“[27] The combined effect of Part 4 of theCourt of Protection Rules 2017 andPractice Direction 4C , entitled ‘Transparency’ creates a supposition in favour of a public hearing with accompanying reporting restrictions. That is achieved in a rather roundabout way. [28] Rule 4.1 states that the general rule is that a hearing is to be held in private. However, the court may make an order for a public hearing (r. 4.3(1)) and when doing so may impose reporting restrictions under r. 4.3(2), which reads: “4.3(2) Where the court makes an order under paragraph (1), it may in the same order or by a subsequent order— (a) impose restrictions on the publication of the identity of— (i) any party; (ii) P (whether or not a party); (iii) any witness; or (iv) any other person; (b) prohibit the publication of any information that may lead to any such person being identified; (c) prohibit the further publication of any information relating to the proceedings from such date as the court may specify; or (d) impose such other restrictions on the publication of information relating to the proceedings as the court may specify.” [29] Rule 4.3(3) contemplates a practice direction providing for the way in which the court may exercise these powers. [30] Rule 4.4(1)(a) states that an order for a public hearing may only be made where it appears to the court that there is good reason for making the order, but this is subject to provision in a practice direction. [31]Practice Direction 4A provides for the orders the court will ordinarily make at para. 2.1: “2.1 The court will ordinarily (and so without any application being made)— (a) make an order under rule 4.3(1)(a) that any attended hearing shall be in public; and (b) in the same order, impose restrictions under rule 4.3(2) in relation to the publication of information about the proceedings.” [32] However, by para. 2.4, the court may decide for good reason not to make an order under para. 2.1, or to make an order for part of a hearing only to be held in public. Para. 2.5(1) contains a list of factors for the court to take into account when making this decision. Para. 2.3. provides that an order under paragraph 2.1 will ordinarily be in the terms of the standard order approved by the President of the Court of Protection. [33] The Practice Direction accordingly reverses the general position signalled by the Rules by requiring there to be a good reason for the court to sit in private rather than in public with reporting restrictions. This balance reflects well-known case law articulating the principles of open justice and personal privacy, while giving the court the ability to tailor its arrangements to the circumstances of the individual case. Although we were addressed in detail about the established principles in this area, we do not consider it necessary to say more about them. (i) any party; (ii) P (whether or not a party); (iii) any witness; or (iv) any other person; “2.1 The court will ordinarily (and so without any application being made)— (a) make an order under rule 4.3(1)(a) that any attended hearing shall be in public; and (b) in the same order, impose restrictions under rule 4.3(2) in relation to the publication of information about the proceedings.”
“[36] Turning to the substantive dispute between the article 8 and 10 rights in play, the President accepted that he was required to conduct a balancing exercise in the manner set out in Re S[2004] UKHL 47 ;[2005] 1 AC 593 . He held that the existence of this analytical framework satisfied the requirement that any interferences with Convention rights be prescribed by law. He also observed that it gave equal weight to articles 8 and 10. Given this, he considered that it was time to draw a line under the remarks of Sir James Munby P in A v. Ward[2010] EWHC 16 Fam;[2010] 1 FLR 1497 insofar as they suggested that anonymity should not be afforded to a class of individuals in the absence of “compelling reasons”
“11- For the purpose of clarity and ease of reference I would highlight the main concerns as follows. (I have provided up to date information on MC’s current care and treatment as context as Appendix 1 to this statement): a) A significant risk of MC becoming aware of the programme and his story being told, however peripherally, and destabilising the positive progress MC has achieved during his current admission as well as the risk of disrupting the therapeutic work which is positively impacting on reducing restrictive practices and which unfortunately has not been possible to progress in the community. This is despite the assurances within the application and evidence submitted. Please see Appendix 1 below for detail on progress made. MC is a highly vulnerable young man who is acquiescent and suggestible. This is despite his strong determination shown at times of heightened anxiety with him reverting to the use of dysfunctional coping mechanisms and fixating on extreme behaviours in an attempt to have some control on his life, for example his “peaceful protest”, requests for physical restraint and more recently his “hunger strike”