“[MB] Punch me in the stomach we fell out after Drink. [MB] stabbed me all over my body Back of The Legs and cut my hands as well. [MB] rapped me [sic] 1 night about 3 times in the past.”
“18 … I agree that there must be good reason for local authority intervention in a case such as the present. Equally, if there are disputed issues of fact which go to the question of Mr S’s capacity and suitability to care for S, the court may need to resolve them if their resolution is necessary to the decision as to what is in S’s best interests. Findings of fact against Mr S on the two issues identified in para [16] would plainly reflect upon his capacity properly to care for S. But it does not follow, in my judgment, that the proceedings must be dismissed simply because the factual basis upon which the local authority instituted them turns out to be mistaken, or because it cannot be established on the balance of probabilities. What matters (assuming always that mental incapacity is made out) is which outcome will be in S’s best interests. There will plainly be cases which are very fact specific. There will be others in which the principal concern is the future, and the relative suitability of the plans which each party can put forward for both the short and long-term care of the mentally incapable adult. The instant case, in my judgment, is one of the cases in the latter category. 21 Whilst I acknowledge that in a relatively untried jurisdiction there are dangers in too relaxed an approach to historical issues, I am unable to accept the proposition that the approach to best interests is fettered in any way beyond that which applies to any judicial decision, namely that it has to be evidence based; that it excludes irrelevant material; and that it includes a consideration of all relevant material. In a field as complex as care for the mentally disabled, a high degree of pragmatism seems to me inevitable. But in each case, it seems to me that the four essential building blocks are the same. First, is mental incapacity established? Secondly, is there a serious, justiciable issue relating to welfare? Thirdly, what is it? Fourthly, with the welfare of the incapable adult as the court's paramount consideration, what are the balance sheet factors which must be drawn up to decide which course of action is in his or her best interests?”
“Fact-finding hearings at Tier 3 in the Court of Protection are extremely rare. Junior Counsel in this case tell me that they are conducted more frequently at Tier 1 and 2, especially at Tier 2. I have been surprised to hear that. I can see no obvious reason why this should be the case. For my part, I do not think that in this sphere of law, they have quite the same practical utility that they can have in the Family Court. In the Court of Protection, the range of welfare options for P is frequently very limited and unlikely to vary very much in response to a shifting factual matrix. In determining whether a fact-finding hearing should be convened, Judges must consider, rigorously, what real purpose it is likely to serve i.e., from the perspective of informing decisions relating to P’s welfare. Such hearings are inevitably adversarial and invariably generate further hostility. This is inherently undesirable. Delay in reaching conclusions is inimical to P’s best interests. In a very pressing and literal way, time is often not on P’s side. Delay can only be justified if it is identifiably purposeful … However, I am satisfied that the gravity of the allegations here and the nature of the family’s responses has made such a hearing unavoidable. It has clear resonance for the central welfare issues i.e., as to where G will live and whether or to what extent it will be in her best interests further to promote her relationship with her family. This disagreeable truth, I very much regret to say, must be confronted. As I have intimated above, fact-finding hearings in the Court of Protection, as in the Family Court, require tight judicial control and an unswerving focus both on their scope and ambit as well as on purpose…”
“At the risk of repeating what has been said at [37] in Re H-N and at [41] above, the main things that the court should consider in deciding whether to order a fact-finding hearing are: (a) the nature of the allegations and the extent to which those allegations are likely to be relevant to the making of the child arrangements order, (b) that the purpose of fact-finding is to allow assessment of the risk to the child and the impact of any abuse on the child, (c) whether fact-finding is necessary or whether other evidence suffices, and (d) whether fact-finding is proportionate.”