“For some years it has been recognised that a difference exists in the approach taken by courts in different regions when determining whether a final care order, supervision order or no order should be made when care proceedings conclude with a plan for the subject child to be placed, or remain living, at home with their parent(s). Broadly speaking, if a line is drawn from Hull down to Bristol and beyond, courts in England and Wales that are North and West of that line will often make a care order in such cases, in contrast to courts South and East of the line where normally a supervision order or no public law order will be made.”
“My experience is that the judges who sit on one side of the line or the other are confident that the approach taken in their area is the correct one. The difference of approach is striking, and its existence has become something of a hot potato, and increasingly so as Family Courts across England and Wales strive, once again, to conclude public law care proceedings within the statutory 26 week time limit set byChildren Act 1989 .”
“In contrast to a care order, a child under a supervision order is not being ‘looked after’ by the local authority and the authority neither has parental responsibility for the child, nor the power to direct how those who do have parental responsibility may exercise it. By CA 1989, Sch 3, para 2, a supervision order may require the child to comply with any directions given from time to time by the supervising officer. If the person responsible for the child’s care (for example a parent) consents, the supervision order may include a requirement for the responsible person to comply with directions and other requirements.”
“28. In summary, looking at the statutory scheme and the case law as a whole, the following is clear: i) making a care order with a subject child placed at home in the care of their parent(s) is plainly permissible within the statutory scheme and express provision is made for such circumstances in CA 1989, s 22C and in the placement regulations; ii) the early post-CA 1989 authorities established that a care plan for placement at home was an appropriate outcome where the facts justified it, without the need for exceptional circumstances; iii) the analysis of Hale J/LJ in Oxfordshire and in Re O laid particular weight upon the need for the authority to have power to remove the child instantly if circumstances required it, or to plan for the child to be placed outside the family; iv) since Oxfordshire and Re O, the High Court decision in Re DE, containing guidance endorsed by the President, has been widely accepted so that, in all but a true emergency, the local authority power to remove a child from their home under a care order should not be exercised without giving parents an opportunity to bring the issue before a court; v) the difference concerning removal of a child from home either under a care order or where there is no care order is now largely procedural. In all but the most urgent cases, the decision on removal will ultimately be taken within the umbrella of court proceedings, rather than administratively within a local authority; vi) sharing of parental responsibility by the local authority with parents is an important element, but, as Hale J/LJ stressed, the fact that considerable help and advice may be needed over a prolonged period is not a reason, in itself, for making a care order; vii) it is wrong to make a care order in order to impose duties on a local authority or use it to encourage them to perform the duties that they have to a child in need; viii) the protection of the child is the decisive factor, but proportionality is key when making the choice between a care and supervision order for a child who is placed at home; ix) supervision orders should be made to work, where that is the proportionate form of order to make.”
“Rarely and in exceptional circumstances.”
“33. Accordingly, the court had to address these questions in relation to each of these children: (1) What type of harm has arisen and might arise? (2) How likely is it to arise? (3) What would be the consequences for the child if it did? (4) To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed? (5) What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account? (6) In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare? (7) If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate?”