“1. Every other weekend. a. During school term the father to collect the children from school on Friday and drop them off at school on Monday morning. b. During school closures the handovers to take place at the local shops or such other place and at such times as may be agreed. 2. Every Wednesday evening from after school until Thursday morning during term time 3. During half term breaks the father to spend half the week with the children. The part of the week each parent spends with the children will be the part of the week falling on their weekend pursuant to paragraph 1. For February half term 2018 the father will spend time with the children from the 9th February to Wednesday 15th February. Times to be agreed between the parties. 4. At Easter the father to spend one week with the children from Friday to Friday. His week will be the week that falls on his weekend pursuant to paragraph 1. In 2018 this will be from 23rd March after school until Friday 30th March. Times to be agreed between the parties. 5. For 3 weeks during the summer holidays. Two weeks can be taken consecutively. Dates of the weeks should be agreed by the 23rd April. Holiday dates to be agreed with the other party in writing in the contact book prior to the holiday being booked and paid for. 6. At Christmas. In 2018 from Christmas Eve to Christmas day at 2pm. In 2019 from Christmas Day at 2pm until Boxing Day at 2pm. This arrangement to alternate annually thereafter. 7. For one week during the Christmas holidays in addition to Christmas day times. Dates to be agreed between the parties. This time can include some of the time at the weekend which would usually be the Applicant father’s weekend. In 2018 this shall be Thursday 27th December until3rd January 2019 . 8. On the children’s birthdays, the child will spend the day with the parent with whom they are staying on the day of their birthday unless alternative arrangements can be made between the parties. 9. On the parent’s birthdays, the children will spend the day with the parent with whom the children are staying on the day of the parent’s birthday unless alternative arrangements can be made between the parties. 10. Handovers to take place at the local shops at Little John Road or school as agreed and at such times as may be agreed. Handovers will be facilitated by the maternal grandmother handing them over to the Applicant father. When the maternal grandmother is not available the Respondent mother will hand over the children to the Applicant father’s partner Jess at the local shops on Little John Road or school as agreed. When the Respondent mother and Jess are meeting then the Applicant father and the Respondent mother’s partner must not attend. 11. Any communication by the Applicant father regarding the contact arrangements can only be made by phone text and email to the maternal grandmother. Communication between the Respondent mother and the father’s partner Jess can take place in the future by email once a level of trust has been established and the Respondent agrees to this. The parties will continue to use a contact book. 12. Such other contact as may be agreed between the parties. 13. This contact schedule to continue until further order or the written agreement of the parties.”
“1. The father was excluded from the hearing part way through the recorder’s judgment because of his poor behaviour and conduct. 2. In the absence of the father, further evidence was heard which the father had no opportunity, at this hearing or subsequently, to challenge. 3. This led the recorder to make a ‘final’ order for no direct contact without the father having had an opportunity to be heard and, of the court’s own motion, a prohibited steps order and a non-molestation order without notice to the father.”
"To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness."
"… not all directive, assertive, stubborn, or selfish behaviour, will be 'abuse' in the context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child; much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour."
“A court, in circumstances mentioned in subsection (4)(a) or (7), is as respects each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare.”
“In proceedings relating to a child arrangements order, the court presumes that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare, unless there is evidence to the contrary. The court must in every case consider carefully whether the statutory presumption applies, having particular regard to any allegation or admission of harm by domestic abuse to the child or parent or any evidence indicating such harm or risk of harm.”
“4A.1 Under section 91(14) of the 1989 Act orders are available to prevent a person from making an application under that Act without leave of the court. Section 91(14) leaves a discretion to the court to determine the circumstances in which an order should be made, which may therefore be many and varied. However, section 91A specifies certain circumstances “among others” in which the court may make an order. These circumstances include where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual at risk of harm. This would include, but not be limited to, a risk of harm arising where an application could be used to carry out or continue domestic abuse. A future application could be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual. 4A.2 Where allegations of domestic abuse are alleged or proven, the court should consider whether a section 91(14) order might be appropriate even if an application for such an order has not been made.”
“On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.”
“Where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put — (a) the child concerned, or (b) another individual (“the relevant individual”), at risk of harm.”
“2.1 Section 91(14) orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under the 1989 Act without leave of the court. They are a protective filter made by the court, in the interests of children. 2.2 The court has a discretion to determine the circumstances in which an order would be appropriate. These circumstances may be many and varied. They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount. 2.3 These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse. 2.4 A future application could also be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is also merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual. 2.5 There is no definition in section 91A of who the other individual could be that could be put at risk of harm. However, it is most likely to be, but is not limited to, another person who has parental responsibility for the child and/or is living with or has contact with the child, or any other individual who would be a prospective respondent to a future application. 2.6 In proceedings in which domestic abuse is alleged or proven, or in which there are allegations or evidence of other harm to a child or other individual, the court should give early and ongoing consideration to whether it would be appropriate to make a section 91(14) order on disposal of the application, even if an application for such an order has not been made (since the court may make an order of its own motion – see section 91A(5)). 2.7 Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases. Proceedings under the 1989 Act should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person, and the court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such an impact. 2.8 The court should consider case law for further guidance and relevant principles, bearing in mind Parliament’s insertion via the 2021 Act of section 91A into the 1989 Act.”
“4.1 Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered.”
“Guidelines (1) Section 91(14) of the Act of 1989 should be read in conjunction with section 1(1), which makes the welfare of the child the paramount consideration. (2) The power to restrict applications to the court is discretionary and in the exercise of its discretion the court must weigh in the balance all the relevant circumstances. (3) An important consideration is that to impose a restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting his/her child. (4) The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule. (5) It is generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications. (6) In suitable circumstances (and on clear evidence), a court may impose the leave restriction in cases where the welfare of the child requires it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications. (7) In cases under paragraph 6 above, the court will need to be satisfied first that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for a time to settle to a regime ordered by the court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute or between the local authority and the family and secondly that there isa serious risk that, without the imposition of the restriction, the child or the primary carers will be subject to unacceptable strain. (8) A court may impose the restriction on making applications in the absence of a request from any of the parties, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice such as an opportunity for the parties to be heard on the point. (9) A restriction may be imposed with or without limitation of time. (10) The degree of restriction should be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore, the court imposing the restriction should carefully consider the extent of the restriction to be imposed and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be restrained and the duration of the order.”
“45. It is not for this court to presume to interpret or to purport to provide a commentary upon a section in an Act which is not yet in force and in respect of which statutory guidance has yet to be published. It is worth however noting that the proposed new section 91A dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s.91(14) orders. In particular the provision at section 91A(2) , if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of Re P (see para 39 above) by permitting a s.91(14) order to be made where the making of an application under theChildren Act 1989 would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm. 46. Under section 91A(4) when considering whether to grant leave the court will consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances. Again, this would put the current approach to the granting of leave on a statutory footing.”