F v M [2026] EWFC 116 (B)

[2026] EWFC 116 (B)THE FAMILY COURTSITTING AT OXFORDHearing heard on 30 th APRIL TO 1 st MAY 2026JUDGMENT HANDED DOWN ON 22 nd MAY 2026Before Her Honour Judge OwensFAndMThe Applicant, F, represented by Ms Scarsbrook, CounselThe First Respondent, M, represented by Mr Harris, CounselFClaimantMDefendantThis judgment is being handed down in private on 22 nd May 2025. It consists of 29 pages and has been signed and dated by the judge. The Judge has given permission for judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the adult members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties and the child will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.Date 2026-05-22

Introduction

[1]This case concerns one child, A, his parents are M and F. A was born in 2017. M and F were in a relationship from 2016 to end of May 2025. In July 2025 M left the area that she had lived in with F and moved to this area with A. She did not tell F where she and A went to.[2]On 26th August 2025 F made an application to his local court which started these proceedings. On 24th September M filed an application seeking to adjourn the first hearing on 26th September. The applications were considered on 26th September 2025 by a District Judge and transferred to the Family Court in Wiltshire. However, since neither party was resident in Wiltshire, proceedings were then further transferred to this court. M was ordered to make A available for indirect video contact with F on Saturdays at 2pm, Tuesdays at 6.30pm and Thursdays at 6.30pm. The paternal grandparents were permitted to join in that contact.[3]On 28th September 2025 F filed a C2 application seeking an urgent section 7 report and interim orders including disclosure of where A was going to school, where he was living and his GP. On 15th October 2025 F made another application again asking for an urgent section 7 report and other section 8 orders including disclosure of A’s address, school and GP. Those applications were considered on the papers on 23rd October 2025 and CAFCASS safeguarding was directed with the matter listed for a First Hearing Dispute Resolution Hearing on 23rd December 2025.[4]On 3rd November 2025 F filed a C79 application to enforce the indirect contact that had been ordered on 26th September 2025.[5]At the FHDRA on 23rd December 2025, CAFCASS safeguarding had been completed. DJ Chataway ordered indirect contact and supervised direct contact with F once per month, that there should be a Fact-Finding Hearing (FFH) listed with a time estimate of 2 days, and parties were to file their evidence starting with M and then F responding. F was also to undergo drug testing and M to provide a letter from her GP. M was also ordered to provide F with monthly updates in relation to A, including education and healthcare.[6]On 15th January 2026 M made an application for an extension of time to file her statement, for special measures at the FFH and for an order limiting disclosure. The application for an extension of time was granted by DJ Chataway on the papers on 11th February 2026, though the order was not sent to the parties until 20th March 2026. He directed that the FFH and a Pre-Trial Review (PTR) were to be listed as soon as possible and the special measures sought were to be considered at the PTR.[7]On 2nd March 2026 F agreed to undertake shuttle mediation with M. By this point no direct supervised contact had taken place between A and F and only one update had been sent to F by M about A, notwithstanding earlier court orders.[8]I conducted the PTR on 30th March 2026 and made orders in respect of special measures, to extend indirect contact, for supervised contact to take place on 12th April 2026, that A’s school and GP should be disclosed to F, statements from each parent addressing the failure of direct contact to take place, limiting the FFH to allegations made by M against F only, and timetabling the FFH with a reserved judgment to be handed down on 6th May 2026 given the scope of evidence to be considered at the FFH.[9]I have read the evidence contained in the Bundle prepared for this FFH, and heard evidence from M and F.[10]The nature of M’s case changed significantly after oral evidence from each party and during closing submissions. Essentially, issues of fact largely fell away, and it became clear that there was a point of law potentially in issue about M’s allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour by F. This led to advocates needing time to research the relevant law, and so I gave additional time for them to produce written submissions and extended the time for judgment to be handed down to 22nd May 2026.

Parties’ Positions

[11]M alleges that she has been a victim of domestic abuse by F in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour arising from a pattern of behaviour by F. She does not allege that F perpetrated any other form of abuse including financial abuse. She accepts that F had no intention of controlling or coercing her or of being abusive. Her case is that she had been made to feel that her autonomy had been eroded over years but, in closing, made clear that she did not think that F intended any of the alleged acts or inactions that she relied upon as having that result. She also asserted that, as her mental health deteriorated towards the end of the relationship, F should have taken proactive steps to address this.[12]F denies that he has committed domestic abuse as alleged and, whilst accepting many of the facts relied upon by M in support of her case, denies that he intended to cause M to be coerced and controlled.

Relevant legal considerations

[13]Practice Direction 12J is applicable given the allegations and is what has led to this separate FFH. It contains relevant definitions at para 1 which I have summarised as follows:a. Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following: physical or sexual abuse, violent or threatening behaviour, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse, psychological emotional or other abuse and it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.b. “coercive behaviour” means an act or pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish or frighten the victim; andc. “controlling behaviour” means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour.[14]Applying A (No.2) (Children) (Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947:
‘[100] The questions for every fact-finding are What, When, Where, Who, How and Why? Their significance and difficulty varies from case to case. Some answers will be obvious while other questions can be extremely hard or even unanswerable. Sometimes a question may not need answering at all. At all events the questions come in no set order and each inquiry will suggest its own starting point. It will no doubt find apparently solid ground and progress from there, but conclusions can only ever be provisional until they have been checked against each other so as to arrive at a coherent outcome. At each stage, regard is had to the inherent probabilities and improbabilities surrounding what are inevitably abnormal circumstances.’
[15]The burden of proof is on the person making the allegations and the standard of proof is to the civil standard, ie on balance of probabilities (Re H-C (Finding of Fact: Rehearing) [2016] EWFC 48,and Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS Intervening) [2008] UKHL 35). There is no burden of proof on the person against whom allegations are made to disprove them, or to provide alternative explanations (Lancashire County Council v. R and W [2013] EWHC 3064 (Fam)). If an allegation is not proved then the court will disregard it entirely, similarly if it is proved the court will treat it as established and it will form the factual matrix against which welfare decisions will subsequently be made.[16]Findings of fact must be based on evidence, suspicion is not proof, and the court is entitled when determining whether or not a fact has been proved on the balance of probabilities to have regard to the inherent probability or improbability when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, an event occurred (Re B ibid). It is essential to include in any assessment or evaluation every aspect of a case and take fully into account the demeanour of the parent (Leeds CC v. YX & ZX [2008] EWHC 802 (Fam)). The court takes a ‘wide canvas’ approach, and scrutinises relationships over time, rather than applying criminal definitions (Re A [2022] EWHC 3089 (Fam)).[17]Coercive and controlling behaviour was considered by Hayden J in F v. M [2021] EWFC 4, who held that coercive and controlling behaviour is a term that: ‘[4]…is unambiguous and needs no embellishment. Understanding the scope and ambit of the behaviour however, requires recognition that “coercion” will usually involve a pattern of acts encompassing, for example, assault, intimidation, humiliation and threats. “controlling behaviour” really involves a range of acts designed to render an individual subordinate and to corrode their sense of personal autonomy. Key to both behaviours is an appreciation of a “pattern” or “a series of acts”, the impact of which must be assessed cumulatively and rarely in isolation.”[18]The approach of the court in F v. M was endorsed in Re H-N & Others [2021] EWCA Civ 448. Both cases considered the statutory guidance issued by the Home Office pursuant to section 77(1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and endorsed the relevance of that guidance to the evaluation of evidence in the Family Court. That guidance quoted a useful definition from Coercive Control – Women’s Aid“Coercive control creates invisible chains and a sense of fear that pervades all elements of a victim’s life. It works to limit their human rights by depriving them of their liberty and reducing their ability for action”. Paragraph 32 of the guidance lists various examples of behaviours that are within the range of controlling or coercive behaviour as follows:
“Physical and sexual violence/abuse and violent behaviour • Physical violence, and threats of physical violence; • Physical intimidation e.g. blocking doors, clenching or shaking fists, slamming doors, hitting walls, pretending to hit or swing, throwing objects at or around the victim, displaying weapons or harmful objects, driving dangerously or erratically with the victim in the car; and • Sexual assault, coercion or abuse, and threats of sexual assault. Emotional and psychological abuse • Abuse relating to faith or beliefs; • Verbal abuse; • Constant criticism of the victim’s role as a partner, spouse or parent; • Criticising the victim’s choice of friends and associates; • Intentionally undermining and/or manipulating the victim; and • Posting unwanted messages on the victim’s social media. Controlling behaviours • Controlling or monitoring the victim’s daily activities and behaviour, for example making them account for their time, dictating what they can wear, what and when they can eat, when and where they may sleep, who they meet or talk to, where they may work, restricting access to training/development etc.; • Using digital systems, such as smart devices or social media, to coerce, control, upset and monitor the victim (e.g. restricting and checking phone use, needing to know passwords for accounts, using location tracking on devices, posting of a possibly triggering image); • Controlling and monitoring the victim’s access to their post; • Acts of coercion or force to persuade the victim to do something that they are unwilling to do; • Economic abuse (e.g. coerced debt, controlling spending/bank accounts/investments/mortgages/benefit payments); • Using a victim’s workplace to control them, e.g. denying access to work, dictating where they work, turning up at work; • Making and enforcing rules and regulations that the victim is expected to follow and using punishments to make them comply e.g. making accusations or humiliating a person in public or private for deviating from the rules; • Coercing the victim into carrying out criminal behaviour such as selling drugs or carrying weapons; • Following the victim and/or appearing unexpectedly, e.g. at their place of work or at places where they are meeting friends; • Reproductive coercion, including restricting a victim’s access to birth control; refusing to use a birth control method; forced pregnancy; forcing a victim to get an abortion, to undergo in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or other procedure; or denying access to such a procedure; • Using substances such as alcohol or drugs to control a victim through dependency, or controlling their access to substances; • Using child arrangements and child maintenance to control the victim. Restrictive behaviours • Withholding and/or destroying the victim’s immigration documents, e.g. passports and visas; • Preventing normal leisure activities such as volunteering, joining local clubs and groups, sports teams, civil/charitable activity, etc.; • Preventing the victim from learning a language, improving their existing language skills, such as English if this is not their first language, or making friends outside of their ethnic/ or cultural background; • Refusing to interpret (including British Sign Language, BSL, for deaf victims) on behalf of the victim; • Hindering access to communication, e.g. refusing to make information accessible, denying access to communication support tools, augmentative and alternative communication (AAC), and/or professionals who support communication; • Restricting access to health and social care appointments, or preventing the victim from accessing health or social care, including refusing to allow the victim to attend appointments alone (especially relevant for victims with disabilities or long-term health conditions); • Preventing the victim from taking medication, or accessing medical equipment, or over-medicating them; and • Isolating the victim from family, friends, colleagues and professionals who may be trying to support them, intercepting messages or phone calls. Threatening behaviours • Threats of being placed in an institution against the victim’s will, e.g. care home, supported living facility, mental health facility, etc. (particularly for disabled or elderly victims); • Threats to expose/exposure of sensitive information (e.g. sexual activity, private sexual photos or films,[footnote 18] sexual orientation and/or transgender identity), or making false allegations to family members, friends, work colleagues, community or others, including via photos or the internet; • Making false allegations to statutory agencies (e.g. Police, Children’s Services, Jobcentre, Child Maintenance Services); • Using children to control the victim, e.g. threatening to take the children away, threatening to harm the children; • Using pets to control or coerce a victim, e.g. harming, or threatening to harm or give away pets; • Intimidation and threats of disclosure of health status or an impairment to family, friends, work colleagues and the wider community, particularly where this may carry a stigma in the community; • Threats to the victim, including to their family, friends and pets, that make them feel afraid; • Threats to report a victim to immigration enforcement and/or the police, or threaten to remove the victim to their country of origin; and • Intimidation or threats to go to the police to report alleged offending.”
Emotional and psychological abuse Controlling behaviours Restrictive behaviours

Threatening behaviours

[19]Not all poor behaviour in the context of a relationship is abusive, and much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour applying Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121. Re H-N also recognised and endorsed this. Similarly, in K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468and inA v K (Appeal: Fact Finding: PD12J) [2024] EWHC 1981 (Fam) it was acknowledged that there will inevitably be some emotional fallout following the end of a relationship, and that may well leave some unresolved adult disputed issues about the parties’ behaviour but those are not necessarily ones that a court needs to devote any time to resolving unless they are relevant to the determination of the application.[20]R v. Lucas [1981] QB 270 may also be relevant for fact-finding hearings since it is not unusual for witnesses in these cases to tell lies, but a court must be careful to remember that a witness may lie for many reasons including shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear or distress. The fact that a witness may lie about some matters does not mean that they have lied about everything. The R v. Lucas guidance was amplified and enhanced in Wigan Council v. M & Ors (Sexual abuse – Fact Finding) [2015] EWFC 6 and in Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136.[21]Given M’s diagnosis, I bore in mind the relevant sections of the Equal Treatment Bench Book, both when managing the proceedings at the PTR, during the FFH and in considering her evidence. Specifically, although M claimed to have perfect recall of events when giving me oral evidence, I have noted that neurodiversity may mean that she is more likely to struggle with hypothetical thinking and chronology.[22]The key legal issue in this case and, in fact, the issue that remained to be determined after the change in M’s case, is whether intention is required for a finding of abuse by way of coercive and controlling behaviour. In Re C (A Child) (Appeal: Fact-Finding: Domestic Abuse) [2025] EWHC 1648, Harrison J noted that there was ambiguity, concluding that this was a question to be determined when the issue was material to the decision to be made and with full argument before the court. It is material to this case since, if intention is required, M would not be able to prove her case. Also, if coercive and controlling behaviour cannot be established because of failure to act, M’s case would also fail.[23]Mr Harris for M submitted that it is relevant to consider that the criminal offence of coercive and controlling behaviour is not a specific intent offence, though it does require that a perpetrator knew or ought to have known that their behaviour would have a serious effect on a victim (section 76 Serious Crime Act 2015). It is therefore also not a strict liability offence and does require mens rea as well as actus reus. As also noted by Mr Harris, the Home Office statutory guidance that I have referred to earlier highlighted that some perpetrators do not recognise that their behaviour constitutes domestic abuse. I have been very mindful of the need to be cautious in considering criminal law concepts in Family proceedings. This issue was addressed fully in Re H-N and the conclusion was that it is fundamentally wrong for the Family Court to be drawn into consideration and analysis of factual evidence in proceedings relating to the welfare of children based on criminal law principles and concepts. Mr Harris went on to seek to draw a distinction between coercive and controlling behaviour allegations and all other forms of abuse recognised by PD12J because, he asserted, this was the only form of abuse within the scope of PD12J that was also a specific criminal charge. I am not sure that is correct, however, since the other potential forms of abuse envisaged in PD12J include behaviours that could be the subject of other criminal charges such as assault, stalking or harassment even if precisely the same wording may not be used within PD12J. As Mr Harris went on to acknowledge in his written submissions at paras 14 to 16, the main mischief that Re H-N was warning about was the Family Court spending unnecessary time trying to decide whether a criminal offence has been proved to the criminal standard. However, as submitted by Ms Scarsbrook in her written submissions, Family law does not operate in isolation to general legal concepts (Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34, Per Lord Sumption JSC, [37]). Family law is not ‘…a rogue castaway marooned on a desert island conducting itself without regard to the norms of the rest of the legal universe’ (RL v Nottinghamshire CC & Anor [2022] EWFC 13, [44]).[24]GK v PR [2021] EWFC 106 seems to be the first authority to consider the issue of whether intentional misconduct was required for findings of abusive behaviour. It is not an authority that specifically considered coercive and controlling behaviour. Peel J found that intentional misconduct was not a pre-requisite for a finding of abusive behaviour and referred to Re T [2017] EWCA Civ 1889. That latter case was concerned with molestation and the lack of intent required to establish molestation under the Family Law Act 1996. As Ms Scarsbrook pointed out in her submissions, there is a clear line of authority about ‘molestation’ being given its usual dictionary definition, and it is unsurprising that intention is not required since the acts of molestation speak for themselves.[25]In Re A Child (Application of PD12J) (No. 2 – Findings of Fact) 2022 EWFC B5, HHJ Dancey observed that ‘[179] Controlling and coercive behaviour is defined in PD12J in terms of behaviour used (coercive) or designed (controlling) to harm a victim. In my view, to prove controlling or coercive behaviour (rather than more widely defined domestic abuse) does require an element of intent on the part of the perpetrator to bring about the harmful effects of their behaviour.’ Whilst the decision of a Circuit Judge is not binding, it is capable of being persuasive.

Analysis and Findings

[26]As I have noted already in this judgment, ultimately there was little factual dispute by the time I had heard evidence and both advocates commenced their oral closing submissions. The undisputed factual matrix that falls to be considered in this case is therefore the following: a) M fell pregnant by accident whilst both parents were at university. Their relationship was in the early stages, and they had not discussed what would happen if M did fall pregnant despite using contraception. F said to M that he would not have engaged in sexual activity with her if he had known that she was opposed to termination. b) M is older than F and both were first time parents. c) M initially thought she would be raising A on her own, but F agreed to help soon after the conversation at a) above. d) There was an incident of F masturbating in the bathroom at the hospital when M was in labour. e) The couple moved to an isolated part of the country to live in accommodation provided at the paternal grandparents’ property in 2017 because neither of them had other options. At this point F was still completing his university course. M moved willingly and accepted that she thought it was a good idea at the time. f) F was not as supportive as he could have been during M’s pregnancy and the start of A’s life, including spending much of his time playing video games and smoking cannabis in the summer of 2017, and spending a large amount of time gardening during the pandemic. g) F encouraged M to try hot and spicy food at times despite her not liking hot and spicy food. h) F was sometimes tired and grumpy when giving M lifts. M did not drive and this was because she had been unable to pass her driving test despite trying more than once. Public transport was extremely limited in the area they lived in. i) F would sometimes tell M to hurry up when they were shopping. j) They would both use cannabis at times. k) The paternal grandparents and M and F swapped accommodation after the paternal grandfather became seriously ill, leading to M and F being in the paternal grandparents’ much larger house. The condition of this house became extremely poor, cluttered with belongings that were mainly M’s, unhygienic and messy, and this caused some understandable distress to the paternal grandparents. l) The relationship broke down in 2025 but there was a lack of communication about this by F to M, with F only explicitly telling M that the relationship was over at the end of May 2025. m) F accepted that he behaved selfishly and irresponsibly when the relationship was ending, and that he called M disgusting during an argument at the time of the breakup in May 2025. n) M and F both accepted that by the time of the breakup, M was displaying some very alarming behaviours, was in a state of acute emotional distress and was losing weight. M does not allege that her mental health deterioration was caused by any coercive and controlling behaviour from F and accepts that the paternal grandmother paid for her to have therapeutic support. M has a history of mental health issues in the past which pre-date her relationship with F. o) F accepted that he called M ‘crazy’ and ‘mental’ during text messages after the breakup.[27]What remains in dispute is the following: a) Whether or not M said yes when F asked her about masturbating in the hospital bathroom, and whether this amounted to “a serious sexual boundary violation” as M alleged in her statement at C136 para 13. b) F not increasing engagement with shared caregiving or domestic responsibility during the pandemic. c) Whether F’s encouragement to try spicy food represented a disregard for her physical limits and personal boundaries (C138 para 21). d) Whether F’s asking her to hurry at times while food shopping interfered with her ability to meet basic needs independently and increased her reliance on others (C138 para 22). e) Whether M was coerced into using cannabis by ‘relational dynamics in which increased warmth, encouragement, and approval were contingent upon her participation’ (C139 para 24). f) That F should have proactively sought to intervene and seek more support for her during her mental health crisis.[28]Dealing with the disputed aspects above, it is not necessary to devote any time to considering whether M said yes. On her own evidence F asked her and she shrugged, and she accepted in her oral evidence that what happened was a feature of their relationship for each of them at times. Whilst it was a monumentally insensitive time for F to have done this, I do not find that it represented a serious sexual boundary violation as M alleged since it was the timing that was the issue rather than the act itself. It was insensitive but no more than this.[29]M’s written evidence about F not engaging more with shared caregiving or domestic responsibility after he completed his degree in 2019 and specifically during the pandemic is very brief. It is one paragraph at C138:
“during the Covid-19 pandemic, F’s interest and focus shifted toward collecting cacti…and towards gardening activities. This included building a polytunnel in which to grow food. These pursuits occupied a significant amount of his time and attention, without any corresponding increase in his engagement with shared caregiving or domestic responsibility”
. Her oral evidence did not expand much upon this. It was not clear from her evidence whether there had ever been clear discussions between them about expectations over roles and responsibilities as a couple, though she did say in answer to a question from Ms Scarsbrook that it made sense in the earlier days of their relationship and when she wasn’t working for her to undertake the majority of domestic tasks, and that she thought F had said one thing and demonstrated by actions another at times. F also gave evidence about coming home from work and cooking dinner at times, and that when he attempted to talk to M about her possessions in the home that she would refuse to allow anyone to touch them without her being there and would become dysregulated if that was done or suggested. At its highest, it seems therefore as if there was a failure to clearly communicate about expectations around domestic tasks, and this was something that both M and F were responsible for. I have no doubt that M felt very annoyed at having to undertake most domestic tasks at points but, even on her own evidence, she has not established that this was more than two different people approaching the relationship in different ways and not being terribly good about communicating. Whilst she might not have valued F growing food during the pandemic, this was a form of contribution to their family and F gave credible evidence that this was also something that A liked to do with him. Just having A spend time with him in the garden would, of course, have also given M time to herself to do other things and it is not at all unusual in a relationship for one or both parties to have hobbies that they spend time doing without the other partner. Just doing that is not per se problematic and, in this case, it was something that involved A and benefitted the whole family so it is difficult to see why M found this so objectionable. It is also not in dispute that F became the one who mainly worked, whereas M mostly did not, thus practically limiting the amount of time that he could help with domestic tasks, but he still cooked dinner at times when he came home tired from work as he told me. As Ms Scarsbrook submitted in her written submissions, failure to fairly share domestic tasks is not uncommon and, if by doing so, this can amount to abuse by failure to act, that would mean a very high proportion of households are domestically abusive purely due to inequal division of domestic labour. I do not find that M has proved on balance of probabilities that F failing to participate in domestic tasks coerced her into doing something that was inimical to her wellbeing, nor was controlling of her and removed her autonomy.[30]The encouragement to try spicy food at times is the next disputed item. M’s evidence about this was that at times, though not always, F would put hot chillies or spices into food to try to encourage her to eat them and despite knowing that she did not like them. She accepted that F did like hot and spicy food. F accepted that he would sometimes put too much spice into dishes, but that this was by accident given that he could tolerate hotter food and M does not allege that this was done in any way covertly. On her evidence, it seems that this was simply F trying at times to encourage her to try something that she didn’t like. F told me he would cook something else for her when he accidentally put too much spice into a dish and this detail was credible. At its highest, this seems to have been two people who had markedly different palates when it came to heat or spice in food and, as is not uncommon when one person in a relationship likes something food related and the other doesn’t, at times that means the one who doesn’t like the food is accidentally exposed to the food they don’t like. It doesn’t mean that this was done abusively, and even if sometimes the person who likes the food tries to encourage the person who doesn’t like the food to try it, that is also not necessarily abusive unless there was to be an element of force or compulsion to try the food, I find. It is not entirely clear what M is saying F should have done instead apart from never cook with spice or heat, and it is not unreasonable to have occasionally asked if she wanted to try something hot or spicy despite knowing her preference since sometimes people’s tastes can change over time. M was able to say no and F clearly cooked blander food when he accidentally over-seasoned food too, so I find that his actions were reasonable and it is M who was unreasonable in objecting to this and in alleging that it amounted to abuse.[31]F asking M sometimes to hurry when they were shopping and sometimes being irritable when giving her a lift is the next aspect I have considered because, although it is not factually in dispute that this happened, M alleges that this somehow interfered with her autonomy. I am not clear about her evidence on this, either in her statement or to me during the hearing. She does not allege that this happened all the time, and they were the parents of a young child struggling to navigate being in a relationship with each other when each appeared to have had different expectations of their relationship, so being irritable at times may be regarded as inevitable in those circumstances. In fact, it would be less credible if either had said they were never irritable. F gave clear and credible evidence that A would be losing patience when shopping and that is why he asked M to hurry up. He was not challenged about this. M also clearly did have to rely on others for lifts considering the geographical and practical isolation they were living in, but she moved there wholly willingly and said she thought it would be a good thing. It is not clear quite what she expected would happen with being able to move around since it was so isolated, and the fact that she was dependent on others for lifts was due to circumstances that were wholly outside of F’s control, I find. M tried and failed to pass her driving test, but this was not because of anything that F did or did not do on her own evidence which was that she simply could not pass. Public transport was scarce and became scarcer as the years went by, but that was also not something that F was responsible for. They did investigate moving to a larger town at one point before the pandemic but mutually agreed not to move when the pandemic hit. M does not allege that F prevented this to ensure that she remained isolated. They had moved to where they were by mutual consent, they did so because of lack of other options and in circumstances where M became pregnant unexpectedly while they were students with limited means. M also, on her own evidence, had a strained relationship with her family and does not allege that F prevented her from seeing friends. M described this as “resulting in enforced dependency” (C135 para 9), though I cannot see anywhere in her written evidence nor in her oral evidence to me an explanation as to why this was anything other than lack of other alternatives as a result of their combined circumstances, as opposed to F’s actions leading to her becoming isolated and that being a means of controlling her. His being irritable with her at times when shopping or when giving her lifts is not unusual even in the most stable of relationships, I find, and does not amount to abuse let alone something that robbed her of autonomy as she alleged.[32]The final disputed allegation relates to the use of cannabis by M. Her evidence about this was that she willingly agreed to try cannabis because she was in pain. She had taken cannabis intermittently in the past including when she and F were at university, and both before and after A was born, but had stopped after a bad experience. Her oral evidence about this allegation when questioned by Ms Scarsbrook was striking:
“it was not true that F would encourage me, it was something we would do together mutually, the fact that I saw clear benefits for our relationship when doing it is what incentivised me and for a period I did enjoy it and that improved our relationship, and with hindsight I massively regret the whole period”
. She accepted that there was a difference between being encouraged by F and being incentivised by other factors. I have really struggled to identify where M says F is responsible for her feeling incentivised to use cannabis because she thought it would help with her pain and found that it improved their relationship. Her evidence about this was solely focused on her own perceptions and feelings rather than what F did and she actively denied that F encouraged her when she was asked about that as I have noted. It seems more likely than not to me that M willingly took cannabis, initially to help with her pain, but then found that it unexpectedly improved their relationship in some form. She has not established that this was due to action or action on the part of F, and I do not find that this was coercion by F to make her use cannabis in circumstances where she would not have done so otherwise.[33]Given my findings and the undisputed facts, I have next considered whether these facts can amount to coercive and controlling behaviour on the part of F, including whether there was a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour as M alleges. Leaving aside the legal argument about whether F’s actions were intentional, Ms Scarsbrook raised the issue in her written submissions that the crux of this case is about M’s perception rather than reality and that the driving force behind her allegations is her own distinctive subjective perspective rather than any coercive or controlling behaviour by F. As Ms Scarsbrook submitted, M’s evidence to me during this hearing confirmed that she is unable to distinguish between external actions and coercion or control by others, and her own internal motivation. It was striking that much of M’s evidence focused on how she felt and how she then reacted to those feelings, rather than setting out what F did or did not do and how that directly made her feel and react in the way that she did, the cannabis issue being a clear example of this but also her evidence about living in a very isolated area relying on others for lifts, as well as her evidence about occasional irritation expressed by F when giving her lifts or when he wanted her to hurry because A was losing patience with shopping.[34]I have also considered the dictionary definitions of coercion and control since that can be helpful when trying to determine disputes in cases like this. Coercion is defined as to impel or force (into obedience), and control is defined as the power of directing or restraining. Impel is also defined as to drive, force, urge, propel. There is therefore an element of required action on the part of someone using coercion and control that goes beyond suggestion or hint, and it is also something that carries a strongly negative implication if applied by someone in a position of greater power to a person of lesser power. I have also been mindful of the fact that abusive behaviour has at its heart an imbalance of power in the relationship and that this is exploited by an abuser for their benefit. It can be insidious in nature and requires sophisticated analysis. I have also carefully considered the definitions of coercive and controlling behaviour in both PD12J and in the Home Office statutory guidance. Most of the examples given in the latter, as well as the Women’s Aid guidance, are far more serious and sinister than any of the facts relied upon by M. That does not necessarily mean they are not capable of amounting to abuse since it would be possible for there to be a cumulation of ostensibly relatively minor actions that are abusive, and often what may seem minor to one person is less so to another where there is a particular context. However, what is notable in the definitions I have mentioned is that they refer to coercion being used “to harm, punish or frighten the victim”, or “’controlling behaviour’ being an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour”. Whilst F’s behaviour may have been selfish, insensitive and poor at times, the link between those instances and this being a means of harming, punishing or frightening M is not made out on the evidence before me. Similarly, the evidence does not establish that those acts were designed to make M subordinate or dependent. M remained financially independent, was able to work when she chose, was able to leave when she chose (albeit her means of transport were limited by her inability to drive), was able to make decisions about her day to day life both on the smaller scale and larger scale including considering moving to her own rental property with financial support from F when the relationship was ending and, ultimately, was able to leave with A without F or the wider paternal family doing anything to discourage her. The fact that she was in such distress in the period leading up to her leaving seems more likely to be related to her underlying mental health difficulties combining badly with her inability to recognise that there is a difference between external actions and coercion and control by others, and her own internal motivation as Ms Scarsbrook submitted.[35]In terms of M’s case, that F has not been intentionally coercive or controlling but the cumulative impact of his behaviour has led to her autonomy being restricted, I am not satisfied that her autonomy was restricted on the evidence before me. She left the relationship when she chose and with access to her own funds including savings, albeit not enough savings to start a new life as she told me, this seems more likely to have been due to the fact that she did not work much by choice. She does not allege that F prevented her from working when she wished nor that he subjected her to any form of financial abuse, in fact. The geographical isolation that she willingly moved to contributed to practical limitations on her ability to move around freely, as did her inability to learn to drive, but this was not due to the actions or inactions on the part of F. The fact that she felt uncomfortable asking for lifts was not because of anything unreasonable that F or the wider paternal family did on her own evidence. It was driven by her perception and reaction to entirely human expressions of irritation on the part of F at times. Similarly, being asked to hurry up when shopping with a young child who is losing patience is not unreasonable on the part of a parent and, arguably, is doing what the Children Act 1989 envisages and putting A’s welfare above any adult needs. Similarly, a lack of sensitivity or failure to communicate clearly at times on the part of F is not sufficient to establish abusive behaviour, let alone coercive and controlling behaviour I find. The incident in the hospital when she was in labour was not repeated and took place a number of years ago and was itself not a serious breach of her sexual boundaries as I have found. The behaviour that M complained of was, at its highest, perhaps unreasonable or insensitive at times but certainly not unusual and at times mostly due to circumstances that were wholly beyond F’s control and certainly not either because he intended that M should be coerced or controlled or ought to have been aware that this would be the outcome. I can entirely see that there might be circumstances where coercive control is achieved by subtle means of passively allowing a situation to develop that results in the victim having their autonomy removed or reduced to an extent that is abusive. However, that is not what I have found has happened in this case.[36]I have considered carefully the point made by Mr Harris in his written submissions that, regardless of whether or not F intended what he did or did not do, M was vulnerable and there was a pattern of behaviour that resulted in her being controlled and coerced and therefore this is sufficient to establish her allegation of abuse. I am not satisfied that, in light of a complete absence of link between what F did or did not do and her feeling controlled and coerced, it is sufficient to establish coercive and controlling behaviour. Logically there must be some nexus otherwise how is the court to subsequently assess risk if findings were made? And the fact that the caselaw acknowledges that there is a difference between intentional action and unintentional action when it comes to risk assessment does not mean that there also does not need to be a nexus. There is in fact no allegation that M’s vulnerability was exploited in any way by F deliberately or unintentionally. It is strikingly not referred to at all in any of M’s evidence about the alleged abuse, nor was it mentioned by her in her oral evidence to me. It is also not her case that her mental distress at the end of the relationship was caused by F, her case about this is simply that F and the paternal grandparents should have done more though she has not identified what more they should have done. It seems that even M did not think about seeking help from her GP when I attempted to clarify this with her, so it is difficult to see what else she expected others to try. On her own account, she was also exhibiting some very distressing and extreme behaviours by late spring 2025, so I am also not sure how much her mental state then has coloured her perception of events afterwards and I did not find her credible when she told me that she had perfect recall given the level of distress that she herself described herself experiencing.[37]M did allege that she was constantly criticised but gave very little evidence of fact about this. At most, her evidence seems to be that the paternal grandparents did not always agree with her parenting and were critical of the condition of the house. Given the photographs of the house in the bundle and, as I have noted, the fact that the house in question was their home, I am not at all surprised that they were critical of the condition of the house. On her own evidence, most of the belongings piled up in those photos were M’s and she accepted that she did not want anyone to touch them without her being present as F told me. She also accepted that it was reasonable for the paternal grandparents to have been upset about the state of the house but that they and F were not people who shouted or became overly emotional, unlike her and her family. In fact, F also told me that she would become dysregulated if he tried to talk to her about sorting out her belongings, so it seems as if the one who reacted strongly about the state of the house was M, not F or the paternal grandparents. It is also not uncommon for there to be differences of opinion about parenting too, particularly between different generations, and F himself told me that his parents tended to try to parent M and F when they first moved in. This is not at all the same as criticising M, though, and is likely part of normal family life in these circumstances. What I do find happened is that M seems to have struggled to compromise or to respond appropriately to inevitable differences in views about parenting. It was also clear from both M and F’s evidence that they had very different ways of functioning in daily life, with M seemingly more rigid about her expectations and finding a lack of shouting and emotion on the part of F and his parents unusual. M’s inability to realise that there will be such differences and that compromises may need to be made in relationships may have been driven by her neurodiversity or may simply be due to her psychology, but either way it was not due to abusive behaviour on the part of F, I find.[38]The end of their relationship was undoubtedly difficult for both M and F looking at their evidence. F accepts that he did not behave well during the breakup, but it seems M was also behaving badly at times, culminating (as she accepted in her evidence to me) in a very unfortunate incident where she seemed oddly fixated on trying to identify the car driven by the woman that F was in a relationship with during which she bit him when he tried to prevent her going outside to cause a potential confrontation. Similarly, A was present when M was exhibiting extreme and concerning behaviours during her period of mental distress, and it was apparent in her evidence about this that she either did not think of him during this time or was incapable of thinking of him. She did accept he would have been frightened by witnessing her behave in this way, but she seems to have taken no steps to protect him including seeking medical help for herself. The three abusive words that F accepts he used towards her during and after the breakup were the only abusive language that M produced as evidence, though she did suddenly try to add details of verbal abuse in her oral evidence to me. She was not credible or convincing in relation to the latter since it did seem to be an afterthought prompted by cross examination, and she had completely failed to address this in her written evidence. She also accepted in her oral evidence to me that she had sent abusive messages about F’s new partner and about F to F. I find that F’s poor behaviour when the relationship ended was simply the sort of bad behaviour that sadly does often occur when a relationship ends. His use of the words ‘crazy’ and ‘mental’ in the text messages was in the context of an argument where both were clearly arguing with each other, and even M’s evidence is not that this was gaslighting her. The words were unfortunate given her mental distress, but also not uncommon when emotions are running high and a relationship is ending as messily this one did. There is no credible evidence of a pattern of verbal abuse.[39]On balance, I am not satisfied that there was a pattern of behaviour by F that amounted to coercion and control of M and deprived her of her autonomy as she alleged.[40]I think it is also necessary to note that I was concerned about one aspect of M’s evidence during this hearing. This was her evidence of discussions with A about whether it was ‘safe’ for him to spend time with F. To have such discussions with a child of A’s age and considering M’s allegations in this case is not child focused and raises a question mark about whether M is able to keep A out of the adult dispute about arrangements for him. This will be something that the welfare stage of the proceedings will have to consider, but this and M’s ability to promote A’s relationship with F will need to be explored by way of a section 7 report.[41]Given my findings above, there are no safeguarding reasons for A not to spend unsupervised time directly with F. 22nd May 2026