“[her] partner was getting [G] undressed to change his bum and he heard a click in his arm and ever since then he’s been crying. He’s not really been moving his arm so much either. He is crying and in pain a little bit.”
“... a crucial element in the judge’s analysis for the judge to be able to experience the behaviour of the parent who is the focus of the allegations throughout the oral court process; not only when they are in the witness box being examined in-chief and cross-examined, but equally when they are sitting in the well of the court and reacting, as they may or may not do, to the factual and expert evidence as it unfolds during the course of the hearing.”
“The need for care with witness demeanour as being indicative of credibility has also been highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Sri Lanka v the Secretary of State for the Home Department[2018] EWCA Civ 1391 . The Court of Appeal observed that it has increasingly been recognised that it is usually unreliable and often dangerous to draw a conclusion from a witness' demeanour as to the likelihood that the witness is telling the truth, noting research suggesting that interlocutors cannot make effective use of demeanour in deciding whether to believe a witness and some evidence that the observation of demeanour diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments ... Within the context of the foregoing legal principles, this court must bear in mind that the assessment of the credibility and reliability of the parents should coalesce around matters including the internal consistency of their evidence, its logicality and plausibility, details given or not given and the consistency of their evidence when measured against other sources of evidence (including evidence of what the witness has said on other occasions) and other known or probable facts. The credibility and reliability of that parent should not be assessed simply by reference to their demeanour, degree of emotion or other aspects of their presentation. This of course works in both directions. It is as problematic to rely on an impression that a witness has an 'honest' tone, manner or presentation, for example that they appear "genuinely upset", as it is to rely on an impression that the tone or manner of a witness appears 'dishonest', for example that they cross their arms or look at the floor. These principles must apply both when the court is evaluating the parent in the witness box and when the court is evaluating the significance of the observations of other's regarding the parent's demeanour at a given point.”
“I grabbed the cuff of his baby grow with my left hand and his arm with my right had to pull it out of the sleeve but he pushed his hand against my left hand as I pulled and I heard a loud click.”
“22. I reached for a nappy and unzipped G’s baby grow. I grabbed the cuff of the babygrow with my left hand and put my right hand on the inside of his elbow. G pushed my hand and kicked with his legs at the same time as I was pulling the babygrow off. I was not using much force but I heard a distinct click. G cried a little bit more than he had already been crying, however after about 15 or 20 seconds it became a full, loud cry as if he was in pain. 23. My first thought was that I had injured G’s shoulder. I tried to call [the Mother] on the phone, still holding G’s arm with my left hand. I picked him up from the blanket where he was lying when I heard [the Mother] coming downstairs so that I could put him on his cushion. I told [the Mother] that I had heard a click when I was changing him and he had started crying like he was now. As I put him on the cushion I could see that his arm was positioned strangely and I told [the Mother] I might have broken his arm. [the Mother] then called 111. 24. I believe that I accidentally fractured G’s arm when I was changing his nappy and when he pushed against me at the same time as I was tugging the Babygrow off his arm …”
“A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied— (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.” (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.”
“I suggest, therefore, that in future cases judges should no longer direct themselves on the necessity of avoiding "straining to identify a perpetrator". The unvarnished test is clear: following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B (2019), he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question.”
“[a lie] may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against [the person telling the lie] if the [court is satisfied] that: (1) it is shown, by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake; (2) it relates to a significant issue; (3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of [the person telling the lie], or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to [the person telling the lie]'s guilt.”
“The temptation there described is ever present in family proceedings too and, in my judgment, should be as firmly resisted there as the courts are required to resist it in criminal law. In other words, there has to be factored into every case which concerns a disputed aetiology giving rise to significant harm, a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities.”