EZ (A Minor) (Number 2) (Care and Placement Proceedings: Nigerian Fertility Clinic: Welfare), Re [2025] EWFC 359

The original, unredacted judgment was given in private. The judge has given leave for this redacted version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child and the lay respondents must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.[2025] EWFC 359B e f o r e:Mr. Recorder Tyler KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
B e t w e e n :
Between
Leeds City CouncilApplicant(1) A Purported MotherRespondents(2) A Purported FatherRespondent(3) EZ (A Minor)RespondentLorraine Cavanagh KC&Louise McCallum of counsel (instructed by the legal department) for Leeds City CouncilStefano Nuvoloni KC and Wendy Frempong of counsel (instructed by Living Spring Solicitors) for first respondent, the purported motherPhilippa Wordsworth of counsel (instructed by Williscroft Solicitors) for second respondent, the purported fatherVikki Horspool, solicitor (Ramsdens Solicitors) for third respondent child, EZDate 2025-10-10

Parties, application, issues, positions

[1]This case involves the interests and future of little girl whom I shall call throughout this redacted judgment Eleanor (not her real name). Eleanor was born on or around [a date in] June 2024, probably in Nigeria. This makes her 13 months old at the final hearing which took place before me on 4 July 2025 and a little under 16 months old at the point of this reserved judgment.[2]That final hearing was the concluding chapter of the Part IV Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”) proceedings (care proceedings) concerning Eleanor and also of Leeds City Council’s application for a placement order pursuant to the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“ACA 2002”) and a declaration of non-parentage in relation to her. In March 2025, I adjudicated a fact-finding hearing, handing down my judgment at the beginning of May. That judgment is published in anonymised form as Re EZ (A Minor) (Care Proceedings: Nigerian Fertility Clinic and Maternity Hospital) [2025] EWFC 122. In it, I found that PM is not the mother of Eleanor, whether that term is given its gestational or its biological meaning, and that PF is not her father.[3]Having found that the jurisdictional criteria of s.31 of the CA 1989 were satisfied, this hearing was necessary in order to determine the applications of Leeds City Council (“the LA”) for the declaration and for a care and a placement order.[4]The LA was represented before me by Lorraine Cavanagh KC and Louise McCallum. The social worker is Emily Rhodes.[5]In my fact-finding judgment I referred to the first and second respondents as the purported mother (“PM”) and the purported father (“PF”) of Eleanor. Although I have now found that neither of them is in fact a parent of her, I will adopt the same initials for the sake of consistency and clarity.[6]PM has been represented before me by Stefano Nuvoloni KC and Wendy Frempong.[7]PF has been represented before me by Philippa Wordsworth.[8]Eleanor has been represented before me, through her Children’s Guardian, Beverley Kelsey (“the CG”), by Vikki Horspool.[9]PM and PF oppose the LA’s applications; the CG supports them.[10]The Nigerian Embassy has been on notice of these proceedings throughout but has not chosen to engage with them in any way. Background[11]The full background is dealt with in some detail in my fact-finding judgment.[12]In short, PM and PF, Nigerian citizens, live in England with their two sons. In June 2024, PM travelled from the UK to Nigeria. She returned on 6 July 2024, together with Eleanor, then a tiny baby. She tried to pass Eleanor off as her own baby, claiming that she had left England heavily pregnant and had been delivered of Eleanor during her stay in Nigeria. The authorities thought otherwise. PM was arrested on landing in the UK. Eleanor was removed from and has at all times since remained outside PM’s care.[13]The issues for my determination at the fact-finding hearing were:a. Is Eleanor the biological child of PM and PF?b. Was PM ever pregnant with Eleanor?c. Did PM give birth to Eleanor?d. What was and is the state of mind of PM and, separately, of PF, in relation to Eleanor’s true parentage? Given that the first three questions were quickly and definitively answered in the negative, in relation to the fourth question, I asked myself: - Has this been a preplanned and sustained deception on the part of one or both of the purported parents, up to and including presenting a knowingly false case to the court on oath? - Or has one, or have both, of them at any stage, or on an ongoing basis, genuinely believed themselves to be the genetic and/or gestational parents of Eleanor? - Or is the truth somewhere between these two extremes?[14]My findings were as follows:a. [PM] and [PF] are not the legal or genetic parents of [Eleanor] (girl) (given dob 9.6.2024).b. [PM] was not pregnant with [Eleanor] and did not give birth to her.c. In order to mislead authorities and professionals, [PM] staged a scene that was video recorded and of which photographic images were taken, which she falsely claimed showed her giving birth to [Eleanor], which it did not.d. In order to mislead authorities and professionals, [PM] produced or procured documents falsely purporting to demonstrate(a) that [Eleanor]’s conception had been the result of [PM] having undergone IVF treatment, and(b) that [PM] gave birth to [Eleanor] in Nigeria on [xx] June 2024.e. [PM] and [PF] have brought [Eleanor] into the United Kingdom in circumstances which they are concealing.f. The true date of birth of [Eleanor] is not known, save and insofar as may be known to, but is concealed by, [PM] and [PF].g. The true identity and whereabouts of the parents of [Eleanor] are not known, save and insofar as may be known to, but are concealed by, [PM] and [PF].h. The version of events put forward by [PM] and [PF] to explain how [Eleanor] came to be in their care is a fundamental lie, told and maintained by both of them as to who [Eleanor] really is.i. [PM] and [PF] have caused [Eleanor] significant emotional and psychological harm.j. By reason of their lie as to who [Eleanor] really is, at the relevant date, [Eleanor] was likely to suffer significant emotional harm in the care of [PM] and [PF].k. For the purposes of s.31(2)(a) of the Children Act 1989, [Eleanor] suffered significant harm when her mother, a person unknown, was not in a position to exercise parental responsibility over her and she was brought to the United Kingdom without her mother or father but in the care of [PM] and [PF].l. Furthermore, the attributability requirements of s.31(2)(b) are satisfied on the basis of the care likely to be given to [Eleanor] by [PM] and [PF], if an order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.[15]I also recorded the following further thought:
‘[123] Having made these starkly expressed findings in relation to both PM and PF, I should add some further contextual observations. [124] I have no doubt that the motivation of PM and PF in their quest to find [Eleanor] and to bring her into the country was no more or less than a genuine desire to add another baby to their family, and to offer her the love, devotion and security they have given to their two sons. It is also clear to me that PM’s yearning to add to the family was largely driven by the huge, I imagine largely unresolved, grief she has endured subsequent to the death in infancy of her son, L, just a couple of years ago. I entirely accept that they wanted nothing other than to give [Eleanor] the chance of a happy and fulfilled life with them, that they speak genuinely when they describe thinking of her as their ‘princess’
. Nor do I doubt, given the huge hole in her life which L’s death impelled PM to try to fill, the enormous efforts to which she in particular went in order to procure [Eleanor] and to bring her to this country, and the fact that she cared for and tended to [Eleanor] for the first few weeks of her life, that she feels a real and agonising bond to and connection with [Eleanor]. Almost the last question Mr Nuvoloni KC asked his client in her evidence-in-chief was, ‘What does [Eleanor] to mean to you?’ Her answer, emotionally delivered, was:
‘She means a big something to me. She’s my princess, my queen. I cherish that girl too much. When I lost L, I used [Eleanor] to console my heart.’
I have no doubt that, however many falsehoods and misrepresentations have been told as to the true provenance of [Eleanor], this much is entirely true. [125] It is equally clear, however, that, as above, both PM and PF know that [Eleanor] is not their child and was not carried by PM, and that significant and ongoing emotional and psychological harm awaits a child who is brought up in the context of the sort of fundamental lie which underpins PM and PF’s account of her origins.’[16]On delivery of my fact-finding judgment, I directed that PM and PF respond to my findings, that the LA conclude its assessment of PM and PF and that the CG provide a final report in the applications. The parties’ current positions[17]The LA contends for a declaration of non-parentage and, separately, for final care and placement orders. Eleanor was placed in an Early Permanence Placement (“EPP”) on 7 December 2024. (This is the name given to the interim placement of a child with foster carers who can look after the child during the time it takes for care proceedings to conclude, but who are also approved and able to adopt the child if that is the court’s ultimate decision; the purpose of the scheme is to allow children who end up being adopted to form attachments with their adoptive parents-to-be as early as possible, avoiding the harm caused by delay in reaching final decisions about the children’s future.) Eleanor’s EPP carer is of Black Nigerian heritage. The LA’s proposed care plan is that this carer adopt Eleanor. This would necessitate my making a care order, approving the care plan of adoption and going on to make a placement order, leading, in a few months, to the making of a final adoption order.[18]The CG supports the LA’s plan and applications.[19]PM and PF oppose the plan. They seek Eleanor’s moving to their care (not a return, so far as PF is concerned, he never having met her) by whatever means and pursuant to whatever orders I might decide necessary.[20]During the hearing before me a few weeks ago, I made the declaration of non-parentage sought. At the conclusion of the hearing, in the knowledge that it would, for various reasons, take me a little time to prepare this judgment, but eager to avoid unnecessary stress and distress for PM and PF, I announced that I would indeed make the care and placement orders contended for by the LA and approve the plan that Eleanor be adopted.[21]I gave the following short-form reasons:
‘I have carefully and anxiously considered the documents filed in this case, in particular the analyses of the LA and the CG, and the statements and position statements of and on behalf of [PF and PM]. I have also carefully considered the very helpful oral submissions from all the parties, of course including those of Ms Frempong and Ms Wordsworth. I have already made a declaration of non-parentage: that can be taken as taking effect on my having made it orally, even though the formal order will be drafted and drawn over the next day or so. The law I will set out in full in due course. In the briefest of shorthand, when it comes to deciding what placement will best meet her needs, [Eleanor]’s welfare is, of course, my paramount consideration. Given the LA’s plans include an application for a Placement Order, it is her welfare throughout her life to which I am to have regard. Ultimately, I am driven to the clear conclusion that her welfare requires me: a. to approve the LA’s care plan; b. to make the care order sought; and c. to make the placement order sought. I am acutely conscious of the pain that my decision will cause for [PF and PM], and I am sorry for that. But my duty is to maintain the sharpest focus on [Eleanor]’s welfare, and in my judgement that allows of only one conclusion in this case. I will circulate a judgment setting out fully my reasons for so doing as quickly as I can.’
[22]The unusual and particular circumstance of Eleanor’s provenance, her first few weeks of life, the fact that her true parentage is neither known nor ascertainable and her neither being a British citizen nor having been born in the UK all combine to complicate the legal position somewhat. I set out below what I have decided, why and how. Declaration of non-parentage[23]Because of its relevance to the question of parental responsibility (of which more below), the LA sought a declaration of non-parentage in relation to both PM and PF at the beginning of the hearing. This was supported by the CG and not opposed by PM and PF.[24]The possibility of such a declaration is provided for by s.55A of the Family Law Act 1986: 55A Declarations of parentage(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person may apply to the High Court or the family court for a declaration as to whether or not a person named in the application is or was the parent of another person so named.(2) A court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an application under subsection (1) above if, and only if, either of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection— (a) is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or (b) has been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with that date, or (c) died before that date and either— (i) was at death domiciled in England and Wales, or (ii) had been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of death.(3) Except in a case falling within subsection (4) below, the court shall refuse to hear an application under subsection (1) above unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application (but this is subject to section 27 of the Child Support Act 1991).(4) The excepted cases are where the declaration sought is as to whether or not — (a) the applicant is the parent of a named person; (b) a named person is the parent of the applicant; or (c) a named person is the other parent of a named child of the applicant.(5) Where an application under subsection (1) above is made and one of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection is a child, the court may refuse to hear the application if it considers that the determination of the application would not be in the best interests of the child.(6) Where a court refuses to hear an application under subsection (1) above it may order that the applicant may not apply again for the same declaration without leave of the court.(7) Where a declaration is made by a court on an application under subsection (1) above, the prescribed officer of the court shall notify the Registrar General, in such a manner and within such period as may be prescribed, of the making of that declaration.”[25]Section 58 allows for the possibility of the court not making a declaration if to do so would offend against public policy: 58 General provisions as to the making and effect of declarations(1) Where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy.(2) Any declaration made under this Part shall be binding on His Majesty and all other persons.(3) A court, on the dismissal of an application for a declaration under this Part, shall not have power to make any declaration for which an application has not been made.(4) No declaration which may be applied for under this Part may be made otherwise than under this Part by any court.[26]Rule 8.1 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR 2010”) provides that such an application must be made by the Part 19 procedure.

Sufficient interest

[27]It is well established that a local authority may in principle be the ‘any person’ making such an application pursuant to s.55A(1).[28]Whether this local authority has ‘sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application’ (without which, pursuant to s.55A(3), the court must refuse to hear the application) is a separate question.[29]In Re D (Parentage: Local Authority Application) [2024] EWHC 305 (Fam), [2024] 2 FLR 222, Poole J held that the local authority applicant, being identified in a supervision order relating to the child in question, did not have a ‘personal’ interest, or, if it did, not a ‘sufficient’ personal interest: [57] In my judgement, in this case the making of a Supervision Order, whether interim or final, does not give a Local Authority a personal interest in the determination of an application for a declaration of parentage. If I am wrong about that, then I would add that any personal interest is not ‘sufficient’ because there is no link between the interest of the Local Authority and the determination of the application that could reasonably be regarded as of any substance. FLA 1986 s 55A(1) allows for applications for declarations as to whether or not a person named in the application is or was the parent of another person so named. The provisions in relation to jurisdiction as well as ss 55A(3), 55A(5), and 58 are designed to ensure that the opportunity to make such applications is not misused. It would be a misuse of the right to apply, for a person to apply out of prurient interest or to seek to uphold some perceived public interest. The officious bystander does not have a ‘sufficient personal interest’ in the determination of the application and so is refused a hearing. Nor would a person who, without any personal interest in the determination, wishes to correct the public record. Here, D’s birth certificate may be inaccurate and I understand that the Local Authority may not want to stand by and allow that record to stand. However, although the Applicant Local Authority in the present case is, I accept, acting from the best of motives, I do not regard it as having a sufficient personal interest. It does not have parental responsibility, it does not require a determination of its s 55A application in order to know whether, or how, to exercise its obligations and powers in relation to D, and it does not need to know who is D’s biological father in order to ensure fairness in the public law proceedings. [58] Accordingly, I find that the Local Authority does not have sufficient personal interest in the determination of its application for a declaration of D’s parentage and that, under FLA 1986 s 55A(3) the court must refuse to hear its application.’[30]By contrast, in the current case, the LA holds parental responsibility for Eleanor pursuant to the interim care order (and is seeking, at this hearing, a final care order). It is also the body proposing a care plan to the court which, if approved by the court, will have momentous consequences for Eleanor. The fact that PM and PF are not Eleanor’s parents is already an established legal fact (consequent to my earlier findings), as is the fact that Eleanor will be caused future harm if she is brought up with a belief in the false narrative that PM and/or PF are her parents. In those circumstances, in my judgement, in the current case, this particular local authority, in these particular circumstances, clearly has the requisite ‘sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application’.

Best interests to refuse to hear the application

[31]MacDonald J stated in H v An Adoption Agency (Declaration of Parentage Following Adoption) [2020] EWFC 74, [2021] 2 FLR 869:
‘Within this context, I am satisfied that the words used in s 55A(5), namely “refuse to hear the application” at the very least suggest that the court is permitted to determine as a preliminary issue the question of whether it is in the child’s best interests for the application to be determined. Whilst the power in s 55A(6) to order that the applicant may not apply again for the same declaration without leave of the court where the court has refused to hear the application pursuant to s 55A(5) might be said to argue against the latter constituting a separate stage prior to the hearing of the substantive application, having regard to the matters set out in the foregoing paragraph I am satisfied that s 55A(5) at the very least permits the court, in an appropriate case, to determine as a preliminary issue that the determination of the application would not be in the best interests of the child.’
[32]In the present case, I discern no best interest consideration suggesting that I should consider not hearing the application, and none is pressed on me by any of the parties.

Are PM and PF the biological parents of Eleanor?

[33]MacDonald J pointed out in H v An Adoption Agency (ibid.) that the objective of s.55A is to provide an authoritative statement of fact:
‘Section 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 deals with the identity of a child’s parent as a matter of fact. The purpose of Part III of the Family Law 1986 is to make provision for declarations regarding status, dealing as it does with marital status (s 55), parentage (s 55A), legitimacy and legitimation (s 56) and adoptive status under a foreign adoption order (s 57). Within this context, s 58(1) of the 1986 Act makes clear that on an application under Part III of the Act for a declaration of status, the court is concerned with proof of matters of fact. A declaration as to status made under Part III of the Family Law Act 1986 is intended to be an authoritative statement of the fact so declared. Within this context, the term ‘parent’ in s 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 refers to someone who is a parent of the child as a matter of fact.’
[34]That matter of fact I have already determined: PM and PF are not Eleanor’s parents.

Should a declaration of non-parentage be made?

[35]Black LJ (as she then was) stated in Re S (A Child) (Declaration of Parentage) [2012] EWCA Civ 1160:
‘[24] Issues of status, such as parentage, can be expected to be approached with some formality. They concern not only the individual but also the public generally which has an interest in the status of an individual being spelled out accurately and in clear terms and recorded in properly maintained records.’
[36]Ms Cavanagh KC and Ms McCallum point out a number of considerations militating positively in favour of making the declaration sought, viz.:a. the requirement to correct the public record;b. the fact that Eleanor’s birth certificate and identity documents are false;c. the fact that PM and PF currently have parental responsibility (it would seem; more in relation to this below) but have no entitlement to it; accordingly, that they would otherwise have a locus standi in proceedings relating to Eleanor (for instance the placement order application) which they should not have;d. most fundamentally, as a matter of proven fact, PM and PF are not Eleanor’s parents.[37]In my judgement, it is clear that I should make the declaration sought. Eleanor’s true provenance and earliest days of life are, and are likely to remain, shrouded in mystery. It is in her interests – as and when appropriate and in a carefully considered and child-focussed way – to know as much about her true identity as is possible; and it is a source of likely harm that she may never be able to know everything. In those circumstances, quite apart from the separate benefits served by correcting a false record, it is, in my estimation, in her interests that I make the declaration sought.[38]Accordingly, and as separately recorded in a sealed order, it is declared that:a. [PM] is not the mother or parent of [Eleanor] (given DOB: xx.06.2024).b. [PF] is not the father or parent of [Eleanor] (given DOB: xx.06.2024). Did PM and PF ever have parental responsibility; do they now?[39]The question of the holding of parental responsibility for Eleanor is not straightforward. In order to ensure that the procedural requirements of the other applications (for care and placement orders, and, in the future, if made, for an adoption order) are complied with, it is necessary for me to decide these inter-related issues:a. whether PM and/or PF ever held parental responsibility for Eleanor, and, if so:b. the impact on this of my having made the declaration of non-parentage.[40]My starting point is to grapple with the question of habitual residence. Had Eleanor been PM’s baby, the fact that PM was at the time habitually resident in England and intended to bring Eleanor to live in England would have been all but determinative of Eleanor’s habitual residence. But PM is not Eleanor’s mother. I do not know and cannot discover who Eleanor’s birth mother is, nor, it follows, the country of the true mother’s habitual residence. While it seems likely that her mother was Nigerian, as Ms Cavanagh KCand Ms McCallum point out, this is no more than informed speculation. At the point that she was passed over to PM’s care, when possibly just a few hours, perhaps minutes, old, Eleanor’s habitual residence – so far as this court is concerned – was unknown.[41]From that moment, Eleanor was living with PM, so a person who was not her mother, who was present in Nigeria and who lived and intended to take Eleanor to live in England. Eleanor lived with PM in Nigeria for a short amount of time before being flown to England.[42]Thus, at the point that Eleanor came into this country, that she was taken into public care, and that the present Part IV CA 1989 application was made:a. she had been, for the days or weeks beforehand, in PM’s care;b. she was named (albeit falsely) on a Nigerian birth certificate as the child of PM and PF;c. PM’s intention, at the point of entry into the country, was for Eleanor to live here, with PM and PF; and from the point of being removed from PM’s care, Eleanor has been provided with all of her care within and on behalf of the State; all of her roots remain in the UK.[43]Articles 5, 6 and 16 of the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“the 1996 Hague Convention”) provide:
‘Article 5 (1) The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child’s person or property. (2) Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction. Article 6 (1) For refugee children and children who, due to disturbances occurring in their country, are internationally displaced, the authorities of the Contracting State on the territory of which these children are present as a result of their displacement have the jurisdiction provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 5. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply to children whose habitual residence cannot be established. Article 16 (1) The attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by operation of law, without the intervention of a judicial or administrative authority, is governed by the law of the State of the habitual residence of the child. (2) The attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by an agreement or a unilateral act, without intervention of a judicial or administrative authority, is governed by the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence at the time when the agreement or unilateral act takes effect. (3) Parental responsibility which exists under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence subsists after a change of that habitual residence to another State. (4) If the child’s habitual residence changes, the attribution of parental responsibility by operation of law to a person who does not already have such responsibility is governed by the law of the State of the new habitual residence.’
[44]From the above, applied to the facts of this case, I deduce the following:a. at the point of the initiation of the Part IV CA 1989 proceedings, the English court had jurisdiction either by virtue of Eleanor having already acquired habitual residence in England (Art. 5(1)), or, more likely, by virtue of her having had at the time a ‘habitual residence which cannot be established’ (Art 6(2));b. by the point of the final hearing, the court’s jurisdiction flowed from Eleanor’s being incontrovertibly habitually resident in England (Art. 5(1));c. having been unable to determine that Eleanor was habitually resident in Nigeria at the point of her birth, I need not try to discern whether or not a non-parent would, under Nigerian law, acquire parental responsibility for a child by virtue of their knowingly fraudulent registration of themselves as parent (Art. 16(3));d. rather, I need only determine whether or not (and, if the former, when) PM and/or PF held parental responsibility for Eleanor pursuant to English domestic law (Art. 16(1)).[45]Noting the fact that closely related legal questions are shortly to be determined by the Court of Appeal, I should record the submission of Ms Cavanagh KC and Ms MacCallum:
‘Unlike any other case in the law reports these facts bring into stark focus the public policy imperatives behind the need for clarity on the law in respect of whether a section 55A declaration renders any PR void ab initio as, here, there is no means under the Children Act 1989 to remove PR from a mother and married father if it were voidable.’
[46]As pointed out during argument, while the terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are not defined in the CA 1989, the meaning, at least of the term ‘mother’, was considered by the Lord Chief Justice in R (Alfred McConnell & YY) v Registrar General for England and Wales[2020] EWCA Civ 559 2020 3 WLR 693, [2020] 2 FLR, 366 [64] We were told at the hearing by counsel for Mr McConnell that the word “mother” is used 45 times in the Children Act 1989 alone. Importantly, in our view, that is the word that is used in section 2(2)(a) of that Act. It provides that a mother has automatic parental responsibility for a child from the moment of birth. No one else has that automatic parental responsibility, including the father. There is no need for any registration document for that purpose. The fact of giving birth to a child has that effect as a matter of operation of law. It can readily be understood why this could be important in practice. From the moment of birth someone must have parental responsibility for a newly born child, for example to authorise medical treatment and more generally to become responsible for its care. [65] Furthermore, as Mr Jaffey submitted, it cannot simply be a question of this court substituting a word such as “parent” for the word “mother”. This is because the word “parent” has a distinct meaning which has been given to it by Parliament in other legislation. This has been the product of considered legislative change over several decades, in various statutes, including the HFEA 1990 and the HFEA 2008. The legal position under the HFEA 2008 was succinctly summarised by Helen Mountfield QC sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen’s Bench Division in R (K) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] 1 WLR 6000, para 51: “under the 2008 Act, at birth a child always has one mother, who is the woman who bore her; may also have a female or male co-parent; may never have more than one male parent; and may not have more than two parents by birth.”’[47]I am aware of the competing various authorities dealing with the question of the status of acquired (as opposed to automatic) parental responsibility, and that there is a conjoined appeal pending in the Court of Appeal. I have read and considered the following judgments: - Re G (Children) [2006] 2 FLR 629 (Baroness Hale), - R v R [2011] 2 FLR 1132 (Peter Jackson J), - RQ v PA and another [2018] 4 WLR 169, [2018] EWFC 68 (Theis J), - Re G (Declaration of Parentage: Removal of Person Identified as Mother from Birth Certificate (No.1)) [2018] EWHC 3360 (Fam) (Williams J), - Re SB [2022] EWFC 111 and Re SB (No.2) [2023] EWFC (HHJ Case), - Re C [2023] 3 WLR 1 (HHJ Moradifar (sitting as a High Court Judge)), - B v C (No 2) (1996 Hague Convention Art 22) [2024] 4 WLR 3 (MacDonald J), - KL v BL (Parental Responsibility) [2025] EWHC 102 (Fam) (Deborah Powell KC (sitting as a High Court Judge)).[48]To the extent that public policy might have some relevance to my decision on this issue, MacDonald J’s observations in B v C are apposite. In that case, MacDonald J was dealing with a case of fraudulent acquisition of parentage by a person who was unknown to the child but who had had her identity stolen and was, under Spanish law, the father with parental responsibility. MacDonald J declined to apply Spanish law under the 1996 Hague Convention for public policy reasons, leaving UK law as the applicable law and made a declaration of non-parentage. In respect of the public policy imperatives in cases of dishonesty the learned

judge said:

‘With respect to international norms relevant on the facts of this case, it is clearly established that there exists a fundamental right to identity, which fundamental right encompasses children. The preamble to the 1996 Convention states that the common provisions established by the Convention take account of the UNCRC. Art 7 of the UNCRC provides that a child shall be registered immediately after birth and have the right to a name. Accurate registration at birth constitutes a decisively important step to ensure the child is recognised as a person and is fundamental to the efficacy of the child’s right to identity. As I observed in Osborne v Arnold (Parentage: Revocation of Adoption) [2023] 1 FLR 549: ‘[38] Within this context and as I noted during the hearing, whilst having a superficially bureaucratic character, administrative steps such as the registration of a birth are absolutely fundamental to an individual’s identity (both as a unique and separate individual and as a recognised member of society), legal status and familial relationships. Within this context, Art 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that a child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, a right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. Within this context, the seemingly mundane administrative act of correctly registering a birth carries with it enormous significance for child and parents. It is a decisively important step both in ensuring legal proof of identity and civil status and as the foundation on which a personal identity is built.’ 67. Under Art 8 of the UNCRC, State parties must respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, name and family relations. The right to respect for private and family life under Art 8 of the ECHR likewise includes the right to identity. In Bensaid v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205, the court held that Art 8 protects a right to identity and the right to establish and develop relationships. In R (Countryside Alliance) v A-G [2008] 1 AC 719, Baroness Hale described Art 8 as protecting the inviolability of the personal and psychological space within which each individual develops his own sense of self and relationships with other people. In Phinikaridou v Cyprus (2008) Application No. 2390/02 at [45] the court concluded as follows: ‘… birth, and in particular the circumstances in which a child is born, forms part of a child’s, and subsequently the adult’s, private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings and that an individual’s entitlement to such information is of importance because of its formative implications for his or her personality. This includes obtaining information necessary to discover the truth concerning important aspects of one’s personal identity, such as the identity of one’s parents. Finally with respect to the relevant principles of public policy, in this case I am satisfied on the unchallenged evidence before the court that the grant of parental responsibility to D by operation of Spanish law was founded on a fraudulent deception. In this context, I note the observation of Lord Bingham in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 349 (itself based on the observation of Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702 at 712) that: ‘…fraud is a thing apart. This is not a mere slogan. It also reflects an old legal rule that fraud unravels all … once fraud is proved, ‘it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever’’.’
[49]The case with which I am concerned has some similarities with a number of the cases cited above. However, none of them deals with the exact situation present here. This is not a case of (possible) acquired parental responsibility, but rather of automatic parental responsibility. As I have decided that the question of parental responsibility for Eleanor is to be determined with reference to English law, I remind myself of that law, found in section 2 of the CA 1989: 2 Parental responsibility for children.(1) Where a child’s father and mother were married to, or civil partners of, each other at the time of his birth, they shall each have parental responsibility for the child. […](2) Where a child’s father and mother were not married to, or civil partners of, each other at the time of his birth— (a) the mother shall have parental responsibility for the child; (b) the father shall have parental responsibility for the child if he has acquired it (and has not ceased to have it) in accordance with the provisions of this Act.[50]As a matter of English law, then, had Eleanor’s Nigerian birth certificate been accurate, that is to say, were it the case that PM was her mother, then PM would have acquired parental responsibility for Eleanor. As she was married to PF at the time, if PF was (or was presumed to be) Eleanor’s father, then he would also have acquired parental responsibility for her. Importantly, in this eventuality, PM and PF’s acquisition of parental responsibility would have been automatic. Parental responsibility vests in the gestational mother and the married father at the point that the baby ceases to be en ventre sa mère. Were this to be the actual state of affairs, the parental responsibility of neither parent could be judicially removed (at least under the statutory regime).[51]However, as I have found incontrovertibly to be the case, PM is not Eleanor’s mother and PF is not her father.[52]That being the case, as a matter of English law, who does hold parental responsibility for Eleanor? The answer is simple: it is the woman (or girl) who gave birth to her, and she acquired it at the moment of the birth; and, if that mother was already married when Eleanor was born, her husband also acquired parental responsibility if he is Eleanor’s father (or if he was presumed in law as being so – this is one of the questions for determination in the Court of Appeal). As to the identity of Eleanor’s true mother and father, at paragraph 116 of my fact-finding judgment, I concluded that the prospects of tracing them are ‘very remote indeed’.[53]Assuming this is correct, this is not a case in which I need to consider whether any person’s parental responsibility or parenthood was void ab initio or merely voidable. This is because the person or persons who do hold parental responsibility for Eleanor (according to English law) cannot be identified or traced. But incontrovertibly, PM and PF are not those people and could not, under English law, have acquired parental responsibility for Eleanor: it is inconceivable that the fraudulent obtaining of a false birth certificate in a foreign country could somehow vest parental responsibility in the fraudster(s), still less remove it from the true parents who had already acquired it by automatic operation of law.[54]I am aware(a) of the debate in other cases about the meaning to be given to the word ‘father’ with reference to s. 4 of the CA 1989,(b) that Debra Powell KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) in KL v BL (Parental Responsibility) [2025] EWHC 102 (Fam) focussed on the ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ of the words in s.4(1)(a) (in particular ‘father’), and(c) that this and other decisions are pending appellate determination. While much of the reasoning adopted in Ms Powell KC’s judgment resonates with this case, I note that it applies to a different section of the legislation and to a different situation.[55]The three questions for me have been simple and each admit of only one answer: - Question one: who holds parental responsibility for Eleanor? Answer: Eleanor’s mother, and, if married to her mother, her father. - Question two: when did they acquire it? Answer: at the point of Eleanor’s birth. - Question three: do PM and/or PF hold parental responsibility for Eleanor? - Answer: no, they are not the persons identified at answer one and could not have subsequently acquired parental responsibility as a result of fraudulently obtaining a false birth certificate in Nigeria. Impact of non-parentage and not holding parental responsibility[56]It follows from my earlier judgment in this case (as reported at [2025] EWFC 122) and from my decisions above that:a. Eleanor has no known parents;b. PM and PF are not her parents; andc. PM and PF do not and have never held parental responsibility for Eleanor.[57]PM and PF remain respondents to the Part IV CA 1989 application (the care proceedings) as they have not been discharged. They are proper respondents to the placement order application as they are ‘persons who are or have been parties toproceedings for a care order in respect of the child where those proceedings have led tothe application for the placement order’ (FPR 2010, r.14.3). They will not be respondents to any application for an adoption order made by Eleanor’s prospective adopters. Further, in the placement order application, it is not necessary to consider dispensing with the consent of PM and PF (ACA 2002, ss. 21 and 52, as it is ‘each parent or guardian of the child’ who must consent or have their consent dispensed with, and they are neither). Eleanor’s welfare

PM and PF’s response to the findings

[58]I directed that PM and PF provide statements in response to my findings.[59]PM’s statement included this passage:
‘While the Judge has found my version of events regarding how [Eleanor] came into my care to be a fundamental lie, I continue to maintain that I have no reason to doubt that [Eleanor] is my daughter. The fact that the DNA report has confirmed that I am not the biological mother of [Eleanor] will cause [Eleanor] emotional and psychological harm. Withholding the truth from [Eleanor] would further result in significant harm. Notwithstanding, I treasure [Eleanor] and have developed bonds with her as my daughter. She will be loved and cared for as I have done for her brothers. [Eleanor] will be informed of the circumstances of her birth in a supportive and at an age-appropriate time, ensuring that she grows up with a secure understanding of her identity with an unwavering love that surrounds her.’
[60]Similarly, PF does not accept my findings:
‘I understand and respect the decision of the Judge and the findings which he has made. My position however has not changed. This is not out of any discourtesy to the court, but because I simply cannot give a different version of events when what I have told the Court is the truth. I still believe absolutely that my wife […] was pregnant at the time she left the UK and returned to Nigeria in June 2024. I was not in Nigeria myself, so I cannot say with certainty what happened in Nigeria, but I know that my wife was pregnant when she went to Nigeria and when she came back, she was not pregnant. Instead, she had baby [Eleanor] with her and I still believe she gave birth to [Eleanor]. […] If [Eleanor] was in our care, we would not lie to her about the situation that has arisen. We would explain to [Eleanor] that she is not genetically related to either myself or [PM], but that would not make her any the less our daughter. We would explain to [Eleanor], in as sensitive a way as possible, that she was subject to court proceedings as a baby and that we fought in those proceedings to have her in our care because we love her, and we are committed to her. She would be brought up in the knowledge that she is not genetically related to either of us or that we cannot tell her precisely who her genetic parents are but she is still our daughter in every way that matters. I understand that the Judge would want us to be able to go further than this, but I am not able to say that my wife did not give birth to [Eleanor]. I was not in Nigeria and to the best of my knowledge and belief [PM] did give birth to [Eleanor] as she has stated she did. […] I understand that the Judge has made findings that I was aware that [PM] was not pregnant and that I am aware that she did not give birth to [Eleanor]. I am aware that the Judge has found as a fact, that I have been complicit in some kind of misrepresentation/ dishonesty around the circumstances of [Eleanor]’s. I maintain that this is simply not true, but I do not intend any disrespect to the Judge by saying this. It is simply the truth of my situation.’
[61]Both PM and PF continue to express unconditional love for and unwavering commitment towards Eleanor. Both point to the established and unquestioned quality of the parenting they have given to their sons and to all they have to offer Eleanor. But, as above, both refuse to acknowledge what is obvious to all others and what I have found to be true.

Impact of non-acceptance

[62]The social worker, Emily Rhodes, stated the following in her final statement:
‘3.3.3 [Eleanor] has experienced significant trauma throughout her short life and will likely struggle to make sense of her life story as she ages and matures. [Eleanor] does not know her biological parents and how she came into the world. The details around [Eleanor]’s parentage and birth may never be known, which will likely have an impact on [Eleanor]’s sense of identity from childhood into adult life. There are many facts that are unknown even down to her date of birth or place of birth is unconfirmed. 3.3.4 There are no identified family members to be able to care for [Eleanor] or to establish a relationship with her as a child. Although life story work will be completed for [Eleanor], this will be limited due to the lack of information that is available. [Eleanor] will not have the benefit of knowing her parents or wider family. 3.3.5 Some of the above information may be held by [PF] and [PM] who have chosen not to share this. As noted with the judgment, this has caused [Eleanor] significant emotional and psychological harm. 3.3.6 The circumstances around [Eleanor]’s birth sadly include the possibility of baby farming, which is, in itself, a form of abuse including the rape, forced pregnancy and murder of women. The possibility – and also uncertainty – that [Eleanor]’s birth may have been the result of baby farming will likely cause [Eleanor] on-going emotional harm throughout her life. 3.3.7. If [Eleanor] was placed in the care of [PF] and [PM] she would likely suffer further significant emotional harm due to what they would tell her about her conception and birth.’
[63]The CG expresses this opinion in her final report:
‘15. [Eleanor] has been harmed emotionally through being removed from her biologicalmother in unknown, but likely traumatic circumstances, [Eleanor] is likely to never knowher biological parents or how she came to be in the care of [PM]. [PM] hasrefused to provide this information for the benefit of [Eleanor] and to help [Eleanor]’sunderstanding as she grows. It is evident that [PM]’s need to continue with thesefalse claim’s overrides [Eleanor]’s need for the truth. This is not the actions of someone whoproclaims to love and value [Eleanor] in her own right. It is sad that [PM] is unableto put [Eleanor] first, when she has been the cause of this harm to a child she professes tolove and cherish. 16. [PF and PM] have not been able to be open and honest with professionals or thiscourt about [Eleanor], despite the significant findings made. I am unclear of why they feelthat continuing to stand by their position will strengthen their professionals with any reassurances about their ability to care position or providefor [Eleanor]. 17. [PF and PM] have had little meaningful engagement with the social work teamas they are unable to be open and honest about [Eleanor] and her heritage. This leaves verylittle room for discussions about how they would meet [Eleanor]’s identity needs or supporther to understand her past when they themselves continue to present the false narrativewhich the court has rejected. There is simply no way to reduce the risks they pose to[Eleanor].’
[64]I agree with the analyses of both the social worker and the CG in relation to the harm caused to Eleanor, and likely to continue to manifest itself, secondary to the concatenation of circumstances which have befallen her from the moment of her birth to her being placed with her current carers. I also agree with the assessing professionals in their prediction of further harm being caused, were Eleanor to be placed with PM and PF, as a result of being fed an entirely concocted narrative about an issue as crucial to her sense of self and identity as the story of her provenance, her birth and the circumstances in which she came to be in PF and PM’s care. Whilst physically healthy and normal, Eleanor has very specific needs, most particularly in relation to her identity and PM and PF could not meet those needs.[65]There are parallels to be drawn with the case of Haringey LBC v C, E and Another Intervening [2004] EWHC 2580 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 47. In that case (also a so-called ‘miracle pregnancy’ case), Ryder J found that the child would be caused harm if brought up with a false understanding of his provenance:
‘[84] All children should be able to understand where they come from and where in the context of life they belong. C cannot do that because he has no accepted identity with Mr and Mrs E. The claimed relationship with Mr and Mrs E would be founded on a lie which when discovered would likely lead to a profound disruption. If the basis of his existence is denied there will be adjustment problems, feelings of grief, loss and rejection. The risk is great. The lack of any family medical history may present C with additional difficulties as he grows older.’
[66]In my judgement, the same is true for Eleanor in this case. If she lives with PM and PF, she will be encouraged to believe something which is not only fundamentally untrue, but also obviously and self-evidently so (bearing in mind, for example, the need to believe that a 56-week human pregnancy is possible, in order to accept the narrative). The lie will be discovered, and harm will inevitably follow.

Assessment of the realistic options

[67]There are two realistic options for Eleanor’s future: either adoption or being placed with PM and PF. I rule out long-term fostering as being unrealistic, given Eleanor’s age and need for permanence and stability, and there are no known family members or friends.[68]Eleanor had a particularly unsettled early life. She was removed from her birth mother’s care at a very young age, possibly at the point of birth itself. She was cared for by PM for three or four weeks in Nigeria. She was removed from PM’s care on their landing at Heathrow on 6 July 2024. She was placed on an emergency basis with foster carers on 6 July, moving to other foster carers on 7 July. She was then collected from Sussex by a social worker from Leeds on 9 July, brought to Yorkshire and placed with another foster carer that evening. She stayed there for some months.[69]Eleanor was then moved to an EPP placement on 7 December 2024, where she has remained to date. The EP carer is of Black African (Nigerian) origin and has been assessed as able to meet all of Eleanor’s current and anticipated future needs. She is aware and accepting that there is unknown information in relation to possible inherited health or other genetic conditions. The carer is said to have thought carefully about her role in supporting Eleanor, with professional assistance, to understand her life story. At the point of the final hearing before me, Eleanor had settled well in the EP carer’s home, where she had lived for seven months. It is important to note that, while the EP carer has at all times been aware of the possibility of the court deciding otherwise, from the point of Eleanor’s being placed with her, she, the carer, has thought of her as her child-to-be, and doubtless the loving care with which Eleanor has been provided has reflected this.[70]The benefits for Eleanor of remaining with her current carer are many. She is already settled and secure in her care and will not have to be forced to make yet another move with all of the emotional damage that would bring. To the extent that any placement in this country rather than in Nigeria could do so, Eleanor’s cultural and ethnic needs will be mirrored and met. Eleanor will have the security and permanence that adoption brings, becoming, in law, the child of her carer-turned-parent, acquiring British Citizenship in the process. The carer is assessed as able to give attuned, skilled and therapeutic parenting, and will approach life story work from a position of truth (rather than one of denial and deceit). There is no reason to suppose that Eleanor will have anything other than a happy, settled, secure and loving childhood.[71]The disadvantages for Eleanor of continued placement with her current carer are principally consequences of the circumstances of her life rather than the placement itself. She will be brought up in a country other than that of her birth and by people who are not her natural family. This, though, is the reality, whichever option I adjudge better for her.[72]It is suggested by PM and PF that it is a disadvantage to Eleanor of her being adopted by her EP carer that she would lose her connection with PM and PF. I accept that, from PM’s point of view and, perhaps to a less fervent degree from PF’s, the sense of an emotional bond with Eleanor is undimmed by either my findings or the passage of time. It is certainly true that PM and PF appear to be good and loving parents to their own children and that they are likely to be able to provide loving care and to ensure Eleanor’s physical wellbeing.[73]Mr Nuvoloni and Ms Frempong meet the criticism of PM and PF for refusing to accept my findings with this submission:
‘All adopted children are at a risk of a negative impact from learning about the reality of their early lives. The context of that knowledge is of real importance. The context for [Eleanor] will be the commitment of her carers to provide her with the very best of the life they have to offer, provided in a warm and loving home.’
In a sense, there is little with which to take issue in these assertions. What is missing, however, is any acknowledgment of the very real emotional damage which will flow from being brought up by carers who are intent on maintaining an entirely inaccurate narrative of Eleanor’s provenance and identity, which I have found to exist earlier in this judgment.[74]The benefits to Eleanor of being placed with and brought up by PM and PF are that they undoubtedly love her, that they feel a strong emotional bond to her, that PM provided her with a few weeks of loving care at the very start of her life and that they are devoted, to a fault, to the prospect of caring for her. Eleanor would likely be very well physically cared for, would receive love and affection and would grow up in a family who has claimed her as one of them, in every sense.[75]It is important, however, to note that PM has not seen Eleanor for more than a year (i.e. since 6 July 2024) and that Eleanor was only ever in her care for three of four weeks; Eleanor will have no conscious memory of PM. None of PF and PM and PF’s other two children has ever even met Eleanor. It follows that placement with PM and PF – so far as the emotional impact on Eleanor is concerned – would represent moving from a carer to whom she is attached and in whose care she is settled, to live with strangers. Given her particular need for stability in light of her particularly unsettled early months of life, it is likely that such a move would cause her significant emotional harm.[76]Further, as I have already set out above, I consider that being brought up by carers who would promote an entirely false narrative about Eleanor’s true origins would be to expose her to the strong likelihood of permanent and debilitating psychological and emotional harm. Put simply, PM and PF are not able to meet Eleanor’s particular emotional and psychological needs. Rather, as Ms Cavanagh KC and Ms McCallum point out, they would likely compound the emotional harm she has already suffered: it would likely be extremely disturbing for Eleanor to discover later in life that she was living with the very persons found by the court to have caused her emotional and psychological harm. Conclusion[77]Comparing the two realistic options, to my mind virtually all factors point towards its being in Eleanor’s best interests, through her childhood and the rest of her life, to be placed for adoption, which adoption is planned to be by her current carer. That carer already loves Eleanor as a daughter and can meet all of her needs, physical, psychological, emotional and cultural. It would be all but unthinkable to remove her from that placement and into one with carers who are not able to meet her emotional needs and to whom she has no current attachment (or even passing familiarity) or family link. In reaching this decision, I have considered all aspects of the welfare checklists of s.1(3) CA 1989 and s.1(4) ACA 2002, taking Eleanor’s welfare throughout her life as my paramount consideration.[78]When deciding whether to make a care order, I must consider the permanence provisions of the s.31A care plan.[79]I cannot make a placement order unless, in the case of each parent or guardian of Eleanor, I am satisfied either that they consent or that their consent should be dispensed with (s.21 ACA 2002). I cannot dispense that that consent unless I am satisfied that the parent or guardian cannot be found (or lacks capacity), or Eleanor’s welfare requires the consent to be dispensed with.[80]I have already found the s.31 CA 1989 jurisdictional criteria to be satisfied. I consider the permanency provisions of the s.31A CA 1989 care plan to meet Eleanor’s needs. Accordingly, and for the reasons fully set out above, I make a care order in relation to Eleanor.[81]As referred to in this and my previous judgment, Eleanor’s true parents cannot be found. I dispense with their consent for that reason (ACA 2002, ss.21(3)(b) and 52(1)(a)). Her welfare being my paramount consideration, for all of the reasons explained above, I make a placement order in relation to Eleanor. For the purposes of that placement order (and generally), I deem Eleanor’s date of birth to be [xx] June 2024 (‘the court will determine the probable date of the child’s birth’: FPR 2010, r.14.7(4)) and I conclude that the country of Eleanor’s birth is unknown (‘cannot be proved to the satisfaction of the court’: r.14.7(6)).[82]Eleanor is parentless (in the sense of having no identified or traceable parents) and likely stateless. Her welfare absolutely requires a court to intervene in order to regularise her status, to ensure that her safety and wellbeing are appropriately protected and that she is in the care of loving adults who are able lawfully to exercise parental responsibility for her. To the extent that the orders I make engage and interfere with her or any other persons’ Article 8 ECHR rights, it is self-evident from the above that the interference is both necessary and proportionate.[83]Mr Nuvoloni KC and Ms Frempong asked me, in their written submissions, ‘to consider how on-going contact with [Eleanor], if she is not to be returned to [PM]’s care, could be of real benefit throughout [Eleanor]’s childhood and into adulthood’. Although I continue to have significant sympathy at a human level for PM and PF, and whilst I acknowledge their genuine belief that they love Eleanor and that she would benefit from their being in her life, it is plain from all of the above that any form of contact with them would be entirely inconsistent with Eleanor’s interests, even if it provided PM and PF with some small crumb of comfort.[84]The LA has been conscientiously ensuring that Eleanor’s status and stability in the UK are protected, having made proactive enquiries of the Registrar General for Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Home Office Adoption Section, and having commissioned expert advice in relation to her immigration position. I am satisfied that these hugely important practical issues have been and are being appropriately dealt with.[85]After the most unsettled and precarious first few months of life, Eleanor has found stability in a loving home, where she has lived for some nine months and in which she will remain for the rest of her childhood and probably beyond. This is the best outcome that could have been hoped for.[86]I conclude by expressing my gratitude to the social work team and the Children’s Guardian for their hard work and to Counsel and the wider legal teams for the skilled and proportionate way in which their respective cases have been managed and put.