"Having considered some of the evidence in this case, together with the CCTV footage, which I have been shown in court today, I consider that this is a case where there is a nexus in law and in fact. I have considered whether there would be an unfairness to the defendants to be tried together and given the proximity of the offences in time, and the weapons carried, I do not feel that there is such prejudice to the defendants with being tried together."
"31. In my judgment, a jury properly directed could properly find Mr Trotman and/or Mr Dedman guilty on count 2. The matters submitted on behalf of Mr Trotman and Mr Dedman are matters which can be considered by the jury, and to which the jury may give weight, but that is a matter for the jury. 32. It will be open to the jury to view the events of5 May 2023 in the context of the incident on3 May 2023 and the fact that the defendants had remained together since then and the fact that on the evening of5 May 2023 the defendants were all at Dagenham Heathway underground station carrying similar, and very dangerous, concealed weapons. 33. The jury will also have to consider the fact that, although the defendants did not initiate the incident on5 May 2023 , the defendants all responded to the threat of violence from the occupants of the blue BMW by producing their weapons and approaching the car. It will be open to the jury to conclude that this was how, to each defendant’s knowledge they had intended to respond to any violence or threat of violence and that their agreement to act, and/or their acting, in this way assisted or encouraged the violence which followed and was done with the intention that really serious bodily harm should be caused. 34. The incident began with the three men from the blue BMW demonstrating hostile intent towards Mr Trotman, who at that stage was outnumbered and, seemingly, unarmed, but the position was transformed when Mr Trotman produced his knife and the other three defendants did the same. It will, in my judgment, be open to the jury to conclude that from that point onwards, this was a fight between the four defendants, on the one hand and the three occupants of the car, on the other hand. 35. Given that two of the occupants of the car sought to run away, it was to be expected that different defendants would concentrate their attentions on different individuals, but that does not preclude the jury, if they are sure, from concluding that this was a group activity directed at all of the occupants of the car and in which all of the defendants provided assistance or encouragement to the others. For instance, the act of chasing Mr Adekoya, after the unknown man had run away, left Mr Kukabu isolated and vulnerable to an attack by Mr Tommy-Mbogba from one side of the car, with Mr Odunewu standing at the other side of the car. (6)(b) Decision: Count 3 36. Since Mr Trotman accepts that there is a case for him to answer on count 4, the only issue in his case on count 3 is whether a jury properly directed could properly conclude that he intended to kill Mr Adekoya. In my judgment, a jury could properly reach such a conclusion, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature of the weapon used, the nature of the injuries inflicted and the CCTV evidence of the altercation. 37. Again, the matters raised on behalf of Mr Trotman are matters which can be considered by the jury, and to which the jury may give weight, but that is a matter for the jury. (6)(c) Decision: Count 4 38. My decision on count 4 is the same as on count 2, for substantially the same reasons. 39. I note that the actions of the defendants in chasing Mr Kukabu cannot have constituted assistance or encouragement of his murder, since, on the Crown’s case, the chase took place after the fatal stab wound had been inflicted. However, the conduct of the defendants at this stage in the incident is capable of constituting evidence of their intention earlier in the incident."
"(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case. (2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the case. (b) Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of the witness's reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury."
"In cases where there is a more or less spontaneous outbreak of multi-handed violence, the evidence may be too nebulous for the jury to find that there was some form of agreement, express or tacit. But, as we have said, liability as an aider or abettor does not necessarily depend on there being some form of agreement between the defendants; it depends on proof of intentional assistance or encouragement conditional or otherwise. If D2 joins with a group which he realises is out to cause serious injury, the jury may well infer that he intended to encourage or assist the deliberate infliction of serious bodily injury and/or intended that that should happen if necessary. In that case, if D1 acts with intent to cause serious bodily injury and death results, D1 and D2 will each be guilty of murder."
"DIAGNOSIS AT TIME OF OFFENCE Areas of agreement 7. The experts would like to emphasise the inherent difficulty in forming a clinical opinion retrospectively, without having assessed Ethan at the time of these offences. 8. We note that Ethan’s diagnoses at the time of the offences is recognised to have encompassed Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (cPTSD), and Disorder due to use of Cannabis. Areas of disagreement 9. Dr Harvey holds the view that Ethan was most likely to be suffering from Schizophrenia at the time of the offence. 10. Dr Reeves has the view that Ethan was most likely suffering from a psychotic episode at the time of the offences that has now developed into a schizophrenic illness. 11. Dr Church’s view is that any evolving psychotic illness was not identifiable or fully developed at that point, with no clear evidence of impact on his behaviour around the time of the index offence, nor during his trial. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY Areas of agreement 12. Dr Reeves was the treating Responsible Clinician and can comment on diagnosis but has not been in a position to comment on medico-legal aspects such as diminished responsibility. 13. Dr Harvey and Dr Church agree that at the time of the offences Ethan had a recognised medical condition, with differences in the nature of the condition as specified above. 14. Dr Harvey and Dr Church also agree that Ethan was not substantially impaired in his ability to understand the nature of the conduct at the time. Areas of disagreement 15. Dr Harvey holds the view that Ethan was substantially impaired in his ability to form a rational judgment, and that it is possible that he was also impaired in his ability to exercise self-control. 16. Dr Church does not identify evidence to support substantial impairment in Ethan’s ability to form a rational judgement or self-control at the time of the offences, but recognises Ethan’s general vulnerabilities throughout his childhood that were present at the time."
"(1) A person ('D') who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which— (a) arose from a recognised medical condition (b) substantially impaired D's ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and (c) provides an explanation for D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing. (1A) Those things are— (a) to understand the nature of D's conduct; (c). to exercise self-control. (1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D's conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct."
"We do not go so far as to say that a defendant will only be able to pursue a partial defence of diminished responsibility in circumstances where he or she personally admits the actus reus and also an intention to kill or commit grievous bodily harm. There will be circumstances – and Mr Bennathan QC has reminded us of them – where defendants do rely upon the partial defence, and yet do not themselves give evidence at trial. We are aware of the same. However, in such cases we note that there is necessarily an evidential basis upon which the partial defence is mounted. Be that an account by the defendant in interview with police or psychiatrists, or a contemporaneous narrative eyewitness account of the assault leading to death, and which provides the context for a psychiatric opinion as to the impact of or link between the likely abnormality of mind and the assault."
"23 Evidence (1) For purposes of this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice— (a) order the production of any document, exhibit or other thing connected with the proceedings, the production of which appears to them necessary for the determination of the case; (b) order any witness who would have been a compellable witness in the proceedings from which the appeal lies to attend for examination and be examined before the Court, whether or not he was called in those proceedings; and (c) subject to subsection (3) below, receive the evidence, if tendered, of any witness. (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) above, where evidence is tendered to the Court of Appeal thereunder the Court shall, unless they are satisfied that the evidence, if received, would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal, exercise their power of receiving it if— (a) it appears to them that the evidence is likely to be credible and would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (b) they are satisfied that it was not adduced in those proceedings but there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it."
"One core principle relating to the good administration of justice is the need for finality in litigation. It is ordinarily the obligation of a party to advance his whole case at trial: and an appeal cannot simply be treated as a means of having a second go. There may be some exceptions to this general approach: but that remains the general approach."
"Wisely and correctly, the courts have recognised that the statutory discretion conferred by section 23 cannot be constrained by inflexible, mechanistic rules. But the cases do identify certain features which are likely to weigh more or less heavily against the reception of fresh evidence: for example, a deliberate decision by a defendant whose decision-making faculties are unimpaired not to advance before the trial jury a defence known to be available; evidence of mental abnormality or substantial impairment given years after the offence and contradicted by evidence available at the time of the offence; expert evidence based on factual premises which are unsubstantiated, unreliable or false, or which is for any other reason unpersuasive. But even features such as these need not be conclusive objections in every case. The overriding discretion conferred on the Court enables it to ensure that, in the last resort, defendants are sentenced for the crimes they have committed and not for psychological failings to which they may be subject."
"3.46 In attempting to better understand Ethan's mental state during this incident I asked whether he felt guilty or remorseful over the death of one person and the serious injury of another. Ethan told me he did not think he had any choice and went on to say that one of the victims was the, 'main guy I hate ... because my mate killed his older brother, so he hates me ...' 3.47 I asked Ethan directly about whether he had experienced hearing voices prior to or during this incident; for example, referring to his previous comments about the voices wanting him to 'spill blood'. However, Ethan was quite clear in his response that did not recall hearing voices until later, after the events. He said: 'No, there was no time the voices only come afterwards… I just remember chasing them… and then stopped when they were far enough away.' Ethan then told me: 'there was no mad thing in my brain ... the voices only came later.'"
"6.21 For the sake of completeness, I will also mention that I did not elicit evidence for any other serious mental disorders, such as schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, or major mood disorders. With specific regard to the 'voices' reported by Ethan, in my opinion these represent (indeed, as described by Ethan himself) intense, and at times intrusive, thoughts related to his experience of anxiety. I would observe that such experiences are relatively common in the general population (around 10% of people report such experiences) and are often associated with both anxiety disorders (such as post-traumatic disorders) and are also frequently seen in people with Autism Spectrum Disorders. In my opinion these experiences do not indicate the presence of a functional psychotic illness."
"Q. So, what do you remember happening at that point where you turned round? A. I remember at this point the unknown male had run, like, away from where he, in my opinion, was trying to attack Jamal. And I see three males all, like, in my opinion they were surrounding Jamal, and they were shouting aggressively. And I turned around, and I saw Jamal have, like, three people, like, running around him. Q. Was anybody else with Jamal at that time? A. No, nobody was with Jamal. It was just Jamal, the unknown male, Jordan, and Matthew. Q. Going on to page 57, if we can turn the page? Still on clip 14. We can see there that you are doing something. What are you doing? A. I had a machete on me for my own protection, and because I thought the unknown male had a knife, and I thought he was going to stab Jamal, because I was with Jamal, like, we were together, I thought I was going to get attacked. So, I pulled it out to deter anyone from trying to attack me. Q. And do what? A. Deter anyone from trying to attack me. Q. Did you, when you pulled it out, have any intention to stab anybody with it? A. No, I had no intention to stab anybody. I just wanted to scare people away. Q. Or to cause anybody really serious harm? A. No, I did not. Q. Or even to kill anybody? A. No, I did not."
"A. Yes. I thought that Matthew was still a threat, so I decided to chase him briefly until he was far away enough to, like, not be attacking. Q. Well, let us see what happened. Can we play this slowly to see what you can be seen doing on the screen? Play. You are in the road at that point, and you run across. Stop. Pause there. So, you have seen what has happened there, and there are two other people now in the road. Can you describe, after you chased Matthew away, and you stop at that point, why you stopped? A. So, I saw who I am now know to be Jordan running in my direction, and everything was everything was going so fast, and I had so much adrenaline, and I thought, like, he was going to attack me, in my mind. I started chasing after him because I now knew that Matthew was no longer a threat, because he was running in the opposite direction. Q. What were you intending to do by chasing Jordan? A. Just to scare him off, like, just to chase him far enough where I know he’s not going to, like turn around and, like, start to attack me if I run away."
"[In relation to Jordan] Q. When you chased him, there came a time when you stopped seeing him. We can see on the video. A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. Why did you stop chasing him? A. So, as I was chasing him, when we got about, quite – I think it was quite far down the road I started seeing, like, little, like, blood splatters on the floor. And also he, like – I don’t know if it was me or him, but I just seen, like, him moving, like, a bit wobbly, so I thought I don’t know what’s happened but I’m just going to run away now. I don’t think he’s a threat no longer. Q. Because he had blood and? A . I thought his legs were gone wobbly."
"evidence of mental abnormality or substantial impairment given years after the offence and contradicted by evidence available at the time of the offence"