"Stepfather stepdaughter schoolgirl to fuck so as not to punish her for being late"
"I went up to Lara's bedroom when she was on her phone sat up on her bed. Her mood was low, and I sat with her, and asked her what she was thinking about, and whether anything was bothering her. Lara replied, 'I miss how I was before, when I was happy, I want to be happy again'. I asked her about the texts she had sent to my mum, and she said REDACTED The statement then goes on to say: "
"Mother recalls meeting with the social workers on the above occasion, and there being a discussion about the allegations. Mother recalls saying that she did not know the truth of what [Lara] had alleged. She also recalls saying words to the effect that she (mother) was not there, she could not know what had happened, and that it was [CD]'s word against hers (Lara's). Mother does not accept saying that [Lara] 'came onto [CD]'. Mother however acknowledges that she found the allegations difficult to accept at the time. Moreover, mother accepts that on the basis of what she said during that discussion that professionals would have concerns. Mother at that time was not in possession of the evidence / information that she now has. Mother does not accept that the discussions she had with professionals on this occasion can / should lead to a conclusion that she would fail to protect Child A in the future."
“To this admirable summary I add three further points. First, that the legal concept of proof on a balance of probabilities "must be applied with common sense", as Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said in The Popi M, Rhesa ShippingCo SA v Edmunds, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 948 , 956. Secondly, that the court can have regard to the inherent probabilities: see Lady Hale in In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening)[2008] UKHL 35 ,[2009] 1 AC 11 , para 31. But this does not affect the legal standard of proof, as Lord Hoffmann emphasised in the same case (para 15): "There is only one rule of law, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities. If a child alleges sexual abuse by a parent, it is common sense to start with the assumption that most parents do not abuse their children. But this assumption may be swiftly dispelled by other compelling evidence of the relationship between parent and child or parent and other children. It would be absurd to suggest that the tribunal must in all cases assume that serious conduct is unlikely to have occurred. In many cases, the other evidence will show that it was all too likely.”
“57. I accept that there may occasionally be cases where, at the conclusion of the evidence and submissions, the court will ultimately say that the local authority has not discharged the burden of proof to the requisite standard and thus decline to make the findings. That this is the case goes hand in hand with the well-established law that suspicion, or even strong suspicion, is not enough to discharge the burden of proof. The court must look at each possibility, both individually and together, factoring in all the evidence available including the medical evidence before deciding whether the “fact in issue more probably occurred than not” (Re B: Lord Hoffman). 58. In my judgment what one draws from Popi M and Nulty Deceased is that: (i) Judges will decide a case on the burden of proof alone only when driven to it and where no other course is open to him given the unsatisfactory state of the evidence. (ii) Consideration of such a case necessarily involves looking at the whole picture, including what gaps there are in the evidence, whether the individual factors relied upon are in themselves properly established, what factors may point away from the suggested explanation and what other explanation might fit the circumstances. (iii) The court arrives at its conclusion by considering whether on an overall assessment of the evidence (i.e. on a preponderance of the evidence) the case for believing that the suggested event happened is more compelling than the case for not reaching that belief (which is not necessarily the same as believing positively that it did not happen) and not by reference to percentage possibilities or probabilities.” (i) Judges will decide a case on the burden of proof alone only when driven to it and where no other course is open to him given the unsatisfactory state of the evidence. (ii) Consideration of such a case necessarily involves looking at the whole picture, including what gaps there are in the evidence, whether the individual factors relied upon are in themselves properly established, what factors may point away from the suggested explanation and what other explanation might fit the circumstances. (iii) The court arrives at its conclusion by considering whether on an overall assessment of the evidence (i.e. on a preponderance of the evidence) the case for believing that the suggested event happened is more compelling than the case for not reaching that belief (which is not necessarily the same as believing positively that it did not happen) and not by reference to percentage possibilities or probabilities.”