]THE FATHER’S EVIDENCE

[61]The father filed four statements including a response to final threshold. He maintained his position of denying responsibility and being unaware of any cause for the injuries. He no longer challenged the medical evidence and accepted that the injuries were inflicted. As he was not responsible, then it must be the mother who was responsible, but this was expressed with great reluctance.

[62]The father gave evidence over the course of most of the day and, at least superficially, presented as calm, measured and likeable. He was capable of showing genuine emotion, becoming tearful when speaking about A, and his distress in that respect appeared authentic. However, this emotional presentation sat alongside a very strong and persistent attachment to the mother. He openly accepted that he remained in love with her and was “desperate” to reunite the family. That emotional dependency was a central feature of his evidence and, in my assessment, had a significant impact on both the content and reliability of what he told the court.

[63]A consistent and striking theme throughout his evidence was minimisation, as indeed it was with the mother. This applied equally to the mother’s behaviour, his own conduct, and the difficulties within the relationship. He downplayed the incidents of violence perpetrated by the mother, particularly whether they were relevant to A, including occasions when she assaulted him, and at times went as far as attributing partial responsibility to himself for her loss of control. Similarly, he sought to minimise his own behaviour, only accepting that he had been verbally abusive when confronted with clear documentary evidence. This tendency was not confined to isolated points but ran throughout his evidence, suggesting a broader unwillingness to confront matters that might reflect negatively on the relationship or, more particularly, on the mother.

[64]In relation to A’s injuries, the father maintained a firm denial that he was responsible. He did, however, willingly accept the logical proposition that if he had not caused the injuries, the only other possible perpetrator was the mother. Despite this, he had never asked her whether she had harmed A at any stage. His explanation - that they had initially believed there to be a medical cause and that he did not revisit the issue thereafter - is wholly inadequate when set against the seriousness of the injuries and the 3 month time gap before the EDS suggestion. This failure is not simply an omission but is highly significant: it suggests potentially a profound lack of curiosity in circumstances where any reasonable parent would have sought answers, or, more plausibly, a deliberate avoidance of a question he did not wish to confront or even knowledge. It could also suggest knowledge. These are possible inferences; however I assess them alongside other evidence.

[65]The reliability of his evidence was further undermined by his repeated attempts to distance himself from the plain meaning of his own words. When faced with prior statements - whether to the police or in text messages - he frequently asserted that they had been wrongly expressed, misunderstood, or did not reflect what he truly meant. This pattern arose in a number of important contexts, including his description of events concerning the bruise as “a bit of a murky line,” his comments about being forceful during feeding, and his accounts of conflict within the relationship. In each instance, he sought to recast the meaning in a way more favourable to his position. This was not an isolated lapse but a recurring feature of his evidence, and it significantly detracts from its credibility.

[66]There were also numerous and material inconsistencies within his account, both internally and when compared with contemporaneous evidence. In summary, his account of when he first observed bruising to A, and on which side of the body it appeared, shifted over time and could not be reconciled. His description of the events on the night in question was similarly inconsistent, particularly in relation to timing and sequence. He initially gave the police the clear impression that he had been present when blood was discovered but later accepted that he had in fact been asleep and could not explain why he had said otherwise. His accounts of A’s presentation also varied considerably; at times he described him as generally calm, whilst at other points he accepted that he was unsettled and difficult, which is more consistent with the contemporaneous evidence.

[67]Further inconsistencies arose in relation to the relationship itself. He initially described it to the police as “really, really good” with no issues, but later accepted that this was untrue and that there had been arguments, physical and verbal abuse. His evidence was also directly contradicted by the text messages between the parties, which revealed a relationship marked by stress, conflict, and the mother’s evident mental health struggles. His attempts to suggest that he was unaware of those struggles are very difficult to accept given the content of those messages and his replies. Additionally, there were discrepancies in his account of events such as the trip to the pub and the timeline surrounding A’s deterioration, for which his explanation was generally that he was confused or had been mistaken. In the context of serious allegations of harm to a child, those explanations lack credibility.

[68]A particularly important feature of the evidence is the father’s admitted dishonesty. He accepted that he had lied to the police about the nature of the relationship and about incidents of abuse, and that he only corrected those lies after the mother had done so. He also accepted giving misleading accounts about other matters, including alcohol consumption and aspects of the events in question. While he sought to characterise these as unintentional or the product of poor wording, the pattern is clear: he was prepared to mislead where doing so protected the mother or preserved the image of the relationship. This is of considerable significance, as it demonstrates a willingness to prioritise loyalty over truth, putting his relationship and the mother before A’s best interests.

[69]From a legal perspective, these features of his evidence have important implications. In a fact-finding exercise, the court must assess both credibility and reliability. The father’s evidence is materially weakened on both fronts. The inconsistencies in his account, his tendency to minimise and reconstruct his evidence, and his admitted history of lying to the police all significantly reduce the weight that can properly be placed upon his testimony. In those circumstances, the court must treat his evidence with caution and to prefer contemporaneous documentary material, medical evidence, and other objective sources where conflicts arise.

[70]His failure to ask the mother about the injuries, even after accepting that she would be the only alternative perpetrator, is highly probative. It speaks directly to his insight and to his approach to risk or to knowledge. In legal terms, this omission may support an inference that he was either consciously avoiding the truth or was willing to tolerate uncertainty in circumstances where A’s safety demanded clarity. Either interpretation is adverse to him. He answered questions about whether the mother was responsible carefully and specifically, responding that he had not seen the mother do anything to A although he was clear that he did not think she would.

[71]The father’s evidence also has significant implications for findings of fact in relation to threshold. His failure to provide any consistent or credible explanation surrounding any of the injuries, just like the mother, raises questions. Further, where a party is found to have lied about material matters, the court is entitled to consider whether those lies were told to conceal wrongdoing or protect another person. In this case, given the clear pattern of minimisation and his strong emotional allegiance to the mother, there is a real basis for concluding that his dishonesty was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to shield her.

[72]Beyond the immediate fact-finding exercise, his evidence raises serious concerns regarding future risk and protective capacity. He accepted that he had failed to disclose incidents of violence, failed to seek help in the face of obvious difficulties, and “swept things under the rug.” His continuing desire to maintain the relationship, even in circumstances where he accepts that the mother may have caused serious harm to the child, raises profound concerns about his ability to prioritise A’s welfare over his emotional needs. In welfare terms, this goes directly to his capacity to safeguard.

[73]Overall, whilst the father presented as an engaging and at times sympathetic witness, the substance of his evidence was undermined by pervasive inconsistency, minimisation, and admitted dishonesty. His testimony cannot be regarded as reliable and is likely to carry limited weight except where supported by independent evidence. The broader picture that emerges is of a father whose judgment is significantly compromised by his emotional dependence on the mother, and whose account has been shaped accordingly.

[9]SUBMISSIONS

[74]I received oral submissions from all parties and I have carefully considered these when coming to my conclusions, even if I do not specifically address all points made.

[75]Those on behalf of the Local Authority submitted an amended threshold seeking findings against the mother alone as perpetrator of the injuriesand additional findings of failure to protect and verbal domestic abuse against the father. They submitted that the evidence was clear that the mother was the perpetrator. She had opportunity, was struggling, physically abusive to the father, lost control, had lied and was resentful of A at times. Father was also lying at times but was acting out of loyalty to and to protect the mother. He had failed to protect A by his own actions and by lack of actions.

[76]The mother remained adamant that she was not responsible. She did not advance a positive case against the father. She accepted the medical evidence, but that was only one part of the whole picture. She continued to submit that the treating medics could be wrong in relation to bruising and the marks may not have been present pre-procedures at hospital. Her mental health was poor but she had acted to protect A by seeking medical interventions whenever she was concerned. She accepted lying on numerous occasions. She was a loving mother in her positive parenting assessment.

[77]The father maintained his innocence. He did not advance a positive case against the mother, she was the love of his life. He accepted lying on occasion. He was desperately trying to keep his family together and wanted to protect the mother, even by drawing suspicion upon himself by saying that he was present when the bleeding was discovered then backtracking, and admitting being heavy handed with A. He had not failed to protect and was not present when any injuries were inflicted, he saw and heard nothing. He was at work for much of the relevant period working long hours on 4 days. He was aware of the mother’s difficulties but did not take action as he did not see a risk to A.

[78]The Guardian submitted that the mother was to blame for the injuries and the father had failed to protect. All findings could and should be made accordingly. There had been delay of up to 90 minutes before A was taken to hospital. Both parents had lied about various matters, only being truthful when confronted and they had no option. Neither parent had acted in the best interest of A and neither had helped the court. Mother had lost control and was in crisis, under stress, frustrated, struggling with a sickly baby and not supported by the father who actually added to her problems and the risks to A by his own abusive behaviour.

[10]THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING FACT FINDING

[79]The legal framework resolving the schedule of findings sought is well settled and I will only set out a summary here. The written opening from the local authority also provided a detailed review of the relevant law with which I concur and adopt. All has been applied. The core principles were summarised by Baker J (as he then was) in Re JS

[2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam)

and approved in many cases since including Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children; Fact Finding Hearing)

[2014] EWFC 3

; Re U; Re B

[2004] EWCA Civ 567

; Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators)

[2022] EWCA Civ 1348

; Y, V and B (Fact-Finding: Perpetrator)

; Re L-W (Children)

; G-L-T (Children)

; Re A (A Child)

; Re H-C (Children)

and others.

[80]The burden of proof rests on the Local Authority. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Findings must therefore be based on evidence and not on suspicion or speculation. The court must decide whether an alleged fact did or did not occur; there is no intermediate position. In assessing the evidence, I consider the totality of the material before the court. Each strand of evidence must be evaluated in the context of the whole, and not in isolation. This includes the expert medical evidence, the contemporaneous documentary and digital material, and the oral evidence of the parties and witnesses.

[81]Expert evidence must be considered alongside all other evidence. Whilst it is often of central importance, the court retains the responsibility for determining the ultimate issues. The role of the expert is to assist; it is the function of the court to evaluate the evidence as a whole.

[82]The evidence of the parents is of particular importance. In assessing credibility and reliability, I bear in mind the guidance in R v Lucas. A witness may lie for a variety of reasons, including fear, shame, panic or misplaced loyalty. The fact that a witness has been untruthful about some matters does not mean that they have been untruthful about everything. Before drawing an adverse inference, I must be satisfied that any untruth is deliberate, material, and not explained by mistake, confusion or other innocent cause.

[83]I also distinguish between credibility and reliability. A witness may be doing their best to tell the truth yet be mistaken; equally, a witness may be untruthful about some matters but still provide accurate evidence on others. I have assessed each piece of evidence on its merits. Demeanour is an unreliable guide and I place limited weight upon it. Presentation in the witness box, including emotional display or lack of it, is an unreliable guide to truthfulness. My findings are based on the substance of the evidence, its consistency with contemporaneous material, and inherent probability, rather than presentation alone.

[84]Where the court is satisfied that a child has suffered non‑accidental injury, it should, if possible, identify the perpetrator on the balance of probabilities. If it cannot do so, it must consider whether there is a real possibility that a particular individual was involved, such that they should be included in a pool of possible perpetrators. The core principle is that if the evidence is insufficient to identify a specific perpetrator, the court should not create one. It should not start from the assumption that a perpetrator must be found in every case. In considering causation, I also bear in mind that in some cases the cause of injury may remain unknown. That possibility must be taken into account, but it does not alter the burden or standard of proof.

[85]It is of course also relevant to the welfare stage if I am unable to identify the perpetrator. A child would remain considered at risk even if the actual perpetrator could not be identified and my views would still be relevant in considering the welfare stage of proceedings.

[86]Allegations of failure to protect require a separate analysis. The question is whether, on the evidence, a parent knew or ought reasonably to have known that the child was at risk of harm and failed to take reasonable steps to safeguard the child. Such findings must not be treated as automatic or “bolt‑on” conclusions.

[87]I have also considered the recent case of Hayden J, Lancashire County Council v M, F, A & J

[2023] EWHC 3097

where the judge found the father to be the perpetrator contrary to the submissions of the Local Authority and the Guardian after considering propensity. Hayden J addressed in detail the issue of propensity evidence and criminal matters at paragraphs 37 to 42 and in family matters from paragraphs 43 to 51. Mr Justice Hayden underlined the duty on judges to draw on the totality of a wide canvas of evidence and, where that evidence permits, to identify the perpetrator of significant harm. He reminded us that this evaluation is carried out on the balance of probabilities (nothing more, nothing less) and, while this builds in a risk of error, lawyers and judges should not shirk that obligation out of an abundance of caution. The wide canvas of evidence invariably includes a variety of evidence, including hearsay and evidence of propensity to cause harm. Drawing together that evidence and properly drawing inferences from it assists in building a picture of the family’s life at the point at which significant harm is caused. Identifying the perpetrator avoids tainting the non-perpetrator parent while also providing the foundations for constructive and safe strategies for a child’s future care.

[88]The mother, supported by the father, initially relied upon research literature concerning bone health and hypermobility associated with Ehlers–Danlos Syndrome (“EDS”). That material was provided to the instructed experts in advance, and written questions were permitted in order to narrow the issues. Each expert confirmed that the literature had been considered. Notwithstanding this, their opinions remained unchanged. I have had regard in this context to A County Council v A Mother & Ors

[2018] EWHC 3283 (Fam)

. That authority makes clear that there is no reliable scientific basis to conclude that hypermobile EDS (“hEDS”) predisposes infants to fractures in the absence of identified bone fragility. Even where hEDS is present, it does not explain the number, type or distribution of injuries, which remain indicative of trauma requiring an external force. In that case, the evidence of Professor Holick, advancing a theory of “temporary brittle bone”, was rejected on the basis that it lacked scientific rigour, relied on flawed material, and did not meet the standards of independence and reliability required of expert evidence. The decision underlines that arguments founded on EDS must be supported by mainstream and robust medical evidence.

[89]Following late consideration of that authority, neither parent ultimately relied upon Professor Holick’s views or the research literature, although there remained some limited suggestion in cross-examination that EDS might have contributed to the injuries. The proper treatment of medical literature has more recently been considered in Re D and A (Fact-Finding: Research Literature)

[2024] EWCA Civ 663

, where the Court of Appeal cautioned against a court undertaking its own analysis of research material in a manner which displaces or distorts the expert evidence.

[90]The court’s task is to evaluate the totality of the evidence, including the oral evidence of the experts, in accordance with established principles (see Re T

[2004] EWCA Civ 558

). As confirmed in Collier v Simpson (1831), A County Council v K, D & L

[2005] EWHC 144 (Fam)

, and Re BR (Proof of Facts)

[2015] EWFC 41

, medical literature may inform expert opinion but does not replace it, and the court must avoid substituting its own scientific analysis for that of the experts. Finally, I remind myself that my task is to evaluate the evidence on a broad, holistic basis, drawing such inferences as are properly open to me, and reaching conclusions based on the balance of probabilities, no more and no less.

[11]ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The approach to the evidence

[91]I have considered all of the evidence in this case, both oral and documentary, including the expert medical evidence, the contemporaneous digital material, the oral evidence of each witness, and the submissions made on behalf of all parties. I have had regard to the legal principles set out above. I remind myself that the burden of proving the allegations rests upon the Local Authority, and that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. I have been careful not to reverse that burden at any stage. Findings must be based upon evidence, including proper inferences drawn from that evidence, and not upon suspicion or speculation. I have considered the evidence holistically, evaluating each strand in the context of the others. Where issues of credibility arise, I adopt the approach set out in R v Lucas and the subsequent family authorities.

[92]I also bear firmly in mind that A has a right, so far as it is possible, to know the truth about what has happened to him.

[93]In reaching my conclusions I have considered the totality of the evidence, adopting a broad evaluative and holistic approach consistent with the guidance in Re U, Re B (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof)

[2004] EWCA Civ 567

. I have sought to assess how the various strands of evidence fit together coherently to create the full picture. Sadly, this has proven very difficult to do in circumstances where both parents have repeatedly told lies and neither has offered any information at all as to how the injuries have occurred.

[94]This duty to identify the perpetrator and cause of the injuries for A’s benefit, was made more difficult until part way through the case, at the time of the evidence of Dr Rose, when the mother’s position changed. Until then, she pursued a position whereby she submitted that the fractures and some or all of the bruising were caused by A suffering from Ehlers Danlos Syndrome and thus she contested the medical evidence. She submitted a number or research papers which she had obtained herself which she said supported her theory. These were from a number of mainly discredited professionals including or linked to Professor Michael Holick who was severely criticised by Mr Justice Newton in 2018. The mother withdrew her argument in relation to EDS after considering that case, A County Council v A Mother & Ors

[2018] EWHC 3283 (Fam)

, and hearing from Dr Rose. The father had also aligned himself with the mother’s theory. The impression which the court had was that neither parent, but particularly the mother, was happy to withdraw their hypothesis and the court was reminded during submissions that the medical evidence was only one aspect of the case despite the evidence being unopposed.

[95]An alternative theory which was pursued, was that the bruising injuries were caused by the treating medics at the hospital when they carried out emergency procedures on A such as a lumbar puncture. This was addressed at length in evidence.

[96]Given the evolution of the Local Authority’s case, I remind myself that I must independently evaluate the case against each parent on the evidence, and not simply adopt the Local Authority’s final position The medical evidence

[97]The medical evidence was clear and, by the conclusion of the hearing, gave rise to no material dispute. Having considered it, I accept the evidence of Dr Rose and Dr Johnson. I am satisfied that A sustained posterior rib fractures requiring significant force well beyond normal or even rough handling, and that there is no accidental or medical explanation for these injuries. I am also satisfied that the bruises (other than bruises 1 and 2) were caused by trauma and were present prior to any hospital procedures. There is no credible medical explanation for them. There is no evidence that A suffers from any condition, including Ehlers‑Danlos Syndrome, which would predispose him to fractures or unexplained bruising.

[98]I find on the balance of probabilities that A sustained non‑accidental injuries comprising rib fractures and bruising; the injuries occurred between [dates] 2025; they were caused by the application of force by a carer; and A, as a non‑mobile infant, could not have caused them himself. I have considered whether the injuries arose from one event or multiple episodes. The medical evidence does not assist in coming to any conclusion, nor did the parents’ evidence. I am unable to decide whether there was one or more instances of abuse.

[99]In relation to the bruising, I am satisfied that the marks identified on A’s body were bruises rather than transient red pressure marks. The medical evidence clearly establishes that marks persisting beyond a short timeframe of around 30 minutes, and particularly those visible across photographs taken some time apart, represent bruising rather than pressure marks. The court had the benefit of photographs taken considerably in excess of 30 minutes following any procedure and the marks were still visible. The court also had the testimony of the treating medics who denied causing any injury and of Dr Rose who confirmed that he had never seen any such bruising caused during these procedures.

[100]There is no credible medical explanation for these bruises. They were not caused by medical intervention and were present prior to invasive procedures. Neither parent has provided any credible, or indeed any, explanation as to how the bruises have occurred and the absence of explanation caused Dr Rose significant concern. A has also not suffered from further bruising during his 11 months in foster care. The parents as witnesses

[101]I have already addressed the parents’ evidence earlier in this judgment, but I now address this further in relation to the findings specifically and consider the reliability of the parents as witnesses. It is a striking and regrettable feature of this case that both parents have been dishonest throughout. Their dishonesty extends beyond minor inconsistencies and touches upon central and material issues including their relationship, the mother’s mental health, the extent of conflict in the household, and the events leading up to A’s presentation at hospital.

[102]In evaluating this, I have applied the safeguards set out above. I do not treat dishonesty as determinative of responsibility. Rather, I consider whether any untruth is deliberate and material; whether it may be explained by stress, confusion or other innocent causes; and what, if any, inference may properly be drawn in the context of all the evidence. I also bear in mind that these events occurred at a time of stress, fatigue and emotional pressure, which may affect memory and the accuracy of recall. Some inconsistencies may arise from those factors. However, having considered these matters carefully, I find that the pattern of inconsistency and inaccuracy in both parents’ accounts goes beyond what can reasonably be explained by stress or mistake

[103]I accept that individuals may lie for a variety of reasons, including shame, fear or misplaced loyalty, as recognised in Lucas. However, in this case the pattern of dishonesty is extensive and persistent. Both parents misled professionals including the police at the earliest stage and continued to do so until confronted with objective evidence, particularly the phone material. The father even continued to lie afterwards to the police, including in his February 2026 police interview when he continued to minimise the mother’s violence towards him, and even sought to blame himself for this, so strong is his desire to protect her. Both of them continued to lie until this court hearing about certain issues such as the ongoing relationship and both lied and minimised throughout their oral evidence to the court in relation to A’s injuries and interpretation of events and messages. They sought to suggest that it was third party understanding which was the issue, not the actual and clear meaning of the contents of some of the text messages. In my judgment, The father lied at every opportunity throughout this case where it would assist the mother, such is the strength of his feelings for her and his wish for full reconciliation with the love of his life, despite the fact that he knows that she must be responsible for causing the injuries to A, his only son, if it was not him. The disclosure in the medical records of the fact that the father looked at / to the mother at the time of his arrest, in shock, adds to this and the suggestion in cross examination that he was seeking for her to speak up is persuasive.

[104]The phone disclosure provided by the police and later phone analysis significantly undermined the credibility of the parents and the portrait of their lives which they had provided. They have misled the court about a number of serious and relevant issues as well as the state of their relationship. There are many other indicators that the parents’ dishonesty has continued in relation to the injuries, including:• The delay in presentation of A at hospital between discovery of the blood stained spit/vomit at [time] and triage at [time]am despite the close distance between the two, which remains unexplained;

• The multitude of inconsistencies between the parents’ accounts of the discovery of the injuries to A, even when given the next day in police interviews and at the hospital on the night;

• The attempts to blame professionals for bruises to A, despite the fact the mother knew there were ‘bruises all over his back’ as of [time] the night of [date] 2025 from her google search;

• It is possible that the parents were collaborating on their accounts given to professionals from the start, this could explain the missing 60-90 minutes before presentation at hospital and why the maternal grandfather was not woken;

• The parents only admitting in evidence at court that their relationship has continued and

• There is also the issue that the father was searching the internet as to whether their baby monitor creates recordings immediately after replacing his phone handset after his police interview on [date] 2025.

[105]In such circumstances, I approach the oral evidence of both parents with considerable caution. I place limited weight on their uncorroborated oral evidence where it conflicts with objective material. I give greater weight to contemporaneous records, including messages and medical evidence, which I regard as more reliable. The wider evidential context

[106]The contemporaneous digital evidence provides a starkly different picture from that initially presented by the parents. I find that they reveal a household under very considerable strain. The mother was struggling emotionally and physically. She was exhausted, anxious, at times overwhelmed by A’s needs and had difficulty coping. The messages show that A was unsettled, difficult to settle, and required constant care and attention. The mother was worried that A had an undiagnosed serious medical condition and was also frustrated that the father did not seem to agree, she felt that as her boyfriend he should take her side. This is also evidence of her controlling nature towards him. The father was aware of these difficulties.

[107]There was significant tension within the relationship, including verbal and physical aggression. The parents argued frequently, including about intimacy. The mother exhibited frustration towards A and at times expressed regret about having him so young. She also used inappropriate and concerning language when referring to him. She felt utterly unsupported by the father, was not coping and instead of support from him, she received verbal abuse, adding to her already low mood. At no stage, did she seek any support for her own mental health issues during this period despite a number of medical appointments for A. She told everyone relevant that all was well. It was only the father who was and should have been fully aware of how she was feeling from the text messages. These he attempted to deny reading, then when it was clear that he had replied to them, dismissed them due to mother’s “dramatics” and showed more concern about the relationship itself rather than the mother or A. His denials of any issues at all in the relationship to the assessing social worker and the police and even to the court during his evidence “things felt really good” were surprising. This was particularly so when he had already been assaulted twice by the mother in recent days and he also admitted in evidence, when discussing the time of discovering the linear bruise, that he was trying to keep the family together at that point. This was not a happy functioning household. It was a family in crisis. None of this information was given to the assessing social workers during the parenting assessment and in my judgment, these lies negate the positive conclusion. It was based on a non-existent fallacy. The relationship was not, as initially portrayed, stable and harmonious.

[108]These factors - emotional instability, exhaustion, conflict and lack of support - constitute a constellation of well-recognised risk factors in cases of non-accidental injury to infants. These matters as a whole form part of the evidential context. I do not treat them as proof of causation, but as relevant background when assessing likelihood and risk. The circumstances of the injuries and opportunity

[109]The injuries were sustained whilst A was in the care of his parents and no other potential perpetrators have been identified. The accounts of the parents were marked by significant and material inconsistencies. They cannot agree on when bruising was first observed, where it was located, when A was fed, when blood was discovered, at times who was present in the room at the time, or the sequence of events leading to the hospital attendance. These inconsistencies are compounded by an unexplained delay of between one and one and a half hours between the discovery of blood and presentation at hospital, despite the hospital being a short distance away. This was neglectful.

[110]I attach particular significance to the mother’s internet search referring to A having “bruises all over his back”. That search is inconsistent with her assertion that she had only seen a single mark and evidences knowledge of more extensive injury. I dismiss her suggestion that it was not meant as such and that she meant just one bruise. It is simply untenable. I do not treat this as conclusive evidence, but I consider that it is more consistent with awareness of multiple marks than with her later accounts.

[111]I also take into account the parents’ failure to disclose that they had been arguing prior to A becoming unwell and consider the discrepancies of those events, including the suggestion that they were in the same room but texting so as not to argue in front of A. I reject this suggestion – they frequently argued in front of A and the father was assaulted twice by the mother when A was present. The use of texts suggests that the parents were in different rooms after the argument, an argument which both parents attempted to downplay in their evidence.

[112]When viewed cumulatively, and adding in the inconsistencies in evidence throughout, these features point strongly to a deliberate attempt to obscure the true sequence of events.

[113]I have considered carefully the opportunity each parent had to cause the injuries. Both parents had care of A during the relevant period. Although the father was absent for work for significant periods, he nevertheless had contact with A during the timeframe in question. Accordingly, I do not exclude him on the basis of opportunity alone. I therefore approach the matter on the basis that both parents are realistic potential perpetrators, and I consider the case against each individually. Assessment of the mother

[114]The mother’s evidence is fundamentally unreliable. It is inconsistent, contradicted by objective material, and characterised by minimisation and reconstruction. She demonstrated a clear pattern of dishonesty, particularly in relation to her mental health and the nature of the relationship. Her concessions were made only when she could no longer maintain her position in the face of documentary evidence. The contemporaneous evidence reveals that she was struggling severely, was frustrated with A, and was experiencing significant emotional distress. Importantly, she demonstrated a capacity to lose control, as evidenced by her assaults upon the father.

[115]In accordance with Re H-C (Children), I am entitled to consider the nature and purpose of her lies. In my judgment, they are directed towards self-protection and concealment.

[116]In assessing the likelihood of the mother being responsible, I take into account her primary role in A’s day‑to‑day care; the pressures and emotional distress she was experiencing; the evidence of her loss of control in other contexts; inconsistencies in her accounts; conflict between her accounts and contemporaneous material and the absence of any credible explanation from her. Each of these matters is capable of an innocent explanation to some degree. I do not treat any one of them as determinative. Rather, I assess their cumulative weight. Assessment of the father

[117]The father is also unreliable, but in a materially different way. He has been dishonest, including to the police, particularly in relation to the relationship and incidents of domestic abuse. However, his dishonesty often places him in a worse position rather than a better one and is not readily explicable as an attempt to conceal his own wrongdoing. It was submitted that that his behaviour is best understood as an attempt to protect the mother. His failure to disclose her violence, his minimisation of her difficulties and his continuing commitment to her all support that conclusion.

[118]Most strikingly, he admitted that he failed to ask the mother how A came to be injured at any time. That omission is highly significant and supports an inference that he either knew or strongly suspected the answer and chose not to confront it. His suggestion that they relied on the EDS issue is extremely weak as there were time periods before the issue was raised and he has always been aware that the court and the professionals were sceptical about EDS being relevant. At best it was only a possibility, yet he never thought to ask about any alternate scenarios.

[119]His conduct demonstrates a consistent prioritisation of his relationship with the mother over the welfare of A.

[120]In relation to the father, I consider his opportunity to care for A; his admitted dishonesty, particularly in relation to the relationship; his minimisation of the mother’s difficulties; his failure to ask the mother about the injuries; his continuing emotional attachment to her. I accept that his dishonesty may be explained, at least in part, by a desire to protect the mother rather than conceal his own wrongdoing. I weigh that explanation in his favour, but it does not remove the need to consider his potential responsibility. Identification of the perpetrator

[121]I now consider whether the Local Authority has established, on the balance of probabilities, the identity of the perpetrator. I remind myself expressly:• that I must not reason by elimination alone;

• that I must consider each parent separately;

• that if I cannot identify the perpetrator, I must say so. I have also considered whether the cause of the injuries may remain unknown. However, having reviewed all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the case does not fall into that category. The medical evidence is clear.

[122]The pool of possible perpetrators is limited to the parents and I have considered each individually. The question is whether I can go further and identify the perpetrator. Considering the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied that I can. My conclusion is based on the cumulative effect of the evidence, including the timing and nature of the injuries; the care arrangements during the relevant period; the mother’s greater day‑to‑day responsibility; the contemporaneous evidence as to her emotional state; her capacity for loss of control; the inconsistencies and unreliability of her accounts; the internet search, which I find more likely than not reflects awareness of multiple injuries; the father’s evidence, which I find more consistent with concealment and protection of the mother than with direct involvement; the absence of any plausible alternative explanation. The mother reported no concerns about his care of A, he had very limited opportunities to care for A alone, and even those were for very short periods of time with the mother present or close by and she reported no events or distress shown by A such as that described as likely by the medical experts at the time of the injuries.

[123]Standing back and considering all of the evidence, and applying the balance of probabilities, I find that the mother inflicted the injuries. I emphasise that this conclusion is not based on demeanour, nor on dishonesty alone, but on the totality of the evidence. My conclusion does not arise from the mere fact that one parent appears less likely, but from positive findings as to the mother’s actions, state of mind and knowledge of injuries. I do not rely on emotional stress or prior aggression as proof of causation. Rather, these factors inform the likelihood of loss of control in the presence of A when combined with factors including the timing, opportunity and her knowledge of bruising. The father’s failure to protect

[124]The issue is whether the father knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that A was at risk of harm and failed to take reasonable steps to safeguard him. This involves distinguishing ordinary parenting difficulties from circumstances giving rise to a real risk of significant harm.

[125]In my judgment, the evidence established that the father was well aware that the mother was struggling to cope with both A’s care and her mental health. The contemporaneous messages demonstrate that she was overwhelmed, particularly when left alone with A for extended periods. She told the father repeatedly that she was exhausted, unable to cope, and that caring for A was “too much”. He was also aware that her emotional state had deteriorated following A’s birth, as evidenced by expressions of frustration, regret, and distress. Taken together, these were clear indicators of escalating emotional strain beyond the ordinary challenges of caring for a newborn.

[126]Of particular significance, the father knew that the mother had a capacity for loss of control. He described two incidents of physical aggression towards him, including one arising out of an argument about A. These incidents demonstrated impulsive and disproportionate behaviour when under pressure. Whilst not determinative of a risk to a child, they were a clear indicator of emotional dysregulation which, in the context of a vulnerable infant and mounting stress, pointed to a real and foreseeable risk of harm.

[127]Despite that knowledge, the father failed to take meaningful protective action. He continued to leave A in the mother’s sole care for prolonged periods whilst at work, at a time when the pressures upon her were acute and A was unsettled and demanding. He did not seek support from professionals or family members, nor did he take practical steps to reduce her burden. This was not a case where support was unavailable, but rather where it was not pursued. On occasions, his own conduct exacerbated the situation: he accepted that he was verbally abusive towards the mother, even when aware of her difficulties.

[128]The significance of these failures is heightened when considering the period during which the injuries were sustained. The father knew that A was unsettled and difficult to manage and that the mother was struggling to cope whilst caring for him alone for most of the time. There were clear warning signs. He accepted that he had observed bruising on A prior to hospital attendance, yet no prompt or appropriate medical attention was sought. When the situation later escalated and blood was observed, there was a further delay in seeking treatment. These were missed opportunities to intervene and to prioritise A’s welfare.

[129]The father’s conduct following the injuries reinforces this conclusion. He did not seek any explanation from the mother, despite accepting that, if he was not responsible, she must have been. That omission is not adequately explained by inexperience or confusion; rather, it reflects a reluctance to confront the reality of what had occurred. He also misled professionals about the nature of the relationship and incidents of domestic abuse, only acknowledging them when faced with contrary evidence. His accounts of key events were inconsistent.

[130]I accept that his dishonesty may have been motivated, at least in part, by a desire to protect the mother. However, that does not mitigate his failure; it reinforces it. By prioritising her over the need to establish the truth, he placed A at further risk and impeded the investigation. A central feature of the case is the father’s prioritisation of his relationship with the mother over A’s welfare. He demonstrated an unwillingness to challenge or distance himself from her, even in circumstances where he accepted she may have caused serious harm. This dynamic explains his minimisation of her difficulties and his failure to take protective steps.

[131]Standing back, I am satisfied that the father knew the mother was emotionally overwhelmed, knew of her capacity for loss of control and violence, knew that A was unsettled and demanding, and knew that the relationship was unstable. These matters would have alerted a reasonable parent to a real, not merely theoretical, risk of physical harm.

[132]Notwithstanding that knowledge, he failed to act. He did not seek support, reduce the risk, respond adequately to signs of injury, obtain timely medical care, or challenge the mother. In doing so, he failed to place A’s welfare above all else. These failures cannot be explained by mere inexperience or misjudgement. They amount to a sustained pattern of inaction in the face of clear and escalating risk.

[133]I therefore find, on the balance of probabilities, that the father failed to protect A from foreseeable harm, and that his omissions materially contributed to the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained. Overall conclusion

[134]Drawing all matters together, I find that A sustained non-accidental injuries, comprising rib fractures and bruising, inflicted within the period [dates] 2025. I find that the perpetrator of those injuries was the mother. I further find that the father failed to protect A from harm and acted in a way which concealed the true circumstances, both failed to seek timely medical attention for him. I find that the parents’ relationship is domestically abusive. I have reached these findings having carefully applied the legal principles, including those relating to burden of proof, the assessment of evidence, and the proper approach to issues of credibility and reliability.

[135]This is a deeply concerning case. Both parents have failed to tell the truth. The mother inflicted serious harm upon a vulnerable infant. The father, though not the perpetrator, failed to discharge his fundamental duty as a parent by prioritising his relationship with the mother over the safety and welfare of his child.

[136]I make the findings as sought by the Local Authority in full with the exception of finding 16 for the obvious reason that I have found the mother to be the sole perpetrator of the injuries. For the sake of clarity, I do not make findings in relation to bruises 1 and 2 but I do make the finding in relation to the balance of the other injuries.

DECISION

[137]I make the findings as stated. Her Honour Judge Hesford 28 May 2026 NOTE: Please ensure that the court appointed experts are provided with either a copy of the finalised judgment or at least the detail about their role and the findings, and that they are thanked by the court for their assistance.