“51. … it is not true that every single aspect of a criminal case has to be proved to the criminal standard, although of course the elements of the offence must be. 52. It is, however, the essence of a successful case of circumstantial evidence that the whole is stronger than individual parts. It becomes a net from which there is no escape. That is why a jury is often directed to avoid piecemeal consideration of a circumstantial case. … The matter is well put by Dawson J in Shepherd v The Queen(1990) 170 CLR 573 , 579-580 (but also passim): ‘the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact -- every piece of evidence -- relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, it is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately’.” ‘the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact -- every piece of evidence -- relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, it is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately’.”
“Appeal in cases of contempt of court (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie under this section from any order or decision of a court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court (including criminal contempt); and in relation to any such order or decision the provisions of this section shall have effect in substitution for any other enactment relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings.”
“34. Accordingly, it is well established that the exception to the requirement for permission to appeal is strictly limited to orders which commit a party to prison. Mr Lewis’ response to these authorities was to contend that the statement made by the judge at the end of his first judgment (see [132] set out at paragraph 9 above), that the custody threshold had been passed, was a sword of Damocles over the head of the appellant, as in Wilkinson, and the contempt decision should therefore be treated as a committal order with unfettered appeal rights. I do not accept this contention. First, this is not what the judge said. The judge merely expressed a provisional view for the benefit of Mr Nambiar, hedged with caveats because he had not heard submissions in mitigation. He passed no sentence, suspended or otherwise. Sentence was adjourned. Secondly, it is trite that appeals are against orders not judgments. The first order, made following the first judgment, was a contempt order. It made no committal order. 35. It follows that Mr Nambiar’s application for permission to appeal the contempt order, before any sanction had been imposed, was properly made, and properly treated by Males LJ as requiring permission. He required permission because the order he was challenging is not, on any view, a committal order. 36. It is unnecessary for me to reach any firm conclusion on the question whether, in the absence of that application for permission to appeal, Mr Nambiar could have used his appeal as of right against the committal order of17 March 2021 (imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment) to challenge the underlying facts or findings that gave rise to the right to impose that penalty. My provisional view is that he would have been able to do so. However, this court has not heard argument on the question, still less argument from both sides. In any event, it is not what happened. The question that now arises is what is the consequence of having sought and been refused permission to appeal the contempt order. Can Mr Nambiar have an identical second appeal?”
“5. It was not suggested that Mr Hussain needed permission for the Sentencing Appeal. Although the parties seem to have assumed that Mr Hussain did need permission for the Liability Appeal, we expressed the view at the outset of the hearing that he did not need permission for that either. That was undoubtedly the view taken by Miles J who at the end of the Liability Judgment said that Mr Hussain had the right to appeal without permission (at [397]), and who made an Order dated2 March 2022 on the handing down of that judgment which extended time for Mr Hussain ‘to appeal against the finding of contempt … and any sanction’ and (by way of contrast) for him ‘to seek permission to appeal any other part of this order’. He repeated this view at the end of the Sentencing Judgment (at [74]) where he said that Mr Hussain was entitled to appeal ‘the findings of contempt and the sentence’ without permission. 6. We did not hear any argument on the point but that seems to me to be right. ByCPR r 52.3 (1)(a)(i) a person committed to prison can appeal the committal order without permission and where, as must happen in a large number of cases, a judge makes findings of contempt and proceeds to commit the contemnor to prison on the same occasion, I consider that that entitles the contemnor to appeal, without needing permission, either the findings of contempt or the sentence or both. If that is right, it cannot make any difference that in a complex case like the present the findings of contempt are made first, and the sentencing is dealt with in a separate and subsequent hearing.”
“25. At the end of the contempt hearings, Morris J found that the appellants' conduct had been out of the norm and ordered them to pay the respondents' costs on an indemnity basis. In my judgment, any consideration of the appellants' conduct of this appeal can only lead to the same conclusion. There are three principal reasons for that conclusion. 26. First, I consider that the appellants have endeavoured to take advantage of the automatic right of appeal, referred to above, in order to prolong the proceedings and delay payment of the sums due. What is more, they have done this whilst in open defiance of numerous court orders. The automatic right to appeal is a rare exception to the usual rule that an appellant requires the permission to bring an appeal. This court must police that right carefully and be swift to mark its disapproval if it considers that its procedures are being abused. Awarding indemnity costs is one mechanism by which that can be achieved. 27. Secondly, on a proper analysis of the matters put in issue in the grounds document, it can safely be concluded that the appeal was hopeless. … . 28. As to category (a), namely matters of fact already considered and rejected by Morris J, there can be no basis for seeking to reargue them in this court. To borrow the words of Lewison LJ in Fage UK Limited v Chobani UK Limited[2014] EWCA Civ 5 at [114], the hearing in front of Morris J was not a dress rehearsal. It was the first and last night of the show. Findings of fact made by the judge below will not generally be reopened by this court. … 29. As to category (b), that is to say matters of fact and other arguments which were never raised before Morris J, the appellants' position is even more untenable. The hearing before Morris J was the time when all points, if they were relevant and had any merit, should have been raised. They were not. Some were not even in the material provided by the respondents after the end of the original hearing of the contempt applications, addressed by Morris J at [55]-[66] of the first contempt judgment. No excuse is offered as to why they were not, or why the appellants were choosing to address the detail only after the proceedings in the High Court had been concluded. It is an abuse of the process of this court to raise arguments for the first time on appeal, in circumstances where those arguments could and should have been raised before the judge below. 30. As to category (c), that is to say the matters which required fresh evidence, the appellants' conduct has been deliberately evasive. Although their solicitors suggested that they would adduce new evidence, when they were chased for it by the respondents in correspondence, the appellants' solicitors kept back-tracking and refused to engage in any sort of detailed analysis of what that evidence might be and when it would be provided. 31. It is for those reasons that I have concluded that the appellants never had any genuine intent to advance this appeal in a legitimate fashion. It was a sham from start to finish. Such conduct is a long way outside the norm, and it justifies an order for indemnity costs.”
“67. … in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified.”
“2. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled: (i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. (ii) The adverb ‘plainly’ does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. (iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. (iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him. (v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable. (vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.” (i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. (ii) The adverb ‘plainly’ does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. (iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. (iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him. (v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable. (vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
“98. … On such an appeal the question for the appeal court is whether the lower court was wrong (CPR r 52.21 (3)(a)). Where an appeal is a pure factual appeal, there are numerous recent statements of the Supreme Court and this court as to the very limited circumstances in which an appellate court can properly interfere with a factual finding. 99. Mr Counsell expressly accepted that the same applies in an appeal against a finding of contempt. He drew our attention to two matters however: first, the requisite standard is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and second that there was here no oral evidence. Both these are true but I do not think they affect the principle. So far as there being no oral evidence is concerned, the limitations on the appellate court’s ability to disturb findings of fact are not based solely on the advantage that a trial judge has of assessing witnesses who give oral evidence (although if there is oral evidence this may be an added reason). So far as the standard of proof is concerned, this means that the question is whether Miles J was ‘wrong’ to conclude that the case had been established beyond reasonable doubt. But in considering whether he was ‘wrong’ in that conclusion, I think the same applies as in any other factual appeal, namely that the appellant must point either to there being no evidence that would support the conclusion, or to some identifiable flaw in his assessment such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency or a failure to take account of some factor which materially undermines the cogency of his conclusion. What cannot be done in practice is to invite the appellate court to review all the evidence below with a view to substituting its own view of the facts. Duplicating the role of the trial judge is not the function of the appellate court, and cannot be done: FAGE (UK) Ltd v Chobani (UK) Ltd[2014] EWCA Civ 5 at [114] per Lewison LJ.”
“325. It was submitted for Mr Vik that the Court: ‘could not reject as incredible the possibility that the information signed in documents, signed as they were by Mr Vik, was incorrect, but that the evidence that he is giving to the court in relation to the 2012 sale agreement is correct.’ (transcript day 10, p77) 326. However, that submission ignores a number of matters: i) the Court's assessment of the credibility of Mr Vik's evidence generally; ii) the motive for Mr Vik to lie in relation to the Sale Agreement because if it were found to be genuine, it would have removed assets from SHI and thus (potentially) put them out of reach of enforcement by the Bank; and in relation to his evidence to this Court, a way to avoid committal for contempt; iii) the belated disclosure of the Sale Agreement and the even later disclosure of the detailed schedule; iv) the absence of contemporaneous documents to support the existence of a sale to VBI, the evidence of payments not being probative in either direction; v) the terms of the AAA. 327. The Court is also entitled to have regard to the findings of Cooke J in support of the view that the Court has reached independently of Mr Vik's credibility. Cooke J found at [356] that: ‘Mr Vik's evidence about these agreements however bears all the hallmarks of being fabricated in order to make a case and, even in the absence of evidence from Mr Meidal, I reject it.’ 328. At [386] Cooke J found that Mr Vik had fabricated an agreement: ‘I conclude that what Mr Vik has done is to seize upon the bank's failure to effect margin calculations, to seek to make capital of it and to fabricate an oral agreement with an individual who was once employed by DBS and who may now be sympathetic to his position but who was not, as he knew by the time of his statements, to be called as a witness by DBAG.’ [emphasis added] 329. Whilst noting that Cooke J was not making findings to the criminal standard this Court is entitled to take into account that evidence in assessing the credibility of Mr Vik's evidence to this Court and the genuineness of the Sale Agreement. To repeat the quotation from Shepherd in Ablyazov (set out above): ‘the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact-every piece of evidence-relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt’ [emphasis added].” ‘could not reject as incredible the possibility that the information signed in documents, signed as they were by Mr Vik, was incorrect, but that the evidence that he is giving to the court in relation to the 2012 sale agreement is correct.’ (transcript day 10, p77) i) the Court's assessment of the credibility of Mr Vik's evidence generally; ii) the motive for Mr Vik to lie in relation to the Sale Agreement because if it were found to be genuine, it would have removed assets from SHI and thus (potentially) put them out of reach of enforcement by the Bank; and in relation to his evidence to this Court, a way to avoid committal for contempt; iii) the belated disclosure of the Sale Agreement and the even later disclosure of the detailed schedule; iv) the absence of contemporaneous documents to support the existence of a sale to VBI, the evidence of payments not being probative in either direction; v) the terms of the AAA. ‘Mr Vik's evidence about these agreements however bears all the hallmarks of being fabricated in order to make a case and, even in the absence of evidence from Mr Meidal, I reject it.’ ‘I conclude that what Mr Vik has done is to seize upon the bank's failure to effect margin calculations, to seek to make capital of it and to fabricate an oral agreement with an individual who was once employed by DBS and who may now be sympathetic to his position but who was not, as he knew by the time of his statements, to be called as a witness by DBAG.’ [emphasis added] ‘the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact-every piece of evidence-relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt’ [emphasis added].”
“28. I have reached this view [that the defendant was not a credible witness] independently. But I note that I find myself in a similar position to Leggatt J, who presided over the trial which underlies the present application, and concluded: ‘18. Mr Nazarov’s evidence was wholly unreliable. While some of his evidence was undoubtedly or probably true, and occasionally candid, other parts were palpably false …’” ‘18. Mr Nazarov’s evidence was wholly unreliable. While some of his evidence was undoubtedly or probably true, and occasionally candid, other parts were palpably false …’”
“41. It was therefore submitted for Mr Vik that the Court should give evidential weight to the Connecticut Judgment in excess of Cooke J’s obiter comments.”
“79. Although the allegations of false statements in relation to the transfer of the private equity interests held by SHI in two Reiten funds and five Carlyle funds are no longer pursued by the Bank, questions were put in cross examination to Mr Vik about documents which have now been disclosed and it is relevant to the assessment of Mr Vik's general credibility to note his response to questions when faced with contemporaneous documentation which were adverse to his position.”
“86. … Whilst the particular documents at issue are not now the subject matter of the alleged false statements in these committal proceedings it is a matter which is relevant to the credibility of Mr Vik's evidence, in particular because in relation to certain of the specific allegations on this Committal Application the genuineness of other documents are [sic.] in issue.”
“95. In the circumstances where the later versions have only come to light from third parties, I do not accept any explanation that Mr Vik was unaware of the fact that these documents which were disclosed by or on his behalf were not the final versions. I am sure that this was a deliberate attempt by Mr Vik to mislead by his disclosure and his evidence to this Court that he did not know anything about the different versions and merely disclosed what he was given by Mr Johansson is a deliberate lie. Whilst this allegation is not before the Court on this Application, it is highly relevant to the credibility of Mr Vik generally and to the plausibility of arguments put forward concerning Mr Vik's actions.”
“Although DB no longer maintains an allegation that Mr Vik gave false evidence in connection with the transfers of the Partnership Interests at the Vik XX Hearing, they remain an important topic of investigation. Indeed, as noted above, they were specifically identified at [2] of the non-exhaustive schedule to theCPR 71 Order as matters in relation to which Mr Vik was required to give disclosure.”
“The fact that DB is not pursuing an allegation of contempt in connection with Mr Vik’s oral evidence about the Partnership Interests does not mean it accepts his evidence to be true.” “The fact that DB is not pursuing an allegation of contempt in connection with Mr Vik’s oral evidence about the Partnership Interests does not mean it accepts his evidence to be true.”
“122. … The answers given by Mr Vik which are alleged to be false must be interpreted in context. Once the questions are read in context it is apparent that the answers which are alleged to be false were in response to questions which were of a general nature concerning Mr Vik's knowledge of the assets in Beatrice and the Trust and it is wholly implausible that the distinction now being advanced for Mr Vik that the substance of his answers was that he had given answers about the asset class but could not provide the detail was how Mr Vik could reasonably have understood the questions or did understand the questions.”
“245. The allegations by the Bank in relation to the Devon Park Interest are ones where the inferences to be drawn from the contemporaneous documentary evidence need to be weighed against the evidence of Mr Vik.”
“332. In assessing the weight to be given to the documents concerning Devon Park which are discussed above and considering the explanations provided by Mr Vik, it is notable that the documents only came to light after Mr Vik gave evidence at the XX Hearing. 333. The evidence of Mr Vik is that the contemporaneous documents now before the Court which on their face are clearly contrary to the purported divestment by SHI to VBI of the beneficial interest were a product of mistake and/or of concealment by SHI of the true position from Devon Park for no good reason other than convenience. 334. For the reasons discussed above I prefer the evidence of the contemporaneous documents and the inferences which can be drawn from them. Whilst considering the submissions advanced by Mr Vik as to why a particular piece of evidence is not compelling or is open to a different rational or plausible explanation, the Court has to stand back and look at the totality of the ‘coincidences, errors and misunderstandings’. 335. For the reasons discussed above I do not accept that read in context Mr Vik did not understand the questions that were put to him in this regard. Further he is a highly intelligent man who is fully abreast of the issues in this litigation. 336. The irresistible inference from the contemporaneous documents is that Mr Vik had a connection to Universal in December 2015 and that he had an economic interest in the Devon Park Interest at that time. … 341. Accordingly, I find that Mr Vik deliberately gave false evidence to the Court in relation to Devon Park as follows: Mr Vik knew at the date of the Vik XX Hearing that: i) The Sale Agreement was not a bona fide agreement entered into between SHI and VBI; ii) SHI did not sell the Devon Park Interest to VBI pursuant to the Sale Agreement, nor transfer it out of SHI on VBI's instructions pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement. Instead, the Devon Park Interest remained an asset owned by SHI until29 August 2014 , when it was transferred by SHI to Universal pursuant to the terms of the AAA. iii) Mr Vik continued as at the date of the Vik XX Hearing to have a connection to Universal, in that Mr Vik continued as at the date of the Vik XX Hearing to have at least a direct (alternatively indirect) economic interest in the Devon Park Interest; and iv) Mr Vik continued to have a connection and/or involvement with the affairs or former affairs of SHI, given his continuing interest in the Devon Park Interest.”
“357. In my view there is ample material in relation to Devon Park to justify the conclusion on the bona fides of the Sale Agreement without the need to rely on the additional regulatory notifications in relation to IFA. However, there is additional material and the public filings in relation to the IFA Shares and the IFA annual report which on their face are totally inconsistent with Mr Vik's position that SHI/Mr Vik held the assets for VBI pursuant to the Sale Agreement. 358. As referred to above, Mr Vik's own evidence is that he held the IFA Shares personally from 2013 upon the liquidation of Vik Beteiligung. The notification that SHI ceased to have an interest in the IFA Shares in 2013 would appear to speak for itself and was not contradicted by Mr Vik in his evidence. Accordingly, the crux of the additional evidence in relation to the Sale Agreement and whether the IFA Shares were transferred to Universal on the instruction of VBI lie in the need to reconcile Mr Vik's evidence that he held the IFA Shares personally and not for SHI with the purported position under the Sale Agreement that the assets were held by SHI on trust for VBI and this evidence stands independently of the regulatory notifications.”
“378. The evidence in relation to the IFA Shares and the inferences to be drawn have to be taken together with the evidence in relation to Devon Park and the conclusions of the Court on Devon Park. As was said in Gulf Azov Shipping [Gulf Azov Shipping Co Ltd v Idisi[2001] EWCA Civ 21 ]: ‘It is not right to consider individual heads of contempt in isolation. They are details on a broad canvas…’ 379. For the reasons discussed above I am satisfied that Mr Vik's evidence as alleged by the Bank in relation to the IFA Shares was deliberately false. I find that Mr Vik knew at the date of the XX Hearing: i) The Sale Agreement was not a bona fide agreement entered into between SHI and VBI; and ii) SHI did not sell the IFA Shares to VBI pursuant to the Sale Agreement in 2012, nor transfer it out of SHI on VBI's instructions pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement in 2014. iii) Instead, Vik Beteiligung owned the IFA Shares until on or around29 July 2013 , when the IFA Shares were transferred from Vik Beteiligung to Mr Vik personally. Mr Vik subsequently transferred the shares to Universal in or around May 2014.” ‘It is not right to consider individual heads of contempt in isolation. They are details on a broad canvas…’ i) The Sale Agreement was not a bona fide agreement entered into between SHI and VBI; and ii) SHI did not sell the IFA Shares to VBI pursuant to the Sale Agreement in 2012, nor transfer it out of SHI on VBI's instructions pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement in 2014. iii) Instead, Vik Beteiligung owned the IFA Shares until on or around29 July 2013 , when the IFA Shares were transferred from Vik Beteiligung to Mr Vik personally. Mr Vik subsequently transferred the shares to Universal in or around May 2014.”
“411. Given that on Mr Vik’s evidence some emails were preserved, the stark overriding point is that there were no emails disclosed which were responsive to the Part 71 Order.”
“(1) For the purposes of an appeal, or an application for leave to appeal, under this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice— … (c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies. (2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence, have regard in particular to— (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.” … (c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies. (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.”
“39. … The court should first consider (as a criminal court would do) the culpability of the contemnor and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused by the breach of the order. In this regard, aggravating or mitigating factors which are likely to arise for consideration will often include some of those identified by Popplewell J in Asia Islamic Trade Finance Fund … 40. Breach of a court order is always serious, because it undermines the administration of justice. We therefore agree with the observations of Jackson LJ in Solodchenko [JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No. 2)[2011] EWCA Civ 1241 ] as to the inherent seriousness of a breach of a court order, and as to the likelihood that nothing other than a prison sentence will suffice to punish such a serious contempt of court. The length of that sentence will, of course, depend on all the circumstances of the case … However, because the maximum term is comparatively short, we do not think that the maximum can be reserved for the very worst sort of contempt which can be imagined. Rather, there will be a comparatively broad range of conduct which can fairly be regarded as falling within the most serious category and as therefore justifying a sentence at or near the maximum. 41. As the judge recognised, it may sometimes be necessary for the sentence for this form of contempt of court to include an element intended to encourage belated compliance with the court’s order. …”
“70. Taking the contempt of failing to give information as the lead content, which is thus aggravated by the failure to produce documents, the shortest term that can be passed commensurate with the seriousness of the contempts is that Mr Vik should be committed to prison for 20 months for failing to give information at the cross-examination hearing and 10 months, concurrent, for failing to produce documents. … 72. I indicate that of the total sentence of 20 months, I regard 10 months as the punitive element for the historic contempt and 10 months as the coercive element to encourage future co-operation.”
“(1) An appellant or respondent requires permission to appeal— (a) where the appeal is from a decision of a judge in the County Court or the High Court, or to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a judge in the family court, except where the appeal is against— (i) a committal order; (ii) a refusal to grant habeas corpus; or (iii) a secure accommodation order made undersection 25 of the Children Act 1989 orsection 119 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 ; or (b) as provided by Practice Directions 52A to 52E.” (a) where the appeal is from a decision of a judge in the County Court or the High Court, or to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a judge in the family court, except where the appeal is against— (i) a committal order; (ii) a refusal to grant habeas corpus; or (iii) a secure accommodation order made undersection 25 of the Children Act 1989 orsection 119 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 ; or (b) as provided by Practice Directions 52A to 52E.”