Connexus Homes Ltd v Belinda Weaver & Anor [2025] EWCA Civ 655

[2025] EWCA Civ 655Case No CA-2024-002238
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
Venue ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT BRISTOL
His Honour Judge Ralton
K00GL492
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 20/05/2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE KINGLORD JUSTICE SINGHLORD JUSTICE NUGEE
Between
CONNEXUS HOMES LtdClaimant/1. BELINDA WEAVERDefendants/ Appellants2. GERALD WEAVERAppellant
Mr and Mrs Weaver appeared In Person for in personMichael Singleton (instructed by Anthony Collins LLP) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 8 May 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 11.00am on 20 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal against a suspended committal order made by HHJ Ralton (“the judge”) on 23 September 2024 arising from findings of contempt of court which he had made in relation to breaches of an injunction by Gerald Weaver and Belinda Weaver (“Mr and Mrs Weaver”) on 28 June 2024. The appeal is against both the findings of contempt and the suspended prison sentence.[2]Mr and Mrs Weaver have had the permission of the court to attend remotely at each hearing due to their health issues. Although entitled to criminal legal aid as of right, they are litigants in person in the appeal. They have had legal representation at the committal hearing which took place on 28 June 2024, but were not represented at the sentencing hearing which took place on 23 September 2024.

Background

[3]Mr and Mrs Weaver have been tenants of Connexus Homes Ltd (“Connexus”) at a Property at Goodrich, Ross-on Wye, (“the Property”) since 6 April 2009. The Property consists of a house and garden. Mr and Mrs Weaver live there with their adult daughter, T, who is severely autistic. Her parents are T’s full-time carers. Mr and Mrs Weaver also have their own significant health difficulties.[4]The tenancy agreement between Mr and Mrs Weaver and Connexus dated 6 April 2009 provides, at paragraph 11 of section 2, details of the obligations on the tenant to permit access to the Property:
“Access You must: i) Allow us, or anyone working for us, including contractors acting on our behalf, reasonable access to all parts of your home. Access will usually be during the daytime, on production of appropriate proof of identity, to inspect the condition of your home or carry out repairs or other works to your home or adjoining Property. We will normally give you a minimum of 24 hours notice that we need access, but we may need immediate access in an emergency; and ii) Clause (i) applies to inspections, repairs and other works to the installations in your home, such as gas, electricity and water. iii) Not obstruct access to your home, either directly (for instance by refusing permission or cancelling appointments) or indirectly (for instance by accumulation of furniture, personal effects, stored items or unhygienic conditions).” i) Allow us, or anyone working for us, including contractors acting on our behalf, reasonable access to all parts of your home. Access will usually be during the daytime, on production of appropriate proof of identity, to inspect the condition of your home or carry out repairs or other works to your home or adjoining Property. We will normally give you a minimum of 24 hours notice that we need access, but we may need immediate access in an emergency; and ii) Clause (i) applies to inspections, repairs and other works to the installations in your home, such as gas, electricity and water. iii) Not obstruct access to your home, either directly (for instance by refusing permission or cancelling appointments) or indirectly (for instance by accumulation of furniture, personal effects, stored items or unhygienic conditions).”
[5]The term “your home” is defined on the first page of the tenancy agreement as the Property “including any garden, garage, outbuilding, fence or wall let with the Property…”.[6]There are a number of large outbuildings at the Property which have been erected by Mr and Mrs Weaver, the most substantial of which are kennels in which T keeps her six dogs described as her “support dogs”.[7]Since July 2022, Connexus have made continuous attempts to conduct safety checks on the Property. There is a statutory duty to inspect the electrical wiring which requires access to all parts of the house. There was also a need to inspect the outside areas due to concerns about the safety of the electrical arrangements for the outbuildings including the kennels, but also in relation to the accumulation of substantial amounts of “waste” at the rear of the Property contained in numerous black bin bags and in small pink and blue bags of the type used to pick up dog faeces.[8]Initially Connexus were denied access to the Property entirely, but latterly they have been permitted to view the inside of the house and parts of the garden and outbuildings. As at the date of the appeal hearing, it would seem that all that is outstanding is for Connexus to be allowed to check that all the waste has finally been removed from the garden and the kennels.[9]The principal reasons given by Mr and Mrs Weaver for limiting access relates to T’s significant worry about others entering the outbuildings. T, it would seem, has a profound fear that any third parties entering the kennels (or indeed the house) may bring with them a ringworm infection which her dogs might catch.[10]Mr and Mrs Weaver also seek to argue that the tenancy agreement does not provide a right of access to the garden, or the outbuildings as they are private property and they built and paid for them. This belief, genuinely held by them, is wrong in law on a straightforward reading of the tenancy agreement as set out above at paragraph [4] above.[11]As time has moved on, concerns about the safety of the arrangements at the Property escalated, extension leads snaked out of upstairs windows to feed electricity to the kennels and neighbours complained of foul smells and rodent infestation. The time came when Connexus felt they had no alternative but to take legal action.[12]On 28 July 2023, Connexus filed an application for an injunction requiring Mr and Mrs Weaver to permit access to the Property in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement. The Particulars of Claim set out a number of dates during 2022 and 2023 when they had made appointments and attempted to gain access to the Property and had been prevented from doing so by Mr and Mrs Weaver.[13]On 5 September 2023 at a hearing on notice to Mr and Mrs Weaver, but which they did not attend, an injunction was made. Mr Singleton, counsel for Connexus at the appeal hearing, told the court that the form of injunction as originally drafted and placed before the District Judge at that hearing, contained considerably more detail than that which was ultimately made, but that the District Judge hearing the application decided to “simplify” the terms of the order. The order was made for 2 years expiring on 5 September 2025 and said:
“The Court ordered that Gerald Weaver and Belinda Weaver 1. Must comply with Section 2 paragraph 11 of their Tenancy Agreement dated 6 April 2009.”
[14]At various stages following the making of the injunction, Mr and Mrs Weaver offered to provide videos of the garden and kennels as a substitute for physical inspection. Whilst they genuinely believed this was an appropriate reasonable adjustment for T, it was, unsurprisingly, not acceptable to Connexus as it not only meant the areas shown were self-selected, but the videos would not alleviate concerns as to whether electricity had been hard wired to the outbuildings.[15]Between September and October 2023, correspondence was sent to Connexus by a representative of Mr and Mrs Weaver called Samantha Moore, who challenged on their behalf the injunction itself and refused access to the Property. In her correspondence, Ms Moore said that access would only be provided once three conditions were satisfied, namely that there would be no access to the rear garden or the kennels, that anyone attending would wear PPE and that they would accept Mr and Mrs Weaver had Covid-19. On 25 October 2023, Ms Moore wrote that if Connexus would not agree to the conditions, she had no alternative but to invite them to return the matter to court.[16]In the light of this stalemate, Connexus conducted punctilious multidisciplinary proportionality assessments and a Public Sector Equality Duty review pursuant to s149 Equality Act 2010. Each concluded that the matter would have to be brought back to court for breach of the injunction, but that in the meantime further efforts would be made to gain access to the Property.

Enforcement Proceedings

[17]On 14 December 2023, Connexus issued an application for enforcement citing alleged breaches of the injunction order. The second statement of Mr Robert Pugh, the Senior Housing Officer, dated 8 December 2023 detailed Connexus’s attempts to access the Property since the injunction had been made in September 2023. This was reduced to a schedule containing eight alleged breaches which was served on Mr and Mrs Weaver. Mr Pugh’s statement also set out all the adjustments it had made and offered to make, in order to address Mr and Mrs Weaver’s concerns.[18]On 12 April 2024, the committal hearing came before the judge. Mr and Mrs Weaver again appeared remotely. The judge adjourned the committal application as Mr and Mrs Weaver agreed at the hearing to provide Connexus access to the Property on 19 and 26 April 2024. On 18 April 2024, the parties agreed a consent order varying the agreed dates of access to 3 and 8 May 2024 and on 1 May 2024, Mr and Mrs Weaver again applied to vary the dates of access on the ground that the Connexus had failed to provide protective material for them, and the judge refused the application on paper on 2 May 2024.[19]Two more visits to the Property took place on 3 May 2024 and 8 May 2024. Progress was made in that access was gained to the house and part of the garden but not to the kennels. There remained numerous black bin liners and blue and pink bags. A further application was made, therefore, by Connexus to add those dates to the schedule of alleged breaches, bringing the total to ten.[20]On 13 May 2024, the adjourned committal hearing came before the judge who again granted Mr and Mrs Weaver’s application to adjourn the matter, this time to enable them to obtain legal advice. On 8 June 2024, Mr and Mrs Weaver made an application seeking to prohibit access to the Property until after the hearing on 28 June 2024. The judge refused the application on paper on 10 June 2024 as totally without merit. Despite Connexus’ best endeavours to avoid committal proceedings they were now inevitable.[21]No one can help but have sympathy in differing ways for both Mr and Mrs Weaver and for Connexus. Life is profoundly challenging for the Weaver family. Each of the adults has serious health problems and Mr and Mrs Weaver have the full time care of T. As if that is not difficult enough, it is clear from all the material that the family have been the victims of hate crimes and unpleasant neighbour disputes. The court has looked at various videos and photographs, which whilst not relevant to the committal proceedings, demonstrate clearly just what this family has had to go through. Much of the vitriol has been directed at T who, several years ago, had had some sort of breakdown as a consequence of the distress caused to her by the spiteful behaviour directed towards her.[22]It is undoubtedly the case that Mr and Mrs Weaver’s main aim in life is to protect T. That is so, no matter how illogical and irrational their approach and attitude may seem to be to an objective bystander. One of the challenges for Connexus and for the courts in achieving a satisfactory outcome, is that Mr and Mrs Weaver have been wholly unable to separate out their feeling that they have been let down by Connexus in relation to the victimisation of T and the profoundly anti-social behaviour of some of their neighbours, from the matter with which the courts below have been concerned, namely the simple, unthreatening request by Connexus to inspect the Property and the outbuildings. The importance of the inspection is borne out by the fact that when Connexus did manage to gain entry to the house, it was discovered, by way of example, that the family had no hot water due to a broken immersion heater and Connexus were able to facilitate repairs.[23]Mr and Mrs Weaver have filed numerous documents which relate to their problems with the neighbours and building works next door which caused noise and dust for over three years. Some of this material was adduced to this Court by way of an application to adduce fresh evidence. It was explained to Mr and Mrs Weaver during the course of the appeal hearing that this material was not relevant to the issue before the Court and that it would not be taken into account in determining the outcome of the appeal. I would accordingly refuse permission for Mr and Mrs Weaver to rely on the fresh evidence.[24]One must also, however, have both sympathy and respect for Mr Pugh who has shown patience and compassion throughout, despite being wrongly accused by Mr and Mrs Weaver of lying and of behaving unfairly. No one could have made more effort to accommodate the undoubtedly unreasonable requirements and adjustments demanded by Mr and Mrs Weaver. Connexus offered to arrange for T to have a trip out for the day so that she would not be made anxious by people visiting her home and the kennels; the contractors attending the home wore with good grace the (wholly unnecessary) PPE demanded by Mr and Mrs Weaver; money was provided for quantities of disinfectant to allow rapid disinfection of any areas the contractors visited; a shopping voucher of £150 was provided which allowed the Weavers to use their shopping money on PPE; skips were paid for to enable the disposal of the waste and finally Connexus offered to pay for the dogs to stay in kennels whilst the inspection was carried out.[25]It is abundantly clear that even now, all that Connexus want to do is to complete the inspection, an inspection which, subject to going into the garden and kennels, is now, after this tortuous process, nearly complete. The last thing Connexus wants is for either of Mr or Mrs Weaver to go to prison even for a few days. The Court was told that a number of skips have recently been to the house and as of a few days or weeks ago, no waste remains. Mr and Mrs Weaver, however, continue to deny access to the kennels for Connexus to check, saying that the photographs they have sent which, they say, show that no bags of waste remain, should suffice.

The Contempt Hearing

[26]On 28 June 2024, the committal application was heard by the judge. Mr and Mrs Weaver attended remotely, but on this occasion were represented by a solicitor, Mr Kemp, and Counsel, Ms Yeung. Mrs Weaver and Mr Pugh each gave evidence and were cross examined. Mr Pugh confirmed that the necessary inspection of the house had now been achieved and the residual problem lay with the inspection of the kennels, the issue now being of waste management relating to the dogs, concerns about electricity having been resolved.[27]There is no transcript of the breach judgment on 28 June 2024 due to a recording error. There are, however, the individual notes prepared by the representatives at the hearing. Mr and Mrs Weaver submitted that their appeal had been prejudiced by the absence of a full transcript of the hearing. It became clear, however, that they accepted that the notes in relation to the committal and findings were accurate. The deficit in their mind was that they believed that had there been a full transcript, it would have revealed that their solicitor, Mr Kemp, had apologised to the court for some misnumbering in the bundles. This was an incident about which Mr Kemp has no recollection and which in my judgment had no impact upon the outcome even though Mrs Weaver maintains that it hampered the cross-examination by their counsel of Mr Pugh.[28]In relation to the injunction, the note of the solicitor for Mr and Mrs Weaver (in common with the other notes of the hearing) records

the judge as saying:

“The first point that Ms Yeung makes is that the injunction order is not closely defined. I rather agree with Ms Yeung about that. It is not an injunction I would choose to make but it does cross refer to the tenancy agreement which is of course a matter of contract between the Claimants and the Defendants. I do not think it can be said it was of insufficient clarity and I do not think Ms Yeung pushes the point too hard, but I would observe given that I know that the Claimant seeks to extend the injunction that my preference would be to see clearly defined injunction orders in the future if that was necessary.”
[29]The judge having heard evidence from Mr Pugh and Mrs Weaver found that Mr and Mrs Weaver had not granted Connexus reasonable access to the Property, and that the objections of Mr and Mrs Weaver’s daughter to such inspection did not preclude Mr and Mrs Weaver from providing such reasonable access as they were obliged to under the terms of the tenancy agreement. He held that Connexus had made reasonable adjustments to accommodate T’s disability.[30]The judge neither set out the individual alleged breaches in his judgment (although they appear in a schedule to his order), nor did he make findings in respect of each allegation even in brief terms. In relation to the original eight breaches, he said:
“In regards to breaches 1- 8 they are all very similar. Mrs Weaver sought to blame others for the appointments not taking place. So far as 1 – 8 are concerned, I am afraid I do not accept her evidence save in respect of one breach, number 3 where the appointment was cancelled because of Covid afflicting the family.”
[31]So far as the two breaches in May 2024 were concerned, the judge provided rather more detail regarding these as “more troubling” as they were subsequent to the court hearing in April 2024 when dates for inspection of both the house and the garden and outbuildings had been agreed by consent.

The judge concluded:

“I have listened carefully but have come to the conclusion that I am satisfied those breaches are made out as well. Seven out of the original breaches and breaches nine and ten. That concludes my judgment.”
[33]The judge accordingly found the following breaches of the injunction order as set out in the schedule to the contempt[34]Having made these findings, the judge adjourned his sentencing decision in the hope that the injunction might yet be complied with by Mr and Mrs Weaver.[35]On 16 September 2024 in preparation for the sentencing hearing, Mr Pugh filed an updating statement, his seventh in the proceedings. It records that Connexus had now been granted access to the whole of the interior of the Property, but they were still refusing to allow full access to the outbuildings and kennels.

The Sentencing Hearing

[36]On 23 September 2024, the matter came before the judge for sentencing. Mr and Mrs Weaver appeared remotely as litigants in person at the hearing.[37]The judge found that while there had been some limited compliance, Connexus had not been able fully to inspect the outbuildings and kennels as detailed in Mr Pugh’s statement. He therefore moved to consider sentence. Regarding the intent of Mr and Mrs Weaver, he said that while he sympathised with their difficulties in complying with the injunction, his overall impression was that Mr and Mrs Weaver had chosen to be “exceedingly difficult” and had blamed Connexus for the issues and that there had been limited evidence of proper attempts to collaborate on their part.[38]The judge concluded that there were no financial orders which he could make that would persuade Mr and Mrs Weaver to comply. The judge sentenced Mr and Mrs Weaver to 14 days imprisonment, of which each would serve 7 days. The sentence was suspended for 12 months on the condition that they comply with the injunction and he ordered that in the event that they were to serve the terms of imprisonment, they were to do so at separate times so that T would not be left alone. The judge stayed the order pending any appeal.[39]On 2 October 2024, HHJ Blohm KC sitting as a High Court Judge in Bristol dismissed an erroneous application for permission to appeal on the ground that the High Court did not have jurisdiction which lay with this Court. His judgment states that permission is required to appeal the findings of contempt of court which underlie a committal sentence, but this is an error on his part as was noted by Andrews LJwhen making case management orders in relation to the appeal;see Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings and Alexander Vik [2023] EWCA Civ 191:
“[39] I agree with the provisional views expressed by Lady Justice Simler and Lord Justice Nugee. In a case where for convenience the issue of contempt is dealt with in two stages and an order making a finding of contempt is later followed by committal to prison (including a suspended sentence), the defendant has a right of appeal against the order for committal and no permission is required. The grounds of appeal in such a case are not limited to a contention that the sentence was too severe, but may include a contention that the finding of contempt was wrongly made. Either ground, if made out, means that the defendant should not have been committed. [40]……..To hold that, merely because the issue of contempt and the issue of sanction are separated in time, a defendant loses the right to challenge the finding of contempt would frustrate the legislative intention. It should make no difference whether the finding of contempt and sentence are all dealt with in one hearing, one judgment and one order, or, for what are purely practical reasons, are split into two hearings, two judgments and two orders.”
The extension of the Injunction[40]At an earlier hearing on 10 May 2024, Connexus had made an application to vary the injunction both as to its length and as to its terms. That application was adjourned to be heard at the conclusion of the committal proceedings.[41]The application was to extend the term of the injunction so as to run to the length of the tenancy.

(i) and section 9 of the Tenancy Agreement which provide:

“5. Care of Your Home You must: (i) Keep your home in a clean and tidy condition … in particular: - You must not place any item or items or allow any item to be placed in such a position (either inside or outside your home) so that access to or from your home or to and from any neighbouring Property or land is obstructed; - You must keep the garden, if you have one, in a tidy condition, free from rubbish and cultivated to a good standard. You must: (i) Keep your home in a clean and tidy condition … in particular: - You must not place any item or items or allow any item to be placed in such a position (either inside or outside your home) so that access to or from your home or to and from any neighbouring Property or land is obstructed; - You must keep the garden, if you have one, in a tidy condition, free from rubbish and cultivated to a good standard. 9. Rubbish You must dispose of all rubbish and refuse promptly and properly and not allow rubbish or other waste to accumulate in or around your home.”
[42]The judge said that Connexus had shown a prima facie entitlement to the injunction orders because it was “in effect seeking performance by the tenants of their obligations under the provisions of the tenancy agreement”. The judge went on to say that “given that [he had] no remaining optimism of belated compliance [he would] extend the injunction order as sough. The judge therefore amended the injunction to add a second paragraph requiring Mr and Mrs Weaver to “Comply with Section 2 paragraphs 5(1) and 9 of their tenancy agreement of 6 April 2009.”[43]It follows therefore that the committal proceedings were conducted against the back drop of the original general injunction requiring Mr and Mrs Weaver to comply with Section 2 paragraph 11 of their tenancy.

The Grounds of Appeal

[44]Mr and Mrs Weaver filed a document which is a combination of grounds of appeal and skeleton argument. Their grounds and argument fell broadly into three grounds: i) The judge wrongly concluded that Mr and Mrs Weaver did not allow Connexus reasonable access to the Property and should not have found them to be in breach of the injunction. ii) Mr and Mrs Weaver’s solicitor did not make all the evidence fully available to the court. iii) T was discriminated against because Connexus failed to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010.[45]During the course of their submissions Mrs Weaver became very distressed, stressing that they had not intended to breach the orders, but that they only wanted to protect T. They thought, she said, that their “reasonable adjustments” should have satisfied Connexus because of the Equality Act. They remained adamant that Connexus should not have access to the kennels. This, they explained, was not because they had anything to hide, but because of the risk of contamination and the deep distress it would cause to T. They repeated their offer of last year to allow inspection by video. The kennels, they said, are T’s last place of safety.[46]The Court went through each of the breaches on the schedule with Mr and Mrs Weaver, who explained that they felt that some of them should have only been classified as one breach as they arose from the same attempt to gain access to the Property. In respect of another, they felt there had been no breach as they had told Connexus to move the date. In general, however, the appeal is brought on the basis that there had been no breach of the terms of their tenancy as they had offered what they believed were reasonable adjustments which Connexus had wrongly refused to accept.[47]Mr Singleton in response emphasised that Connexus had no desire to cause T distress. He accepted that some breaches appeared to overlap, but each time Mr and Mrs Weaver refused access that was, he said, a separate breach. They had not, he said, been prejudiced in terms of outcome as the prison sentences were all concurrent one to the other.[48]When asked about the terms of the original injunction, Mr Singleton agreed that there would be a concern as to whether, given the breadth of the injunction, the reasonable observer would fully understand what they were actually required to do. The injunction was not, he said, challenged either when it was made or at the committal when they were represented. It followed, Mr Singleton submitted, that Connexus were entitled to rely on the injunction as drafted. It was not unusual, he told the court, for an injunction simply to require the tenancy agreement to be complied with without further detail.

Breach of the September 2023 Injunction

[49]At the heart of the dispute before the judge was the question of what amounted to reasonable access for the purposes of Section 11 of the Tenancy Agreement. In other words, did the “reasonable adjustments” sought by Mr and Mrs Weaver, whether by limiting areas of access, requiring the inspectors to wear PPE, or permitting access only via videos, satisfy the terms of the tenancy agreement or not? If not, then they were in breach of the injunction and therefore subject to committal proceedings and the potential loss of liberty which they now face.[50]The starting point must therefore be the terms of the injunction. There is a long line of authority emphasising that precision is key to the enforceability of an injunction. To take but three examples:[51]In Low v Innes (1864) 4 DeGJ&S 286, 295−296Lord Westbury LC said that the order must “lay down a clear and definite rule ... The Court .. should, in granting an injunction, see that the language of its order is such as to render quite plain what it permits and what it prohibits”.[52]In Phonographic Performance Ltd v Tsang (1985) LS Gaz 2331 Sir John Donaldson MR said that an injunction must be “expressed in terms which make it clear beyond peradventure to the defendant what he is restrained from doing.”[53]More recently in Harris v Harris [2001] 2 FLR 895 (“Harris”) Munby J said:
“288. It is an elementary principle of justice and fairness that no order will be enforced by committal unless it is expressed in clear, certain and unambiguous language. So far as this is possible, the person affected should know with complete precision what it is that he is required to do or to abstain from doing.”
[54]It is common ground that the terms of this injunction were broad and lacked precision, as the judge himself acknowledged. It must be the case that a person faced with committal proceedings is entitled to say that the terms of the injunction are not sufficiently clear and certain so as to enable them to have known what they could or could not do. Mr and Mrs Weaver did not put it that way, but what they said amounted to the same thing in that they were saying that they thought that what they were offering was reasonable in the light of their daughter’s disability. Mr and Mrs Weaver were unrepresented at two critical hearings, namely the making of the injunction and the committal sentencing hearing. As long ago as 2022 it was clear that there was always going to be an issue as to what adjustments were or were not reasonable. It was therefore, in my judgment, all the more important that the Weavers needed to know with absolute clarity and precision what they had to do in order to comply with the terms of their tenancy agreement and that there was no scope for ambiguity.[55]In my judgment, the terms of the injunction made in 2023 left room for any amount of ambiguity. For example, Mr and Mrs Weaver maintained in their skeleton argument on appeal that Connexus was not entitled to go into the outbuildings as they had built them and they were privately owned by them. That is in contradiction to the definition of “home” which requires access to outbuildings but which definition was not referred to in the injunction. This meant that these unrepresented litigants had to cross refer from section 11 back to the definition section of the tenancy agreement itself to see just what was included in section 11. Only having conducted that exercise would they understand that the outhouses and kennels that they had built and paid for, fell within the definition of “home”. Another problem was that the tenancy agreement required them to give “reasonable access”. Mr and Mrs Weaver believed that the access they were offering was reasonable in the circumstances. How could they tell from reading the tenancy agreement whether it was or not?[56]The judge expressed his reservations about the terms of the injunction as set out at [35] above. In my judgment he was right to do so, but should have gone further and fell into error in relying on the fact that the tenancy agreement “which was a contract between Mr and Mrs Weaver and Connexus” provided sufficient clarity such as to expose the Weavers to committal for breach of its terms. In my judgment, notwithstanding that Ms Yeung was not pressing the judge to say the injunction was not sufficiently clear, having recognised that that was the case himself, he should at that stage, have dismissed the application to commit.[57]The judge went on to hear Mrs Weaver and Mr Pugh each give evidence. He did not however make specific findings in relation to each of the allegations even though there was clearly a dispute as to whether what was being offered was reasonable access. As noted above, the judge did not set out the breaches in the body of the judgment, but simply made a global finding and attached a schedule of the breaches he found to be proved.[58]In Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co v Sage [2017] EWCA Civ 973 at [35], Henderson LJ said:
“I would also add that it is in my view a salutary discipline for any judge who is delivering or writing a judgment on a committal application to set out each relevant ground of committal before proceeding to consider whether it is made out on the evidence to the criminal standard of proof.”
[59]In my judgment the application to commit should have been dismissed on the basis of lack of precision in the terms of the injunction alone, but even had that not been the case, the judge fell into error in failing to consider whether each individual breach was made out, by reference to the evidence in relation to each allegation. This could have been done quite shortly by making a finding as to whether the reasonable adjustments demanded by Mr and Mrs Weaver were objectively on each occasion, reasonable when considered against the landlord’s requirement to inspect and the tenant’s obligation to permit inspection.[60]The reason why the court insists on clarity and precision in injunctions is precisely because the way they are enforced is by committal. It is one thing for a person to have signed a contract that may leave it unclear quite what his obligations are: if he gets it wrong the consequence is usually only damages. But it is another thing for a person to be ordered to do something without being quite clear what that means, where if he gets it wrong, the consequence may be prison. People shouldn’t be at risk of being sent to prison unless they are told what they must or must not do.[61]The fact that both Connexus and the judge had bent over backwards to make allowances to Mr and Mrs Weaver and that, even faced with the prospect of prison, they remain adamant that they will not allow access to the kennels, whilst undoubtedly frustrating, is not to the point. As Munby J said in Harris:
“no order will be enforced by committal unless it is expressed in clear, certain and unambiguous language”
. This injunction was anything but “clear, certain and unambiguous” and it could not therefore in law form the basis of a committal application which could result in either or both of Mr and Mrs Weaver going to prison, even for a fortnight of which they would serve a week.[62]The appeal against the findings and therefore the suspended sentence must therefore be allowed.

Complaint against the Solicitor

[63]Mr and Mrs Weaver complain that their solicitor Mr Kemp failed to adduce relevant evidence and misnumbered certain documents which meant that counsel were unable adequately to cross examine Mr Pugh.[64]In his response to this allegation, Mr Kemp explained in a statement filed on the direction of Andrews LJ that the evidence which Mr and Mrs Weaver wished to adduce related to their complaints about the neighbours and not about access to the Property. Counsel and Mr Kemp had advised Mr and Mrs Weaver to that effect and at the time Mr Kemp says, they accepted that the material should not be adduced in evidence. Mr Kemp had no recollection as to any misnumbering.[65]There is no merit in this as a basis for an appeal. Mr Kemp and Counsel quite properly gave advice which was accepted by Mr and Mrs Weaver in relation to the relevance of material concerning the overall situation with the neighbours. Further, Ms Yeung cross-examined Mr Pugh and there is no suggestion that this was in any way inhibited by any misnumbering of the bundles, a problem which is only too common where there are voluminous papers, and both counsel and the court are accustomed to dealing with any problems which arise without any prejudice to the case.[66]Although this appeal must be allowed on the basis that the injunction was insufficiently clear, it is important to consider the third Ground which, had the injunction been enforceable, would have gone to the heart of the appeal.

The Equality Act 2010

[67]The third ground which Mr and Mrs Weaver advanced is that they had done no more than seek to ensure that Connexus made reasonable adjustments in order to comply with its obligations under the Equality Act 2010. Mr and Mrs Weaver have emphasised that all they seek to do is to protect the rights of their daughter.[68]Section 20 of the Equality Act provides that, where that Act imposes a duty to make reasonable adjustments on a person, the duty comprises three requirements. For present purposes the only relevant requirement is the first one. The first requirement, which is set out in subsection (3), is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A’s puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.[69]Assuming for present purposes that the duty to make reasonable adjustments could in principle arise in the present context, it is important to note the precise terms of section 20. There has to be a “policy, criterion or practice” (“PCP”) which is apparently neutral in form but produces a particular degree of detriment for a disabled person which ought to be corrected: see McCue v Glasgow City Council [2023] UKSC 1; [2023] PTSR 220, at para 66 (Lord Sales JSC). It is not clear that in the present case there was any such PCP of Connexus.[70]In any event, if Connexus were, as Mr Singleton submitted, subject to a statutory duty to act as it did, its approach would not be a PCP of its own, but something imposed on it by the law: see para 68 in the judgment of Lord Sales. However, as Lord Sales went on to say in that paragraph, if the law confers a discretion on Connexus, it is possible for that body to adopt a PCP which is capable of falling within section 20(3).[71]Nevertheless, even then it has to be recalled that section 20(3) does not create an absolute duty to do what Mr and Mrs Weaver consider to be a reasonable adjustment. The duty is to do what is reasonable in an objective sense. On behalf of Connexus Mr Singleton submitted that it had made adjustments that were reasonable:(1) notice was given of intended inspections;(2) attempts were made to agree the appointment times, personnel to attend, the scope and purpose of the inspection; and(3) money was provided so that items such as disinfectant or PPE could be purchased.[72]The main contention for Mr and Mrs Weaver has been that Connexus did not need to conduct a personal inspection of all parts of the premises since a video recording would suffice of certain parts, in particular the kennels where T keeps her dogs. I do not accept that contention. As I have said, the duty is one to make reasonable adjustments and the Connexus had been prepared to make reasonable adjustments to what it otherwise needed to do, which was to conduct personal inspections, not least to satisfy statutory duties.[73]Ground 3 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

[74]The judge’s instinct was right when he said he would not have made an injunction in the terms in which it had been made. No doubt the focus of the court and Connexus was, for all the best of reasons, on trying to achieve a resolution to the problem. Had there been at the time of the granting of the injunction, a hearing in which it was decided what would or would not amount to reasonable access, the subsequent ping-pong match which involved going back and forward to court over many months could have been avoided. There would then have been a clear ruling, recorded on the face of the injunction, as to what was required to provide reasonable access. This would have avoided Connexus continually trying to reach a compromise in the face of Mr and Mrs Weaver’s demands for differing adjustments or their frank refusal to allow access. Failure to comply, as one suspects would have been highly likely, would have led to clear breach proceedings far sooner than was the case and the only issue would have been whether they had or had not allowed reasonable access as defined by the injunction.[75]Returning once again to Harris, the principle of justice and fairness demands that no order will be enforced by committal unless it is expressed in clear, certain and unambiguous language. The injunction upon which the application to commit was founded and upon which an order for suspended imprisonment was made, unfortunately failed to satisfy the long standing requirement for absolute precision where an injunction is made. As a consequence, the appeal must be allowed and the findings of contempt and the sentence of imprisonment be set aside.[76]I agree.[77]I also agree.

order

a) On 25 September 2023, by telephone call, the Second Defendant informed the Claimant they could not facilitate an electrical check and Property inspection appointment as pre- arranged by letter dated 18 September 2023. The Defendants requested this appointment be moved to 27 September 2023. b) On 27 September 2023, the Defendants failed to provide access to the Property. The electrical check and Property inspection appointment had been pre-arranged by a telephone conversation with the Second Defendant on 26 September 2023. c) On 6 October 2023, by email, the Defendants’ representative advised access would only be permitted on 10 October 2023 if three conditions were met. d) On 9 October 2023, the First Defendant advised the Claimant may only access the interior of the Property in the upcoming electrical check and Property inspection appointment on 10 October 2023. Subsequently, the appointment had to be cancelled by the Claimant, as access to the entirety of the Property was required for the electrical check and Property inspection appointment. e) On 16 October 2023, by email, the Defendants’ representative advised access would only be permitted on 20 October 2023 if the three conditions contained within her email dated 06 October 2023 were met. This electrical check and Property inspection appointment was prearranged by letter dated 13 October 2023. Subsequently, on 19 October 2023, the Claimant was forced to cancel the electrical check and Property inspection appointment as the conditions could not be agreed and access to the entire Property was being denied by the Defendants. f) On 25 October 2023, the Defendants’ representative challenged the Claimant’s right to full access of the Property and stated that without the three conditions previously set out being met, access would not be granted. g) On 7 December 2023, the Defendants wrote to the Claimant’s Solicitor that full access to the Property would not be granted on 18 December 2023. Full access had been requested by the Claimant’s Solicitor in order for this appointment to take place. h) On 3 May 2024, the Defendants failed to allow access to the entirety of the Property. The Defendants failed to allow the Claimant access to the rear garden of the Property for the purposes of inspection. i) On 8 May 2024, the Defendants failed to allow access to the entirety of the Property. The Defendants have failed to do so by refusing the Claimant access to the various outbuildings contained within the rear garden of the Property for the purposes of inspection.