“[49]….The court should first consider whether there is a 'list' of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability and should seek, but not strain, to do so: Re D (Children)[2009] EWCA Civ 472 at [12]. Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list: "Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?" Only if there is should A or B or C be placed into the 'pool'.”
“[42]The judge completed the first of the steps set out in paragraph [49] in that he properly identified the individuals on the list as "the only individuals who could have caused the injuries were the parents". Unfortunately, rather than then moving on to consider whether the mother or the father had, on the balance of probability, inflicted the earlier injuries, the judge approached it from the other end of the telescope, namely was it so improbable that the father had inflicted the older injuries that he should be excluded as a possible perpetrator? [43]The judge said at paragraph [91] that there is "no reliable direct evidence that would allow me to distinguish between the parents and come to a view about which of them may have inflicted these injuries". There are two difficulties with this approach: (i) in my view the proper approach is not to seek to distinguish as between the possible perpetrators in order to see which one inflicted the injuries. Rather the proper approach is to consider each individual separately in order to determine whether that individual can be found on the balance of probabilities, to be the perpetrator; further (ii) contrary to the judge's finding, there is in my view "reliable, direct evidence" capable of distinguishing the parents, namely the "direct" evidence (which had become a finding of fact) that the mother had inflicted the devastating life-threatening injuries to A on the day A was re-admitted to hospital. [44] In my judgment, the judge's approach to the submission that it was inherently improbable that there were two perpetrators was wrong. Had the judge considered the evidence against each parent individually rather than considering whether it so improbable that the father had inflicted the older injuries such that he should be excluded as a possible perpetrator, that submission would have found its proper place in the analysis.”