A, Re (No 2) (Adoption) [2025] EWFC 213 (B)

The judgment was handed down remotely at 12.00 p.m. on 11 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail.

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

[2025] EWFC 213 (B)

Re A (No. 2)(adoption)

IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT READING

Date 11 July 2025

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF A (a boy, born [2012])

Before: HHJ Vincent

Between

Ms DApplicant

Martin Blount, instructed by Rootes & Alliott solicitors for applicant prospective adopter

The first respondent birth mother represented herself at the hearing

Alexandra Conroy Harris, instructed by the Joint Legal Team for B Council

Jonathan Wilkinson instructed by RWK Goodman, solicitors for children’s guardian

Hearing Hearing date: 10 and 11 July 2025

Judgment

HHJ Vincent:

[1]This is the second judgment I have given in these proceedings arising from an application by Ms D, A’s special guardian, to adopt him.

[2]The first judgment (A, Re (Adoption – notice requirements) - Find Case Law - The National Archives), following a hearing in February 2025, was about whether notice had been given to the appropriate local authority to carry out investigations and report to the Court in respect of the adoption application.

[3]That application having been resolved and all evidence having been filed, this judgment follows the final hearing of the application.

[4]I repeat the background facts from my first judgment: A was born on [ ]2012, in County A. He has significant health and development needs. He has a diagnosis of [ ] Syndrome, a rare chromosome condition caused by a partial deletion of chromosome 4. He has a number of associated diagnoses which include cardiac anomalies, eye problems, and a hearing deficit. When he was a baby he had multi-cystic kidneys. He continues to have growth issues, global developmental delay and epilepsy. His condition is understood to be life limiting, but the advice of health professionals is understood that with appropriate feeding, care and management, children with his condition can live into adulthood. A was made subject to an interim care order to County A Council on 19 March 2013. Following a long stay in hospital, he was discharged to the care of the applicant and her husband on 18 September 2013. They lived in County B and this is where the applicant still lives. A final care order was made to County A Council on 1 November 2013. A remained in the care of the Applicant and her husband as his long-term foster carers. In 2019 the Applicant and her husband applied to the Family Court in County B to become A’s special guardians. On 10 March 2020 the Court made Special Guardianship Orders in their favour. The special guardianship support plan was drawn up by County A Council. In accordance with that plan, County A Council has continued to provide support to A and the Applicant to date. The applicant’s husband died on 20 February 2023. On 20 September 2024 the applicant applied to the Court for adoption order. She says that A is much loved and cherished, a happy little boy in her care. She considers that adoption will secure A’s placement with her, and provide him stability and long-term security. A’s care plan provides for his mother to see him six times a year, for two hours at a time. She has three younger children at home with her, and it is not easy to travel to see A. At the time of the hearing she had not seen A for over a year. She told me that she would like to get contact up and running again. The applicant told me that she had always tried to make A’s contact with his mother and other members of his birth family as good experience for all as was possible. She said she is more than willing to continue with contact. At the hearing A’s mother told me that she has no issues with the care that the Applicant has given to her son for all these years. However, she told me that she never agreed with A being placed away from her care, and she does not support the application for an adoption order. A’s father does not have parental responsibility for him. He has not seen A nor had any contact with him since his first birthday. At the outset of the hearing I determined that all reasonable efforts have now been made to inform him of the application and no further steps are required to be taken towards that aim.

[5]In my first judgment, I determined that this LA should be the designated local authority or the purpose of the application. Thereafter, I appointed a guardian for A. I directed the local authority to file an Annex A report, the applicant and mother to file statements and the guardian to file an analysis document.

Parties’ positions

[6]The application for an adoption order is supported by the local authority and by the guardian. The local authority’s recommendation for contact is that A’s mother and her other children should spend time with him once a year, with letterbox contact on top of that.

[7]The mother, representing herself, opposes the application for an adoption order. Whether A remains subject to a special guardianship order, or is adopted, she seeks an order for contact around six times a year.

[8]Mr Blount for the applicant, Ms Conroy Harris, for the local authority, and Mr Wilkinson, for the guardian, have set out their respective client’s positions in detailed and clear position statements. I have reviewed all the evidence in the bundle, including statements from the applicant, from A’s birth mother, the Annex A report prepared by [Ms S], and the guardian’s final analysis document.

[9]It was agreed by all that I should deal with the application on submissions.

The law

[10]Ms Conroy Harris has helpfully set out the technical requirements that must be fulfilled in order for an adoption order to be granted, and which are met in the circumstances of this case. The below is largely taken from her written submissions:a. the child must have had his home with the applicant for at least three out of the previous five years (Adoption & Children Act 2002 s42(5). A has lived with Ms D since 2013;

b. The applicant must give notice to the appropriate local authority of her intention to adopt, and that local authority must investigate the matter and submit to the court a report of the investigation. On 17 March 2025 I ruled that the notice the applicant gave to County A Councilon 14 March 2024 should be accepted as satisfying the notice requirements of s44, and that County A Councilwas best placed to prepare the required report, notwithstanding the child’s residence in County B. County A Council has filed an Annex A report dated 20 March 2025;

c. One of the conditions in s47 ACA 2002 must be met. A has not been placed for adoption, is not the subject of a placement, permanence or freeing order, and his mother does not consent to his adoption. Therefore, the only condition that is available in this case is that set out in s47(2)(c) ACA 2002 – that the parent’s consent should be dispensed with.;

d. ‘Parent’ in the context of giving consent to adoption means a parent with parental responsibility in accordance with s52(6). Ms C is the only parent with parental responsibility and is therefore the only parent whose consent needs to be dispensed with. A’s father does not have parental responsibility and has not sought it within these or other proceedings.

[11]Ms C’s consent can only be dispensed with if the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with (s52(1) ACA 2002).

[12]In considering whether A’s welfare requires that Ms C’s consent be dispensed with, the court must have regard to the matters set out in a checklist at section 1(4) ACA 2002. The court’s paramount consideration must be the child’s welfare throughout his life (ACA 2002 s1).

[13]The court's approach must be to 'undertake a global, holistic evaluation of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare' (Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation)

[2014] 1 FLR 670

, at [50]).

[14]It is well-established that adoption is an exceptional order and that the test for severing a child's relationship with their family is a strict one (YC v United Kingdom (Application No 4547/10)

[2012] 2 FLR 332

, at [134]). 15. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's decision in Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s 47(5))

[2014] 1 FLR 1035

, which summarised the Supreme Court's decision in Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal)

[2013] 2 FLR 1075

as follows: ‘The language used in Re B is striking. Different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear. Orders contemplating non-consensual adoption - care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders - are "a very extreme thing, a last resort", only to be made where "nothing else will do", where "no other course [is] possible in [the child's] interests", they are "the most extreme option", a "last resort - when all else fails", to be made "only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do ".

[15]Mr Blount has referred me to the leading judgement of Keehan J in Re T (A Child: Refusal of Adoption Order)

[2020] EWCA Civ 797

(at paragraph 59): The Art 8 rights of the mother and C are engaged but where there is a tension between the rights of the child, on the one hand, and the rights of a parent, on the other, the rights of the child prevail: Yousef v. The Netherlands

[2003] 1 FLR 210

Analysis

[16]I have had regard to each of the factors on the section 1(4) checklist ACA 2002, and I have held in mind the case law to which I have been referred.

[17]A is now twelve. As a result of his chromosomal disorder, he has needed a very high level of care from birth. Initially it was not expected that he would live beyond a few months, and then it was doubted that he would live to the age he is now, let alone to adulthood. However, in no small part as a result of the devoted, loving, and intensive care he has received from the applicant, and her husband when he was alive, the prognosis for him to survive to adulthood and beyond is very positive. A will need dedicated full-time care throughout his life. As he embarks on adolescence, his needs will change and will require thought, planning and the continued attuned care and advocacy for his needs of the kind that Ms D has provided throughout his childhood.

[18]A is mostly non-verbal, but can say his name, can laugh and babble and can say ‘mama’ to Ms D, and communicate his needs to her through sounds that she understands and responds to with ease. Considering the complexity of his medical conditions, his general health is good, and he has limited involvement with paediatricians or specialist clinicians. Until the age of eleven, he attended primary school three mornings a week, but there was no local secondary school that could meet his needs, so he is home-schooled by Ms D, with the support of numerous community groups and charities. He still has a connection to his primary school. He enjoys being in the company of other children and going on field trips.

[19]He could not express his wishes and feelings about the application, but has been seen to be content and happy in Ms D’s care, and to depend upon her to meet all his practical and medical needs, to communicate for him, to advocate for him, to give him consistency and routine, security and comfort. She loves him dearly and he loves her. He is thriving in her care. It can be assumed that he would wish to remain in her care.

[20]If she were no longer able to care for him or they were to be separated, it would cause a great deal of distress to A. She has cared for him since he was ten months old. She has a deep understanding of all his needs, and has built relationships with a range of professionals to build a support network around him. Without her, his welfare would be put in jeopardy.

[21]If the special guardianship order comes to an end, then the current legal relationship between A and Ms D would be severed. She would no longer be his legal guardian. She would not be able to make decisions for him.

[22]A’s birth mother would have retained parental responsibility for him. There is a risk that conflict would arise between them as to how best to manage A’s needs.

[23]I do not doubt Ms C’s love for A and that she is genuine in her wish one day for him to return to her care and to become a part of her family. However, she did present as naïve in her understanding of her ability to care for him, together with her other children. She would not be able to offer him the intensive care that he needs.

[24]Having read all the evidence, and heard from Ms C directly, I agree with the guardian’s assessment that she would struggle to prioritise A’s needs above her own emotional needs. I agree that she has not grasped the severity of his condition, nor has she been able to acknowledge Ms D’s relationship with him. She has been very negative towards Ms D.

[25]At the time A was born, Ms C was only nineteen. She had a great deal to contend with in her life, and, by her own admission, was ill prepared to cope with motherhood, let alone the extreme challenges of a baby with the rare condition and very high care needs that A had. A spent his early months in hospital, followed by three months in a mother and baby foster placement with Ms C. Ms C was in many ways a warm and loving parent to A, and tried her best. However, concerns were raised that she was unable to accept and implement medical and specialist advice on how to care for A. She preferred to rely on her own maternal instincts and belief that she would know what was best for her child. The foster placement became unsustainable, and Ms C was asked to leave, but before this could take place A was admitted to hospital with aspiration pneumonia.

[26]Thereafter, County A Councilapplied for an interim care order. On 18 September 2013, after being discharged from hospital, A was placed in foster care with Ms D and her husband.

[27]Ms C said that she was a different person to the nineteen year old who was faced with such a challenge. She does feel resentful to the local authority for not giving her a chance, as she sees it, to be allowed to take care of A. It had always been her expectation that he would return to her care at some point, and certainly by the time he was eighteen. She acknowledged to me that there have been difficulties with the father of the younger three children, but right now she is single, stable and secure, and she continues to be devoted to her children, all of whom are doing well.

[28]Accepting that she was only nineteen at the time, and faced with circumstances that would have been exceptionally challenging for any parent, it remains the fact that after thorough assessment, Ms C was found to be unable to provide the consistent care that A needed. She does not appear to have accepted that, and still feels resentful to the local authority for the decisions that were made to place A away from her care. She now has four other children under eleven to care for. Her life circumstances have meant that she is unable now, and is likely to continue to be unable, to offer A the level of intensive care that he needs. She has difficulty trusting and working with professionals. If she were to resume care of A in the future, there is a significant risk that his welfare needs would not be met.

[29]In her submissions, Ms Conroy Harris said:

‘If an adoption order is not made, Ms D will cease to have any legal relationship with A when he reaches the age of 18 and Ms C will resume the legal status of A’s mother and closest relative. There is a high risk of disputes about A’s care in the future, with Ms C having expressed her intention to remove A from his home. Medical treatment and care provision will be susceptible to challenge by Ms C, who is unlikely to allow Ms D to continue to make decisions about A as an adult. Ms D is having to make decisions now about housing and adaptations for A as he transitions to adulthood, but without the certainty that he will remain in her care. Disputes about A’s care as an adult may have to be resolved through further proceedings and reference to the Court of Protection.’

[30]I accept this analysis of the evidence.

[31]One final point made in support of the application for an adoption order is that Ms D has been unable to obtain a passport for A because Ms C’s name on his birth certificate does not match her name on her birth certificate. Ms C has been unwilling to provide evidence of her name change and describes attempts to resolve the situation as ‘pestering’. The making of an adoption order would allow A to obtain a passport and to travel outside the UK.

[32]A’s father has not seen him since he was about a year old and does not have parental responsibility for him. He has not taken part in any previous proceedings relating to A, and has not responded to notice of these proceedings, served by recorded delivery to his last known address.

[33]Reflecting on the likely effect on A of having ceased to be a member of the original family and becoming an adopted person (section 1(4)(c) ACA 2002), Ms Conroy Harris submitted that A has, in all practical terms, already ceased to be a member of his birth family. He has not lived with his mother for twelve years, and even before that he was with her in highly supervised environments of hospital or a mother and baby foster home. He has never lived with any of his siblings, and there is no indication that he has any understanding of who they are and their relationship with him. From A’s perspective, Ms D and her family are his family. Since 10 March 2020 Ms D has had overriding parental responsibility for A under a special guardianship order. The interference with Ms C’s Article 8 right to a family life of the making of an adoption order has less impact than would an agency adoption following care proceedings.

[34]Ms Conroy Harris refers me to the case of *Re P (a child) (adoption: adoption by step-parent)

[2014] EWCA Civ 1174

“The reason why context is important is that, in each case, it is necessary to evaluate the proportionality of the intervention in family life that is being proposed. For the child, and for the child's welfare throughout his life, there will be a qualitative difference between adoption by strangers, with no continuing contact or legal relationship with any member of the birth family, on the one hand, and an adoption order which simply reflects in legal terms the reality in which the child's family life and relationships have been conducted for some significant time. In ECHR terms, no adoption order will be justified in terms of its interference with family life rights unless it is 'necessary' and 'proportionate', but in assessing those factors the degree to which there is an interference will be relevant.”

Per MacFarlane LJ at para 62

[35]I have found both the Annex A report and the guardian’s analysis to be balanced and fair documents, in which the issues have been properly explored and the conclusions well-reasoned and supported by a firm evidence-base.

[36]Ms D’s own statement in support of her application is a powerful testament to her love and commitment to A, as well as setting out the practical implications for A of an adoption order being made – or not being made.

[37]There is no doubt that Ms C loves A very much. She has shown courage and determination in coming to Court. She has not had a lawyer, but has made her case extremely well.

[38]Having regard to all the factors on the welfare checklist, and considering A’s welfare throughout his life as my paramount consideration, I am satisfied that A’s welfare throughout his life requires that he remains in the care of Ms D, and that she continues to be able to make decisions about his care into adulthood. In my judgment the law should now recognise the nature of the relationship between her and A, who calls her ‘mama’, who depends wholly and utterly upon her, and who looks to her to meet all his needs, with loving and devoted care and attention.

[39]This can only be ensured by the making of an adoption order which will provide a legal framework which reflects the reality of A’s existing family life and relationships. A has a particular need for legal security, continuity and consistency of care into adulthood to which the making of an adoption order is a proportionate response.

[40]I therefore dispense with Ms C’s consent to the application, and make the adoption order to Ms D.

Contact

[41]I have read the witness statement of Ms S, which sets out the contact that has taken place and sets out a detailed analysis of the purpose of contact, and the benefits and disadvantages of contact for A, before setting out proposals and the reasons for them. It is a detailed. thoughtful and helpful document. The guardian supports the local authority’s proposals. Despite some recent difficulties, most recently Ms C asking for Ms D not to be present at contact, and having to read some difficult allegations within Ms C’s witness statement, Ms D remains willing to facilitate contact sessions between A and his birth family.

[42]Ms C loves A and wants her children to grow up understanding that they have a brother who does not live with them. It is important for A to have the opportunity to spend time with his birth family, who love him. However, there must be a balance, and recognition of the limits of A’s understanding, the impact of changes in his routine on him, and an assessment of the benefits to him of contact.

[43]Again, Ms Conroy Harris’s written submissions set out the position in respect of contact comprehensively, clearly and persuasively. I hope she will not mind that I have repeated much of what she says in the paragraphs that follow.

[44]Contact was originally proposed at the rate of six visits per year, but was never established at this rate for various reasons. Contact was suspended in 2020 and 2021 due to Covid. Ms C was frank that contact did not happen in 2020 because of the covid pandemic and thereafter because she did not agree to have a covid vaccination, which led to the local authority suspending contact. It is believed that there were two sessions in 2022, two in 2023, but they needed to be supervised due to difficulties arranging it and because of some hostility during contact. Ms C told me that she lost heart when the special guardianship order was made. Ms D then suffered the sudden and devastating loss of her husband.

[45]There was one session in 2024 and there has been one in 2025. In July 2024 Ms C had said that he wanted to stop the contact sessions, but she changed her mind in February 2025.

[46]Ms C has complained of contact being cancelled at short notice and has made allegations about Ms D’s care of A. She suggests that Ms D has attended contact smelling of alcohol, that A has had bruises, that his clothes are the wrong size and smell unwashed and that he has generally seemed uncared for. None of these observations have been supported by the contact supervisor. In 2024 Ms C told the local authority that she no longer wanted contact with A after a session was cancelled due to A being unwell.

[47]A’s siblings attend contact sessions, and Ms C describes them as having a close bond, that they ‘cry for their brother’ when they can’t attend contact. The social worker reports that A gives no indication of recognising his birth family, can become tired and overwhelmed by contact sessions, and seeks reassurance from Ms D.

[48]It is hard for Ms C to hear, and to accept, but it is not realistic to expect that A will return to her care in his lifetime. The purpose of contact is for A to stay in touch with his family, but it is not about building up the relationship with a view to one day there being a transition to her care.

[49]Ms D is committed to ongoing contact where it can be arranged without distress for A. She has shown this commitment during the currency of the special guardianship order. The local authority supports ongoing contact and will provide support to Ms C through their Birth Relative Support service. Ms C has so far not taken up this support.

[50]Having regard to all the evidence, and weighing up the pros and cons of contact for A, I approve the local authority’s proposal that contact should take place once a year, supported by the Birth Relative Support service. Again, I give weight to the recommendations of Ms S, and of the guardian, both of whom have given careful consideration to the issue. Visits once a year is broadly consistent with the pattern of contact that has taken place over the last few years, and will meet A’s needs to stay in touch with his birth family. In addition there will be indirect contact by post.

[51]I agree that given Ms D’s commitment to continuing contact, the availability of support through the birth relative support service, and A’s high level of needs, which may require a flexible approach to contact, an order for contact is not necessary or appropriate.

[52]This is my judgment. HHJ Joanna Vincent Family Court, Reading 11 July 2025