“(2) Subject to the provisions of this Order, no person shall a) arrange or negotiate; or b) agree to arrange or negotiate, a contract for the acquisition or disposal of any controlled goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such a contract will or may result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country.” a) arrange or negotiate; or b) agree to arrange or negotiate, a contract for the acquisition or disposal of any controlled goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such a contract will or may result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country.”
“(2) Any person knowingly concerned in the supply, delivery, transfer, acquisition or disposal of any restricted or controlled goods with intent to evade any prohibition or restriction in Article 3(1) or 4 shall be guilty of an offence”
“(1) Every local authority shall maintain a register of persons carrying on business in their area as scrap metal dealers; and, after the expiration of three months beginning with the commencement of this Act, no person shall carry on business as a scrap metal dealer in the area of a local authority unless the appropriate particulars relating to him are for the time being entered in the register maintained by the authority under this section.”
“(7) Any person who carries on business as a scrap metal dealer in contravention of subsection (1) of this section, or who fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (5) shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine [on scale 3].”
“Between25 June 2009 and22 August 2011 at Leicester [you] carried on the business of scrap metal dealer…when the appropriate particulars relating to you were not for the time being entered in the register maintained by the said authority undersection 1 of the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 .”
“(1) A person who – ... (b) engages in street trading in a licence street...without being authorised to do so under this Schedule... shall be guilty of an offence.” shall be guilty of an offence.”
“77. I do not have to decide the scope of section 242(1). For the purposes of this case it would be sufficient for me to decide (as I would if it were necessary for me to do so) that money received in exchange for goods sold, where the sales are not otherwise unlawful, does not become property obtained by unlawful conduct solely because it is a criminal offence if the sales are conducted without a licence in a place where trading is required to be licensed. I do not by that intend to suggest that unlicensed trading could never give rise to a civil recovery order. Whether it can or not, and if so, in what circumstances, is a point I leave open.”
“… Those who choose to run operations in disregard of planning enforcement requirements are at risk of having the gross receipts of their illegal businesses confiscated. This may greatly exceed their personal profits. In this respect they are in the same position as thieves, fraudsters and drug dealers.”
“(1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing a house which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 85(1)) but is not so licensed.”
“30. As an initial observation, [counsel for the appellant] re-emphasised that the present case involves what he calls a “regulatory offence” – it is not a case of dishonestly obtaining property by dishonest means, such as by the importation of illegal drugs or the importation of alcohol and tobacco without paying the applicable duties (to take two very familiar examples). That may be so. But it cannot of itself answer the question arising. Whether what may be styled a regulatory offence can, when committed, give rise to the availability of a confiscation order will depend on the terms of the statute or regulations creating the offence, read with the terms of the 2002 Act and set in the context of the facts of the case.”
“76 There was no major disagreement between counsel on the legal principles by reference to which a court is entitled to “pierce” or “rend” or “remove” the “corporate veil”
“25 … (i) Ownership and control of a company were not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil; (ii) the court cannot pierce the corporate veil even in the absence of third party interests in the company, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice; (iii) the corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some impropriety; (iv) the impropriety in question must, as Sir Andrew Morritt had said in the Trustor case[2001] 1 WLR 1177 , be “linked to the use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability”; (v) to justify piercing the corporate veil there must be “both control of the company by the wrong doer(s) and impropriety, that is (mis) use of the company by them as a device or façade to conceal their wrongdoing”; and (vi) the company may be a “façade” even though it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive intent, provided that it is being used for the purpose of deception at the time of the relevant transactions. The court would, however, pierce the corporate veil only so far as it was necessary in order to provide a remedy for the particular wrong which those controlling the company had done.”
“27. In my view, the principle that the court may be justified in piercing the corporate veil if a company’s separate legal personality is being abused for the purpose of some relevant wrong doing is well established in the authorities. It is true that most of the statements of principle in the authorities are obiter, because the corporate veil was not pierced. It is also true that most cases in which the corporate veil was pierced could have been decided on other grounds. But the consensus that there are circumstances in which the court may pierce the corporate veil is impressive. I would not for my part be willing to explain that consensus out of existence. This is because I think that the recognition of a limited power to pierce the corporate veil in carefully defined circumstance is necessary if the law is not to be disarmed in the face of abuse. I also think that provided the limits are recognised and respected, it is consistent with the general approach of English Law to the problems raised by the use of legal concepts to defeat mandatory rules of law. 28. The difficulty is to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing. References to a “façade” or “sham” beg too many questions to provide a satisfactory answer. It seems to me that two distinct principles lie behind these protean terms, and that much confusion has been caused by failing to distinguish between them. They can conveniently be called the concealment principle and the evasion principle. The concealment principle is legally banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is that the interposition of a company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity is legally relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding the “façade”, but only looking behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing. The evasion principle is different. It is that the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right against the person in control of it which exists independently of the company’s involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. Many cases will fall into both categories, but in some circumstances the difference between them may be critical. This may be illustrated by reference to those cases in which the court has been thought, rightly or wrongly, to have pierced the corporate veil.”
“35. I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company's separate legal personality. The principle is properly described as a limited one, because in almost every case where the test is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal relationship between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil. Like Munby J in Ben Hashem v Al Shayif[2009] 1 FLR 115 , I consider that if it is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, it is not appropriate to do so, because on that footing there is no public policy imperative which justifies that course. I therefore disagree with the Court of Appeal in VTB Capital v Nutritek[2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 313 who suggested otherwise at para 79. For all of these reasons, the principle has been recognised far more often than it has been applied. But the recognition of a small residual category of cases where the abuse of the corporate veil to evade or frustrate the law can be addressed only by disregarding the legal personality of the company is, I believe, consistent with authority and with long-standing principles of legal policy.”
“In the ordinary way acts done in the name of and on behalf of a limited company are treated in law as the acts of the company, not of the individuals who do them. That is the veil which incorporation confers. But here the acts done by the appellant and his associate Mr Philips in the name of the company have led to the conviction of one and a plea of guilty by the other. Thus the veil of incorporation has been not so much pierced but rudely torn away. The crux of the appellant’s case, moreover, is that the prime mover in the company was Mr Philips, not himself, a case which can only be explored by examining the internal management of the company, an examination inconsistent with the treatment of the relevant acts as those of the company. There is no merit in this point.”
“40. We do, however, consider that in the circumstances of this case, the effect of POCA is that this matter falls within the concealment principle. Thus, we accept the prosecutions argument, rather than that put forward by Mr Goose, who himself accepted that the matter was one of fact and degree. In the circumstances of this case, where the defendant was the sole controller of the company, and where there was a very close inter-relationship between the corrupt actions of the defendant and steps taken by the company in advancing those corrupt acts and intentions, the reality is that the activities of both the defendant and the company are so interlinked as to be indivisible. Both entities are acting together in the corruption. 41. Accordingly, in so far as the company was involved, what it did serve to hide was what the defendant was doing. Although the Supreme Court did not consider R v Seager[2010] 1 WLR 815 , there is in our judgment, nothing inconsistent in the approach taken at para 76 of that case with Prest v Prest. It may be that the three situations identified by the court in R v Seager might be prefaced as if the preceding sentence read as follows: “In the context of criminal cases the courts have identified at least three situations when a benefit obtained by a company is also treated in law by POCA as a benefit obtained by the individual criminal.” 42. The italicised phrase replaces the words “the corporate veil can be pierced”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of the state to enforce such laws as it seems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“34. There may be other cases of disproportion analogous to that of goods or money entirely restored to the loser. That will have to be resolved case by case as the need arises. Such a case might include, for example, the defendant who, by deception, induced someone else to trade with him in a manner otherwise lawful, and who gives full value for goods or services obtained. He ought no doubt to be punished and, depending on the harm done and the culpability demonstrated, maybe severely, but whether a confiscation order is proportionate for any sum beyond profit made may need careful consideration. Counsel’s submissions also touched very lightly on cases of employment obtained by deception, where it may well be that difficult questions of causation may arise, quite apart from any argument based upon disproportion. Those issues were not the subject of argument in this case and must await an appeal in which they directly arise; moreover related issues are understood to be currently before the Strasbourg Court.”
“21. Waya requires the court to consider whether a POCA confiscation order is disproportionate. We are satisfied that it generally will be disproportionate if it will require the defendant to pay for a second time money which he has fully restored to the loser. If there is no additional benefit beyond that sum, any POCA confiscation order is likely to be disproportionate. If there is additional benefit, an order which double counts the sum which has been repaid is likely, to that extent to be disproportionate, and an order for the lesser sum which excludes the double counting ought generally to be the right order. But, for the reasons explained above, we do not agree that the mere fact that a compensation order is made for an outstanding sum due to the loser, and thus that that money may be restored, is enough to render disproportionate a POCA confiscation order which includes that sum. What will bring disproportion is the certainty of double payment. If it remains uncertain whether the loser will be repaid, a POCA confiscation order which includes the sum in question will not ordinarily be disproportionate.”