“10. … I derive the following principles …:”
“Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion of whether the case put forward by the Local Authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.”
“It is important to remember that (1) the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision.”
“I venture to suggest that it would be good practice when the tribunal is invited to proceed on the basis, or itself determines, that such a direction is called for, to seek Counsel’s submissions to identify: (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/ they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. The principles of the direction will remain the same, but they must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the witness before the court." Similar caution should be exercised in relation to a respondent giving unsatisfactory explanations or failing to give any explanation for the allegations made against them – the fact that they are unsatisfactory or missing may not be probative of the truth of the allegations or of the culpability of the respondent. 12. As observed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss President in Re U, Re B[2004] EWCA Civ 567 : “The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today's medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research may throw a light into corners that are at present dark”
“… there has to be factored into every case which concerns a discrete aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities.”
“41. S.31(2) does not require the court to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of significant harm before the threshold criteria are satisfied. What is required is for the local authority to prove on a balance of probabilities that the harm suffered was attributable to “the care given to the child … not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to [her]”
“55. As a general proposition we think that it is in the public interest for those who cause serious non-accidental injuries to children to be identified, wherever such identification is possible. It is paradigmatic of such cases that the perpetrator denies responsibility and that those close to or emotionally engaged with the perpetrator likewise deny any knowledge of how the injuries occurred. Any process, which encourages or facilitates frankness, is, accordingly, in our view to be welcomed in principle. 56. As a second background proposition, we are also of the view that it is in the public interest that children have the right, as they grow into adulthood, to know the truth about who injured them when they were children, and why. Children who are removed from their parents as a result of non-accidental injuries have in due course to come to terms with the fact that one or both of their parents injured them. This is a heavy burden for any child to bear. In principle, children need to know the truth if the truth can be ascertained.” 42. As a result, courts in care proceedings invariably endeavour to identify the perpetrator of injuries to a child. The suggestion expressed in another case that a court in care proceedings should “not strain to identify a perpetrator” has now been disavowed: Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators)[2022] EWCA Civ 1348 . 43. In order to make a finding that a particular person was the perpetrator of significant harm suffered by a child, the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities. But a series of cases has established that, where a finding as to the perpetrator cannot be made, the threshold is nevertheless crossed where there are a number of people who might have caused the harm and the local authority has satisfied the court that in relation to each of them there is a real possibility that they did: see Lancashire County Council v B[2000] UKHL 16 , Re O and N (Minors)[2003] UKHL 18 , North Yorkshire County Council v SA[2003] EWCA Civ 839 , Re S-B (Children)[2009] UKSC 17 , and Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator)[2019] EWCA Civ 575 . 44. The reason why the law allows the threshold to be crossed in these circumstances was explained by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re O and N at paragraph 27: “Quite simply, it would be grotesque if such a case had to proceed at the welfare stage on the footing that, because neither parent, considered individually, has been proved to be the perpetrator, therefore the child is not at risk from either of them. This would be grotesque because it would mean the court would proceed on the footing that neither parent represents a risk even though one or other of them was the perpetrator of the harm in question.” 45. The rationale was expressed by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator) in these terms: “46. ….the concept of a pool of perpetrators seeks to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual, including those of the child, and the importance of child protection. It is a means of satisfying the attributable threshold condition that only arises where the court is satisfied that there has been significant harm arising from (in shorthand) ill-treatment and where the only 'unknown' is which of a number of persons is responsible. So, to state the obvious, the concept of the pool does not arise at all in the normal run of cases where the relevant allegation can be proved to the civil standard against an individual or individuals in the normal way. Nor does it arise where only one person could possibly be responsible. In that event, the allegation is either proved or it is not. There is no room for a finding of fact on the basis of 'real possibility', still less on the basis of suspicion. There is no such thing as a pool of one. 47. It should also be emphasised that a decision to place a person within the pool of perpetrators is not a finding of fact in the conventional sense. As is made clear in Lancashire at [19], O and N at [27-28] and S-B at [43], the person is not a proven perpetrator but a possible perpetrator. That conclusion is then carried forward to the welfare stage, when the court will, as was said in S-B, 'consider the strength of the possibility' that the person was involved as part of the overall circumstances of the case.”
“The court should first consider whether there is a ‘list’ of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability … Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list: “Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?”