“in the absence of specific safeguards to prevent reporting of the most private details of SP’s health, mental health and care, it is very likely that these will also become public.”
“The Official Solicitor considers that in this case, owing to the Chancery Division proceedings, SP’s Art. 8 rights in respect of information about his property and affairs matters are already significantly compromised. However, private information relating to SP’s physical and mental condition and the care needed to manage his condition remain largely private. Further, such information will contain extremely intimate matters, which are always most strongly protected by Art.8 and which could be deployed distastefully and sensationally. Reporting that material is likely to be detrimental to SP’s Art. 8 rights.”
“As to the health and welfare issues, the Official Solicitor recognises the concerns of the court that “policing” any ongoing reporting restriction in relation to the detail of SP’s medical condition and incapacity may be difficult. And so, on careful reflection, she does not seek, at this stage, to argue for any order restricting reporting of such detail. She reserves the right to revisit this issue at a later hearing should it be required.”
“GP suggested that the Official Solicitor’s position on behalf of SP was to waive his privacy rights, and that this position was not consistent with his best interests. And (implicitly) therefore that the Official Solicitor was taking a wrong position as his litigation friend in these proceedings. But as explained in the Position Statement of the Official Solicitor at [6] a party has a presumptive human right under Article 6 to a fully reportable hearing in open court. This is the primary human right in play in a situation of this sort, and it sits alongside the common law right which is in similar terms. The position of the Official Solicitor on behalf of SP is, justifiably, to assert this important human right. And it is a mischaracterisation of her position on behalf of SP to characterise it as a waiver of his Article 8 rights. It may be that when a P does not oppose the making of an anonymity order in the COP this is an assertion of P’s privacy rights. But that does not mean that a party who asserts the full open justice entitlement is waiving any Article 8 rights they may have. The Official Solicitor maintains the position she has taken on behalf of SP for the reasons already set out in submissions.” iii. The daughters invited the Court to leave the RRO in place or at least to continue to restrict reporting of private matters concerning SP’s health and welfare. Mr McKendrick KC presented a draft order which contained lists of matters that could and could not be reported. This became known as the ‘half-way house’ option. iv. Bloomberg applied to lift the reporting restrictions while expressing neutrality about the restrictions sought by the Official Solicitor regarding the location of care and the identity of clinicians. v. On behalf of PA Media, Mr Brian Farmer joined in applying for the lifting of the restrictions, saying that: “We will only report a minimal amount of information about P’s health. We will say he is P, and say he has dementia, and say he has lived longer than expected. We will not go into any detail about his health problems.”
“5. … Time is not on Srichand Hinduja’s side. Every day of delay in finding a suitable care package for him is inimical to his welfare and represents a failure on the part of those who purport to love and care for him. The Official Solicitor has formed the clear view that notwithstanding Srichand Hinduja’s wealth and the outward respect that is afforded to him, his needs have become marginalised in a family dispute. I agree. Unusually, in Court of Protection proceedings where strong and determined efforts are made to keep P at the centre of the process, Srichand Hinduja’s visibility has been very low, particularly during the course of the last 12 months. The Official Solicitor considers that Srichand Hinduja’s wealth and the infrastructure that surrounds it appears to have enhanced rather than reduced his vulnerability.” “14. … Demonstrably, both Gopichand Hinduja and Vinoo Hinduja have changed their positions regarding the utility or ambit of the RRO. It is plain that the driver behind their shifting positions has been a calculation of their respective litigation interests…” “23. Whether the [open justice principle] is properly described as a presumptive right is perhaps debatable. … where the court has been sitting throughout with the public in attendance, my focus is primarily on the Article 8 rights of Srichand Hinduja and the Article 10 rights of the press.” “25. In the light of the extensive case law illuminating how Articles 8 and 10 should be evaluated, I do not consider that it would be logical to analyse the competing rights and interests in play here on the premise that Article 10, in this context, should be afforded presumptive weight. I am prepared to accept a presumption that the Court should sit in open court, unless there are strong countervailing reasons, but, as I have said, that is not in focus here. In any event, as will become clear below, I do not consider that the facts of this case will turn on this point. Mr Rees has advanced his application on the premise that Srichand Hinduja’s Article 8 rights and the Article 10 rights of the press should be evaluated on a parallel analysis of the competing rights and interests engaged, in which neither has precedence. I consider this to be the correct approach.” “27. The arguments advanced on behalf of Srichand Hinduja are properly rooted in his Article 8 rights but evaluated in the context of Article 10. Frequently, there will be a tension between the two but here, and from Srichand Hinduja’s perspective, it is submitted that there is no such tension because, on the factual stratum in this case, Article 10 itself serves effectively to promote Srichand Hinduja’s Article 8 rights. Thus, what is usually a balancing exercise between rights which have an entirely different complexion, generates, it is argued, a confluence of interests pointing clearly to significant benefits for Srichand Hinduja in removing any reporting restrictions.” “31. It is further argued on behalf of the Official Solicitor that the impact on Srichand Hinduja of any intrusion into his private life, from media reporting on his medical condition, “would be very limited” given his compromised level of awareness. Whilst that is certainly true, insofar as it goes, I do not consider it captures the full ambit of the Article 8 rights engaged by this exercise. Understanding the full range of Srichand Hinduja’s Article 8 rights requires a recognition that the importance of privacy to him can only be evaluated by considering his whole life, not only who he is now, but also to the man he has been. Srichand Hinduja as a successful and pioneering businessman has, where necessary, sought to harness the power of the press in his own business interests by way of interviews etc. Insofar as I can analyse it, from the accounts I have been given, that has been driven by business expediency rather than any temperamental instinct to court the limelight. On the contrary, I consider Srichand Hinduja was instinctively a man who very much valued his privacy. In evaluating the weight to be given to this therefore, it may be that I have attached greater weight to it than contended for by Mr Millar.” “54. The Official Solicitor’s argument, to the effect that open reporting of these proceedings is more likely to provide a ‘protective layer’ to Srichand Hinduja’s interest is, in my judgment entirely made out. At present Srichand Hinduja remains in hospital where he ought not to be. There is a conflict within the family concerning the financing of his care package. Suitable accommodation and appropriate care have not been identified. I do not consider that this would have occurred if these issues had been ventilated in public and reported. 55. The unique circumstances created by the family’s public profile and the ongoing Chancery Division proceedings have served to stultify any effective reporting. The risk of jigsaw identification or inadvertent breach of the RRO has effectively closed reporting down, notwithstanding that this court has been sitting in public throughout. 56. The importance of maintaining probity and integrity in the appointment of attorneys under LPAs is central to the efficient operation of the property and affairs jurisdiction of the Court of Protection. Any departure from the high standards required plainly ought to be in the public domain, not least to maintain those high standards of practice. 57. Whilst Srichand Hinduja was a man who preferred privacy, he also recognised the expediency of publicity when that was identified as necessary. Here, for the reasons above, publicity is expedient. Srichand Hinduja’s Article 8 rights are not in opposition to the Article 10 rights of the press in this case but, in these unusual circumstances, the two are reconciled in the overall objective of promoting Srichand Hinduja’s best interests. 58. Whilst variation of the RRO, as contended for by the Official Solicitor, will permit some matters of a personal nature to be reported on, it is correct to say that a good number of those are already ventilated in the Chancery Division proceedings and thus in the public domain. Moreover, the sensitivity of the issues before this court, whilst important, should not be overstated. What now falls to be considered is a practical care plan i.e., identifying suitable property, arranging care and nursing support. Srichand Hinduja’s diagnosis and condition are already in the public domain. They require no further exploration in this court.” “60. Accordingly, and for all the reasons set out in the body of the judgment I approve the amendments to the RRO advanced in the application on behalf of the Official Solicitor.”
“1. There are two significant reasons which cause me decisively to reject what has been referred to as the ‘half-way house’ option. The first centres upon Srichand Hinduja’s vulnerability generally and particularly within these proceedings. This was initially identified by the Official Solicitor some time ago. As Mr Patel QC set out, the OS was struck by “the vulnerability of someone who owing to their wealth exists outside the state health and care system” and in respect of whom therefore, the established state safeguards to his welfare are largely absent… For the reasons the Official Solicitor analysed here, proper public scrutiny is more likely to serve to protect Srichand’s interests than militate against them. I agree. It is for this reason that I considered the arguments for lifting of the Reporting Restrictions Orders in respect of the property and affairs issues were cogently established. 2. However, logically, the vulnerability that the Official Solicitor identifies is not confined to one aspect of the litigation. Here, Srichand’s vulnerability, properly analysed, is ubiquitous within the proceedings generally. His interests are neither less nor more likely to be marginalised in the health and welfare context than in that of property and affairs. The risk is identical. Moreover, the property and affairs issues in this case are inextricably linked to those of health and welfare. There is very little within the papers concerning Srichand’s medical issues. The focus has been on how those medical needs are met i.e., in what accommodation, and with what level of support. 3. The second basis upon which I rejected the ‘half-way house’ option, is its likely enforceability in any injunctive framework. This point overlaps with the above, in the sense that the health, welfare, and property issues are so interconnected that however an injunction might be framed, it is almost certain to inhibit reporting, because of a perceived risk of eliding these two spheres of protection. A great deal of attention has been focused on obtaining appropriate accommodation and a suitable care plan for Srichand. The need for this was identified many months ago and the delay in obtaining it reinforces the Official Solicitor’s concern. It is easy to see how a journalist endeavouring to report these issues might be highly apprehensive about what may or may not be reported and in consequence, decide not to report at all. In any event, given that, for the reasons above, I have found reporting to be actively in Srichand’s interests, these are, inevitably, secondary issues.”
“I argued, and still argue, that naming SP is in the public interest: because of who he is, because of what his family business interests are, because of who is relatives are and because of how many people they employ world-wide. For example, surely people have a right to know, that Mr Justice Hayden, a High Court judge and vice-president of the Court of Protection, considered placing SP (a man whose family is worth£28,4 billion according to 2022 The Sunday Times Rich List,$13 billion according to Bloomberg; a man, whose family group, Mr Browning told Mr Justice Hayden, “employs more than 150,000 people in 38 countries”) in a public nursing home, and his reasons why. If the free press can’t report information of that nature, aired by a judge of Mr Justice Hayden’s standing, at a public court hearing, in London, then what isArticle 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights for? What’s the point of free speech? We’re not fighting to report trivialities here.”
“10. The material and information (‘the Information’) covered by this injunctive order is: 10.1. the name or address of any placements accommodating Srichand Parmanand Hinduja and/or Sareeta Hinduja for treatment care or otherwise, but only while they are accommodated at such placements. 10.2. the identity of any clinicians providing care or treatment to Srichand Parmanand Hinduja and/or Sareeta Hinduja, but only while they are under the care of such clinicians. 10.3. the addresses or contact details of any party or family member of Srichand Parmanand Hinduja (including any private residence where he may be cared for). 10.4 any information about Srichand Parmanand Hinduja’s clinical diagnosis or prognosis, healthcare and daily care unless the information is contained in any past or future published judgment given in the Court of Protection, the Chancery Division or another court in England and Wales. 10.5 Any information about SP’s wife’s clinical condition, healthcare, daily care and the time she spends with SP unless the information is contained in any past or future published judgment given in the Court of Protection, the Chancery Division or another court in England and Wales.”