The Courtyard RTM Company Ltd & Ors v Rockwell (FC103) Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 712

[2026] EWCA Civ 712Cases No: CA-2025-000587CA-2025-000775
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)
(Martin Rodger KC, Deputy Chamber President)
[2025] UKUT 39 (LC)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 09/06/2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE SINGHLORD JUSTICE MILESLORD JUSTICE FOXTON
Between
THE COURTYARD RTM COMPANY LTDAppellantsTHE STUDIOS RTM CO LTDAppellantX1 THE TERRACE RTM CO LTDAppellant(1) ROCKWELL (FC103) LTDRespondents(2) GREY GR LPRespondentAnd between:Respondent(1) 14 PARK CRESCENT LTDRespondent
Between
PC INVESTMENTS LTDAppellants- and –14 PARK CRESCENT RTM CO LTDRespondent
Winston Jacob and Chelsea Sparks (directly instructed) for Appellants in CA-2025- 000587Simon Allison KC and Sophie Gibson (instructed by JB Leitch) for Second Respondent in CA-2025-000587Justin Bates KC and Peter Sibley (instructed by Northover Limited) for Appellants in CA-2025-000775Philip Rainey KC (instructed by Wallace LLP) for Respondent in CA-2025-000775Hearing Hearing dates : 29-30 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 9 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]We have heard two separate appeals concerning Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) which governs the rights of tenants to manage relevant premises. It creates a statutory right for a leaseholder-owned RTM company to manage premises to which the Chapter applies. The issue in each case is whether the premises over which the right has been claimed are a “self-contained part of a building”.[2]The appeals are from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (Martin Rodger KC, Deputy Chamber President) (“the UT”). His decision ([2025] UKUT 39 (LC)) was given in two appeals from separate decisions of the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (“the FTT”). One of the appeals was about a group of modern, purpose-built residential blocks in a new development in Liverpool. The other concerned part of a Regency terrace and its associated mews in central London, recently restored to residential use following a major redevelopment. As the two cases raised similar issues they were heard together by the UT.[3]The first appeal to the UT concerned “The Courtyard”, “The Studios”, and “The Terrace”, three blocks forming part of the Plaza Boulevard development on the southern fringe of Liverpool city centre. It had originally been contended by the RTM companies that each of the blocks was a self- contained building in its own right (and expert evidence going to that issue had been served) but, by the time of the hearing before the FTT, the RTM companies argued instead that each of these blocks was a self-contained part of a building. The FTT decided that none of the blocks was a self-contained part of a building in the sense required by section 72(3) of the 2002 Act. The RTM companies were the appellants in the appeal to the UT. The UT disagreed with some of the reasoning of the FTT but upheld its conclusion that the blocks did not constitute self-contained parts of a building. The UT therefore dismissed the RTM companies’ appeals. The RTM companies claiming a right to manage the three relevant blocks have appealed to this court with the permission of the UT. The only active respondent to the appeal was Grey GR Limited Partnership, which holds a long headlease interest in The Terrace, but has no interest in either of the other two blocks. I will refer to the appeal as the “PB appeal”, the appellant RTM company as “the PB claimants”, and the second respondent as “the PB landlord” (while recognising that its interest is limited to The Terrace).[4]The second appeal to the UT concerned 14 Park Crescent and 8 Park Crescent Mews East in London W1 (together, “No. 14”). In 2023 14 Park Crescent RTM Co Ltd claimed the right to manage No. 14 on the basis that it comprises a self-contained part of a building. The FTT dismissed the objections of the immediate landlord and its superior landlord and concluded that the RTM company had established its claim. The UT in turn dismissed the landlords’ appeal. The landlords have appealed to this court with the permission of the UT. I will refer to this appeal as “the No. 14 appeal”, the RTM company as “the No. 14 claimant” and the two landlords as “the No. 14 landlords”.[5]The PB claimants were represented by Winston Jacob and Chelsea Sparks and the PB landlord was represented by Simon Allison KC and Sophie Gibson. The No. 14 landlords were represented by Justin Bates KC and Peter Sibley and the No. 14 claimant was represented by Philip Rainey KC. Their arguments greatly assisted the court.

The relevant qualifying conditions in the 2002 Act

[6]Sections 72 to 77 of the 2002 Act explain the circumstances in which the right to manage can be acquired and exercised. There are various “qualifying rules”, one of which, in section 72, is the identification of the premises to which the right applies.[7]Section 72 provides: “Premises to which Chapter applies(1) This Chapter applies to premises if— (a) they consist of a self-contained building or part of a building, with or without appurtenant property, (b) they contain two or more flats held by qualifying tenants, and (c) the total number of flats held by such tenants is not less than two-thirds of the total number of flats contained in the premises.(2) A building is a self-contained building if it is structurally detached.(3) A part of a building is a self-contained part of the building if— (a) it constitutes a vertical division of the building, (b) the structure of the building is such that it could be redeveloped independently of the rest of the building, and (c) subsection (4) applies in relation to it.(4) This subsection applies in relation to a part of a building if the relevant services provided for occupiers of it— (a) are provided independently of the relevant services provided for occupiers of the rest of the building, or (b) could be so provided without involving the carrying out of works likely to result in a significant interruption in the provision of any relevant services for occupiers of the rest of the building.(5) Relevant services are services provided by means of pipes, cables or other fixed installations.(6) Schedule 6 (premises excepted from this Chapter) has effect.” (a) they consist of a self-contained building or part of a building, with or without appurtenant property, (b) they contain two or more flats held by qualifying tenants, and (c) the total number of flats held by such tenants is not less than two-thirds of the total number of flats contained in the premises. (b) the structure of the building is such that it could be redeveloped independently of the rest of the building, and (a) are provided independently of the relevant services provided for occupiers of the rest of the building, or (b) could be so provided without involving the carrying out of works likely to result in a significant interruption in the provision of any relevant services for occupiers of the rest of the building.[8]There are then provisions about the other qualifying conditions, about the constitutions of RTM companies, and about the procedure to be followed to claim the right to manage. Section 96 sets out the management functions that are taken over by an RTM company which has established the right to manage. By subsection (5), “‘Management functions’ are functions with respect to services, repairs, maintenance, improvements, insurance and management”. The facts Plaza Boulevard

The facts

[9]The Courtyard, The Studios and The Terrace are parts of the Plaza Boulevard complex of five blocks (together “the Estate”). The Estate was developed in phases, and although the individual blocks are separated from each other, each successive phase is structurally attached to a central podium which spans the area between them and to an underground car park beneath the podium which serves all of the blocks.[10]The Estate stands on rising ground, so that the ground level at one end is approximately two floors above ground level at the other end.[11]A single large underground car park lies beneath the Estate and is overlapped by each of the three blocks. The area of the car park beneath each block is not reserved for the exclusive use of the occupants of the block situated above it. Parking spaces are let to tenants of different blocks, and to the public, and tenants of flats in the building have rights of access over the whole car park.[12]By the time of the hearing before the FTT it was common ground that the three blocks were not self-contained buildings (as they were not structurally detached). They were said instead to be self-contained parts of a building within the meaning of section 72(3). As the UT said, the unstated assumption before the FTT was that “the building” of which each block is part comprises either the whole of the Estate or at least those built elements adjacent to each building including the underground car park and the podium deck which connects the buildings at ground floor level.[13]The extent of the premises over which the right to manage was being claimed by the RTM claimants was not clearly defined in the claim notices, which referred to the blocks simply by their postal addresses. The argument before the FTT therefore took an unusual course. Rather than each RTM company identifying the premises over which it claimed rights, the premises to which each claim related was treated as an open question which was to be answered by considering which, if any, premises could be identified which both included the individual blocks and satisfied the requirements of subsections 72(3) and (4).[14]Three alternative configurations were considered by the FTT, referred to as “options”. The first option treated the premises as comprising only the building above ground level. That option was dismissed by the FTT and was not revived on appeal to the UT. Another option assumed that the premises comprised the whole of each block, both above ground and down to basement level, and that at basement level they extended beyond the footprint of the block to take in an undefined area of the car park. This was rejected by the FTT because it was not a vertical division and included common areas the use of which was shared between different blocks.[15]The FTT therefore considered a third option, namely that in each case the premises comprised the area enclosed within the relevant block’s steel frame, which runs from the basement to the top floor. At the ground level and above, on each of the blocks cladding panels are fixed to the front face of the columns and beams of the steel frame. At basement level part of the area within the steel frame is enclosed by block walls, while the rest is open and forms part of the shared car park. The extent of the open areas within the steel frame at basement level is different for each building. By the UT’s estimate, at basement level about 5% of the area defined only by the steel frame of The Courtyard (but not enclosed) is included within the car park, but about a quarter to a third of the corresponding areas beneath The Terrace and The Studios are within the car park.[16]At basement level a largely continuous concrete floor slab extends well beyond the footprint of the individual buildings. There are expansion joints in the slab. In one place (beneath The Studios) an expansion joint in the concrete slab follows the line of steel columns which support the building, but otherwise the expansion joints do not align with the steel columns. There are similar columns throughout the car park, which support the buildings above as well as the podium deck and road at ground level between them.[17]One side of The Terrace fronts onto Sefton Street. That façade features what the FTT called balconies. These are continuous bays which project from first to fifth floor level, extending beyond the steel frame of the building and overhanging the public highway. The RTM companies argued before the FTT that the requirement of vertical division had no application to any part of the block which is not structurally connected to the remainder of the Estate, but the FTT rejected that argument. It nevertheless considered that although these balconies were a deviation from the vertical line that runs down the steel frame wall, the deviation was de minimis.[18]The Terrace also has a parapet on the flank wall, several floors up, which overhangs the podium, and an entrance porch which projects beyond the face of the block on the podium side.[19]The FTT, after considering written evidence from two witnesses who had been involved in the design and construction of the Estate, found that each of the blocks had been erected separately and that each could be redeveloped independently of the remainder of the Estate. The FTT noted that the podium deck which sits above the car park and spans the space between the individual blocks is supported on beams attached to the steel building frames of the various blocks. If the steel frames were to be removed in their entirety and without independent support the podium deck would collapse. Similarly, a staircase between Sefton Street and the podium deck, which is supported on one side by the flank wall of The Terrace, would require other means of support if The Terrace (including the steel frames) were to be entirely removed. However, the FTT found that this did not prevent the independent redevelopment condition being satisfied.[20]For the most part each of the blocks on the Estate has its own independent services. The only continuing connection was between the fire alarm systems serving The Tower and The Studios. The UT recorded that evidence on this was sparse, but noted that the FTT had concluded that any connection could be decommissioned and independent services to each of the two blocks could be reinstated without significant interruption.

No. 14

[21]Park Crescent was designed by John Nash and completed in 1820 as a terrace of houses, each sharing a solid party wall with its neighbours on either side. It suffered substantial bomb damage during the Second World War and in the 1960s it was redeveloped as offices with a restored façade after the original design supported by new steel and concrete frames. The Bloomsbury and Marylebone County Court occupied the western end, incorporating No. 14 and its mews. It was closed eleven years ago as Park Crescent was redeveloped and restored to residential use.[22]The freehold of Park Crescent is held by the Crown, which does not object to the acquisition of the right to manage. The freehold is subject to two separate headleases, one of which is held by PC Investments Ltd. Part of that title, comprising No. 14 and the mews behind it, is subject to an underlease held by 14 Park Crescent Ltd.[23]The recent redevelopment of No. 14 created six new apartments in the main building and a further three in the mews. Each of these apartments has been let on a long lease. The mews and the main building are connected by internal corridors and staircases and jointly comprise the premises in respect of which the right to manage is claimed.[24]No. 14 lies between 12 Park Crescent on one side and 98 Portland Place on the other. The whole crescent was redeveloped between 2012 and 2018 as one project, but in stages, so that No. 12 was completed and occupied before work began on No. 14. No. 14 underwent almost total demolition except for the front façade and its 1960s steel and concrete frame, which were retained. In the course of the work the original foundations of the party walls were excavated, and deeper and more substantial foundations were inserted below them, in effect underpinning the party walls. Photos taken during the redevelopment show the party walls being supported by steel supports. A new basement level was added, and a new residential mews building was created in place of the former mews offices.[25]There are movement joints on the facade of No. 14 which do not align with the party walls behind them. The movement joints are located in the gaps between the steel frame which supports the façade of No. 14 and the frames supporting the façades of the adjoining buildings. In that location the façade is supported by the party wall. It was the view of the appellant's expert witness, Mr Ilsley, that if No. 14 were to be removed in its entirety along the inside face of the party walls, the section of the front elevation in front of the party wall, up to the movement joint, would be unsupported and would collapse. There are similar movement joints in the vicinity of the party wall with 98 Portland Place and at the rear of the building.[26]A vertical division along the line of the party wall would also encounter the new foundations, the whole of which were said by the landlords to belong to No. 14 and to be part of the premises over which the right to manage is claimed. The landlords contended that a vertical division of No. 14 would therefore have to deviate around the foundations in order to include them in the managed premises. Additionally, the landlords contended that the new foundations could not be removed as part of a redevelopment of No. 14 without destabilising the party wall and causing it to collapse. The same was said to be true of the mews.[27]Despite the various points made about the structure of the building and the support which No. 14 provides to and receives from its neighbours on either side, it was agreed by Mr Ilsley in his evidence that, by using temporary supports and restraints it would be possible to redevelop No. 14 without redeveloping the neighbouring parts of the terraced building.[28]At the rear of No. 14, where it abuts the rear of 98 Portland Place, a balcony on the neighbouring premises projects across a notional straight line drawn through the centre of the party wall separating the two buildings. This was said by the landlords to prevent a vertical division of No. 14 from its neighbour because, on a bird’s eye view, it would create a “dog leg” rather than a straight line. At the front of the mews, a step, which is said to be part of the claimed premises, projects beyond a vertical line drawn down the face of the building. This was said by the landlords to prevent the vertical division as a vertical line drawn through the step would leave part of the premises on the wrong side, while a line which followed the surface of the step would not be vertical. The decisions of the FTT and the UT Plaza Boulevard

The decisions of the FTT and the UT

[29]The FTT considered that the blocks did not satisfy the vertical division test because a vertical line drawn from top to bottom of each of the blocks would have met the solid concrete slab at the basement level. As the horizontal concrete slab was continuous and not divided along the lines of the steel frames of the blocks, there was no continuous vertical division through the slab.[30]The FTT decided that the projecting balconies on the Sefton Steet side of The Terrace constituted a deviation from the vertical division of the block but that this was de minimis.[31]The FTT found (contingently) that each of the blocks were all capable of independent redevelopment. It accepted that if the steel frames were to be removed altogether part of the podium and the staircase bolted to the side of The Terrace would collapse without other forms of temporary support but did not think that this mattered as the test of independent redevelopment did not require that the relevant blocks had to be entirely removed.[32]The UT disagreed with the reasoning of the FTT about the basement concrete slab. At [62], the UT said:
“Standing back and considering whether the premises as a whole constitute a vertical division of the building as a whole, the precise route of the notional dividing line between the premises and the rest of the building risks becoming a distraction and should not be taken to the extremes that have featured in these cases. In my judgment the FTT which decided the Park Crescent case was correct on this issue and the fact that a notional dividing line between the premises and the remainder of the building (wherever precisely it may be drawn) would have to pass through a solid structure running perpendicular to that line is no obstacle to the premises constituting a vertical division of the building. That is because the line is a notional one.”
[33]The UT also decided that the FTT had erred in relation to the balconies on The Terrace. It held that there is no requirement that, to constitute a self-contained part of a building, premises must not overhang land which is not part of the larger building of which the premises form part. There is no requirement that the façades of the premises be free of projections, or bays or overhangs; what is required is that the part of the building over which the right to manage is claimed must constitute a vertical division of the building. The only boundaries of the premises which are relevant to this requirement are those which are connected to the rest of the building.[34]The UT rejected the landlords’ argument that the parapet prevented The Terrace from being a vertical division of part of the Estate. It held that since there was no division between The Terrace and the remainder of the building at the level of the parapet, The Terrace was not prevented from being self-contained as that expression would ordinarily be understood by the projection of the parapet. No difficulty arises in relation to the enforcement of rights of support or maintenance of a part of the premises not connected to the remainder of the building. The parapet derives no support from the podium or car park and will not be prejudiced by their general state of repair. This conclusion was not affected by the general principle of law that ownership of the freehold or leasehold of a building carries with it the airspace above the built structure.[35]The UT nevertheless decided that the various blocks did not constitute a vertical division of the building (i.e. the Estate). This was because of the partially undivided basement car park extending beneath each of the blocks in the complex. The UT accepted that at the basement level there was no difficulty in identifying the area over which the right to manage was claimed for The Terrace, The Studios and The Courtyard. In most locations it is marked by solid walls enclosing the basement storerooms or service areas beneath the individual blocks. In other areas it is delineated by the lines of steel columns which support the blocks. But, as the UT explained, in those locations one can step or drive between the columns and across the expansion joints, where present, and so pass unimpeded from the area of the basement for which the right to manage was being claimed to the remainder of the car park sitting under the Estate, over which it is not claimed. The UT noted that third parties, without any interest in any of the blocks, have rights to park in the parking spaces immediately under the blocks; in some instances tenants of flats in one block may also have been leased parking spaces under a different block.[36]The UT framed the critical issue as whether the requirement that the premises constitute a “vertical division of the building” could be satisfied where part of the premises over which the right to manage is claimed was undivided from the remainder of the building.[37]The UT noted that the consequence of extending the right to manage to only part of the car park would be that responsibility for practical matters such as cleaning, lighting, signage and road markings would have to be divided between the landlords who would manage most of the car park and the three RTM companies which would each manage the portion of the car park lying immediately beneath their own block.[38]The UT concluded that at basement level the car park beneath the individual blocks did not constitute self-contained premises in the ordinary sense; rather the space was open-plan and undivided.[39]The UT also concluded, drawing on Settlers Court RTM Co Ltd v FirstPort Property Services Ltd [2022] UKSC 1, [2022] 1 WLR 519 (“Settlers Court”) that the statute should generally be read so as to avoid management of an undivided space being shared between the building owner and an RTM company. Such a division of responsibility would be impractical and was not of the kind generally contemplated under the right to manage regime. The UT noted that parts of a complex estate which have been left physically undivided from the remainder despite occupying the same footprint are often designed for joint use and call for common management of the sort for which the right to manage regime is not designed. The UT thought that this consideration pointed strongly away from construing section 72(3)(a) as including such physically undivided spaces within a vertical division of the building to which the right was confined.[40]The UT thus held that the PB claimants had not satisfied the vertical division condition in section 72(3)(a) and that this was fatal to the claim.[41]The UT contingently addressed the question of independent redevelopment. It agreed with the FTT that the test did not require one to assume the complete removal of every component of the original structure, including the steel frames. The UT would therefore have upheld the FTT’s factual finding that each of the blocks was capable of independent redevelopment.

No. 14

[42]The FTT decided that a vertical division of the relevant part of No. 14 was created by the party walls within the terraced structure. The foundations and steel frames did not cause any difficulty in identifying the premises over which the right to manage was claimed. Nor was there any requirement for the vertical division (viewed from above) to consist of a single straight line.[43]The FTT concluded on the facts that No. 14 could be independently redeveloped. It held that section 72(3)(b) meant that the RTM premises must be capable of being redeveloped while the remainder was not.[44]The UT upheld the FTT’s conclusions on the vertical division and the independent redevelopment issues. It held, specifically, that the latter test did not connote the assumption of a complete demolition of the premises. Nor did it mean that it always had to be possible to redevelop the premises without the consent, agreement or support of the owners of any neighbouring premises and without impacting their property. Issues in the appeal and outline of the parties’ submissions The PB appeal

Issues in the appeal and outline of the parties’ submissions

[45]The PB claimants submitted that the UT was wrong to conclude that the part of the car park beneath the footprint of each building “is not part of self-contained premises in the ordinary sense”. Section 72 provides an exhaustive, bespoke, definition of the term “self-contained part”. It is satisfied here.[46]Division may be achieved by drawing a notional line on a plan. Indeed the UT saw no difficulty in doing that when considering the concrete slab.[47]The statutory purpose of section 72(3)(a) – which is to limit the acquisition of the right to manage to premises which do not overlap or underlap the remainder of the building – is satisfied here.[48]Division of management of the car park between the building owner and the RTM company is not impractical. Indeed, the statutory regime contemplates such division of management. The existence of a physical separation makes little, if any, difference to the practicalities.[49]The question of the rights granted to third parties over the premises is irrelevant – whether premises fall within “self-contained… part of a building” is a purely physical test.[50]The reasoning in Settlers Court does not support the UT’s conclusions on vertical division. That case concerned the issue whether an RTM company could acquire the right to manage property outside the self-contained building or part of the building and did not address the issue of third-party rights over the self-contained building or part.[51]Third-party rights are irrelevant to the issue of vertical division since such rights can be granted regardless of a physical separation.[52]Section 72(3)(a) only requires there to be a vertical slice of the building. The statutory wording was taken from section 3(2)(a) of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”). The purpose of vertical division in the 1993 Act is to prevent the creation of flying freeholds. Similarly, the purpose of section 72(3)(a) must be to prevent different managers managing parts of a building above and below each other. This purpose is met provided the RTM company is entitled to acquire the right to manage all property on one side of the vertical slice.[53]The right to manage legislation is designed to provide rights to tenants. It should therefore be interpreted as far as possible to afford them such rights: compare 9 Cornwall Crescent London Ltd v Kensington & Chelsea [2005] EWCA Civ 324, [2006] 1 WLR 1186 (“Cornwall Crescent”) at [4].[54]Moreover, as the UT correctly observed at [68], “there is no real difficulty in identifying the area of which the right to manage is claimed” in the present case where the PB claimants seek to acquire the right to manage only the basement below the footprint of their respective blocks.[55]The PB landlord submitted in summary that the UT was correct about vertical division for the reasons it gave.[56]The facts are important. The car park slab at basement level extends from the wider underground car park to an area beneath The Terrace as one continuous concrete slab. The parking beneath The Terrace is not exclusively used by leaseholders/commercial tenants within The Terrace; parking at the development is allocated across the car parking area without direct reference to any block and is not only used by occupiers of the development itself. There is no internal sub-division in the basement car park such that one can easily step or drive between the steel columns throughout it.[57]In construing the right to manage provisions of the 2002 Act weight should be given to sections 121 to 124 of, and Schedule 8, to the 2002 Act concerning “right to enfranchise” (RTE) companies, notwithstanding that those provisions have not been brought into force. Those provisions demonstrate an intention that the right to manage and collective enfranchisement regimes should dovetail, including through the possibility that a single company might both manage and enfranchise the same premises. This intention is further reflected in the legislative history, including an August 2000 Consultation Paper, which explains that the right to manage was intended to sit alongside, not replace, the right to collective enfranchisement, and to facilitate a smooth transition between different forms of management and ownership of the same premises.[58]Although a notional division of a ground bearing slab may be conceivable in abstract terms, here the basement forms a shared, open car park subject to rights enjoyed by the wider development. Dividing it would create serious management and funding difficulties: the RTM company would bear responsibility for part of the common car park but would be unable to recover service charges from most users, whose leases fall outside the right to manage premises. This would result in impermissible dual management and an unworkable allocation of responsibility, contrary to the statutory scheme and the principles articulated in Settlers Court.[59]The UT’s decision accords with common sense and the practical realities with a shared common space where there can be no dual management.[60]By a respondent’s notice the PB landlord contended that the UT was wrong about the parapet. Holding and Management (Solitaire) Ltd v 1-16 Finland Street RTM Co Ltd [2008] L&TR 16 shows that the vertical division required by section 72(3)(a) is unqualified: it must be a straight vertical line with no deviation, save for de minimis deviations. The UT was right to say that balconies or projections over third-party land or the highway do not themselves prevent satisfaction of the test, since the vertical division only runs where the part is divided from the rest of the same building. However, here, the relevant vertical line dividing The Terrace from the rest of the building bisects the podium slab and basement slab at lower levels, and cuts through a substantial parapet at roof level projecting into airspace above the podium deck. The parapet is structurally attached to The Terrace but projects over property not included in the right to manage claim. This creates a broken vertical line, not a de minimis deviation. The UT erred in holding that the case of L M Homes Ltd v Queen Court Freehold Company Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 371, [2020] QB 890, does not stand in the way of the vertical division test being passed. That case shows that “building” in the 1993 Act is capable of including the airspace immediately above it. If the same logic applies to section 72(3) of the 2002 Act (as it must have been intended), the parapet intruding into airspace over the podium is inconsistent with a true vertical division.[61]By the respondent’s notice the PB landlord also contended that the UT had erred in relation to the independent redevelopment test. The steel-framed structure of The Terrace supports the adjoining podium deck along the rear elevation. It also supports the substantial staircase running from Sefton Street up to the public realm area atop the podium deck; that staircase sits between The Terrace and The Tower. In addition, the basement car park floor slab is one continuous slab running from the wider car park area to the parking spaces beneath The Terrace. Section 72(3)(b) requires the structure of the wider building to be considered – not just the structure of the part claimed. That will include the podium deck. The term “independently” means that the part claimed must be capable of being demolished without structurally affecting the rest of the building. However, that cannot happen where another structure hangs off the part claimed – especially where the horizontal structure is going to be bisected part way along its length by the line of the intended division (as here).[62]The test requires that the claimed part be capable of demolition and reconstruction as a whole, without structurally affecting the remainder of the building. Anything less – such as internal, non-structural works – would render the test meaningless and deprive it of statutory purpose.[63]Full redevelopment of The Terrace would necessarily entail cutting through the steel RSJs, podium slab, and basement slab that are structurally interdependent with the wider development. Removal of The Terrace would destroy the support for the podium deck and staircase, leading to collapse. The possibility of providing alternative or temporary support is irrelevant: importing such a qualification into the statute impermissibly dilutes the requirement of “independent” redevelopment and assumes the availability of third-party rights that the Act does not contemplate.

The No. 14 appeal

[64]Mr Bates argued in summary as follows. The requirement for a vertical division is unqualified and there is no “materiality” threshold, although de minimis deviations could be ignored.[65]The need for a single straight line or slice is consistent with the policy of the 2002 Act. An earth-to-sky division helps produce a unified and coherent “premises” which can be managed without needing the intervention or support of third parties.[66]In this appeal, an earth-to-sky division produces problems. At the front elevation, the party walls are misaligned with the façade movement joints, meaning such division would intrude into the neighbouring property or part of the party wall of these “premises” would be lost. The foundations of No. 14 span beneath the neighbouring properties, meaning an earth-to-sky division is not possible.[67]In the rear parts it is unclear where any single vertical line could be drawn; any purported division would either be non-vertical or result in the exclusion of essential access or inclusion of adjoining property. The FTT’s solution to the above was that it could be overcome by having multiple vertical divisions (i.e., a “dog leg” division). However, section 72(3)(a) requires “a” (singular) vertical division.[68]The UT erred in failing to follow the straight line approach. Specifically, in concluding that “[t]here is no relevant sense in which foundations on one side of a party wall “belong to” the building on the other side”. This is a question of fact in each case. The evidence shows that No. 14’s premises extend beneath the party walls.[69]The UT erred in relation to the independent redevelopment test. “Independently” means without the need for the consent, support, cooperation, or ongoing reliance upon neighbouring properties or other parts of the building, and without material impact upon them. The term denotes exclusivity and self-sufficiency, consistent with the “stand alone” and “self- contained” character of the right to manage regime and with the requirement for a self-contained part of a building. The structure of the premises is such that independent redevelopment is not possible. The premises are intimately and materially connected to neighbouring parts, including the foundations of No. 14, which extend beneath and into areas of neighbouring properties. They cannot be removed or altered without destabilising shared structures and risking catastrophic collapse.[70]The fact that redevelopment is technically achievable using temporary supports does not satisfy section 72(3)(b). Otherwise, the provision would exclude nothing and be rendered devoid of effect.[71]Mr Rainey for the No. 14 claimant submitted that the UT was right for the reasons in its decision. He supplemented this with some further points.[72]A self-contained part of a building can have more than one vertical dividing line from the rest of the building. There is nothing in the statute which requires that “a” vertical division must run along a single straight vertical line.[73]As to the shared foundations, if the landlords’ argument were right (shared foundations prevent a vertical division) then(a) in every claim concerning attached premises, it will be necessary (absent “as built plans”) to excavate to determine whether there are shared foundations – that is impracticable, and(b) assuming shared foundations to be a common feature of attached premises, as it frequently is for a row of properties in a single terrace development, the argument, if correct, would render futile the distinction between a self-contained building and a self-contained part of a building – the latter would never qualify by reason of the shared foundations alone.[74]A part of a building will only be a “vertical division” where, at points of structural attachment, there is a dividing feature which lies in a vertical plane. However, ownership of that feature is irrelevant.[75]As to independent redevelopment, there is no basis for the maximalist “scorched earth” test proposed by the No. 14 landlords. Whether a putative scheme of works would count as redevelopment is a matter of fact and degree and the exercise is evaluative. The landlords’ own expert conceded that the independent redevelopment of No. 14 was possible from a practical and technical perspective (as found by the FTT). The test is a purely physical test – consent of a neighbour is irrelevant. Further, the question is not whether works can be carried out without affecting neighbours – but whether part of the building can be physically redeveloped without physically redeveloping the rest of the building. The landlords’ reference to “impact” on neighbours is to gloss the statutory test. The same applies to questions of ownership – such matters ought not to affect the “redeveloped independently” test. As to the use of temporary props and supports, there can be few redevelopment projects which do not require temporary support of adjoining land. Analysis General considerations

Analysis

[76]The right to manage legislation gives tenants important statutory rights. At common law the relationship between a landlord and tenants, and their rights and obligations in respect of a property, are determined by the terms of the lease. Leases generally provide that the landlord retains responsibility for wider management responsibilities affecting a building and the flats within it, which is effected at the tenants’ cost. The right to manage was created in 2002 to give tenants the opportunity to take over the management of their building (or relevant part of it) for which they are paying in any event.[77]Before the enactment of the relevant parts of the 2002 Act the court and latterly the tribunal could appoint a manager where the landlord or managing agent had failed to discharge its management responsibilities. The 2002 Act created a no-fault right, which tenants could exercise without the need to prove a complaint against the landlord or managing agent. The Act provides that leaseholders must first set up an RTM company, of which the tenants are members. The Act sets out a procedure for the company to follow to acquire the right to manage from the landlord, including the service of notices and counter-notices. In cases of dispute the FTT has jurisdiction to determine whether the qualifying conditions are met.[78]The qualifying criteria for “premises” under section 72 of the 2002 Act are in terms essentially the same as those required for collective enfranchisement under the 1993 Act. The only material textual difference between section 3 of the 1993 Act and section 72 of the 2002 Act is that the latter expressly refers to appurtenant property. Indeed the 2002 Act itself contained provisions (which have not been brought into force) under which exercise of the right to manage was seen as a stepping stone to collective enfranchisement (known as the right to enfranchise or RTE).[79]Parliament’s decision to re-use materially the same definition of “premises” governed by section 3 of the 1993 Act in enacting section 72 of the 2002 Act throws helpful light on some aspects of the right to manage scheme. The first is the use of the vertical division test for the purposes of identifying a self-contained part of a building. As the UT explained, in the enfranchisement legislation the verticality requirement has been used to avoid the creation of flying freeholds. These can create special difficulties of repair and support. Though this is not an issue in the context of the right to manage as the landlord’s title is not affected by the right to manage, which concerns management and not ownership, materially the same test has been used. Again, the requirements of independent redevelopment and separability of services are likely to be significant in the case of enfranchisement because it will lead to part of the building being carved out of the freehold. The new owners of that part can do what they want with it, including carrying out a redevelopment. So there is a good reason for requiring that the new freehold interest be physically autonomous in this sense. A requirement that the two parts of the building be capable of being developed independently of each other also limits the effect of enfranchisement on the redevelopment of that part of the building retained by the landlord. RTM companies by contrast are unlikely to have the power to redevelop the relevant part of the building; the right is to manage the relevant part, not own it. But again, Parliament has used materially the same test. For these reasons when determining the legislative purpose of the qualifying conditions for a self-contained part of a building it is relevant to consider the functions of these tests in their place in the 1993 Act. While in theory the same statutory wording might be given different meanings in the two statutes, given the deliberate legislative decision to use the same phrases, one would expect the same construction to be placed on the two sets of provisions.[80]In [41] of Eveline Road RTM Co Ltd v Assethold Ltd [2024] EWCA 187, [2024] Ch 204 (“Eveline Road”), a case concerning section 72 of the 2002 Act, Lewison LJ referred to caselaw concerning what he called “the very similar statutory provisions” of the 1993 Act and said that the reasoning was equally applicable to the 2002 Act. I consider that the same approach applies here.

Vertical division

[81]It is convenient to start under this heading with a point taken in the No. 14 appeal. The parties’ submissions have already been summarised. In oral submissions Mr Bates for the No. 14 landlords concentrated on the foundations. He accepted that if he failed on this point he would not succeed on the other elements (including the steel frames in the façades).[82]Mr Bates referred to the evidence about the way in which the foundations of the party walls between No. 14 and its neighbours had been created. He said that the new foundations of No. 14 now span under and in the voided areas of the neighbouring properties. Mr Bates submitted that the whole of these new foundations served and belonged to No. 14 and were therefore all part of the premises over which the right to manage was claimed. Drawing a notional line through the solid foundations would leave part of No. 14’s foundations on the wrong side of that line.[83]I am unable to accept this argument for a number of reasons.[84]The test in section 72(3) is physical. It is to do with built structures, not with ownership of land. Lewison LJ explained this in Eveline Road at [36]:
“Whether premises satisfy the definition of “self-contained building or part of a building” is a purely physical test. The definition is concerned only with the structure of the built envelope, its internal structure, and the separability of services.”
[85]This echoes [42] of Settlers Court which described section 72 of the 2002 Act as “an entirely physical set of qualification requirements”.[86]I agree with the reasoning of the UT:
“The foundations themselves are not jointly owned, let alone owned by one owner to the exclusion of the other. Each owner owns up to the midpoint of the party wall and the foundations beneath it. To put it another way, the foundations on the No.12 side of the party wall are not part of the premises over which the right to manage is claimed and it is therefore unnecessary to consider whether they prevent No. 14 from constituting a vertical division of the Crescent.”
[87]Mr Bates accepted that where there are party (spine) walls in a terrace, the outer boundaries of the relevant part of the terrace could be identified for the purposes of the right to manage by taking a notional line or plane through the centre of the wall. He said, however, that the position was materially different when it came to the foundations. He was not able to explain convincingly why this should be so and I am unable to accept it. It appears to me that where the parts of a building are said to be separated by a party wall, the idea of drawing a notional line or plane is a practical way of determining the extent of the area claimed for the purposes of the right to manage. I agree with the UT that there is no sensible reason why the same notional line should not be extended down through the foundations.[88]Mr Bates argued that this approach would go against the grain of the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Settler’s Court, which was in essence that the legislature had not contemplated the shared management of premises (see, among others, the passages cited in [‎101] below). He said that by restricting the right to manage to a notional centre line through the foundations, the RTM company would have to share management of the foundations with a neighbouring owner. I do not find this persuasive. The relevant management function can only be to maintain the foundations. I can see no practical difference between the maintenance of a party wall and the maintenance of foundations. To the extent that those on each side of a party wall share the maintenance responsibility, the same could be said of the foundations. Hence the argument proves too much: it would entail that terraces would fall outside the reach of the right to manage legislation. That cannot be correct. The shared responsibility for maintaining foundations is far removed from the kinds of problems identified by Lord Briggs in Settler’s Court concerning the shared management of estate facilities such as gardens or car parks.[89]The No. 14 landlords did not develop the dog-leg argument orally at the hearing. For the reasons given by the UT, I consider there is nothing in the point. As the UT said, section 72(3)(a) says nothing about the need for a single perfectly straight boundary drawn between the premises and its neighbour and no such requirement can be read into the section. In particular, a “dog leg” vertical divide does not present the problem of flying freeholds which the requirement of a vertical divide was intended to avoid.[90]The other point of principle arising under this head concerns the shared basement car park located in part under the blocks in the PB Estate.[91]Counsel for the PB claimants advanced the following argument. In a simple case of a terraced house with party walls, the spine boundary of “the premises” is a notional line (or plane) drawn though the centre of each party wall. A vertical division of a building is simply a slice of the building bounded by notional lines or planes. In the case of the PB blocks notional lines or planes are capable of being extended into the basement car park area by continuing the position of the steel frames of the blocks (or possibly the outer edge of those frames plus cladding: nothing turns on this). The UT acknowledged that this method could be used to identify the area of the car park over which the relevant right to manage was being claimed.The vertical division is merely the area which falls within the notional lines or planes.[92]I am unable to accept this argument. In my judgment section 72(3) is concerned with actual, physical, divisions of a building. Where there is such a division, it has to be vertical rather than horizontal. But the first requirement is that the building is actually divided. I have reached this conclusion for a number of reasons.[93]The test is purely and entirely physical: see Eveline Road at [36] and Settlers Court at [42] (cited at [‎83] and [‎85] above).[94]Section 72(3)(a) requires that the relevant part of the building “constitutes a vertical division of the building”. On a natural reading the test is actual. This wording contrasts with the hypothetical test in section 72(3)(b) (“the structure of the building is such that it could be redeveloped independently of the rest of the building”). The same actual/hypothetical distinction is found in section 72(4) where the test in paragraph (a) is actual and that in paragraph (b) is hypothetical. The question raised by section 72(3)(b) is not whether the building could be divided vertically; it is whether it is so divided.[95]As explained above, the qualifying criteria in section 72(3) are expressed in materially the same words as those in section 3 of the 1993 Act (collective enfranchisement). As already explained the vertical division test was included in section 3 of the 1993 Act to avoid the creation of flying freeholds (parts of premises physically above or below other premises). The section is concerned with the physical, built structure of the buildings. It is very hard if not impossible to see how there could be enfranchisement of part of a building which is not actually, physically, divided from the remainder. This supports a reading of the test based on the actual, physical, vertical division of the relevant part of property rather than the use of notional lines on a plan or drawing.[96]I also agree with the UT that in construing section 72(3) the court must give weight to the words used in the defined concept (“a self-contained part of a building”) as well as the three elements in sub-paras (a) to (c) used to define it. As Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Construction (8th ed) states at [18.6], whatever definition is given to a term, the natural meaning of the term is likely to exert some influence over the way that the definition is understood and applied by the court. The term defined itself often has some potency. In this case the words “self-contained part of a building” are ordinary words with their own meaning. The phrase naturally connotes a part of a building within actual dividing features, complete in itself, rather than merely being something that could be drawn on a plan.[97]The UT considered that the undivided space in the basement carpark was not part of “self-contained premises” in the ordinary sense. Instead, as the UT said, it is open plan and undivided. I agree with that reasoning.[98]Mr Jacob argued that one could imagine a building with a large opening on one side and that the opening would not stop the building being self-contained within section 72(2). That may be correct, but the present question is whether a part of a building is self-contained. He said the same could be said of a part of the building: the absence of walls did not stop it being self-contained. I agree with the UT’s view that the open plan, undivided basement space would not as a matter of ordinary language be described as self-contained.[99]It is one thing to say that where there is an actual physical dividing feature within a building, such as a party wall, one can notionally map the outer limit of the physically divided premises by drawing a notional vertical line or plane through the centre of the wall. It is another to assert that the notional line or plane is itself a dividing feature. In the first case one is merely identifying the outer boundaries of an actually divided area. In the second one would be creating a division through space which is not actually there, which would be no more than virtual or imagined. The UT made this point well in [73]:
“It is only by drawing a notional line on a plan that a division is achieved, but this is an instance where focussing on a notional dividing line is liable to distract from the real question. To achieve a vertical division the premises must incorporate part of the car park because otherwise the footprint of the buildings at basement level would be smaller than at higher levels, creating an impermissible overhang. But by bringing in part of the car park the premises cease to be a division of the building. There is no division at that point. It does not seem to me to be an apt description of the part of the car park beneath the individual blocks to say that they each form part of a vertical division of the building otherwise consisting of the block above them.”
[100]I also agree with the UT that in interpreting section 72(3) the practical consequences need to be considered. Managing a car park involves a number of activities including lighting, cleaning and security. As the UT said, the division of these management responsibilities between an RTM company and others would be impractical.[101]The UT referred in this regard to [35] and [36] of Settlers Court:
“[…] the RTM company has the right to perform its allotted functions itself, to the exclusion of any participation by the landlord, third party manager or even a manager appointed under the 1987 Act, save to the extent that the RTM company agrees otherwise. That is a very powerful pointer to a construction which confines the right to manage to that which the RTM company can manage on its own, namely the structure and facilities within the building or part of it constituting the relevant premises and, where they exist, those facilities outside it which are exclusively used by the occupants of the relevant premises. “The apparently unconstrained right of the RTM company to perform its management functions on its own runs into insuperable problems if those functions are construed to include management of shared estate facilities. This is because the landlord or third party manager will have the right and obligation to manage those facilities under the potentially very large number of leases of flats outside the RTM company's allotted single block. All those tenants will have the right under their leases to insist that the landlord or third party manager (and no-one else) performs those functions, and it would be a very strong thing to read section 97(2) as taking that right away from them.”
[102]Mr Jacob submitted that Settler’s Court was concerned with a different issue, namely, the definition of the extent to which an RTM company was entitled to manage “appurtenant property” as defined in section 112(1) where that appurtenant property was used in common by the tenants of all the blocks on an estate. He submitted that the UT fell into error when it relied on the reasoning in Settler’s Court in the present context which is quite different.[103]Mr Jacob is right to say that Settler’s Court concerned a different issue from the ones raised by the present case. There was no dispute in that case that the relevant block of flats was a self-contained building within the scope of section 72 of the 2002 Act or that the management functions in respect of that block were those of the RTM company. The issue was the extent of the management functions and whether they extended to common estate facilities outside the block. The disputed statutory phrase was whether the estate facilities counted as “appurtenant property” within section 72. The decision does not therefore directly bear on this appeal.[104]Nonetheless the reasoning of the Supreme Court shows that the court should seek to read the 2002 Act so as to minimise the practical problems that might arise from the management of shared estate facilities. In Settler’s Court Lord Briggs gave weight, when construing the 2002 Act, to the practical problems that would be entailed by exercising the claimed right to manage over the shared facilities and in my judgment the UT was right to consider the workability of the rival constructions.[105]Mr Jacob may be correct to say that if the right to manage were to be granted here, the PB claimants would strictly be responsible only for the parts of the car park lying under the footprints of the relevant blocks. But that is not a complete answer to the practical issues that would arise on their argument. The parts of the car park lying under the block’s footprints are part of a larger, undivided, car park that is designed for joint use and common management. As the UT said the right to manage regime is not generally intended to provide for common management. In my judgment, when construing and applying section 72, the UT was right to give weight to the practical problems that would arise from the shared management of the undivided car park space.[106]Mr Jacob relied on the general statement of this court in [4] of Cornwall Crescent (a case about the 1993 Act) in support of the submission that the legislation should be construed with a view, if possible, to making it effective to confer on tenants those advantages which Parliament must have intended them to enjoy. That is hard to disagree with so far as it goes. It adds little to the modern approach of the courts to reading legislation with its purposes in mind. And as Lord Carnwath pointed out in Day v Hosebay Ltd [2012] UKSC 41, [2012] 1 WLR 2664 (a case about enfranchisement under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967) at [6], by the same token the court must also avoid an interpretation which has the effect of going beyond that intended by the legislation. A balanced, purposive, interpretation is required.[107]Mr Jacob also took us to paras 1 and 10 of the August 2000 Consultation Paper. He relied on the statement that it was the leaseholders who normally have by far the greatest financial interest in the building and that landlords should not have complete control when they hold a relatively small stake in the building. Paragraph 10 of Section 3 Chapter 1 states that the procedure should be as simple as possible and that the allocation of responsibilities should be clear-cut, but recognises that the legitimate interest of the landlord in the property should be properly recognised and safeguarded. Beyond providing some guidance as to the general purposes of the legislation I do not think that these passages assist in the interpretation of section 72.[108]A shared basement car park also featured in Consensus Business Group (Ground Rents) Limited v Palgrave Gardens Freehold Company Limited [2020] EWHC 920 (Ch), [2020] L&TR. 12. The tenants of a series of five interconnected blocks of flats known as Palgrave Gardens sought collective enfranchisement under the 1993 Act. There were issues about the validity of the notice. There was also a question whether the five blocks, a podium construction, and an underground carpark which ran under all the blocks constituted a self-contained building for the purposes of section 3 of the 1993 Act. The freeholder contended that each of the blocks was a separate self-contained building. The county court judge found the five blocks, podium and carpark constituted a single self-contained building. On appeal Falk J upheld the judge’s decision. At [114] to [117] she said:
“114 It follows that if [the freeholder’s] submissions were correct then it would be possible for residents of each Block to enfranchise in a way that included the area of the car park below their Block, but no other parts of the car park. The conclusion that the Blocks are structurally detached would also necessarily mean that each of them would be a “self-contained” building for the purposes of the legislation, even though part of each one, namely the basement area, is patently not self-contained.” 115. Such a conclusion offends common sense. It would also be highly artificial, and in my view it would not be consistent with the principles referred to by Lindblom LJ in LM Homes at [78]. As Lord Millett said in R (Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer [2003] UKHL 20 at [116]: ‘The Courts will presume that Parliament did not intend a statute to have consequences which are objectionable or undesirable; or absurd; or unworkable or impracticable; or merely inconvenient; or anomalous or illogical; or futile or pointless.’ 116. The Blocks are clearly not structurally detached at basement level. There is a continuous slab that forms the floor of the car park. There are no walls or other obstructions to prevent passage between the areas under the Blocks and other parts of the car park. The Blocks are not simply properties in adjacent sub-soil. A single built structure extends under each one. Furthermore, there is direct lift and stair access between that structure and each Block. 117. As a matter of common sense, the development is constructed as a single unit. The car park serves all the Blocks, and as just mentioned there is direct access to and from the Blocks. If the basement car park was at ground level, with the Blocks above it from the first floor upwards, it is hard to see that there would be any dispute about the issue.”
[109]The issue in that case was whether the entire estate was a self-contained building and that turned on whether the blocks were structurally detached. The court did not need to address the issue whether the separate blocks were self-contained parts of the larger building. But Falk J’s reasoning nonetheless sheds helpful light on the issue in the present case. She rejected the idea that blocks which include a shared, open-plan, carpark at the basement level constitute self-contained buildings. In my judgment the point she made about a self-contained building applies also to a self-contained part of a building. It offends common sense to say that blocks which share an undivided carpark at basement level are “self-contained” parts of a wider building.[110]The UT concluded at [77] in the present case that the presence of the undivided car park beneath each of the three blocks means that individually the blocks do not constitute a vertical division of the Estate as a whole. I agree.[111]The PB landlord did not criticise the UT’s conclusion in relation to the balconies that what is required is that the part of the building over which the right to manage is claimed must constitute a vertical division of the building. I would simply record my agreement with the UT that the only boundaries of the premises which are relevant to this requirement are those which are connected to the rest of the building.[112]In the light of these conclusions it is unnecessary to consider the issue concerning the parapet raised by the respondent’s notice. I would prefer not to express a concluded view on this issue, partly because the FTT did not reach findings as to whether any deviation from the vertical plane was de minimis. Having said this, I consider that there is much to be said for the way that the UT approached the issue of the parapet (see [‎34] above).

Independent redevelopment

[113]The test in section 72(3)(b) is that the structure of the building is such that a part could be redeveloped independently of the rest of the building. As already explained, this part of the test involves a hypothesis rather than an actually anticipated redevelopment.[114]Mr Bates submitted that the statutory test requires that the redevelopment could take place without affecting the occupiers of land other than that within the right to manage. He referred to [38] to [40] of Settlers Court, and particularly [40], which states:
“The starting point lies in section 72, which imposes a much tighter qualification requirement in relation to premises than the equivalent provision in the 1987 Act. The premises must be self-contained. If they constitute a whole building it must be structurally detached. If part of a building that part must be divided vertically from the rest of the building, be capable of being independently redeveloped and have services which either are or could without interruption to the rest of the building be made independent. All these requirements point strongly towards confining the right to manage to separate premises within which the quality of the management provided by the RTM company affects only the occupants of that building or part of it.”
[115]Mr Bates submitted that the test in section 72(3)(b) means that it must be possible to redevelop the right to manage premises without needing the consent, agreement or support of the owners of any neighbouring premises and without impacting on their property. He said that the word “independently” had connotations of exclusivity, freedom of action and absence of cooperation.[116]I am unable to accept these submissions. I agree with the UT that section 72(3)(b) connotes only that the relevant part of the building could be redeveloped without the rest of the building being redeveloped at the same time. The test is about the building and its structural features.[117]Mr Bates’s suggestion that the test, drawn from Settler’s Court, is whether the redevelopment would “affect” others is too broad to be workable. It is hard to imagine the redevelopment of part of a building which will not affect the owners or occupants of other parts. Redevelopment works would be bound to cause noise and other disruption.[118]Settler’s Court itself was not concerned with the independent redevelopment test. There was no issue in that case about the RTM company having the right to manage in respect of the relevant block of flats (a self-contained building). The issue was whether the right to manage extended beyond the block and included the estate facilities. The question was about the extent of the right to manage, and not whether there was a self-contained building or part of a building. The last sentence of [40] of Settlers Court, on which Mr Bates relied, was concerned with the need to confine the extent of the right to manage and says nothing about the physical test under section 72(3)(b). There is no warrant for glossing the statutory test by asking whether other people would be affected.[119]The proposed test of the redevelopment not affecting others is too wide for other reasons. Even in a case where there is an undoubted right to manage, there may be many aspects of the standard of the management of part of a building that will affect others. Take the case of a terrace. A failure to maintain part of it may very well affect the neighbouring occupiers or owners. Indeed there are many contiguous properties in wholly independent ownership and management where redevelopment of one will affect the other in the manner contended for by Mr Bates. Not affecting others is not part of the statutory test or a workable substitute for it. The question is whether the premises are self-contained. It is this which governs the allocation of management functions.[120]It is also to be noted that, by contrast with section 72(3), section 72(4)(b) does expressly address the impact of certain works on other occupiers, as it requires that relevant services could be provided to the occupiers of part of a building without involving the carrying out of works likely to result in a significant interruption in the provision of any relevant services for occupiers of other parts of the building. Where the impact of (hypothetical) works on other occupiers is relevant, the statute expressly provides for this.[121]Nor does the statutory test contain anything which would bar the use of supports or props as part of the hypothetical redevelopment postulated by section 72(3)(b). Many redevelopment schemes may involve supports. Indeed, when No. 14 was previously redeveloped the building was gutted and internal struts were inserted to hold up the walls. I see no reason why such use of supports should not be part of the notional redevelopment postulated by the test in section 72(3).[122]I also reject the submission advanced by both Mr Bates and Mr Allison that redevelopment for the purposes of the 1993 and 2002 Acts entails the complete removal of every element of the relevant part of the building, top to bottom, including in the case of No. 14, the foundations and, in the case of the PB blocks, the entire steel frame. The words of the section do not warrant such an extreme assumption. Whether a hypothetical construction scheme would amount to the redevelopment of part of a building is, in any given case, a question of fact and degree. It is significant that disputes about satisfaction of the statutory criteria are decided by the specialist property chamber of the FTT, and that such cases (as in these cases) are frequently decided by panels including surveyors. There is no requirement that every part of a built structure must be removed before one would say that it had been redeveloped.[123]Take the properties in this case. Mr Bates said that redevelopment required the complete removal of absolutely everything, down to the sub-floor foundations. But why should that be so? In my judgment if No. 14 were to be gutted, leaving the foundations and outer walls, there would clearly be a redevelopment of the premises by any ordinary use of that term. Substantial rebuilding schemes involving less than that might well constitute redevelopment too. As I have stated, the issue is one of fact and degree in any given case. “Redeveloped” is an ordinary English word. There is no warrant for glossing it to require the complete removal of the existing built structure.[124]The legislation needs to be read sensibly and practically. On the landlords’ case, every element of the relevant part of the structure would have to be removed, including all foundations and party walls (at least to the mid-point). A test of that stringency would rule out most, if not all, terraced buildings. But it is clear that the right to manage (and enfranchisement) legislation is designed to cover terraced buildings.[125]In relation to the PB appeal, Mr Allison said that redeveloping The Terrace required the entire steel frame to go. Again, why should that be so? Suppose (say) that the top five floors were to be removed and rebuilt (even including the removal and rebuilding of the steel frames for those floors). It is hard to see why this would not naturally constitute a redevelopment of the block. Something less may well be enough.[126]The question is one of fact and degree: would a hypothetical scheme of works on part of the building be sufficient to amount to redevelopment and could it be done without redeveloping the building generally? I agree with the UT’s conclusion:
“whether sufficient work is involved in a particular scheme to merit the description redevelopment would obviously be a matter of degree, but something well short of complete demolition is likely to suffice.”
[127]I do not consider that it is necessary for the purposes of the PB appeals to reach a view about the extent to which temporary supports might have been provided to the podium and staircase on the assumption that the entire structure of the blocks (including the steel frames) was to be removed. As already explained, I do not think that the test requires one to assume the complete removal of the building. The FTT found that a scheme of works short of complete demolition would amount to a redevelopment of the blocks and that this could take place independently. I do not read the FTT’s decision as reaching any conclusions about the nature or feasibility of supporting apparatus that would have been required on the assumption that the entire structures (including the steel frames) of the blocks were to be removed.

Disposal of the appeals

[128]As to the PB appeal, for the reasons given above, in my judgment the UT correctly decided that the PB claimants had failed to establish that the premises over which it claimed the right to manage constitutes a vertical division of the Estate. It is therefore unnecessary to resolve the issues concerning the parapet. I would have rejected the PB landlords’ arguments that the relevant part of the building could not be redeveloped independently of the rest of the Estate.[129]As to the No. 14 appeal, the UT correctly held that the premises over which the right is claimed constitute a vertical division of the terraced building and that the relevant part could be developed independently of the rest of the building.[130]There were no separate issues concerning services under section 72(4).[131]In my judgment the Deputy President was correct for the reasons he gave in his admirably clear and well-reasoned decision. I would therefore dismiss both appeals.[132]I agree.[133]I also agree.