'If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a "fact in issue"), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened'. [44] That is clearly the law, although as everyone will immediately recognise, it does not accord exactly with the realities of human life as it is experienced, but it is perhaps inevitable if we are to have a system of law that we have a rule of that sort. [243] A failure to find a fact proved on the balance of probabilities does not equate, without more, to a finding that the allegation is false (see Re M (Children)[2013] EWCA Civ 388 at [17]). Having heard and considered the evidence it is open to the court to conclude that the evidence leaves it unsure whether it is more probable than not that the event occurred and, accordingly, that the party who has the burden of proving that the event occurred has failed to discharge that burden (see The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 948 ). e. InRe M (A Child)[2012] EWCA Civ 1580 Ward LJ held that the judge had fallen into error in taking the view that “absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents are being required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury”. f. Re U (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof); Re B (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof) -Case Law – VLEX 804424317 “The responsibilities of local authorities under theChildren Act 1989 had not been changed by the decision in R v Cannings. However, the following considerations emphasised by that judgment were of direct application in care proceedings: the cause of an injury or an episode that could not be explained scientifically remained equivocal; recurrence was not in itself probative; particular caution was necessary in any case where the medical experts disagreed, one opinion declining to exclude a reasonable possibility of natural cause; the court always had to be on guard against the over dogmatic expert, the expert whose reputation or amour propre was at stake, or the expert who had developed a scientific prejudice; and the judge in care proceedings should never forget that today’s medical certainty might be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw light into corners that were at present dark…...” g. The court is not limited to making only those findings sought by the applicant. It may make additional / alternative findings as long as such findings are securely supported by the evidence and do not undermine the fairness of the hearing (Re G and B (Fact-finding Hearing)[2009] EWCA Civ 10 ; Re B (a child)[2018] EWCA Civ 2127 ; Re A (No.2) (Children: Findings of Fact)[2019] EWCA Civ 1947 , para.93-99). a. Findings of fact must be based on evidence not speculation. Munby LJ observed in Re A (Fact Finding: Disputed findings)[2011] 1 FLR 1817 (para 26) “it is an elementary position that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can be properly drawn from evidence and not suspicion or speculation”. [44] …section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 requires the Court to focus not only on the significant harm sustained by the child but on its attributability. Inevitably, within the home environment, there are unlikely to be witnesses. The investigative process must track down ascertainable facts from the broadest canvas available and, where possible, draw such inferences as those facts will support. It is frequently a difficult task, but it is not one that can be shirked. The danger in failing to confront it is that an innocent individual may be tainted by a finding that has a direct impact, both on her and on the child. A finding which leaves a parent in a pool of perpetrators is likely to adversely influence the nature and extent of the contact arrangements or indeed, on where and with whom the child will live in the future. Of course, the imperative of child protection must not generate a reason to burden unsatisfactory evidence with a greater weight than it can legitimately support. That would create an injustice to all, not least the subject children, but neither does it absolve the Judge of the responsibility to confront the findings that the evidence properly establishes. The same obligation for forensic rigour applies to the lawyers. [72] … the fact that at one stage there had been, or might have been, other evidence relevant to the allegations did not prevent the judge proceeding to make findings on the evidence put before her. In almost every case there will be potentially relevant evidence that for one reason or another is not adduced at the hearing. One other example in this case was that neither J nor Y gave oral evidence. Had they done so, it is possible that the judge may have reached a different conclusion on J’s allegations. The fact that material evidence is “missing” does not preclude a judge reaching a decision on the basis of what is available. Mr Twomey is, of course, right to say that the judge has to consider the wider canvas. There may, of course, be cases where the available evidence is so thin – where substantial parts of the canvas are empty or obscure – that, applying the burden and standard of proof, a finding cannot fairly or properly be made. But that was plainly not the case here. [24] The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors (A County Council v A Mother, A Father and X, Y and Z[2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) ). Where the evidence of a child stands only as hearsay, the court weighing up that evidence has to take into account the fact that it was not subject to cross-examination (Re W (Children)(Abuse: Oral Evidence)[2010] 1 FLR 1485 ). […] [26] The court must not evaluate and assess the available evidence in separate compartments. Rather, regard must be had to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward has been made out on the balance of probabilities (Re T[2004] 2 FLR 838 at [33]). e. Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings concerning children (Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993 / SI 1993 No.621) and the court retains broad powers to control evidence under Part 22 FPR. [40] I do not seek in any way to undermine the importance of oral evidence in family cases, or the long-held view that judges at first instance have a significant advantage over the judges on appeal in having seen and heard the witnesses give evidence and be subjected to cross-examination (Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] WL 477307,[1999] 2 FLR 763 at 784). As Baker J said in in Gloucestershire CC v RH and others at [42], it is essential that the judge forms a view as to the credibility of each of the witnesses, to which end oral evidence will be of great importance in enabling the court to discover what occurred, and in assessing the reliability of the witness. [41] The court must, however, be mindful of the fallibility of memory and the pressures of giving evidence. The relative significance of oral and contemporaneous evidence will vary from case to case. What is important, as was highlighted in Kogan, is that the court assesses all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it and does not inappropriately elevate one kind of evidence over another. [42] In the present case, the mother was giving evidence about an incident which had lasted only a few seconds seven years before, in circumstances where her recollection was taking place in the aftermath of unimaginably traumatic events. Those features alone would highlight the need for this critical evidence to be assessed in its proper place, alongside contemporaneous documentary evidence, and any evidence upon which undoubted, or probable, reliance could be placed. a. Just because a person has lied in one aspect of a case does not mean they have lied about everything. A finding that a person has lied about one issue does not, in and of itself, confirm the truth of any allegation(s) against them. It does not - necessarily - undermine the truth of other areas of their evidence (Re H-C (Children)[2016] EWCA Civ 136 , para.97-100). [57] To be clear, and as I indicate above, a ‘Lucas direction’ will not be called for in every family case in which a party or intervenor is challenging the factual case alleged against them and, in my opinion, should not be included in the judgment as a tick box exercise. If the issue for the tribunal to decide is whether to believe A or B on the central issue/s, and the evidence is clearly one way then there will be no need to address credibility in general. However, if the tribunal looks to find support for their view, it must caution itself against treating what it finds to be an established propensity to dishonesty as determinative of guilt for the reasons the Recorder gave in [40]. Conversely, an established propensity to honesty will not always equate with the witness’s reliability of recall on a particular issue. [49] The court should first consider whether there is a 'list' of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability and should seek, but not strain, to do so: Re D (Children)[2009] EWCA Civ 472 at [12]. Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list: "Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?" Only if there is should A or B or C be placed into the 'pool'. b. Each step in the route described in Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator) - the “proper approach” according to King LJ in Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators)[2022] EWCA Civ 1348 - ought to be reflected in the court’s judgment if a pool finding is reached. c. The court must take into account, to the extent that it considers to be appropriate in any given case, the possibility of an unknown cause (see R v. Henderson and Butler and Others[2010] EWCA Crim 126 and Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation)[2011] EWHC 1715 (Fam) , para.10). [78] […] In particular, the authorities make clear that in every court case of this type, the answer is not to be found in the inherent probabilities per se but in the evidence, and that it is when analysing the evidence in a specific case that the court takes account of the inherent probabilities as appropriate (see Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof)[2008] UKHL 35 ,[2009] 1 AC 11 ,[2008] 2 FLR 141 and Re BR (Proof of Facts)[2015] EWFC 41 (unreported) 11 May 2015 ). Thus, in the context of the general population it is less likely that a child presenting with S’s symptoms will have been smothered or overlaid than it is that he will have been the victim of a natural event. However, in the context of the evidence in this case, the inherent probability of smothering or overlaying as against being victim of a poorly understood natural event will necessarily be different because inherent probability is sensitive to context. [79] In the circumstances, the proposition that an organic cause of respiratory arrest or suppression in a child is inherently more probable than deliberate or accidental suffocation is generally true for the population at large. However, the validity of that proposition becomes increasingly strained where the context that falls to be considered having regard to the evidence in this specific case is not that of the general population at large but rather that of a child living in a chaotic household in which domestic abuse and drug and alcohol abuse was prevalent, where S’s parents were the subject of significant stressors in the form of a lack of finances, exhaustion, lack of support and social isolation, where there had already been a drunken incident causing S to fall to the floor, where the parents had put in place unsafe sleeping arrangements for their children, including co-sleeping, where on one parent’s evidence S was found face down in a pillow and where the parents claim to have awoken at just the right time to resuscitate S. [64] Any court conducting a finding of fact hearing should be alert to the danger of such a serious finding becoming 'a bolt on' to the central issue of perpetration or of falling into the trap of assuming too easily that, if a person was living in the same household as the perpetrator, such a finding is almost inevitable. As Aikens LJ observed in Re J (A Child)[2015] EWCA Civ 222 ,[2015] All ER (D) 229 (Mar), 'nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or another'
“From Social Work observations since the referral to the Local Authority on27/10/2023 , [the mother] has demonstrated a loving and insightful approach to her children’s needs. [the mother] has prioritised seeing the children for contact when this has been arranged. She has continued to be thoughtful and organised to ensure any items they need have been brought to them. This evidences that [the mother] is able to show her children she is thinking of them, and that she is present and available to them. It is also my view that [the mother] has good capacity to demonstrate emotional warmth, love and attentive care for D, E and F. These highly positive parental capabilities are evidenced by observations of Social Worker’s during hospital visits and contact sessions thus far, which she has continued to demonstrate, despite experiencing significant emotional distress being asked to live separately from her children.”