VTY v GDB [2025] EWFC 110 (B)

IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of any child and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Unauthorised publication of the judgment will be a contempt of court. The names of the parties and any children must not be disclosed in public without the court’s permission This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.[2025] EWFC 110 (B)Case No 1697-1965-4871-2241
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Date 24 April 2025
SITTING AT THE CENTRAL FAMILY COURT
The Central Family Court
First Avenue House
42 – 49 High Holborn
London
WC1V 6NP
Before
RECORDER RHYS TAYLOR(In Private)
Between
VTYApplicantGDBRespondentHearing dates 11 March 2025 – 14 March 2025This judgment was handed down remotely on the 24 April 2025 at 3pm by circulation to the parties or their legal representatives by email and by release to the National ArchivesJUDGMENTMs Madhavi Kabra (instructed by Sears Tooth) appeared for ApplicantMr Amiot Vollenweider (instructed via The Bar Council Public Access Scheme)appeared for Respondent

Contents

[1]This is the court’s judgment on the applicant’s application for financial remedies dated 19 October 2023.[2]In this judgment, for convenience I shall refer to the applicant as “the wife” and the respondent as “the husband”. No disrespect is intended in so doing.[3]This case was listed for a final hearing for four days between 11 and 14 March 2025. This was an inadequate time estimate, necessitating written closing submissions and a reserved judgment.[4]A direction dated 7 March 2025 provided for trial bundles (main and supplementary) not to exceed 1,986 pages. As will shortly be apparent, the husband has engaged in a frustrating and confounding process of obfuscatory disclosure. It still remains incomplete.[5]The wife’s counsel has referred to one batch of disclosure as being “as clear as mud”. That observation, in the court’s assessment, has general applicability. Equally accurate is the observation that, “The court has the unenviable task of picking through the parts of the puzzle which have been disclosed and trying to piece together the rest”.[6]It seems to me that it will be a fool’s errand to try to make sense of everything. It is a mess. Pursuant to the overriding objective, the court will conduct a proportionate review and make such findings such as are necessary in order to resolve this application.[7]The advocates have worked impressively and tirelessly in attempting to bring this chaos into some kind of order for me. This has included a fully cross-referenced schedule of issues, where all documents relevant to any agreed issue have been individually listed, described neutrally with a note (as to by whom and when the document was disclosed) with relevant bundle page numbering cross-referenced.

Representation

[8]The wife is represented by Sears Tooth (Mr Haroop Ahluwalia) who instruct Ms Madhavi Kabra.[9]The husband acts as a litigant in person but instructs Mr Amiot Vollenweider via the Public Access Scheme. Previously, the husband was represented by a firm of solicitors called Abbott Forbes Solicitors. Later, between November 2024 and January 2025 he instructed Streathers.[10]Not only have the representatives worked tirelessly to bring some order to the chaos, but there have been many factually contentious issues which have been hard fought. The case has been presented on both sides with forensic acuity and professionalism.[11]Each party can be assured they have been represented to a high and very professional standard. All that could have been said has been canvassed. Mr Vollenweider could not have done more for the husband.

Background

[12]The wife is 46 and the husband is 54. They have three children, respectively aged 23, 22 and 16. The oldest is female and the younger two are male.[13]The parties married in 1999.[14]The structure of the family had been a traditional one. The husband has been the breadwinner and the wife has been the homemaker. These roles are equal in law. The wife had not really worked outside of the home for about 20 years. The wife was a 100% shareholder and director in a company but, as I will explain, the court finds that she has been merely the nominee of the husband who, at all times, has controlled the purse strings and business ventures.[15]The husband described himself on his Form E as a self-employed financial consultant. He trades in shares and invests in properties. He has been hugely successful over the course of the parties’ marriage. The parties enjoyed a high standard of living.[16]The family relocated to Country Y in 2007 where the parties lived in a prestigious location. The children attended an English public school which has an outpost in Country Y.[17]Around 2016/2017, the family returned to England. In addition to the properties already owned in or about London, a second family home was purchased near to the English public school so that the family could live nearby, albeit now on home soil.[18]One of the children has enjoyed semi-professional junior motor racing, a hobby which has cost several tens of thousands of pounds to maintain per annum. The family had staff in Country Y and, to a lesser extent, upon their return to England. High-end holidays were enjoyed and the family lived a financially privileged existence.[19]All was not well, however. The husband determined that the wife and children should live in the second home near to the school while he remained in London and visited every few weeks.[20]In March 2022, the wife was recovering from a major operation. She became aware that the husband had been conducting an affair as intimate videos and photos from his phone had uploaded onto the family photo sharing account, which she chanced upon when looking at her iPad.[21]The parties did not immediately separate. The wife came under cultural pressures from both sides of the family to avoid divorce if at all possible. The marriage limped on for a about a year before the wife stated that she wanted a divorce.[22]Whilst there are numerous aspects to the case, there are perhaps six assets or class of assets which loom the largest in the chronology. These are, in brief, 22.1. A property I shall call “The Farm”, in Country X; 22.2. A plot of land in Country X (“DHA plot”); 22.3. Two properties in Country X; 22.4. The proceeds of sale of an apartment in Country Y; 22.5. Companies located in Countries X and Z; and 22.6. The English properties.

Procedural history

[23]Prior to issue of a Form A, the parties each completed a voluntary Form E and each raised a questionnaire on the same.[24]Financial proceedings were commenced on 19 October 2023. The course of these proceedings has not been straightforward.[25]The application came before DJ Hussain for a First Appointment on the 6 February 2024. Directions were given.[26]On 12 February 2024, the husband made an application for the joinder of his father to the proceedings. This relates to an alleged interest that the father had in the former matrimonial home in London.[27]An MPS application was made by the wife on 18 April 2024.[28]The case was listed on 28 May 2024 to deal with the joinder application of the husband’s father. The joinder application was withdrawn, with potential costs and the father’s health being cited. The hearing was vacated upon the filing of an agreed consent order. On 28 May 2024 the First Appointment directions were re-timetabled on paper and by consent before DDJ Glasner. This included for the valuation of The Farm. Costs were ordered in the sum of £4,000 + VAT for the costs thrown away by the wife in dealing with the aborted joinder application.[29]Included in the recitals to DDJ Glasner’s order is a definition of The Farm noted above and the following concession by the husband, namely, “… in which the respondent accepts he has a beneficial interest, and which has been the subject of contested legal proceedings in [Country X]”.[30]The MPS application was determined by DDJ Marks on 20 June 2024. £3,000 pcm was ordered plus the husband was to pay the outgoings on the FMH. A costs order in the global sum of £12,500 was ordered (not to be enforced before the end of the proceedings). It is of note that, despite the husband’s prodigious rate of spending on himself after this date, he has not complied with this order citing the fact he has no funds. There are very substantial arrears now owing.[31]Despite having agreed that he had a beneficial interest in The Farm, the husband did not co-operate with the order for the property to be valued. He stated that it was “illiquid” and denied that it belonged to him, contrary to the concession made in the recital in DDJ Glasner’s order.[32]The wife made a Part 25 application for the court to determine the identity of the Single Joint Expert who would value The Farm. Ultimately, Savills were appointed by agreement, but it took the coercive pressure of the wife’s Part 25 application to extract that agreement.[33]There was an FDR before HHJ Willans on 25 September 2024.[34]At an appointment before DJ Keating on 7 November 2024, it was expressly recorded that the husband had not made any Part 25 application for the valuation of the wife’s handbags and jewellery. It has been a feature of the husband’s case that the wife is in possession of very valuable such chattels which should be included within the computation exercise. The agreement for Savills to value The Farm is recorded in the order. The court noted that if the husband failed to comply with the order, then the wife had permission to proceed with the instruction on a sole name basis. The husband was ordered to pay costs in the sum of £9,975 + VAT within 14 days.[35]The application was listed for a PTR before DJ Dias on 12 February 2025. The following is of note from the recitals and body of that[36]Subsequent to the PTR, the wife sought to issue witness summonses against the husband’s father and sister. In the event they were not issued by the court office by the time of the hearing, after which time the court’s permission was formally required. DJ Ashworth issued the summonses against the father and the sister whilst the case was being heard before me and substituted service was affected by email.[37]On 7 March 2025, DDJ Jabbour extended the bundle size so that there was a core bundle of 817 pages and a supplemental bundle of 1,118 pages.[38]The wife has provided a schedule of the husband’s disclosure. The schedule identifying the problems with disclosure itself runs to ten pages. It is colour coded: Blue denotes “documents missing”; Yellow denotes disclosure category “Items never previously disclosed and with documents missing”; Red denotes “Items still not disclosed”. This includes most, if not all, of what was individually ordered by DJ Dias at the PTR.[39]It would be a disproportionate exercise for this court to attempt to articulate the tangle which is apparent from this helpful schedule. The court gratefully adopts it. If there was ever identified the odd inaccuracy with some of the granular detail in the schedule it would not alter the court’s view that this is an extremely helpful document in the round which sets out in technicolour the sorry state of the husband’s disclosure compliance.[40]Mr Vollenweider has also provided a disclosure schedule which attempts to shore up the husband’s position and to demonstrate when the husband has made required disclosure. He has provided a second schedule which details the bank and credit card disclosure in some detail. These are carefully crafted documents but ultimately, as I will shortly describe, I prefer the wife’s presentation in the round and so prefer to place reliance on her schedule, which is far closer to the mark in capturing the problems with the husband’s disclosure. My impression of the parties and witnesses The husband

My impression of the parties and witnesses

[41]Ms Kabra submits that the husband presented as an angry and arrogant individual. This submission has force.[42]On occasions too frequent for the court to do justice to here, the husband has been demonstrated to not be telling the truth.[43]At times it appeared that the husband was making things up as he went along. He appeared to have little self-reflection as to how unbelievable he was sounding.[44]In this respect, and by way of illustration only, the husband was asked about what attempts he had made to obtain the documents relating to the sale of an apartment in Country Y. 44.1. DJ Dias had provided for the husband to copy the wife “… into all written requests for that material to include evidence of the bank account into which the sales proceeds were received and shall copy [the wife] into all requests for that material”. 44.2. It was the husband’s position that an agent in Country Y had held a power of attorney for him and had received funds not previously disclosed within these proceedings, which were then disbursed to various (previously unevidenced) creditors of the husband. I shall return to the detail of this later. 44.3. At this stage it is of note that the husband asserted that this agent was impossible to get hold of. He suggested that he had gone away travelling and would be hard to contact. 44.4. A professional website was then shown to the husband with this agent as the chairman of the enterprise. All persons listed on the website had a professional photo with their email address prominently displayed underneath. He was asked why he had not simply used the email address which had been very easy to find during the course of his oral evidence. He said that this individual did not like emails and that he much preferred dealing in WhatsApp communication, which was not possible given that he did not know where the individual had gone. 44.5. This was demonstrable nonsense on the husband’s part. He appeared to have no appreciation at all as to how completely ridiculous he sounded.[45]Another vignette is instructive, which concerns what possessions the husband was able to take from the FMH. 45.1. The husband spent, given the economics of this case, an obscene amount of money after separation on clothes (including, by way of illustration, £800 on a belt and £2,500 on a coat), sportswear and luxury personal grooming. 45.2. Whilst the husband accepted he was wrong to have done so, and that he was in “a dark place”, he also shared, without apology or reflection, that he came from a wealthy family and that he was used to spending well on himself and that his appearance was important to him. 45.3. Part of his justification for the clothes spending was that the wife had, in breach of an agreement, been present at the former matrimonial home when he attended to collect his personal affects and that he had not been permitted to remove any clothes save for a couple of pairs of jeans. He was very clear about this. 45.4. He was warned by Ms Kabra that the truth of the position would be apparent from a video integral to the doorbell, but the husband was resolute in his denial that he had taken any clothes and that he had only taken a couple of items including a computer monitor. 45.5. Overnight the doorbell footage was produced. I admitted it into evidence. It shows the husband leaving the house, lugging two large suitcases. 45.6. Shamelessly, as the court finds, the husband pivoted and then contended that the clothes that he had been able to take in two large suitcases were not the ones he really wanted, which the wife had locked away. 45.7. He appeared to have little appreciation that the video showed his evidence on oath to be untrue and he had declined to take the opportunity to resile from his position prior to the production of the doorbell footage.[46]The husband has been engaged in litigation in Country X which is highly relevant to what this court has to determine. More on that in a moment. 46.1. Of note here, reviewing the overall impression the husband has made upon the court, was that he commenced litigation in Country X relating to a plot which I have described as “the DHA plot”. This was done in March 2024. The husband was asserting in that litigation that he was the true beneficial owner of the plot of land. The title to the plot is held in the names of the wife and one of the parties’ sons. This is recorded to be the case in the definition section of orders made in these proceedings from February 2024 onwards. The husband failed, for most of the life of these proceedings, to mention that he was engaged in litigation concerning this plot of land in Country X. 46.2. The husband purported to serve the wife at his father’s address in Country X. His justifications for so doing were wholly unsatisfactory. 46.3. He stated that when visiting Country X, as the family did from time to time, the parties stayed in a wing of his parents’ substantial property. They regarded the wing as their space. 46.4. Attempts by officialdom to actually serve the wife at the husband’s father’s address were met with dissembling by servants or agents of the husband and/or his father, with officials variously being told that the wife “was not here” or that she was “abroad”. 46.5. The wife does not live at the husband’s father’s address and this fact was well known to the husband. They were separated. She lives thousands of miles away in England. He made absolutely no attempt to alert the wife to the fact of the DHA plot litigation in Country X. 46.6. With the continuing failure to serve the wife, the husband also swore an affidavit in Country X that the father’s address was “the only known address of the defendants as per the knowledge and belief of the deponent”. This is completely dishonest and is, I am afraid, a calculated attempt to mislead the court in Country X as to where the wife might have been served. 46.7. It was not until February 2025 when the husband disclosed within these proceedings that this litigation (which was ultimately unsuccessful) had been undertaken. 46.8. There is a sly and determined calculation to the husband’s dishonesty in this regard. He knew full well where the wife could be served but instead sought to obtain advantage by dishonestly ensuring that she was not served with proper or, indeed, any notice of these proceedings. It is disgraceful behaviour.[47]The husband sought to portray the wife as a property developer who had gone into business with a friend. He denied he had anything to do with it. A video was shown with a marketing panel discussion concerning the alleged business. The husband is on the panel, talking up investment prospects. He was the recipient of invoices from an accountant in regard to this business until, after separation, he directed the accountant to send them to the wife. Whilst the wife was notionally a director, she was in that role as a nominee of the husband. His attempts to cast her as a business-savvy property developer is a dishonest attempt to imply an earning capacity she simply does not have.[48]The level of obscene spending by the husband on himself whilst pleading poverty and not complying with the court orders for MPS also reflects very badly on him. I note, again by illustration only, he spent €2,137 on a clutch/wallet for what he described as a delayed birthday present for the wife of a friend who had been providing him with somewhere to stay in Country Y.[49]The husband owned and was a director of an offshore company in Country Z. 49.1. This was the vehicle through which he chose to invoice much of his commercial activity. On about 12 April 2024, the husband purported to cease to be involved with this company. There is an unsigned letter in which he intends to resign as “President” and “Company Secretary”. 49.2. A register of directors shows him ceasing to be a director on 11 April 2024 and an old friend and business associate takes up that role. That associate gets a mention in The Panama Papers, something which the husband is defensive about, taking the view that the data leak was a disgraceful breach of privacy. 49.3. From 1 May 2024 there is a “Certificate of Incumbency” naming the husband’s associate as the sole director. 49.4. Tacking back to DJ Dias’ order, it provided that the husband is to disclose “Any correspondence or other written communication (including emails, letters, texts and the like) passing between him (and anyone instructed by him) and [business associate] (and anyone instructed by him) regarding the sale by him to [business associate] of his interest in [company in Country Z] in or about April 2024”. 49.5. When questioned about the lack of compliance with DJ Dias’ order, the husband would have it that there had not been any written form of communication and that he was able to effect these changes over a phone call with his associate. The court does not accept this.[50]The husband, bluntly, cannot be believed. His disclosure and litigation conduct has been appalling and has been designed to confuse and obfuscate. He is thoroughly and determinedly dishonest.

The wife

[51]The husband has set forth a series of propositions in a composite statement of issues, entitled, “The Applicant Wife’s alleged misleading behaviour”. In the interests of proportionality, I am not going to determine seriatim. Standing back, I do not accept that any of them are well made and/or material criticisms. They have the feel of a smoke screen designed to highlight the speck of dust in the wife’s eye whilst attempting to detract from the plank in the eye of the husband. It is pettifogging which I am not required to resolve in a judgment which is already, of necessity, very long.[52]I found the wife to be straightforward in her evidence. She came across with quiet dignity and determination, given all that she has had to contend with in this litigation.[53]The wife has not worked outside of the home for many years, save for putting in the odd token appearance at a business premises in her capacity as an owner, albeit as the nominee of the husband.[54]Where the evidence of the husband and wife conflict, in most instances I am inclined to prefer the evidence of the wife. I do so with caution and am mindful of the risk of wishful thinking on the wife’s part.

The husband’s father

[55]The husband’s father attended the hearing via a remote video link following the service of the summons. He appeared annoyed, given the time difference, that his evidence was disturbing his dinner plans. He also cut the remote link off after a while, sending an email to the court saying that there had been a technical difficulty.[56]The husband’s father appeared old and frail. There is a suggestion he is suffering from dementia. He was at times inconsistent in what he was saying but, given his overall demeanour and frailty, it would be inappropriate to hold this against him. There was little I could really divine one way or another in the short session during which he gave evidence.

The husband’s sister

[57]The husband’s sister gave evidence remotely. She was travelling and found a quiet space and appeared on her phone.[58]I will deal with the issue of The Farm litigation in Country X in a moment. Presently I am concerned only with the impression that the sister made in oral evidence.[59]There had been procedural problems with the litigation she had brought about The Farm in Country X. She was unable adequately to explain what had happened and said that the lawyers in Country X would have to be asked. The issue had the feel of procedural skirmishing perhaps akin to a relief from sanctions application in this jurisdiction. I accept that the lawyers would be best placed to deal with this.[60]The sister was slow to accept her motivation for her bringing the claim about The Farm, but eventually conceded that she had been aware that there was a dispute going on between the husband and the wife.[61]It was suggested that the husband and father have not been on speaking terms for about two years. The sister has brought litigation against the husband which might be thought to denote a strained relationship. Notwithstanding this, there has been produced in the bundle a picture of the husband, the sister and her family together in the sister’s house in April 2024. The sister explained that this was to celebrate Eid and that the father had asked her to invite the husband into her house for this religious festival. The father’s encouragement to do so might seem inherently unlikely if he was not on speaking terms with the husband. The sister stated that Eid is a very important festival, and that the family were prepared to put aside their differences and come together for this occasion.[62]The sister made an application for an early disposal of her application. When asked why she had done this she stated that it was to do with foreign travel. When challenged, she rowed back and was confused about the travel issue and stated she could not recall. (Another reason, of course, for an early disposal would be the judgment in Country X being available before the judge in these proceedings).[63]The sister was overly defensive about where she lives. She denied that accusing her brother of fraud was a big thing.[64]Overall, I accept Ms Kabra’s submission that there were unsatisfactory elements to the sister’s evidence. That said, she gave evidence for a relatively short time via a phone. Responding to a witness summons, there was no proof of evidence and Ms Kabra was not in a position to cross-examine as the sister was “her witness”.[65]I am left with concerns and anxieties about the role the sister has played within the litigation relating to The Farm.

The law

[66]The burden of proof rests on the person seeking to establish a fact. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all the available evidence.[67]Findings of fact must be based on evidence not speculation. Evidence-based findings of fact may include inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors.[68]In determining whether a party has discharged the burden upon it, the court looks at what has been described as “the broad canvas” of the evidence before it. The court takes account of a wide range of matters including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence. The role of the court is to consider the evidence in its totality and to make findings on the balance of probabilities accordingly. Within this context, the court must consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence.[69]The evidence of the parties is of utmost importance. It is essential that I form a clear assessment of credibility and reliability. I am entitled to place weight on the evidence and impression that the parties have made upon me.[70]I remind myself that demeanour is an uncertain guide in assessing the reliability of evidence and that far more important is the substance of the evidence given, its internal consistency with contemporaneous documents and inherent probabilities. That said, the court is still permitted to have regard to the demeanour of witnesses when there is little by way of other contemporaneous documents. I remind myself to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of the parties’ behaviour when giving oral evidence.[71]I also give myself a Lucas direction and remind myself that a witness may lie for many reasons such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything.[72]I must have regard to all of the circumstances of the case (MCA 1973 s.25(1)) when applying the checklist at MCA 1973 s.25(2). The minor child of the family is my first consideration.[73]s.25(1) provides:
“It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24, 24A, 24B and 24E above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.”
[74]s.25(2) provides:
“As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24, 24A, 24B and 24E above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters: a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely to make in the foreseeable future to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.”
[75]s.25A(1) provides:
“Where on or after the making of a divorce or nullity of marriage order the court decides to exercise its power under s.23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24, 24A, 24B or 24E above in favour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so as to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable.”
[76]s.25A(2) provides: “Where the court decides in such a case to make a periodical payments or secured periodical payments order in favour of a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party”.[77]The modern case law is helpfully distilled by Peel J in WC v HC (Financial Remedies Agreements) (Rev 1) [2022] 2 FLR 1100 at [21]. I do not propose to quote in full the list of well-known factors, all of which I have firmly in mind. In brief: 77.1. The claimant spouse is entitled to the greater of their claims resulting from the needs or sharing principle. 77.2. Non-matrimonial assets should only be “invaded” to meet needs. 77.3. Needs are an elastic concept. 77.4. The standard of living during the marriage is an important factor but cannot dominate the exercise. 77.5. The Family Court Practice 2024 also notes the observations of Mostyn J in Clarke v Clarke [2023] 2 FLR 1 in which he describes Peel J’s summary of the law as an impeccable synopsis, before adding one further item to the list, which is a call for s.25A to be diligently applied.[78]I have in mind the well-known guidance given by Mostyn J in SS v NS (Spousal Maintenance) [2015] 2 FLR 1124.[79]I also have in mind the earlier and still relevant warnings by Ward LJ in Flavell v Flavell [1997] 1 FLR 353 and C v C (Financial Relief: Short Marriage) [1997] 2 FLR 26 that the court requires evidence to be satisfied that a payee will adjust without undue hardship and that “Gazing into the crystal ball does not give rise to such a reasonable expectation. Hope, with or without pious exhortations to end dependency, is not enough.” Similar observations were made by Holman J in Murphy v Murphy [2014] EWHC 2263 (Fam).[80]In Crowther v Crowther and Others [2022] 2 FLR 243 Peel J stated “Non-disclosure alleged by W against H [56] In NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16], Mostyn J enunciated the proper approach to take as follows: ‘Pulling the threads together it seems to me that where the court is satisfied that the disclosure given by one party has been materially deficient then:(i) The Court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden.(ii) But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, the Court is satisfied he has not got.(iii) If the Court concludes that funds have been hidden then it should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those funds, even in the broadest terms.(iv) In making its judgment as to quantification the Court will first look to direct evidence such as documentation and observations made by the other party.(v) The Court will then look to the scale of business activities and at lifestyle.(vi) Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third parties is inadmissible in the exercise.(vii) The Al-Khatib v Masry [2004] EWCA Civ 1353, [2005] 1 FLR 381 technique of concluding that the non-discloser must have assets of at least twice what the claimant is seeking should not be used as the sole metric of quantification.(viii) The Court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. If the result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better that than the Court should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the claimant.’ [57] In Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR 225, the Court of Appeal did not dissent from those propositions, save in respect of (iii) where it concluded that the court is not required to reach a specific determination as to the figure, or bracket, of undisclosed resources. [58] Usually, in my view, the evidential platform for a finding of non-disclosure is established by one or more of the following: (i) Direct evidence of an asset which the alleged non-discloser has not revealed (the classic example being the revelation of the existence of a bank account or accounts which feature nowhere in his/her financial presentation, and holding large sums of money). (ii) Failure to comply with court orders and/or provide adequate or complete responses to questions asked, from which failure the court feels able to draw inferences adverse to the alleged non-discloser. (iii) Evidence of a lifestyle which is wholly inconsistent with disclosed financial resources.[81]In Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 Mr James Ewins KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge stated: “[34] Because the respondent has not made any financial disclosure whatsoever, I must consider what if any adverse inferences I can reasonably and properly draw concerning his financial resources, as was forewarned by Peel J in his 14 May 2024 order – see … above. The court’s duty to consider drawing adverse inferences can be traced back to the decision of Sachs J in J v J [1955] P 215, in which he stated: “In cases of this kind, where the duty of disclosure comes to lie on a husband; where a husband has – and his wife has not – detailed knowledge of his complex affairs; where a husband is fully capable of explaining and has had opportunity to explain, those affairs, and where he seeks to minimise the wife's claim, that husband can hardly complain if, when he leaves gaps in the court's knowledge, the court does not draw inferences in his favour. On the contrary, when he leaves a gap in such a state that two alternative inferences may be drawn, the court will normally draw the less favourable inference – especially where it seems likely that his able legal advisers would have hastened to put forward affirmatively any facts, had they existed, establishing the more favourable alternative. The obligation of the husband is to be full, frank and clear in that disclosure. Any shortcomings of the husband from the requisite standard can and normally should be visited at least by the court drawing inferences against the husband on matters the subject of the shortcomings insofar as such inferences can be properly be drawn.” [35] In the Court of Appeal case of Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, Moylan LJ stated as follows: [86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party’s financial resources, rather than the latter. [87](i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non- disclosing party. [88](ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker, inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’. This was reiterated by Lady Hale in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415, [2013] 2 FLR 732, at para [85]: ‘… the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.’ [89](iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux’s submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because, the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi. [90](iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both Al- Khatib v Masry and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16](vii). [91] This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what Butler- Sloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a ‘cheat’s charter’. As Thorpe J said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16](viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non- discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations. [36] In Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam), Peel J said at ¶15: The potential consequences of failure to disclose have been clearly set out in a series of cases summarised in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR 225. The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party. As Thorpe J (as he then was) said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, at 367: ‘… if in consequence the obscurity of my final vision results in an order that is unfair to [the husband] it is better that than that I should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the wife.’ [37] In Hersman v De Verchere [2024] EWHC 905 (Fam), Moor J stated, at ¶25: The second point, however, is that I do not have the benefit of any up to date evidence from the Wife. Mr Amos KC, who again appears on behalf of the Husband, has not had the chance to cross-examine her as to her earlier statement or what has happened since then. I have already made it clear that this is deliberate on her part. She could easily have attended by video link and I am clear that she has the resources to be represented if she wished to instruct a lawyer. In these circumstances, I am entitled to draw adverse inferences against her, but this does not mean I can draw any inference I like. An inference must be properly drawn.” “In cases of this kind, where the duty of disclosure comes to lie on a husband; where a husband has – and his wife has not – detailed knowledge of his complex affairs; where a husband is fully capable of explaining and has had opportunity to explain, those affairs, and where he seeks to minimise the wife's claim, that husband can hardly complain if, when he leaves gaps in the court's knowledge, the court does not draw inferences in his favour. On the contrary, when he leaves a gap in such a state that two alternative inferences may be drawn, the court will normally draw the less favourable inference – especially where it seems likely that his able legal advisers would have hastened to put forward affirmatively any facts, had they existed, establishing the more favourable alternative. The obligation of the husband is to be full, frank and clear in that disclosure. Any shortcomings of the husband from the requisite standard can and normally should be visited at least by the court drawing inferences against the husband on matters the subject of the shortcomings insofar as such inferences can be properly be drawn.” [86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party’s financial resources, rather than the latter. [87] (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non- disclosing party. [88] (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker, inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’. This was reiterated by Lady Hale in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415, [2013] 2 FLR 732, at para [85]: ‘… the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.’ [89] (iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux’s submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because, the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi. [90] (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both Al- Khatib v Masry and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16](vii). [91] This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what Butler- Sloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a ‘cheat’s charter’. As Thorpe J said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16](viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non- discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations. The potential consequences of failure to disclose have been clearly set out in a series of cases summarised in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR 225. The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party. As Thorpe J (as he then was) said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, at 367: ‘… if in consequence the obscurity of my final vision results in an order that is unfair to [the husband] it is better that than that I should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the wife.’

Factual issues in dispute which go to computation

[82]The parties prepared a helpful and comprehensive composite schedule of issues. I have pared this down in the interests of materiality and proportionality. It seems to me that the following computational issues require determination:

Property related disputes

[83]Whether the litigation conducted in Country X in respect of The Farm was engineered by the husband and is, in fact, fraudulent litigation (resulting in a void foreign judgment not entitled to recognition by an English court) or in the alternative, the beneficial interest in the property is retained by the husband and/or the property will be returned to the husband at the conclusion of these proceedings.[84]Whether the husband has retained and failed to disclose the premium of c.£385,000 received from the proceeds of the sale of an apartment in Country Y.

Company related disputes

[85]Whether the husband has been deliberately misleading and retains the beneficial ownership of a company in Country Z and/or this ownership will be returned to him by “Associate A” at the conclusion of these proceedings.[86]Whether the husband has failed to disclose that he owns/ holds an interest in a property company in Country X and, if so, the value of this interest.[87]Whether the husband retains any shareholdings in Audioboom Group PLC and/or Tap Global Group PLC or has failed to disclose any other shares.

Whether the husband has undisclosed assets

[88]Whether the husband has any other undisclosed assets (bank accounts, shares, investments and investment/brokerage accounts). The level of the husband’s indebtedness and whether debts found to subsist are hard or soft in character[89]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to “Associate A” totalling £31,000 (three loan documents) are bona fide loans and, if so, whether they are repayable or are they, as alleged by the wife, income.[90]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to “Associate B” totalling £37,000 (verbal agreement) is a bona fide loan and, if so, whether it is repayable.[91]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to his father totalling £150,000 (verbal agreement) is a bona fide loan and, if so, whether it is repayable.[92]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to his uncle totalling £22,000 (verbal agreement) is a bona fide loan and, if so, whether it is repayable.[93]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to “Associate C” totalling £10,000 (loan document) were in fact paid to him and, if so, whether it is a bona fide loan and, if so, whether it is repayable.[94]Whether the funds which the husband alleges are repayable to “Associate D” totalling £10,000 (loan document) were in fact paid to him and, if so, whether it is a bona fide loan and, if so, whether it is repayable.

The value of the wife’s chattels/bank accounts

[95]Whether the wife has jewellery and handbags worth £318,245.[96]Whether the wife has an offshore account with about £800,000 in it.

The Farm

[97]The Farm, located in Country X, was purchased in the name of the husband’s father in the early 2000s.[98]It is the wife’s case that it was purchased with a bonus which the husband had earned in his employment, but that his father, living in Country X, had been the husband’s “man on the ground” who had purchased it on behalf of his son. The husband’s case is that it was purchased by his father with the father’s own funds. There is no documentation either way to assist me in this regard.[99]The husband would have been about 30 years old when The Farm was purchased. The husband said that he was not formally employed consistently through his 20s, suggesting he had spent about four years working for his father. Even allowing for a break in employment, it is not a difficult evidential step to expect that an individual employed in finance, which the husband was around the time of purchase, would be in receipt of substantial bonuses as part of a renumeration package which might have gone to finance the purchase of a property in Country X.[100]The Savills valuation refers to The Farm as being an agricultural parcel about 5 acres in size. It has a farmhouse which has two bedrooms with attached baths, a kitchen and two further bathrooms and a living area. The land is described as open land utilised as a garden cultivation area, a servant house, a cattle feed yard, an open seating space and a car porch. Utilities such as water and electricity are available. The surrounding areas are primarily used for farming and cultivation.[101]The Savills appraisal suggests a valuation of about £400,000.[102]In her oral evidence, the husband’s sister painted a picture of the property being located in a remote and non-residential area – somewhere where you might visit for the day, but not where women or children in the family would feel safe in sleeping overnight. No one in the husband’s family has ever lived there and it has been used only for day trips, picnics and for gardening/cultivation by the wider family.[103]In 2017, the father executed a deed of gift of The Farm to the husband. The starting point, from the perspective of English property law, is that equity will follow the law. In 2017 or 2018 (when the records in Country X were formalised), the husband was therefore the sole beneficial owner. This accords with the husband’s concession in several court orders in these proceedings that he had a beneficial interest in the property. As noted above, this is a concession which the husband later sought to resile from when resisting a valuation of this property.[104]In the autumn of 2023, with pro bono legal assistance in Country X, and anticipating mischievous dealings in respect The Farm by the husband, the wife applied for some sort of injunction in Country X, referred to in the papers as a “stay order”. This was designed to stop further dealing with The Farm, pending the outcome of her financial remedy proceedings in England.[105]This was refused in the first instance but, on appeal in November 2023, a temporary injunction was granted pending a further hearing.[106]It was the sister’s evidence that she had been denied access to the property by staff acting under the direction of the husband, upon the basis that a stay order was in place. Her evidence in this regard was confused as, in the litigation in Country X, she had suggested that it was the husband who had prevented access. Either way, this alerted her to the fact of the wife’s application and, in December 2023, the sister issued proceedings for a cancellation of the “forged and fabricated gift” of The Farm made by her father to the husband back in 2017. The timing of the sister’s application is highly suspicious.[107]I have already referred to the ducking and weaving the husband has engaged in within these proceedings in respect of The Farm. Having conceded that he had beneficial ownership on the face of orders within the proceedings, he then sought to deny this fact and refused to cooperate with a valuation, necessitating a Part 25 application to progress the appointment of the suggested expert, Savills.[108]Of note, on 12 August 2024, the husband’s then English solicitors, on record within these proceedings, asserted that a court in Country X had made a decision that the father’s gift was illegal, and that therefore the ownership of the land is not his. This was not the case at that stage as the litigation in Country X was not determined until January 2025. The assertion was misleading.[109]There are a number of features which put this court on alert as to the possibility of fraud. 109.1. It is plain from the disclosed pleadings from the litigation in Country X that the husband did not put up much of a defence. His case lacked much by way of positive averments in support of his position. 109.2. It would appear from the transcript of the hearing that he did not cause his sister or father to be cross-examined. 109.3. The husband’s position in these proceedings appeared to be at odds with what he asserted in the proceedings in Country X, which was a bare denial that the gift was illegal. In these proceedings he suggested in his oral evidence that there was a very loose agreement that he would hold the property on behalf of his mother and siblings. He disputed the Country X judgment, stating that he had not done anything wrong. 109.4. The husband did not contest the sister’s procedural application for an early disposal of the hearing. This ensured that the judgment was delivered prior to this final hearing. 109.5. The judgment in Country X refers to the husband having “miserably failed” to evidence aspects of his case. 109.6. There is no evidence of the judgment being implemented in Country X. 109.7. As already noted, it would appear from the service issue in the unrelated DHA plot litigation, also in Country X, that the husband is perfectly capable of deliberately misleading, and has misled, courts in Country X. 109.8. Despite having engaged his brother in litigation, having alleged fraud against him, the sister invited him to her house for Eid celebrations in April 2024. Whilst I accept the religious significance of Eid to the husband and the sister, it seems an improbable turn of events given the nature of the dispute between them at that time.[110]Ms Kabra submitted the case of Broxfield Ltd v Sheffield City Council [2019] EWHC 1946 (Admin) dealing with the law relating to sham transactions and the applicable standard of proof. Mostyn J stated the following:
“[20] The classic definition of a sham was given by Diplock LJ in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, at 802: “It means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the 'sham' which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. Diplock LJ went on to justify this definition by reference to “legal principle, morality and the authorities”
. His reference to morality clearly signifies that he intended the legal definition to correspond to the natural literal definition; he did not intend that the meaning in law should be a term of art.” [21] That definition was expressly approved by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs [1982] AC 300 at 337. Earlier, at 323 he said:
“To say that a document or transaction is a “sham” means that while professing to be one thing, it is in fact something different. To say that a document or transaction is genuine, means that, in law, it is what it professes to be, and it does not mean anything more than that.” [22] In A v A [2007] 2 FLR 467 at [34] Munby J rightly stated that Diplock LJ's statement of the law has always been treated as canonical. [23] Thus, in my opinion courts should be careful of being beguiled by the irresistible temptation of senior judges to apply spin, gloss and tweaks to a very simple literal concept. For example, reference has been made to the decision of Neuberger J in National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2000] BPIR 1092 at [59] where he said that because “a degree of dishonesty is involved in a sham”, it follows that “there is a strong and natural presumption against holding a provision or a document a sham.” [24] For my part, I struggle with the concept of a “strong presumption”
. A presumption is merely a starting point, and it yields to the evidence in the case. In Quinn v Quinn [1969] 1 WLR 1394

Lord Justice Winn said about a presumption:

“[it] operates solely in the field of evidence; indeed, its function is to make good a lack of evidence.”
In 1906 an American judge described presumptions as the “bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts” (Mackowick v Kansas City St. J. & C.B. Ry., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262, Lamm J). If the evidence satisfies the court that it is more likely than not that the arrangement was a sham, then it matters not how “strong” the starting point was. [25] Mr Royle argues that the ratio of the decision in National Westminster Bank plc v Jones is that because a finding of sham obviously will involve dishonesty, and because dishonesty is a serious finding, the court should be slow to make it and should require “very cogent evidence” before reaching such a finding. I am surprised that after the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Re B (Children) [2009] 1 AC 11, such a submission should still be made. At [64] Baroness Hale stated:
“Lord Nicholls' nuanced explanation [in Re H (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586D-H] left room for the nostrum, "the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needed to prove it", to take hold and be repeated time and time again in fact-finding hearings in care proceedings (see, for example, the argument of counsel for the local authority in Re U (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening) [2004] EWCA Civ 567, [2005] Fam 134, at p 137. It is time for us to loosen its grip and give it its quietus.”
And at [70]:
“My Lords, for that reason I would go further and announce loud and clear that the standard of proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold under section 31(2) or the welfare considerations in section 1 of the 1989 Act is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”
See also Lord Hoffmann at [15] to the same effect. The fact that an allegation is serious, or that its consequences, if proved, will be serious, is not a reason for subversively elevating the standard of proof from the simple balance of probability, nor for suggesting that the quality of the evidence, should such an allegation be made, needs to be better than if the seriousness of the allegation were less grave. The court has to consider on the admissible evidence whether the charge is more likely than not made out, no more no less.” “It means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the 'sham' which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. Diplock LJ went on to justify this definition by reference to “legal principle, morality and the authorities”. His reference to morality clearly signifies that he intended the legal definition to correspond to the natural literal definition; he did not intend that the meaning in law should be a term of art.” “To say that a document or transaction is a “sham” means that while professing to be one thing, it is in fact something different. To say that a document or transaction is genuine, means that, in law, it is what it professes to be, and it does not mean anything more than that.” “Lord Nicholls' nuanced explanation [in Re H (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586D-H] left room for the nostrum, "the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needed to prove it", to take hold and be repeated time and time again in fact-finding hearings in care proceedings (see, for example, the argument of counsel for the local authority in Re U (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening) [2004] EWCA Civ 567, [2005] Fam 134, at p 137. It is time for us to loosen its grip and give it its quietus.” “My Lords, for that reason I would go further and announce loud and clear that the standard of proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold under section 31(2) or the welfare considerations in section 1 of the 1989 Act is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”[111]Ms Kabra submits that I can be guided by the approach adopted in the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, which deals with the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments. The basis on which registration and enforcement is a recognition that the foreign judgment is valid. Ms Kabra draws my attention to circumstances when a registered judgment may be set aside, which includes a situation where the foreign judgment has been obtained by fraud by the parties to the litigation.[112]Further, Ms Kabra submits: 112.1. ‘Fraud’ in this context can take a broad meaning. It is not confined to the limited number of causes of action generally regarded as ‘fraud claims’ in English law. It has been said it can extend to encompass “every variety of mala fides and mala praxis whereby one of the parties misleads and deceives the judicial tribunal”: Jet Holdings Inc v Patel [1990] 1 Q.B. 335, 346. 112.2. To rely successfully on the ground of fraud, the party alleging fraud/resisting the enforcement of a foreign judgment must demonstrate a ‘conscious and deliberate dishonesty’ and that this dishonesty was an operative cause in bringing about the foreign judgment (pursuant to RBS v Highland Finance Partners LP [2013] EWCA Civ 238 and GFH Capital Ltd v Haigh [2020] EWHC 1269 (Comm) paras 69-70). 112.3. The fraud ground for resisting enforcement is a “carefully delineated exception and is not to be given an expansive application” (Gelley v Shepherd & Anor [2013] EWCA Civ 1172 at [47]) being an exception to the general rule that the English Court will not re-open the substantive merits of final and conclusive judgments entered by foreign courts of competent jurisdiction. 112.4. That being so, even where powerful considerations of comity arise, “it is questionable how compelling such considerations would be if the enforcing court considered it proven on the balance of probabilities that the foreign judgment had been obtained by fraud”: GFH Capital Ltd v Haigh [2020] EWHC 1269 (Comm), per Henshaw J at [74]. 112.5. The English Court will nevertheless take “a nuanced approach depending on the reliability of the foreign legal system, the scope for challenge in the foreign court, and the type of fraud alleged…” (AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7 per Lord Collins at [116], obiter).[113]Mr Vollenweider draws my attention to the case of Servis-Terminal LLC v Valeriy Ernestovich Drelle [2025] EWCA Civ 62 which determined that a bankruptcy petition in England and Wales could not be based on a foreign judgment which has not been recognised or registered in this jurisdiction. This contains helpful analysis of the considerations in play when dealing with the recognition of foreign judgments.[114]Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed), Rule 45 provides that a judgment of a court in a foreign country has no direct operation in England, but may be recognised as a defence to a claim or as conclusive of an issue in a claim. Rule 51 provides a foreign judgment which is final and conclusive on merits, and is not impeachable, is conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon. Rule 53 provides one of several grounds for the impeachment of a foreign judgment, which includes the fraud of the party in whose favour the judgment is given.[115]I am confronted with very particular difficulties in this case. Ms Kabra has properly and reasonably put her case of fraud in respect of this judgment. I am very mindful of the findings I am making about the husband’s veracity, which includes misleading the court in Country X about the service of the proceedings in the unrelated DHA plot. I have in mind the manoeuvring of the father in bringing, and then abandoning, a claim for joinder in these proceedings concerning an alleged interest in the family home. The husband conceded a beneficial interest in this land on the face of court orders. I am highly suspicious and have at the forefront of my mind that there is no enhanced standard of proof in this instance.[116]Despite my suspicions and reservations, I am left wrestling with aspects of this situation which make it not appropriate, in my judgment, to proceed on the basis that the foreign judgment has been obtained by fraud.[117]With translation difficulties it is not totally clear the basis on which the judgment has been obtained. An element of the decision concerns what appears to be a formalities’ point, with a member of staff in the father’s household claiming that a deed was not properly witnessed. Ms Kabra suggests that this member of staff will simply do the father’s bidding. She points out that this member of staff gave misleading answers to the process server in the DHA plot litigation when attempts were made to serve the wife at the father’s house. He had stated that she had travelled abroad, which is not an accurate description for someone who does not live in Country X in the first place. This is suggestive that the answer was given at the direction of the husband and/or father. Whilst this is indeed very suspicious, without more it feels like an unwarranted evidential leap to say that the staff member has given false evidence in The Farm litigation. Similarly, I am doubtful whether I have the material upon which I can say, on the balance of probabilities, that the sister is engaged in a fraud upon a foreign court.[118]I am also mindful that the husband and sister have two further siblings who were joined to The Farm litigation. I have simply no idea whether they are party to an alleged fraud or have been innocently added by agreement or otherwise.[119]Standing back, whilst I recognise all of the well-made points advanced by Ms Kabra, I am not prepared to say that the judgment of a foreign court should not be recognised on the grounds that it has been obtained by fraud. There are too many imponderables at play, notwithstanding my suspicions.[120]I am alive to the very real possibility that, notwithstanding the foreign judgment, the husband and his family may choose to deal with the beneficial ownership of The Farm contrary to the judgment once these proceedings have concluded.[121]In the event, as I will explain shortly, this approach has not deflected the court from its ultimate needs’ based determination as to overall outcome. The inclusion or exclusion of this asset from the balance sheet simply moves the dial closer or further away from a 50/50 outcome, something which the court is permitted to depart from if justified by needs and fairness.

Missing sale proceeds from the sale of apartment in Country Y

[122]Between January 2021 and March 2021, the husband paid several instalments by way of a deposit to acquire an off-plan apartment in Country Y. The parties visited the property in December 2021.[123]The property was sold in late 2022. The husband says he was a regular investor in property and this was acquired to be flipped to make a profit. The wife says she was told it would be a property that they could enjoy in Country Y, a place where they had previously lived. I do not need to resolve this issue as it is agreed by the husband that he could not, in either event, afford the balancing payments which were required over a couple of years, and he needed to sell the property.[124]The order of DJ Dias made plain that the husband was to disclose documentary evidence relating to the purchase and sale of the apartment in Country Y. For both purchase and sale there is a requirement in the order that the wife was to be copied into all requests for the information. I have already touched upon the impression the husband has made upon the court in this regard. I was treated to an unbelievable story about how the agent in Country Y was uncontactable as his business had either closed down or he had gone off travelling. The website with photo and email contact address told a different story. The husband’s suggestion that this person only dealt on WhatsApp was risible and I do not accept it.[125]It is no answer to the case the husband needs to meet that all of the documents were left at the family home in London. He could have simply emailed the agent in Country Y and obtained all the necessary sales information. That he has not done so, despite the clear order of DJ Dias is, I am afraid, a significant matter in the scales when combined with his overall presentation and when making an adverse inference against him concerning the destination of these proceeds.[126]The wife was able to find part of a sales document. It seems to suggest that the husband was paid a total of about £725,000 (I have converted and rounded) on the sale of the apartment.[127]I can see being paid into the husband’s account the sum of about £210,000 (converted and rounded) on 15 December 2022 and £152,000 (converted and rounded) on 2 February 2024. This totals about £362,000. This leaves about £363,000 (in rough terms) unaccounted for on the basis of the sales document. Where did this money go? The husband has not given a satisfactory explanation or complied with the order of DJ Dias to chase down these documents with his agent in Country Y.[128]In oral evidence, however, the husband’s case became curiouser and curiouser. The husband stated, for the first time, that he had had a bit more than the £725,000 I have referred to. However, this money had not come to him as he had various creditors due money and his agent in Country Y had simply paid these creditors on his behalf. He referred to a friend for the first time who was said to have made a £50,000 investment into the property in the first place. The husband suggested that it was common for him to get funding from others and that this was how he invested in properties to make a profit. This was all news to everyone present in court and completely unevidenced, despite the clear requirement to evidence all purchase and sales documentation. The husband, boldly, given the circumstances, suggested that the court would “have to take my word for it”.[129]Things got even murkier when the husband was asked to give an account for where the unaccounted money may have gone. He suggested that some money had been lost due to currency fluctuations when repaying an investor; some was for jewellery for the wife “to make her happy” and some was to purchase gold to protect against inflation. If there was any truth in the above, I am afraid that the husband is hoist by his own petard. By failing to evidence anything in support of his various ranging assertions, despite a clear order requiring him to do so, he has left the court in a position where it is simply unable to believe him when balanced against all his other demonstrable untruths. I will come to lifestyle issues shortly.[130]It is no answer for the husband chaotically to disclose a pile of bank and credit card statements and to say that all of the money has gone on spending on the family. It is a very particular, and relatively straightforward, obligation to have complied with the order of DJ Dias so that I could see what the full extent of the sale proceeds were and where they were subsequently deposited or disbursed.[131]It appears to the court that there is a sum of at least £362,000 which is unaccounted for. The inference I am driven to is that the husband must have that. Ms Kabra asserted a slightly higher figure, in the order of about £385,000, and the difference between us may be due to currency fluctuation or the like. In this kind of exercise, in the absence of the documents, it is impossible to be precise. I have accepted the gravamen of Ms Kabra’s submissions, even if my figures have fallen out slightly lower.[132]I make plain that the £362,000 I have been able to identify does not include the money which, for the first time, the court was told had not come to the husband but had been paid to others by his agents. I have no idea what the sum amounts to but it is evidence direct from the husband that he was due more than £362,000.[133]I also note that the husband referred at this stage of the case about having had “trading money” in about 2021. He clearly distinguished in his mind between capital which had been used to purchase property in the parties’ names and capital which he might deploy in trades or property transactions for investment purposes.

The husband’s alleged ownership of a company in Country Z

[134]I have already tangentially referred to this issue when dealing with the question of the overall impression the husband has made on the court. It will be recalled that the court does not accept his account that he has been able to divest himself of his beneficial ownership of the company and his status as director without having communicated in writing with “Associate A”.[135]A further curious feature of this arrangement is that about a week after the supposed transfer of the company out of the husband’s name, it invoiced a company in Hong Kong for $53,920 for work which the husband says he undertook for a Ugandan entity. I am not even going to begin to try and fathom why the Ugandan company is dealing with its finances via Hong Kong. It is simply not necessary for me to understand this in order to be able to make the necessary decisions in this case. The husband’s case was that “Associate A” who had “taken on” the company had allowed him to raise an invoice via this company as a favour as otherwise he would have been unable to bill for work in progress. Such loose arrangements with company finance might not appear surprising for someone mentioned in dispatches within The Panama Papers but, to this court, without better explanation than has been given, it appears irregular.[136]The husband’s case, backed with accounts, is that the company was loss making and that he could not justify the required fees to keep such an entity going. I am somewhat perplexed as to why “Associate A” was prepared to take on a loss-making company for no consideration.[137]I am unable to find that there is any hidden wealth tied up in this company which is relevant for these proceedings. It may be that “Associate A” will transfer control of the company back in due course. It may also be that, in any event, it continues to be used to disguise income for the husband’s benefit.[138]What remains unexplained to me is why the husband ceased his various business activities and become employed during the life of these proceedings. The husband says he has had some successes and some failures in investing. His position, I think, is that he cannot sustain the risk which he used to carry and that is why he has made the decision to become employed on a salary. This, of course, suggests a lower income than he previously enjoyed. This happens to coincide with him going through a divorce. I will consider his earning capacity in a moment.

Does the husband have an interest in a company in Country X?

[139]In his pleadings in respect of the DHA plot in Country X, the husband makes the following averment about himself (the plaintiff) at paragraph 3:
“That in fact, the plaintiff is doing business in the name and style of “[Company A]” and is a man of means”
. He appears to have signed this pleading dated 7 March 2024.[140]The wife did not get to see this due to the service issue I have already referred to. It was only finally disclosed on 10 February 2025. The husband further pleaded that he had paid a sum running to some tens of thousands of pounds from this company in order to acquire the DHA plot.[141]In replies to answers on 11 April 2024, the husband denied having undisclosed interests in companies anywhere in the world.[142]The wife’s suspicions that the husband has property interests in two locations in Country X are first recorded in an order dated 6 February 2024.[143]I note that it appears that Company A appears to have a social media presence advertising plots of land in the two locations which the wife was concerned about, a long time before the existence of Company A was disclosed to her.[144]The husband gave unsatisfactory replies in his oral evidence. He claimed to not know why this company was referenced in a pleading prepared on his behalf and signed by him. He suggested that it may be a translation issue. He was at a loss to explain why he had put his name to such a document.[145]Given that the assertion that he owns Company A comes via his own hand in pleadings prepared on his behalf, when set in the context of the constellation of lies, fog and confusion the husband has engaged in these proceedings, I do not believe him.

AudioBoom Group PLC and/or Tap Global Group PLC

[146]There is a confusing account of the purchase and sale of about 30,000 shares in a company called AudioBoom Group PLC. These would have a value of about £127,000.[147]The husband asserts that, although the shares were acquired from a personal bank account, they were the property of his company located in Country Z. The company bank statements do show the sale of 3 tranches of 10,000 worth of shares. Ms Kabra raises the point that the references/serial number on the sold shares do not appear to tie up with what the husband had acquired in the first instance.[148]I am not persuaded that there is anything in this that would justify the inference that the husband still holds these shares, despite his failure to produce share certificates. Ms Kabra realistically pitched this part of the case in her opening note as the husband “may potentially” still have shares which would now be valued at £174,000. I do not find this to be the case.[149]There is also a baffling account given about some TAP Global Group PLC shares. It concerns about 25,000 shares said to be worth about £10,000 in total when acquired at 4p a share. The husband variously asserted that he owns them, or the company in Country Z owns them, or that they have be sold, but he provides no evidence in support of that sale. I am told that these shares have now gone down in value in any event.[150]The best I can do is to say that the husband’s presentation, in nearly all respects, is opaque and confusing. Even if he has these shares, I do not consider that they will be material to the determination I have to make.

Does the husband have other undisclosed assets?

[151]The husband’s disclosure has been woeful. He has been shown to be dishonest on numerous occasions. I will not recite them all again here. His spending habits post separation denote a very high standard of living, with frequent purchasing of top-end clothes, gifts and personal grooming appointments both for himself and children of his friends. He has made plain that he is used to living at a high standard and that is what he has continued to do, despite failing to meet his court ordered obligations to his wife to pay maintenance pending suit or to keep up to date with mortgage payments on some of the parties’ properties.[152]He has been evasive about exactly where he is living, saying first he had stayed with friends and now lives in a flat paid for by his employer.[153]The husband, I am afraid, has done himself absolutely no favours at all. Given that he has lied and deceived so much in all other respects, I am left with the distinct impression, and so find, that I have not been told the whole truth. The apparent ease with which he spends at voracious levels suggests to me that he is not down on his luck in the way in which he suggests.[154]I am afraid I am simply unable to quantify what this may amount to. I am not by law required to do so. The agreed schedule of issues cross references the possibility of undisclosed share dealing accounts or undisclosed bank statements. The quality of the husband’s disclosure has made it impossible to get to the bottom of this.[155]The consequences of this sorry state of affairs will be carried by the husband and not by the wife. I will come to this shortly.[156]The wife has not sought an add-back in respect of monies spent from remortgages. There is an issue between the parties as to whether the wife was aware of the remortgages. She says she was not. I am not sure that I need to resolve this discrete issue given that no add-back is being sought. There is a mortgage advisor document which has been produced which suggests a joint meeting took place in early June 2020. This seems inherently unlikely given the state of in-person meetings due to Covid at that time. The wife also says that the mortgage advisor is a childhood friend of the husband.[157]I am mindful that people who operate in the mortgage advisory market may be subject to a degree of regulation. It seems unnecessary for me to make a finding which would carry opprobrium against the mortgage advisor who has not first been given an opportunity to respond.

The husband’s alleged loans

[158]The husband asserts he owes his father £150,000, his uncle £22,000 and “Associate B” £37,000. These are all based on alleged verbal agreements only. There is no compelling documentation in support of these. In respect of his father and uncle, the husband appears to categorise these himself as soft loans in any event. I am not going to include these loans on the balance sheet. Given all of the problems that the husband has heaped into his own lap, he is not going to be permitted to assert that kind of loan without much better evidence in support.[159]There is an asserted loan of £30,000 in respect of a company. There is nothing in support of this and it is unexplained. I do not find it is payable.[160]There are three loan agreements with “Associate A” (who, it will be recalled, took over a loss-making company on the husband’s behalf, the husband would have it, with no emails have been exchanged). One is dated 21 June 2024 and is for £10,000. It is signed by the husband and “Associate A”. The second is dated 19 July 2024 and is for $20,000. Again, it is signed by both parties who are alleged to be party to this agreement. The third is dated 30 July 2024 and is for £5,000.[161]The wife denies that these should be treated as enforceable loans. She points out the curious transaction between the husband and “Associate A” in respect of the company in Country Z (which includes an invoice being raised by the company about a week after the husband said he has ceased to be concerned with it). It is suggested by the wife that these loan agreements are a disguised form of renumeration from the company for the husband, who has not really ceased to be involved. By his chaotic and dishonest conduct elsewhere in the proceedings, which includes his seriously dishonest and deliberate attempts to mislead a court of law in Country X, I do not feel able to include these loans on the balance sheet. My anxiety about the husband’s presentation is further aggravated by the fact that previously the husband did borrow about £40,000 from “Associate A” to help finance his son’s motor racing hobby and I am told that no loan agreement was drawn up on that occasion.[162]There are two further loan agreements from two people, “Associate C” and “Associate D”, each for £10,000. There is no evidence of these sums being paid to the husband. I do not find, on the balance of probabilities, that these are made out.[163]The husband asserts a £19,000 FAB credit card but there is no evidence in support. The husband’s Corner Card with a sum of £778 appears to be a charge card which is cleared on a monthly basis.[164]The wife accepts £8,400 for the husband’s asserted £13,500. This, the wife submits, is in accordance with the loan agreement and the husband has not suggested that he is not properly servicing the loan. I agree with the wife’s analysis in this respect.[165]The husband has asserted outstanding legal fees of £83,956. His Form H has been filled out by the husband rather than his former solicitor. There is no evidence of his former solicitor having chased him for outstanding fees. I am anxious not to be unfair to the husband, notwithstanding his overall presentation. I am going to allow the sum of £50,000 on account of alleged unpaid costs. This is a lower figure than the wife’s unpaid costs upon the basis that they did not see the proceedings through to a final hearing.[166]Overall, doing the best I can, I find the following loans repayable (on the basis of my findings or agreement in the ES2): 166.1. Lloyds Credit card, say £2,900; 166.2. NatWest Credit card £8,322; 166.3. Hard loan, £8,400; 166.4. Unpaid legal fees, say £50,000; 166.5. Polo HP, £6,300 (not agreed, but not formally disputed in submissions); 166.6. Total £75,922, say £76,000.

The wife’s chattels

[167]The husband contends that the wife’s jewellery and handbags amount to about £318,000. I have already outlined the numerous judicial hints which have been provided in orders that the husband has not sought any single joint valuation of these items.[168]Instead, the husband has taken photos of the wife with certain items and then tried to match them with a similar item for sale online.[169]Most astonishingly, the wife is shown in a photograph with what is alleged to be an £80,000 Hermes crocodile skin handbag.[170]The wife’s account of this item is that it does not belong to her. She was attending lunch at some grand establishment and within her lunching party it was agreed she may be under-dressed for such an occasion. As they approached the venue, a wealthy friend lent her an expensive jacket to put on and the crocodile skin handbag, which she held prominently on the way into the venue, daring the maître d’ to take issue with the standard of her dress. The wife was then photographed with these accoutrements. This has a ring of truth to it. I accept the wife’s account in this regard.[171]Even if the wife did own a crocodile Hermes bag (which she does not), I would require a single joint valuation report for a chattel said to have that kind of value.[172]Given that the husband has ignored all recitals pointing out that he has not obtained a single joint report on the wife’s chattels, there is nothing I can do for him.[173]In any event, I doubt very much whether the wife is going to be able to rehouse on the proceeds of sale of second-hand jewellery and some handbags. The wife accepts she has chattels to the value of about £73,167. I have not included them in the overall computational exercise, but I do have them in mind. £44,000 relates to a car which she will use to get around in, including transporting the parties’ minor child. The balance of about £28,000 is jewellery and handbags which the wife can retain.[174]The husband alleges that the wife has a Mercedes vehicle in Country X worth £35,000. I do not accept that to be the case.

The wife’s bank account

[175]In February 2025 the husband forwarded a screenshot of a bank account in the wife’s name. It is not totally clear what period this screenshot relates to. The only date I can see on the document appears to be 2014. When converted into GBP the sum in the account appears to be in the order of about £800,000.[176]The wife denies knowing anything about this. I accept that the husband was the dominant financial mover in the marriage and that from time to time the husband used her as a nominee. She has contacted the bank to try and find out about the account. The emails associated with the account are in the husband’s name.[177]I do not think for one moment that the wife has an undisclosed bank account with £800,000. The husband’s attempts to suggest she does reflects very poorly on him. It is another attempt to mislead a court which I reject out of hand.[178]For completeness I also mention an entry in the wife’s bank account on 6 March 2024 in the sum of £2,400. The husband makes great play of this entry, suggesting that it is evidence of the wife’s new partner. It is nothing of the sort. The wife has been starved of funds whilst the husband defies the maintenance pending suit order and consumes at an obscene rate, but which he considers to be appropriate for his station in life. A friend stepped in to assist her. The money was advanced via that friend calling in a debt from another friend, whose husband paid the money direct to the wife’s account. The wife stated that she does not know the man who paid the money, given the structure of the transaction. I accept her account in this regard.[179]Having made my primary determinations as to computation, the asset base appears as follows: Offers The wife

Offers

[180]The wife’s final open offer is dated 25 February 2025. It was revised once the wife became aware that the husband was seeking to assert ownership of the DHA plot in Country X via litigation there. The wife has no desire to litigate with the husband in Country X over this issue and so her revised position provides for the husband to take the DHA plot. This is actually co-owned with one of the parties’ sons who I am told agrees to the transfer of the land to his father.[181]The wife seeks the sale of all English properties with the first £140,000 being set aside for school fees. The balance is to be paid to wife on account of meeting housing needs and a capitalised income fund. The wife seeks to have conduct of sale.[182]The wife to transfer all properties in Country X to the husband upon the basis that he will meet the any tax arising from the same.[183]100% pension sharing order.[184]Husband to make good his maintenance pending suit arrears and outstanding costs orders within 14 days of the final order.[185]Cleak break[186]No order as to costs, save for the outstanding costs to date.[187]With the determinations I have made above this amounts to a split of current capital in the order of about 67% to wife and 33% to husband of the visible assets.[188]This does not take into account Ms Kabra’s “unknown unknowns” of what assets the husband may be hiding from the court and which I cannot quantify. It also does not take into account the possibility that, once the court’s back is turned, the husband will resume some or all of the enjoyment of the equity in The Farm.[189]With the 100% pension share the dial moves to a 71%/29% division.

The husband

[190]The husband’s open offer is dated 10 February 2025. He essentially seeks the sale of all assets and equal division of net proceeds, save for the DHA plot which he says the wife can retain on account of maintenance pending suit arrears and costs.[191]He makes no offer for a pension share.[192]The offer is made on a clean break basis with no order as to costs.[193]In light of my determinations this is a 62%/38% division of current capital in the husband’s favour and a 67%/33% division if his approach to pensions were to be accepted.[194]If the adverse inference about the sale proceeds of the apartment in Country Y is excluded then the husband’s current capital proposal is very close to 50%/50%.

Issues of evaluation which the court must undertake

[195]Having made my primary determinations of fact, I must consider the following issues enroute to my final disposition: 195.1. The parties’ incomes and earning capacities; 195.2. The parties’ housing needs; 195.3. The parties’ mortgage capacities; 195.4. What the parties’ reasonable outgoings are; 195.5. Whether the youngest child should complete their education in a public school; 195.6. Whether either party has a new partner who would be relevant to these proceedings; 195.7. The parties’ incomes and earning capacities[196]It is impossible to get a proper handle on the husband’s actual earning capacity. With the apparent transfer of his principal trading company in Country Z to “Associate A” it seems likely the husband is not choosing to fully engage in his usual business activities at present.[197]Between paragraphs [69] and [82] of her opening note, Ms Kabra engages in what she accepts is a forlorn attempt to make sense of the husband’s business activities. I am not going to embark on a fool’s errand trying to piece together multiple fragments of partial disclosure to try and even arrive at a shadow of what the husband has historically done. The husband has had every opportunity to explain himself and he has declined to do so.[198]There is a third-party company which the husband used as a broker to buy and sell shares. DJ Dias provided for the husband to disclose all correspondence between himself and this company between 1 January 2023 to date. The husband has not complied with this order.[199]The wife’s case is that in recent years the husband’s earnings were up to £400,000 net per annum. It is very difficult for the court to be precise about this figure. The husband has made sure of that. But the court can see that the three children were educated (sometimes boarding) in an elite English public school or its foreign outpost. The parties had two homes in England and two further buy to lets and additional property interests in Country X and Country Y. One of the children was able to engage in semi-professional junior racing at a cost of tens of thousands of pounds a year. The wife did not work outside of the home. The parties enjoyed a high standard of living in numerous respects, including clothes, holidays, eating out and the like. This kind of lifestyle comes with a price tag and, whilst I cannot be precise, the wife’s suggestion of £400,000 net does not sound out of kilter with the lifestyle that the parties enjoyed.[200]The husband has currently taken employment earning £47,500 net per annum. He says he works nearly seven days a week for very long hours. The court is somewhat baffled why the husband would choose to engage in such employment when he has historically been economically active on a far higher plane. He says he cannot go on as he did before. Given all the shenanigans the husband has engaged with elsewhere in these proceedings, the logical inference, and the one which I make, is that the husband is choosing to supress his current income in the hope that the court will lose sight of his true earning capacity. I expect that, in due course, the husband will bounce back and return to the high earnings which he has become accustomed to enjoying.[201]The wife is 46. She was born in Country X. She has not worked outside of the home to any material extent since was married in 1999. The wife is a graduate but has no modern office experience or similar. The wife has an aspiration to train as a hypnotherapist but doubts that she will have the time or the money to do so if she simply has to go back out to work at the conclusion of the proceedings.[202]The wife accepts that she will have to try and obtain employment. I mean no disrespect to her, but I expect that in the first instance she may find herself working in the retail sector. That said, with her background and understanding of the finer things in life, I could picture her obtaining employment in high-end boutique style retail employment. I expect her earnings will be no more than in the region of £25,000 to £30,000 and that there will be a ceiling on her earnings unless she was to retrain in another endeavour.[203]The husband’s suggestion that the wife is a property developer is nonsense. She has allowed her name to be put to various of the husband’s enterprises down the years and has occasionally “popped into the office” so that employed staff knew that the owners were about. The two plots of land in Country X were a financial reward to the husband from some kind of developer but he chose to have them put into the wife’s name.

The parties’ housing needs

[204]The wife says that she requires a four-bedroomed property in order to accommodate the three children. The children, it will be recalled, are 23, 22 and 16.[205]The wife says that her daughter must live at home with her until she marries. This is what she did and this is, in effect, a cultural necessity. The law does not permit this approach. Whilst the adult children may still be at home, they will have to make efforts to stand on their own two feet in the very near future. It is a matter for the wife and her daughter whether the daughter stays at home until she marries, but this court is not going to craft an order on this basis.[206]The wife’s pitch is for a four-bedroomed house in London with a cost of about £700,000. The SDLT and other costs would be on top of this figure. The options in that price bracket are largely modern or 60s build town-houses. The style of accommodation is realistic in the circumstances, save that I do not accept that four bedrooms should be provided.[207]The husband advances two-bedroomed London flats in the £450,000 bracket. These do not meet the wife’s needs and would represent a vertical drop from the standard of living in the marriage. Two bedrooms are not enough.[208]It seems to me that a three-bedroomed property would more realistically meet the budget in this case. This will allow for the wife and the minor son to have a room each. There can then be a spare room which can be used for when the older children or others visit and for the kind of things that pile up in spare rooms. By a process of inferential deduction, I expect that a global housing fund of £680,000 would allow for a modest but respectable three-bedroomed property, SDLT and the associated costs of moving in and making good.[209]It is very hard to get a sense of the husband’s housing needs. He lives and works in Country Y. Presently his rent is paid for by his company. Two-bedroomed villas appear to be available at between £250,000 - £300,000. Whether rented or purchased, a two-bedroomed flat/villa would meet the husband’s needs for accommodation as he does not care for the children.[210]He may also have a partner who he lives with. I shall deal with this point shortly.[211]I have in mind the comments of Thorpe LJ in M v B (Ancillary Proceedings: Lump Sum) [1998] 1 FLR 53, namely “In all these cases it is one of the paramount considerations, in applying the section 25 criteria, to endeavour to stretch what is available to cover the need for each for a home, particularly where there are young children involved. Obviously the primary carer needs whatever is available to make the main home for the children, but it is of importance, albeit of lesser importance that the other parent should have a home of his own where the children can enjoy contact time with him. Of course there are cases where there is not enough to provide a home for either. Of course there are cases where there is only enough to provide for one. But in any case where there is, by stretch and a degree of risk-taking, the possibility of a division to enable both to rehouse themselves, that is an exceptionally important consideration and one which will almost invariably have a decisive impact on outcome.”[212]Balanced against these comments, I remind myself of the words of Lord Hoffman in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] UKHL 27, having noted the above case, and stating:
“This is a useful guideline to judges dealing with cases of a similar kind. But to cite the case as if it laid down some rule that both spouses invariably have a right to purchased accommodation is a misuse of authority.”
[213]More recently, in Butler v Butler [2023] EWHC 2453 (Fam), Moor J stated that the fact a court concludes that a case is a ‘needs’ case does not mean that it must make an order that satisfies both parties’ needs. There may be insufficient assets to satisfy the needs of either party, let alone both.

The parties’ mortgage capacities

[214]Each party has filed a letter from a mortgage advisor to say that they do not presently have a mortgage capacity. The husband has damaged the parties’ credit worthiness by allowing the mortgages to fall into arrears.[215]The present-day consequences of this mean that the parties will either have to live in mortgage-free owned accommodation or rented accommodation.

What are the parties’ reasonable outgoings?

[216]The wife’s outgoings are pitched at £8,184 pcm. Mr Vollenweider advances a series of well-made points that this budget is excessive. Attacking a number of the big-ticket items, he reduces the wife’s budget down to £5,250 pcm. This does not seem unreasonable to me.[217]With a gross salary of, say, £25,000, the wife will have a net income (per At A Glance) of £20,769 per annum or £1,730 pcm. There is a shortfall of £3,520 with income at this level.[218]I would expect the wife’s income to rise once she has been in employment for some time. I do not have a crystal ball, but it seems entirely achievable to expect her to be earning £30,000 gross in three years’ time.[219]The wife’s income will be forever limited in my judgment. This is as a direct result of choices made during the marriage. Whilst the wife must find employment, I doubt, with respect, she will ever enjoy a career, trying to start out at 46 with no history of being in the workplace. She will not be able to adjust without undue hardship, given the distance between her earning capacity, as I find it to be, and her reasonable needs.[220]A Capitalise calculation for 20 years, with the parameters I have set out above, would result in a capital requirement of £617,615. Having found that the wife will never be able to adjust without undue hardship, a term of 20 years basically takes her to retirement age. Once housing needs are provided for, there is not enough current capital left over to provide such a sum.[221]By his behaviour, the husband has made plain his determination not to comply with court orders. His arrears of maintenance pending suit stand at about £48,500. His contempt for the wife and court orders are plain.[222]It is simply not realistic for me to make an order for periodical payments expecting that the wife will be able to enforce compliance. The husband does not even presently live in this jurisdiction.[223]I am afraid that the husband has driven the court to the position that the only option left is to capitalise what it can on the basis that this is the only way in which the wife’s needs will be met. If the husband had behaved reasonably and lawfully, the court would have had the option of making a periodical payments order so that there would be capital to share. It is the husband’s actions which have closed down this option for the court.

Whether the youngest child should complete their education in a public school

[224]Neither party wishes to see the youngest child have to leave his current school, an education his older siblings were privileged to enjoy.[225]Fees are in the order of about £48,000 and there are two years to go. There are also current arrears in the order of about £12,700. I do not know the exact figure.[226]The wife suggests that a budget of about £140,000 will be required to clear arrears and see the youngest child through to the end of his education, having allowed a buffer for unforeseen extras. The husband says that the figure is closer to £100,000.[227]The reality is most likely to be somewhere between these two competing poles. The husband cannot be trusted to make the payments and so the structure of my award below will be upon the wife’s undertaking to discharge the arrears and ensure that fees are paid through to the conclusion of secondary education. Anything left over will simply fall into the wife’s Duxbury fund.

Whether either party has a new partner who would be relevant to these proceedings

[228]The wife denies having a new partner. I accept her evidence. I have dealt with the payment from a friend of a friend above.[229]The husband’s position is less clear. There are some suspicious entries on his credit card. For example, there is payment to a Ladies Health Club which the husband tried to suggest related to him. I do not believe him. The purchase of the clutch for a supposed female friend (mentioned above) seems exorbitant.[230]Ultimately, I do not need to determine this issue. Even if the husband does have a new partner, I have no way of understanding the status of the relationship or whether she might be considered a resource for the husband to look to assist him with housing.

The court’s award

[231]The wife in closing submits that the husband can have the DHA plot which she co-owns with one of their sons. The son has attained his majority. The wife says that he agrees to offer an undertaking to join in with the transfer of the plot to the husband. Given that the husband has engaged in legal manoeuvres in Country X concerning this plot, it is entirely appropriate that it goes to him, to spare the wife the stress and cost of dealing with any of the husband’s further dishonest mischief in this regard.[232]I will require the son to be joined and to provide an undertaking on the face of the consent order which will give effect to this outcome. I will require confirmation that the consequences of breaching an undertaking have been fully spelled out to the son by a lawyer. My award is based upon this undertaking being forthcoming which is offered in the wife’s closing submissions.[233]The husband can also have the other two plots in County X, namely plot 60 and 61.[234]If the husband had co-operated with the wife and complied with court directions, I would have a CGT report so that any Country X CGT style tax could be understood. I do not have that due to the husband’s lack of co-operation.[235]The transfer of the DHA plot and plot 60 and 61 shall be conditional upon the parties obtaining a joint CGT report, at the husband’s expense, and the husband placing in escrow any tax which the wife or the parties’ son will be required to pay consequent upon the transfer. The detail of this will have to be worked out in a draft order for my consideration, but this should be undertaken forthwith, with a sanction against the husband in the event that he does not comply within a reasonable period of time. If he chooses not to resolve the potential tax issue, then he risks disqualifying himself from receipt of the capital which I consider should be due to him.[236]All of the English properties are to be sold. The wife is to have sole conduct of sale. 100% of the net proceeds are to go to her. The husband should pay the mortgages pending sale and indemnify the wife in respect of the same. I am clear sighted that the wife is likely to face significant enforcement challenges but there are no other assets within the jurisdiction I am able to work with.[237]Once the wife’s housing needs, as I have found them to be, are met and a school fund (whatever that ultimately turns out to be) is provided for, the wife will be left significantly short in terms of a required capitalised Duxbury fund. Ms Kabra is realistic in her approach by saying that the wife will simply have to make do with the capital she gets.[238]I will provide for the wife to have a 100% pension sharing order. Realistically, she is going to have to pay the transfer costs. The pension is a defined contribution pension and so from the date when she is entitled to drawn on her pension (either 55 or 57, I am not sure) she will be able to draw down sums as she wishes, subject to tax. This can be used towards her Duxbury fund from that date until her state retirement date. In the court’s judgment, 50% of the pension share will be for “retirement proper” and 50% is money which can be liquidated (albeit not immediately) in support of income needs pending retirement.[239]The net effect of my disposition appears as follows:[240]Having made this division I have provided a mortgage free home for the wife, school fees and some capital which will go some, but far from all, of the way to meeting the wife’s income shortfall in the coming years.[241]This division relates to assets to the extent the court has been able to divine them. It does not deal with the “the unknown unknowns” as Ms Kabra described them. As I have already made plain, I simply do not know the full extent of the assets which the husband will be able to rely upon in due course, which he has declined to be full and frank about before me. My approach has been necessitated by the husband’s dishonesty.[242]I am mindful of Wilson LJ’s caveats in Vaughan v Vaughan [2008] 1 FLR 1108, in the context of “add-backs”, in particular that re-attributed cash cannot be deployed to purchase accommodation. I make plain that I am engaged in a different exercise to that which Wilson LJ was considering, namely one of adverse inference.[243]The husband should pay his outstanding costs orders within 14 days. He should also pay his arrears of maintenance pending suit. The maintenance pending suit order should continue at the same rate until the London home and second home have completed sales.[244]I remain clear sighted as to the difficulties the wife will face. These difficulties provide a buttress to the overall capital and pension dispositions I have made. The husband cannot be allowed to conduct litigation as he has defied court orders with impunity.

Costs

[245]This judgment was first shared in draft. It invited any costs applications. The wife makes an application for her costs incurred seven days after her open proposal of the 10 February 2025, namely 18 February 2025.[246]The wife’s final revised proposal is actually dated 25 February 2025, a refinement of her 10 February offer becoming necessary upon the basis of the husband’s late disclosure of the DHA litigation only on the 10 February 2025. The refinement is entirely as a result of the husband’s tardy disclosure, and I agree that the relevant date to work from is the 18 February 2025.[247]From 18 February 2025 to date the costs incurred, as recorded in an N260 are £60,225 inclusive of VAT.[248]The wife’s short written submissions highlight extracts from my draft judgment, reminding the court of the egregious and dishonest conduct of litigation by the husband.[249]The wife seeks her costs on an indemnity basis. 249.1. I remind myself, by reference to the Dictionary of Financial Remedies (2025) that indemnity costs are rare and only justified when the payer’s conduct has been highly unreasonable. 249.2. In JM v CZ (Costs: Ex Parte Order) [2015] 1 FLR 559 Mostyn J stated at [23] “… Indemnity costs are awarded in cases only where there has been some conduct by the party liable to pay the costs which takes the case out of the norm – see in that regard Three Rivers District Council & Ors v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm), per Tomlinson J (as he then was).” 249.3. For the multiple reasons set out in my judgment, I am satisfied that this is one of those rare instances where the husband’s litigation conduct has been so reprehensible that indemnity costs would be justified. 249.4. Where costs are assessed on an indemnity basis, only costs which are reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount are allowable; any doubt is resolved in favour of the payee. When assessed on the indemnity basis there is no requirement that costs are proportionate.[250]Standing back for a moment, the wife’s global costs are £162,277. Her Form H1 indicates that she has £70,885 owing to her solicitor, which will presently be dealt with as part of my overall award, along with her litigation loan of £71,715. So, £142,400 of costs is, from one perspective, accounted for.[251]There have also been three costs orders to date: 251.1. DDJ Glasner made an order for £4,000 + VAT (£4,800) on 28 May 2024; 251.2. DDJ Marks made an order for £12,500 inclusive of VAT on 20 June 2024; 251.3. DJ Keating made an order for £9,975 + VAT (£11,970) on 7 November 2024.[252]The total sum already owing by reference to costs orders already made is, by my calculation, £29,270.[253]Viewed from one perspective, the wife has already had recompense for her costs by a combination of costs ordered to date and the outstanding costs and her litigation loan coming out of her share of the proceeds.[254]Viewed from another perspective, however, the wife remains grossly short of the Duxbury fund I have posited to be reasonable to meet her income needs. Once school fees (say, £140,000) and the wife’s housing needs (£680,000) are deducted, even with 50% of the pension attributed to the Duxbury fund, the wife is grossly short of her income needs. In effect, the costs she has incurred and the litigation interest she has become liable for (as at 22 April 2024, £9,995.42) are coming out of money which in fairness should be financing her needs, not her costs bill which is much higher due to the husband’s unreasonable conduct of this litigation.[255]Viewed from that latter perspective I can see justification for a further costs order. I have in mind the relevant provisions of FPR 28.3(5) – (7). I do not propose to recite them here. I have them all in mind. The starting point is no order as to costs which I may depart from if I consider appropriate to do so because of the conduct of a party. I have no way of quantifying the true financial effect on the husband as he has made sure we all remain in the dark. Even if this costs order does cause the husband financial difficulty, that is not necessarily a reason not to make an order (see, by way of example, DH v RH [2024] EWFC 114 at [19] per MacDonald J).[256]This litigation has gone on too long already and I do not wish to subject the parties to a further and costly detailed assessment process. Standing back, I am somewhat surprised that with all that the wife has had to contend with in this case, her costs have come in at only £162,277. Costs appear to be reasonably incurred, in the main.[257]Realistically, Mr Vollenweider does not challenge the principle of costs. He has made several points which go to the quantum of costs.[258]Bearing in mind Mr Vollenweider’s quantum submissions and taking the family law broad brush to the task of reviewing the wife’s N260, imperfect though that device is in this instance, I am going to say that the wife should recover 90% of £60,225, namely £54,202.[259]This will leave more of the wife’s settlement to go towards her Duxbury fund, which will remain significantly below what I have determined would be reasonable. I am well aware of the wife’s likely enforcement difficulties. This is the best I can do with the straw that I have. This costs order will be in addition to the costs orders made to date.[260]All costs orders to be settled within 14 days.

Publication and publicity

[261]This anonymised judgment will be published on the National Archives.[262]The wife has asked for this parties’ names in the heading to this judgment to be published and not be anonymised. This brief one-line request raises important questions of transparency and privacy which I am not prepared to adjudicate upon without full argument. If the parties’ names are publicised the identity of a minor child will be straightforward to divine.[263]At this stage my decision is to publish on an anonymised basis. If the wife wishes to pursue her application, Ms Kabra or those acting on the wife’s behalf must inform me within 21 days from today, and I will give directions for skeleton arguments to be filed and a hearing where this important issue can be properly ventilated. If I do not have any further representations by 4pm on the 16 May 2025 then my preliminary decision to publish on an anonymised basis will be final.[264]This is my judgment. 24 APRIL 2025 RECORDER RHYS TAYLOR

order

35.1. There was a dispute between the parties as to the location of the documents relating to the sale of the apartment in Country Y. 35.2. The wife was alleging that the husband, his father and the husband’s sister had collusively entered into litigation in Country X in order to make it appear as if the husband was not the beneficial owner of The Farm. It is noted that the wife does not allege that the court in Country X was aware of this alleged sham. 35.3. A previous direction for the instruction of a CGT expert to opine on the tax consequences of the property transfer in Country X was abandoned, despite the wife’s assertion that it remained necessary. It had not been complied with on the basis that the husband stated it could not be afforded and the wife was unable to pursue it without the husband’s co-operation. 35.4. Consideration was given as to whether the husband’s father and sister might be called to give evidence, but the court declined itself to sanction witness summonses at that appointment, questioning necessity and impact on the overall timetable. The concern about impact on the timetable turned out to be prescient. 35.5. The court noted that, despite the very significant dispute about the value of the wife’s chattels, the husband had made no application for the appointment of an expert to value them. 35.6. An extremely detailed schedule of the respondent’s outstanding disclosure was set out in the order. This included the requirement for the documents to be produced and, in some instances, the husband to evidence all correspondence he has engaged with in order to try and obtain documents from third-party associates. The husband could not have been left in any doubt as to what was required of him. 35.7. The bundle was extended to 1,500 pages.