Kate Rodgers v Laural Brookes [2025] EWCC 31

[2025] EWCC 31Case No L00MA662Date 17 June 2025
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT MANCHESTER
Before
HHJ MALEK
Between
KATE RODGERSClaimantLAURAL BROOKESDefendantKATE RODGERS Claimant- and –LAURAL BROOKES Defendant
Ms Clare Wisson (instructed by Cohen Davis Solicitors) for ClaimantMr. Gavin Edmondson (instructed by Gavin Edmondson Solicitors) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 22-24 April & 17 June 2025
APPROVED JUDGMENTI direct that pursuant to CPR PD39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

HHJ Malek :

[1]This is a claim brought under section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (the “1997 Act”). The Claimant, Ms. Kate Rodgers, seeks damages and injunctive relief in respect of a course of conduct which she alleges amounted to harassment. The Defendant, Mrs. Laural Brookes, denies liability.[2]The parties are business competitors. Each operates a franchise-based enterprise in the North West of England, trading in children’s clothing and related goods. The Claimant is the founder of Boutique Baby Sale (“BBS”), established in 2013. The Defendant owns The Little Children’s Market (“LCM”), founded in or around 2017.[3]The Claimant alleges that she was subjected to a campaign of harassment comprising three principal elements:(i) online abuse and harassment by an individual using the pseudonym “Lucy Baron”;(ii) the submission of abusive and disruptive messages via the BBS website; and(iii) interference with BBS events by the Defendant’s husband, Mr Simon Brookes.[4]The Defendant denies any involvement in or knowledge of the conduct attributed to “Lucy Baron”, and further denies responsibility for the website messages or her husband’s actions.[5]The issues are factual and turn on the credibility of the parties and the weight of the documentary evidence. The burden of proof lies on the Claimant, and the standard is the balance of probabilities. The Legal Framework[6]The relevant statutory provisions are not in dispute. Section 1 of the 1997 Act prohibits a course of conduct which amounts to harassment and which the defendant knows or ought to know amounts to harassment.[7]Section 7(3A) extends liability to those who aid, abet, counsel or procure such conduct. I am guided by the decision in Smithkline Beecham v Avery [2011] Bus LR D40, which affirms that liability may attach to those who, while not the immediate actors, provide material support or encouragement to a harassing campaign. The “Lucy Baron” Allegations[8]Between August and December 2020, an individual using the name “Lucy Baron” published a series of defamatory and abusive public and private posts on Facebook, directed at the Claimant and her business. These included false allegations of fraud and impersonation.[9]Between November 2020 and February 2022, “Lucy Baron” shared the Claimant’s personal phone number online, which led to a series of unwanted and distressing messages being sent to the Claimant.[10]The Claimant’s evidence on the issue, in summary, was that she did not, at first, know who “Lucy Baron” was, but in time came to suspect that it was either the Defendant or someone close to her.[11]The Defendant says, in summary, that she did not use the alias of “Lucy Baron” to carry out the harassment and she does not know who “Lucy Baron” is.[12]Whilst, in fairness to the Defendant, she has always maintained that she is not “Lucy Baron” or used that name as an alias; her position on whether or not she knew the real identity of “Lucy Baron” has been inconsistent. The evidence shows that she initially said to the Claimant that she had“ no idea” who Lucy Baron was and that she had “reported the profile as fake”. She then told the Claimant that she knew Lucy Baron under her maiden name through her mother as a buyer at an event and that she had called Lucy Baron’s mother to ask for the conduct to stop. However, on being requested to do so by the Claimant, she refused to provide any contact details to pass to the Police and, instead, offered to speak to the Police directly herself. Once the Police became involved, the Defendant told them that she had no connection to or knowledge of “Lucy Baron” saying that “she only told the victim [the Claimant] that she knew who the offender was to shut her up”.[13]This admission, that the Defendant knew who “Lucy Baron” was, is significant. It undermines the Defendant’s credibility and casts doubt on her denial of involvement. The explanation offered — that she lied to bring an end to the Claimant’s inquiries — is implausible. It is not the conduct of one who is innocent and wishes to assist in the identification of a wrongdoer.[14]Further, the content and tone of the “Lucy Baron” messages suggest a close alignment with the Defendant’s interests. The posts promote LCM, disparage BBS, and refer to the Defendant in familiar terms. It is improbable that a disinterested third party would engage in such a sustained and targeted campaign.[15]I do not place much weight on the linguistic similarities between the Defendant’s writing and that of “Lucy Baron”. Such comparisons, absent any expert evidence, are inherently speculative.[16]However, taken as a whole, the evidence leads me to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was either the author of the messages or knowingly permitted and encouraged their dissemination.[17]For the sake of completeness, to the extent that it was suggested by the Defendant that the posts may have been authored by others — including her children, franchisees, or acquaintances — this is entirely speculative and unsupported by any cogent evidence. The burden of proof in such an assertion lies with the Defendant, and it has not been discharged. Messages via the BBS website[18]The Claimant’s website, operated through a website development company called Wix, was the target of a large volume of abusive, offensive and disruptive messages. These included over 1,600 spam messages sent via product upload forms, abusive messages via franchisee forms, and the registration of six fake and/or offensive email addresses.[19]The Claimant submits that the Defendant’s admitted IP address (81.96.210.208) (“the Defendant’s IP address”) is directly linked to the franchisee message, the subscriptions and numerous product upload messages, because: i) the Claimant has managed to obtain from her website operator, Wix, the IP address from which the franchise message was sent and the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) for that address. The message was sent from IP address 81.96.210.208 from a property in Warrington for whom Virgin Media is the ISP. This was the Defendant’s IP address traced to her home address by the Police. ii) The Claimant has obtained from Wix the IP address from which the subscriptions were effected and the ISP address for that address. This was the Defendant’s IP address and which was traced by the Police to the Defendant’s home address. iii) The Claimant has obtained from Wix the email address and IP address for samples of the product upload messages. Many of the sample messages were sent from the Defendant’s IP address traced to her home.[20]The Claimant’s evidence on this point is set out in her witness statement and did not come under any serious challenge.[21]Rather than engage with the substance of this aspect of the Claimant’s pleaded case or the substance of the available evidence on these points, the Defendant chose, instead, to deploy a number of procedural objections.[22]The first argument raised was that the Claimant had relied upon hearsay evidence in her witness statement at paragraphs 127-148 where she had sought to describe the steps that she had taken in investigating who was behind the harassment. To the extent that the Claimant refers, in those paragraphs, to the steps that she took and the matters that are within her own knowledge that cannot, of course, be hearsay evidence. To the extent that reliance is placed upon documents (such as emails, spreadsheets, reports and notes of meetings) produced by the Police or employees of Wix and Virgin Media, given that the authors were not called to give evidence, that might properly be categorised as hearsay evidence. However, this does not make the evidence inadmissible. Rather it is a question as to the weight that I give such evidence. In my judgment this poses two difficulties for the Defendant. Firstly, even if I was to exercise caution and attach little weight to these documents, the difficulty for the Defendant is that she presents absolutely no evidence to contradict anything contained in the documents. Secondly, these documents were disclosed to the Defendant under CPR 31 and she is deemed to admit their authenticity pursuant to CPR 32.19 unless she served notice that she wished the documents to be proved at trial. No such notice has been served and, accordingly, the Defendant is deemed to have accepted that the documents are authentic.[23]Secondly, the Defendant sought to argue that some of the documents (namely emails and a spreadsheet provided by Wix employees which said that the franchise message and the various subscriptions and product upload forms were sent from the Defendant’s IP address) contained “inadmissible expert evidence”. I put the submission in these rather vague terms because no attempt was made by the Defendant, either before me or at any earlier stage, to identify what exactly in each document is said to constitute inadmissible evidence.[24]The starting point is that expert evidence is, subject to the rules of the court, admissible (see s.3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972).[25]In this case the relevant court rules are contained in CPR35. It was common ground (and if that is not the case I have no hesitation in holding) that the court’s permission is required where a party seeks to call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report (see CPR 35.4(1)). A reference to an “expert” in CPR35 is a reference to a person who has been instructed to give or prepare expert evidence for the purpose of proceedings (CPR 35.2(1)).[26]Given that no one from Wix or the Police has been instructed to give or prepare expert evidence for the purpose of proceedings none of the authors of any of the documents can be said to be “experts” for the purposes of CPR35. Further, none of the individuals concerned are called to give evidence and neither was any expert report prepared by them or such report put in evidence. Accordingly, the Defendant’s argument is entirely misconceived.[27]Even if I am wrong about the operation of CPR35 I would, nevertheless, conclude that the relevant documents contain factual evidence as opposed to expert evidence. For example, in the case of the Wix documents the various employees are conveying facts as personally perceived by them. That is to say, from their perspective, they perceive that the relevant forms etc were sent from the Defendant’s IP address. This is evidence of what they perceive and is, accordingly, admissible factual evidence.[28]The suggestion that others — including the Defendant’s children or acquaintances — may have used her network to send these messages is speculative and unsupported. It is axiomatic in civil proceedings that the person who makes an assertion bears the burden of proving it. It is one thing for the Defendant to deny that she sent the messages (in relation to which the Claimant bears the burden), but another to assert that the messages were or may have been sent by someone else (in relation to which the Defendant bears the burden). Unlike proceedings in the criminal courts; it is not enough for her to muddy the water by asserting that someone else was or may have been responsible. She bears the burden of proving this to be the case. This is a burden that she has failed to discharge.[29]I am satisfied that the Defendant’s IP address was used to send the messages in question and I am further satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was responsible for the messages. The conduct of Mr. Simon Brookes[30]It is common ground that Mr. Brookes attended a BBS event on 27 November 2022 and called the local council on 20 March 2023. However, it is denied that Mr. Brookes called Formby High School and/or posed as Mark Stansby. In my judgment it is more likely than not that Mr. Brookes did call Formby High School and posed as Mark Stansby. The Claimant’s witness evidence on this issue, coupled with the hearsay emails that she managed to garner in support of her recollection, was entirely clear, cogent and compelling. I prefer her evidence to that of Mr. Brookes.[31]However, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Defendant was aware of or complicit in her husband’s actions. The Claimant’s suspicion is understandable, but suspicion is not proof. The evidence suggests that Mr Brookes acted independently. The Defendant’s reaction, once informed, was one of disapproval. I am not satisfied, therefore, that she aided or abetted her husband’s conduct within the meaning of section 7(3A). Expert evidence[32]In this case the parties jointly instructed Mr. Joseph Naghdi (the “Joint Expert”) as an expert to “review the BBS website messages and Wix evidence concerning the originating IP address”, review the “digital forensic procedure employed by Wix” and “veracity of Wix document provided by the Claimant [sic]”.[33]It is, of course, trite law that the role of an expert is to assist the court in relation to matters of scientific, technical or other specialist knowledge which are outside the judge’s expertise by giving evidence of fact or opinion (per Lord Hodge in Griffiths v TUI UK Ltd [2023] UKSC 48 at [36]).[34]In this case the Claimant submits that I can garner little, if any, assistance from the expert’s report because: i) The expert evidence is unnecessary to establish the Defendant’s liability for the BBS Website. The parties agree that the IP address 81.96.210.208 was assigned to her residential address between 25 April 2021 and 9 February 2022. There is, therefore, a clear and undisputed forensic link between the Defendant and an IP address associated with some of the impugned conduct. This, combined with the other evidence in the case, is sufficient for the Court to decide on the Defendant’s liability. ii) The Joint Expert did not exercise reasonable care and skill when producing his report. iii) The circumstances of the Joint Expert instruction raised questions about his independence. iv) the Joint Expert’s report is almost entirely inconclusive; for example, he could neither confirm nor deny whether the Lucy Baron and Katie Saxby profiles could be linked backed to the IP address 81.96.210.208. His responses to the Defendant’s questions are mostly equivocal. The only conclusion he definitively states in his report is that, on the data available, “there is no evidence to suggest that any third-party manipulation has taken place”.[35]In addition the Defendant, whilst not expressly disavowing it, also appears to be critical of the Joint Expert’s report. For example in Mr. Edmondson’s skeleton argument he says “The Expert sadly goes on to say, it should be noted the Courts only requested 1 IP address from Virgin Media. This is patently incorrect…” [par 13]; “ The Expert has not identified any data to confirm or deny this, within the documents that they have.” [par 18]; “The Expert, never independently verified the following:a. The data with Wix.b. The dynamic nature of the IP addresses…” [par 22]; and “The Experts conclusions rely on the Claimants supplied data with no independent verification” [par 36].[36]Whilst I am unable to positively conclude that the expert has failed to exercise reasonable skill and care (a conclusion that I ought not to come to lightly given that there has been no opportunity for me to hear directly from the expert or for him to set out his response to such allegations) I can, nevertheless, safely come to the conclusion that, in agreement with the Claimant’s submissions, I ought not to place any weight on his report. I do so for a host of reasons, but two will suffice for present purposes. Firstly, whilst not necessarily concluding that the expert has been negligent I am singularly struck by the fact that he thought it appropriate to allow someone else in his firm to answer CPR 35 questions on his behalf. This demonstrates a clear lack of understanding on the part of Mr. Naghadi; both of CPR 35 and the duties owed to the court by an expert. Secondly, I agree, for the reasons given by the Claimant, that the report is entirely equivocal on the key issues. It offers, therefore, little or no assistance to me. Conclusion on liability[37]For the reasons given, I find that the Defendant was responsible for a course of conduct amounting to harassment through the use of the alias “Lucy Baron” and through the submission of abusive messages via the BBS website. The claim in respect of Mr Brookes’ conduct is not made out. Relief – preliminary views[38]Clearly damages must flow following a finding on liability. The Claimant seeks damages limited to £15,000. The principles applicable when assessing damages for harassment were set out by Nicklin J in Suttle v Walker [2019] EWHC 396 (QB) at §§54-56. Damages are awarded with reference to the Vento bands. The relevant Vento bands are set out in The Employment Tribunal’s Presidential Guidance of 23 March 2023:
“a lower band of £1,100 to £11,200 (less serious cases); a middle band of £11,200 to £33,700 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band); and an upper band of £33,700 to £56,200 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £56,200.”
[39]In this case the harassing course of conduct was carried out over a number of years and referred to the Claimant’s disabled child. I have no doubt that the latter conduct was particularly hurtful to the Claimant. I also accept the Claimant’s evidence that she has had to change the way that she now carries on her business (i.e. no more online sales). The conduct falls therefore, in my view, into the middle Vento band. As such, my preliminary view is that an award of £15,000 in damages is entirely appropriate.[40]It is also, to my mind, appropriate for this court to provide injunctive relief as a result of the findings made. However, my preliminary view (not having heard argument on the point) is that whilst a permanent injunction may not be appropriate an injunction of significant length (between 10-20 years) would be proportionate. Such an injunction would need to be carefully framed, but I have no doubt that many (if not all) of the terms are capable of agreement.[41]Counsel are both invited to agree a consequential order and let me have it (via my clerk) for my approval. In the event that such an order is agreed and sent to me for my approval in advance of the handing down of this judgment then the parties and their representatives are excused from attendance at the handing down of this judgment.