X (A Child) (Disclosure to the NMC), Re [2025] EWFC 332

[2025] EWFC 332Case No MK24C50035
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Venue Royal Court of JusticeDate 30/09/2025
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before
MS JUSTICE HENKE
Re: X (A Child) (Disclosure to the NMC)
Hearing Hearing date: 29 September 2025
Samantha Reddington (instructed by Milton Keynes City Council) for the Applicant
The First and Second Respondents did not attend and were not represented
Matthew Stott (instructed by Blaser Mills Solicitors) for the Third Respondent
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 30 September 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail. Following the stay of the disclosure order expiring, it is uploaded to the National Archives at 2pm on 13 October 2025.
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MS JUSTICE HENKE
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
Introduction
[1]This is the local authority’s application for permission to disclose the judgment I gave on 4 April 2025 together with the findings therein to the Nursing and Midwifery Council (hereafter NMC). The relevant judgment will be published with this and has the Neural Citation [2025] EWFC 87. The application for permission to disclose is dated 6 August 2025. A statement in support was filed by the local authority on 14 August 2025 with an amended statement being filed dated 21 August 2025. The application is not opposed by the mother or the children’s Guardian. It is presumed to be opposed by the father who did not attend this hearing despite having had notice of it and the application made.[2]The NMC are the regulator for nurses, midwives and specialist community public health nurses eligible to practise in the UK with the aim of protecting the health and well-being of the public. The father in this case, Mr B, is a registered nurse (mental health). There is an on-going investigation into his fitness to practice by the NMC.

Relevant Background

[3]On the 29 July 2024 the local authority made a referral to the NMC about the father. On 7 August 2024 the NMC notified the local authority that they had received the referral and were undertaking urgent initial enquiries on possible regulatory concerns arising out of an ongoing criminal investigation into a complaint made by a third party against the father about his conduct towards her when she was 16 years old. That complaint is linked to the public law proceedings which were before me and upon which I made findings against the father. The NMC confirmed that they were also gathering information for their interim order panel. The local authority responded and provided a summary by email dated 1 November 2024 to enable the NMC to discharge their fitness to practice function. There was then no further communication between the local authority and the NMC until the conclusion of the Children Act proceedings before me on 31 July 2025. On 12 August 2025 the local authority requested by email an urgent update from the professional regulation team of the NMC.[4]The father has been aware of the local authority’s referral to the NMC and the NMC’s investigation into his fitness to practice for a considerable period. He exhibited to his statement to this court dated 3 January 2025 correspondence he had received from the NMC, the referral the local authority had made to the NMC, and the information that had been disclosed to them by the police.[5]On 31 July 2025 I made a final care order in relation to the subject child. The background to that decision is set out in the judgment dated 4 April 2025. That was a rolled-up hearing (threshold and welfare). As part of that judgment, I made findings of fact which are relevant to the NMC’s investigation. At the hearing on 31 July 2025, two issues were raised:(i) the publication of the judgment dated 4 April 2025 and(ii) the issue of disclosure of that judgment to the NMC. At that hearing all parties were represented. The positions of the local authority, the mother and the child’s guardian were that the judgment should be published subject to appropriate anonymization to protect the identity of the child and her Article 8 rights. The local authority proposed that the judgment (anonymised other than in relation to the father) should be sent to the NMC to inform their investigation into the father’s fitness to practice. The mother and the children’s Guardian supported that application. The father took a contrary position in relation to both applications. He sought the publication of the judgment without any anonymization. However, he resisted the disclosure of the judgment to the NMC. On his behalf it was argued that the application for disclosure should be made by the NMC. The father sought formal notice of the application. Accordingly, I gave directions for the local authority to file and serve any application and supporting evidence by a date certain, timetabled any skeleton arguments and set the hearing of that application (if made) down for hearing on 29 September 2025. At the hearing on 31 July 2025, I asked Counsel on behalf of the father whether the NMC should be invited to attend the September hearing. They indicated that they should and the order of 31 July 2025 records that such an invitation was to be extended to the NMC.[6]On 12 August 2025 an email was sent by the local authority to the professional regulation team of the NMC requesting an urgent update on their investigation. The initial response was to enquire of the local authority what further details they required. In reply the local authority indicated that they required an update on the referral made and the status of the referral including any timescales.[7]The next communication from the NMC was on 24 September 2025 when they sent the local authority an email which included the following: The NMC is the regulator of nurses and midwives in the United Kingdom, and nursing associates in England. We exist to protect the health and well-being of the public, which we do by maintaining a register of nurses, midwives and nursing associates. We investigate any concerns raised about the fitness to practise of those on our register. Fitness to practice is defined as a nurse, midwife or nursing associate’s suitability to remain on our register without restriction. We require the above documents to direct our own enquiries. We may disclose this information to the nurse and their representative, should they have one, as well as the relevant people within the NMC who consider the case to determine what, if any, action needs to be taken.[8]On 25 September 2025 the NMC sent an email to the court which attached a letter, the substance of which was: We write to the Court that we will not be attending the hearing scheduled for 10:30am on 29 September 2025. We mean no disrespect by our non-attendance. We humbly request that any order made is shared with us following the hearing.[9]The hearing of the local authority’s application for permission to disclose to the NMC was heard before me on 29 September 2025. The hearing proceeded on the basis of written submissions on behalf of the local authority and the Child’s Guardian which were supplemented by brief oral submissions. The mother did not attend but had confirmed to the represented parties that she continued to support the application for disclosure to the NMC. The father did not attend and did not provide any written submissions, whether formal or otherwise. Nevertheless, I decided to proceed in his absence. I did so because I formed the view that he knew of the hearing and its purpose and had chosen not to attend. I did so because:a. The father although not present was represented on 31 July 2025 when the date for the hearing was set.b. He continued to have the benefit of solicitors until just after 2pm on 26 September 2025. Those solicitors accepted service on his behalf of the application, the evidence in support and all the relevant papers filed with the court and served on the parties up to that point.c. On 26 September 2025 but after his solicitor’s ceased to act for him, the father was sent a copy of the 186-page bundle to be used at the disclosure hearing. That bundle contained my order of 31 July 2025 which lusted any disclosure application to be made on 29 September before me at the Royal Cout’s of Justice. It also contained my judgment of 4 April 2025, the local authority's application, the evidence in support of the application, his position statement of 31 July 2025, his statement of 3 January 2025, the skeleton arguments on behalf of the local authority and the child’s guardian and the relevant authority, Re Z (Disclosure to Social Work England: Findings of Sexual Abuse) [2023] 2 FLR 996.d. A search was made for him outside court, and he was not present.e. A CVP link to enable him to attend the hearing remotely was sent to him at his last known email address.f. The father failed to attend the hearing and failed to give any explanation for his non-attendance by any means.

The Law

[10]The Children Act proceedings before me ended on 31 July 2025. Accordingly, s.97 Children Act 1989 no longer applies - Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878. However, s.12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 and the Family Procedure Rules Part 2010, r.12.73-76 and PD12G remain in play.[11]FPR 2010 r.12.73 allows disclosure of material from family proceedings to specified people and bodies with the permission of the Court.[12]Communication of information relating to Children Act 1989 proceedings will fall into 3 categories:a. r.12.73(1)(a) – communications can be made as a matter of right;b. r.12.73(1)(c) and PD12G §1&§2 – communications may be made but are subject to any direction by the court, including in appropriate circumstances, a direction that they should not be made; andc. r.12.73(1)(b) – communications may only be made with the court’s permission.[13]The circumstances are set out in table form within PD12G. None of these appear to automatically permit the local authority to disclose the judgment and findings to the NMC.[14]Providing a copy of the judgment to the NMC therefore falls into category 12.73(1)(b), i.e. only when the Court gives permission.[15]When considering giving permission, the Court can permit disclosure to a regulatory body where it is necessary and proportionate to do so and is in the public interest. These areas would include child protection and safeguarding patients and the vulnerable.[16]In Re Z (Disclosure to Social Work England: Findings of Domestic Abuse [2023] 2 FLR 995 Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles fully considered the legal approach to disclosure at [19] – [34].[17]Her approach in Re Z was also further considered in The General Dental Council v KK and Another [2024] EWHC 3053.[18]In short, the principles and approach to be adopted by the Court are found in Re C (A Minor) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [1997] Fam 76, sub nom Re EC (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 FLR 725 at 85 and 733:
'In the light of the authorities, the following are among the matters which a judge will consider when deciding whether to order disclosure. It is impossible to place them in any order of importance, because the importance of each of the various factors will inevitably vary very much from case to case: (1) The welfare and interests of the child or children concerned in the care proceedings. If the child is likely to be adversely affected by the order in any serious way, this will be a very important factor. (2) The welfare and interests of other children generally. (3) The maintenance of confidentiality in children cases. (4) The importance of encouraging frankness in children's cases. All parties to this appeal agree that this is a very important factor and is likely to be of particular importance in a case to which s 98(2) applies. The underlying purpose of s 98 is to encourage people to tell the truth in cases concerning children, and the incentive is that any admission will not be admissible in evidence in a criminal trial. Consequently, it is important in this case. However, the added incentive of guaranteed confidentiality is not given by the words of the section and cannot be given. (5) The public interest in the administration of justice. Barriers should not be erected between one branch of the judicature and another because this may be inimical to the overall interests of justice. (6) The public interest in the prosecution of serious crime and the punishment of offenders, including the public interest in convicting those who have been guilty of violent or sexual offences against children. There is a strong public interest in making available material to the police which is relevant to a criminal trial. In many cases, this is likely to be a very important factor. (7) The gravity of the alleged offence and the relevance of the evidence to it. If the evidence has little or no bearing on the investigation or the trial, this will militate against a disclosure order. (8) The desirability of co-operation between various agencies concerned with the welfare of children, including the social services departments, the police service, medical practitioners, health visitors, schools etc. This is particularly important in cases concerning children. (9) In a case to which s 98(2) applies, the terms of the section itself, namely, that the witness was not excused from answering incriminating questions, and that any statement of admission would not be admissible against him in criminal proceedings. Fairness to the person who has incriminated himself and any others affected by the incriminating statement and any danger of oppression would also be relevant considerations. (10) Any other material disclosure which has already taken place.'
[19]The approach in Re C was affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Re M (children) [2019] EWCA Civ 1364, sub nom Re M (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [2020] 1 FLR 50. Sir Andrew McFarlane P noted that applications should only be granted if the criteria in Re C were satisfied and it was necessary and proportionate to do so.[20]Moreover, inRe P (Children) (Disclosure) [2022] EWCA Civ 495, [2022] 2 FLR 912 it was noted that:a. The circumstances in which disclosure decisions were made will be variable and will require the court to make an evaluative judgment; andb. Re C did not create a presumption in favour of disclosure.[21]The principles of Re C also apply to disclosure of information to professional regulatory bodies - see Re R (Disclosure) [1998] 1 FLR 433.[22]In Re L (Care Proceedings: Disclosure to Third Party [2000] 1 FLR 913, Mrs Justice Hogg permitted disclosure of her judgment and other documents to the UK Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting (“UKCC”). In that case the mother was psychiatric nurse. The Court made findings that the child had suffered significant emotional harm in the mother’s care by reason of the mother’s deteriorating mental health and emotional state.[23]Hogg J noted that the UKCC “[…] has an obligation to protect as far as possible vulnerable members of the public, namely patients and in this case vulnerable children”. She went further and indicated that courts and practitioners should be alive to the need, in an appropriate case, to consider whether a referral needed to be made to the UKCC and what information should be disclosed form proceedings in the family court.[24]The UKCC was replaced by the NMC in April 2022.[25]In A Local Authority v SK & HK [2007] EWHC 1250 (Fam), Sumner J permitted disclosure to the mother’s employers. She worked in a residential home for elderly people, and the Court had found that the mother had physically assaulted and injured her 8-year-old daughter. Whilst the mother was not working directly with children, Sumner J set out at §47 that the mother worked with “vulnerable adults who may well not be able to look after themselves nor, as with a child, necessarily able to give a coherent account in relation to any harm that they suffer”.[26]The balancing exercise the court needs to undertake therefore includes a balance of confidentiality and the rights of privacy to both the family and the child as well as a balance of the public interest in patient safety and professional regulation.[27]The NMC has its own Fitness to Practise Rules which ensure that any disclosed information is used appropriately within the regulatory framework.

My Analysis

[28]I remind myself that this is an application by the local authority for permission to disclose my judgment of 4 April 2025 to the NMC. The Adult Safeguarding Team opened an adult safeguarding Person in a Position of Trust case and made the initial referral to the NMC las year. The father is defined as a Person in a Position of Trust by reason of his role as a registered nurse. They made the referral to the NMC in accordance with their statutory duties under Working Together to Safeguard Children 2023 and the Care Act 2014. The local authority now seek my permission to disclose my judgment to the NMC. That application is made as a furtherance of their duty to safeguard. It is an application made in accordance with the need for inter-agency cooperation when safeguarding children and the vulnerable, and to inform the NMC’s investigation into the father’s fitness to practice. There is a public interest in enabling inter-agency cooperation to further the safeguarding of the vulnerable both adults and children alike. I factor into my determination that public interest but note hat there is no presumption in favour of disclosure and that I must conduct a holistic evaluation.[29]In determining the application for permission to disclose, I factor in the subject child’s interests. She is the subject of a final care order and is in long term foster care. There is no plan for rehabilitation. Her father makes no contribution to her maintenance. He has no contact with her, having refused contact because he does not accept that it should be supervised. The reality is that disclosure of my judgment to the NMC is unlikely to have any real impact on the subject child’s day-to-day life or her relationship with her father.[30]This court has made serious findings about the father. I have found that he had sexual intercourse with a vulnerable 16-year-old who was placed in the care of his mother. I have made findings that the subject child is likely to be at risk of significant harm from him. The harm in question is sexual, emotional, and psychological harm. In my judgment of 4 April 2025, I found: ‘The harm arises from the father knowing where appropriate sexual boundaries lie but choosing to cross them to meet his own needs. Appropriate in this context is used to denote what a reasonable person in the shoes of the father would or would not do. The risk that arises to [the subject child] from the father choosing to cross appropriate sexual boundaries is the risk of significant harm. The harm is sexual, emotional, and psychological. The risk of sexual harm in this case includes the risk of direct sexual contact and the risk that arises from contact with her father’s inappropriate sexual boundaries. The latter includes the risk of maladapted sexual boundaries for the child herself’.[31]The father is a registered mental health nurse although he has said that he no longer works as such. His registration remains current and there is nothing preventing him from returning to nursing should he so chose. It is known that when he has worked as a registered nurse, he has worked with mentally ill patients and with vulnerable adults. I note, as Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles did in paragraph 56 of Re Z (above)that the father does not appear to work with children. However, like her, I align myself with what Sumner J said in A Local Authority v SK & HK (above) as to the similarities connecting the care of children to the care of vulnerable adults. I factor in that some of those with whom the father may work as a registered mental health nurse will be vulnerable not simply by reason of their mental ill health but also by reason of their social circumstances and intellectual functioning. Some may be survivors of sexual abuse. I factor in that I found that the father knows where sexual boundaries lie but chooses “to cross them to meet his own needs”. The findings are grave, and they have relevance for those assessing the risk he may or may not pose to vulnerable people in his care. There is a public interest in the NMC carrying out a fully informed Fitness to Practice investigation. Such an investigation serves the welfare interests of vulnerable adults and mentally ill patients.[32]I accept that the disclosure of my judgment to the NMC will compromise the subject child's right to privacy and confidentiality of information. However, I can and will redact the judgment in the manner of the draft submitted in the bundle. The Schedule of Findings will also need to be similarly redacted. Such anonymisation will minimise the impact on the confidentiality of the subject child’s information and the interference with her right to privacy under Article 8. There will however be a risk that her identity will become known as the disclosure relates to her father and it will be known that he is Mr B. That risk can be mitigated by making the disclosure on the condition that the judgment is used by the NMC solely for the purpose of their Fitness to Practice Investigation.[33]I take into account the confidentiality and privacy of Children Act proceedings and the important public interest in maintaining confidentiality to encourage candour and frankness in cases concerning children.[34]I factor into my decision making that permitting the local authority to disclose the judgment to the NMC will impinge upon the father’s confidentiality of information and right to privacy under Article 8. On 31 July 2025, I was told on his behalf that he strongly resisted the disclosure. However. I note and set against that objection that he also sought publication of my judgment in full without redaction and anonymisation. Had I acceded to his submissions, the unredacted judgment would be open to the world to view including the NMC.[35]I remind myself that disclosure of my judgment to the NMC may impact on the father’s ability to work in the future and his income. However, I also place into my consideration that the local authority seeks my permission to disclose my judgment to the NMC to inform the NMC’s investigation and decision-making upon the father's Fitness to Practice. It does not dictate the outcome of that process, that is a matter for them.[36]I remind myself that it is important in the overall interests of justice that barriers should not be erected between one court or tribunal and another. The NMC is not part of the court and tribunal system but its fitness to practice procedures are underpinned by statute and regulation and pay proper regard to an individual's right to a fair hearing as well as ensuring that nurses are fit to practice. It is in the public interest that high standards are required and maintained by those working with vulnerable adults and patients.[37]The gravity of the conduct of the father which I have found to have occurred and its relevance to the NMC’s investigation into the father’s fitness to practice must also be factored into my decision making. The findings are grave. The father, if he had attended might argue that the NMC already have the police disclosure and they can have his account without disclosure. However, the father does not accept the findings I made and given the complaint that he attached to his position statement for 31 July 2025, this court can have no confidence that he would relay the findings I made to the NMC faithfully and accurately.[38]Having considered all the relevant factors, I have stood back and asked myself where the balance lies. Having done so, I have decided that the balance in this case falls in favour of permitting the local authority to disclose my judgment redacted as I have approved and the Schedule of Findings similarly redacted to the NMC to inform their investigation into the father’s fitness to practice. That permission is conditional upon the NMC being permitted to use the judgment and the Schedule of Findings solely for their Fitness to Practice Investigation. Despite the potential impact on the subject child and her father’s rights under Articles 6 and 8, the need for public safety outweighs the right to respect for privacy.[39]The order permitting the local authority to make the disclosure to the NMC in the terms outlined above will be stayed until 2pm on 7 October 2025. Thereafter unless the father seeks permission to appeal and an extension of the stay, the local authority will be permitted to make the disclosure ordered. Unless This judgment will be published at 2pm on 10 October 2025.[40]That is my judgment.