“The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Swiss Confederation, Desiring to intensify economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States, Intending to create and maintain favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, Recognizing the need to promote and protect foreign investments with the aim to foster the economic prosperity of both States. Considering the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Have agreed as follows:”
“(1) The present Agreement shall apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting Party by investors of the other Contracting Party, if the investments have been made later than1st January 1950 in accordance with the laws and regulations of the former Contracting Party. (2) The present Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties with respect to investments that are not within the scope of the Agreement.”
“For the purpose of this Agreement: (1) The term “investor” refers with regard to either Contracting Party to (a) natural persons who are nationals of that Contracting Party in accordance with its laws; (b) legal entities, including companies, corporations, business associations and other organizations, which are constituted or otherwise duly organized under the law of that Contracting Party and have their seat, together with real economic activities, in the territory of that same Contracting Party; (c) legal entities established under the law of any country which are, directly or indirectly, controlled by nationals of that Contracting Party or by legal entities having their seat, together with real economic activities, in the territory of that Contracting Party. 2) The term “investments” shall include every kind of assets and particularly: (a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem such as servitudes, mortgages, liens, pledges; (b) shares, parts or any other kinds of participation in companies; (c) claims and rights to any performance having an economic value; (d) copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, utility models, industrial designs or models, trade or service marks, trade names, indications of origin), know-how and goodwill; (e) concessions under public law, including concessions to search for, extract or exploit natural resources as well as all other rights given by law, by contract or by decision of the authority in accordance with the law. …”
“(1) An investor according to Article 1, paragraph (1), letter (c) may be required to submit proof of such control in order to be recognized by the Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has been or is to be made as an investor of the other Contracting Party.”
“Disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party (1) For the purpose of solving disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party and [without] prejudice to Article 10 of this Agreement (Disputes between Contracting Parties), consultations will take place between the parties concerned. (2) If these consultations do not result in a solution within six months, the dispute shall upon request of the investor be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. Such arbitral tribunal shall be established as follows….”
"To conclude, the Tribunal has found that Respondent breached the FET standard in Article 4(2) of the BIT through the following conduct: (i) by issuing the Bojar Letter in bad faith; (ii) by abusing its sovereign powers in order to interfere with the Commercial Arbitration; and (iii) by manifestly failing to comply with the principle of due process during the review proceedings. In particular, as a result of the latter violation, the Tribunal considers that the 2014 Resolution is not entitled to recognition under international law. By way of necessary implication, from the point of view of international law, the 2008 Award has not been cancelled."
“Loss of right to object. (1) If a party to arbitral proceedings takes part, or continues to take part, in the proceedings without making, either forthwith or within such time as is allowed by the arbitration agreement or the tribunal or by any provision of this Part, any objection— (a) that the tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction, (b) that the proceedings have been improperly conducted, (c) that there has been a failure to comply with the arbitration agreement or with any provision of this Part, or (d) that there has been any other irregularity affecting the tribunal or the proceedings, he may not raise that objection later, before the tribunal or the court, unless he shows that, at the time he took part or continued to take part in the proceedings, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection.”
“General principles. The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be construed accordingly— (a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; (b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest; (c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.”
“297. Recalcitrant parties or those who have had an award made against them often seek to delay proceedings or to avoid honouring the award by raising points on jurisdiction, etc. which they have been saving up for this purpose or which they could and should have discovered and raised at an earlier stage. Article 4 of the Model Law contains some provisions designed to combat this sort of behaviour (which does the efficiency of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution no good) and we have attempted to address the same point in this Clause….”
“vii) The allegation that Mr Stava did not hold the investments held by the tribunal to exist when the arbitration was commenced because he had transferred his interest to the Koruna Trust ("the Koruna Trust Objection"). viii) The allegation that Mr Stava did not hold the investments held by the tribunal to exist when the arbitration was commenced because he had sold his interest under the Lawbook Transaction ("the Lawbook Transaction Objection"). ix) The allegation that Diag SE was not controlled by Mr Stava, or not controlled by him from June 2011 ("the No Control Objection").”
“i) As noted in Bunge and Republic of Serbia, if the respondent to such a challenge takes the point that it was made out of time for the first time before the court, it will be too late for the challenging party to seek an extension of time from the arbitral tribunal. ii) The 1996 Act does not provide for a right to challenge the determination of the arbitral tribunal on a jurisdictional point on the basis that it was taken out of time unless it can be brought within ss.67 or 68. Section 1(c) of the 1996 Act tells against the suggestion that, without invoking s.68, a respondent to a s.67 challenge in respect of a jurisdictional challenge considered and determined on its merits can, in effect, submit to the court that the arbitral tribunal should not have entertained the objection. In considering the difficulties which might arise, it is helpful to consider the position where the arbitral tribunal upholds a jurisdictional challenge said to have been taken late. If the other party wishes to challenge that determination not on the basis that it was wrong on its merits, but that the point was taken too late, it must bring itself within s.68. iii) Where the respondent to the challenge is required to take the timing objection before the tribunal, the tribunal is able to consider not simply whether to grant an extension, but whether one is required (there being scope for dispute as to whether a challenge is a new challenge or a permissible development of one which has already been made). The tribunal will not be able to do so if the timing objection is taken for the first time in court. The policy of the 1996 Act, as reflected in s.30, is better given effect by a rule which requires a party wishing to take the timing point to do so before the arbitral tribunal. iv) A rule which requires the respondent to take the timing objection, and thereby crystallise the issue for the tribunal, reflects the essentially collaborative nature of the arbitral process, in which parties are expected to take positive steps to support the “proper conduct” of the arbitration (s.40 of the 1996 Act), and to raise any irregularities promptly during the arbitration (s.73(1)(b)-(d)).”
“Where a delay in raising a plea of incompetence is justified under the circumstances, the arbitrators may declare the plea admissible”
“intending to create and maintain favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting party in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”
“the present Agreement shall apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting Party by investors of the other Contracting Party, if the investments have been made later than1st January 1950 in accordance with the laws and regulations of the former Contracting Party.”
“The present Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties with respect to investments that are not within the scope of the Agreement.”
“For the purpose of solving disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party with respect to investments and concerning claims for breach of the substantive provisions of this Agreement at a time when the investor holds the investment ...”
“Typically under a BIT the investor is given direct standing to pursue his own claim against the state of the investment in respect of any “investment dispute”
“in practical terms means that Mr Stava cannot assert any claim herein in respect of events that occurred after June 2011” and “for the period after June 2011, there is no basis on which the Tribunal could deem Diag Human SE to be a Swiss “investor”.” (Emphasis added by the Judge).
“(i) I will refer to the objection relating to Mr Stava’s inability to claim in respect of conduct after June 2011 as the Stava June 2011 Objection (ii) I will refer to the objection relating to Diag SE’s ability to claim if it was not Swiss after June 2011 as the Diag SE June 2011 Objection.”
“The Appellant wishes to appeal paragraph 1 of the order of Mr Justice Foxton dated11 April 2024 insofar as it concerns the conclusion set out at paragraphs 145 to 147 of the judgment of Mr Justice Foxton dated8 March 2024 that the objection that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider a claim by Mr Stava in respect of conduct after June 2011 was not an objection to jurisdiction”
“The learned Judge erred when he concluded that the objection that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider a claim by Mr Stava in respect of conduct after June 2011 (“the June 2011 objection”) was not an objection to jurisdiction. In particular the Court should have held that Article 9 of the Treaty does not contain an offer to a putative investor to arbitrate a dispute or claims in respect of conduct by the State taking place after that person no longer holds the relevant investment”
“(1) The term “investor” refers with regard to either Contracting Party to (a) natural persons who are nationals of that Contracting Party in accordance with its laws; (b) legal entities, including companies, corporations, business associations and other organizations, which are constituted or otherwise duly organized under the law of that Contracting Party and have their seat, together with real economic activities, in the territory of that same Contracting Party; (c) legal entities established under the law of any country which are, directly or indirectly, controlled by nationals of that Contracting Party or by legal entities having their seat, together with real economic activities, in the territory of that Contracting Party.”
“It would be wrong to read article 31 as reflecting something like the so-called ‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation where one starts with the ordinary meaning of the words and then moves to other considerations only if the ordinary meaning would give rise to absurdity. That is not international law. The International Law Commission made clear in its commentary to the draft treaty, at p 219, that, in accordance with the established international law which these provisions of [the Vienna Convention] codified, such a sequential mode of interpretation was not contemplated: ‘The commission, by heading the article ‘General rule of interpretation’ in the singular and by underlining the connection between paras 1 and 2 and again between para 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation’.” “It would be wrong to read article 31 as reflecting something like the so-called ‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation where one starts with the ordinary meaning of the words and then moves to other considerations only if the ordinary meaning would give rise to absurdity. That is not international law. The International Law Commission made clear in its commentary to the draft treaty, at p 219, that, in accordance with the established international law which these provisions of [the Vienna Convention] codified, such a sequential mode of interpretation was not contemplated: ‘The commission, by heading the article ‘General rule of interpretation’ in the singular and by underlining the connection between paras 1 and 2 and again between para 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation’.”
“Protocol On signing the Agreement between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have, in relation to Article 1, agreed on the following clarification, which shall be regarded as an integral part of the said Agreement. (1) an investor according to Article 1, paragraph (1), letter © [sic.] may be required to submit proof of such control in order to be recognized by the Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has been or is to be made as an investor of the other Contracting Party. …” (1) an investor according to Article 1, paragraph (1), letter © [sic.] may be required to submit proof of such control in order to be recognized by the Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has been or is to be made as an investor of the other Contracting Party. …”
“Preamble The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Swiss Confederation, Desiring to intensify economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States, Intending to create and maintain favourable conditions for investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, Recognizing the need to promote and protect foreign investments with the aim to foster the economic prosperity of both States. Considering the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Have agreed as follows: …”
“330. Overall, the case law on these various provisions dealing with the concept of control demonstrates that arbitral tribunals have shown a high degree of flexibility. In order to determine control, they have, in addition to formal ownership, looked at criteria such as powers of management and operation of the investment, as well as expertise. What matters to establish control are not formal parameters, like the existence or amount of ownership, but the actual ability to direct the action of the controlled investment.”
“216. In this case, I am satisfied that Mr Stava had de facto control of Diag SE of a kind which satisfied Article 1(1)(c): i) Mr Stava was materially (and indeed determinatively) influential in the conduct of Diag SE’s business from the date it was settled into the Koruna Trust until the end of 2011 (which is the chronological limit of this review). Mr Stava, and only Mr Stava, had the relevant knowledge in relation to Diag SE’s claims. ii) The Trustee was necessarily and properly dependent on Mr Stava to conduct Diag SE’s business and was not in a position to direct him in this regard. iii) In the conduct of Diag SE’s business, it was undoubtedly Mr Stava who was ‘in charge’ and the ‘driving force’ behind Diag SE’s pursuit of its claims. iv) It was Mr Stava, not the Trustee nor the Koruna Trust, who was the source of any value in Diag SE, both in terms of establishing its business and funding its attempts to enforce the Commercial Arbitration Awards from May 2011. The success or failure of Diag SE in its business in the period under review would have inured to the benefit or detriment of Mr Stava or members of his family who, because of Mr Stava’s choice when settling the Koruna Trust, were members of the Class of Beneficiaries. In these significant respects, Mr Stava had the economic attributes of ‘ownership’ as discussed in the case law, and the national character of the capital at risk through Diag SE was essentially Swiss. v) The Trustee committed no assets to Diag SE, ran no risk in relation to its business and was not exposed to any loss. It was renumerated in the form of professional fees which on the evidence were paid by Mr Stava. In short, its role was essentially ‘managerial’, and in no meaningful sense could it be said that the national character of the capital at risk through Diag SE was that of the Trustee’s state of incorporation, Liechtenstein. vi) The effect of the matters in (i) to (v) above is as follows: a. While Mr Stava held the legal rights of control on behalf of others (see Annex 3, [61(iv)]), there was no realistic possibility of any conflict of interest between Mr Stava’s interests and those of the Koruna Trust in the conduct of Diag SE’s business (see Annex 3, [61(v)-(vii)]). b. Mr Stava had, therefore, the same scope for decision-making in fact in relation to the conduct of Diag SE’s business after June 2011, as he had when he was the owner of Diag SE. c. It was Mr Stava, rather than the Trustee, who for practical purposes held the economic attributes of ‘ownership’ for the reason set out in (iv) and (v). d. For these reasons, the position of Mr Stava in this case cannot be equated with that of a conventional director or manager of a company or an agent acting on behalf of a principal where I accept de facto control for Article 1(1)(c) purposes would be difficult to establish. The closest analogue to a conventional company director in this case is not Mr Stava. It is the Trustee. vii) The identification of the Trustee as the controller of Diag SE for Article 1(1)(c) purposes would appear to have the improbable consequence that a change in the nationality of a professional service provider would change the nationality of Diag SE and its investment treaty options (with the potential to enhance investment treaty protection or to forfeit it, even though the economic substratum of the investment was unchanged). viii) Recognising that this was an unattractive and improbable outcome, Mr Dunning KC suggested that it was not necessarily the case that a legal entity would have an Article 1(1)(c) controller. That represented something of a departure from the overall trend of the Czech Republic’s submissions that it was the Trustee who had Article 1(1)(c) control of Diag SE. It also entails that consideration of who holds the legal right of control is not determinative for Article 1(1)(c) purposes. However, if that concession has to be made, then it provides strong support for the view that Article 1(1)(c) requires consideration of the realities of factual control.” i) Mr Stava was materially (and indeed determinatively) influential in the conduct of Diag SE’s business from the date it was settled into the Koruna Trust until the end of 2011 (which is the chronological limit of this review). Mr Stava, and only Mr Stava, had the relevant knowledge in relation to Diag SE’s claims. ii) The Trustee was necessarily and properly dependent on Mr Stava to conduct Diag SE’s business and was not in a position to direct him in this regard. iii) In the conduct of Diag SE’s business, it was undoubtedly Mr Stava who was ‘in charge’ and the ‘driving force’ behind Diag SE’s pursuit of its claims. iv) It was Mr Stava, not the Trustee nor the Koruna Trust, who was the source of any value in Diag SE, both in terms of establishing its business and funding its attempts to enforce the Commercial Arbitration Awards from May 2011. The success or failure of Diag SE in its business in the period under review would have inured to the benefit or detriment of Mr Stava or members of his family who, because of Mr Stava’s choice when settling the Koruna Trust, were members of the Class of Beneficiaries. In these significant respects, Mr Stava had the economic attributes of ‘ownership’ as discussed in the case law, and the national character of the capital at risk through Diag SE was essentially Swiss. v) The Trustee committed no assets to Diag SE, ran no risk in relation to its business and was not exposed to any loss. It was renumerated in the form of professional fees which on the evidence were paid by Mr Stava. In short, its role was essentially ‘managerial’, and in no meaningful sense could it be said that the national character of the capital at risk through Diag SE was that of the Trustee’s state of incorporation, Liechtenstein. vi) The effect of the matters in (i) to (v) above is as follows: a. While Mr Stava held the legal rights of control on behalf of others (see Annex 3, [61(iv)]), there was no realistic possibility of any conflict of interest between Mr Stava’s interests and those of the Koruna Trust in the conduct of Diag SE’s business (see Annex 3, [61(v)-(vii)]). b. Mr Stava had, therefore, the same scope for decision-making in fact in relation to the conduct of Diag SE’s business after June 2011, as he had when he was the owner of Diag SE. c. It was Mr Stava, rather than the Trustee, who for practical purposes held the economic attributes of ‘ownership’ for the reason set out in (iv) and (v). d. For these reasons, the position of Mr Stava in this case cannot be equated with that of a conventional director or manager of a company or an agent acting on behalf of a principal where I accept de facto control for Article 1(1)(c) purposes would be difficult to establish. The closest analogue to a conventional company director in this case is not Mr Stava. It is the Trustee. vii) The identification of the Trustee as the controller of Diag SE for Article 1(1)(c) purposes would appear to have the improbable consequence that a change in the nationality of a professional service provider would change the nationality of Diag SE and its investment treaty options (with the potential to enhance investment treaty protection or to forfeit it, even though the economic substratum of the investment was unchanged). viii) Recognising that this was an unattractive and improbable outcome, Mr Dunning KC suggested that it was not necessarily the case that a legal entity would have an Article 1(1)(c) controller. That represented something of a departure from the overall trend of the Czech Republic’s submissions that it was the Trustee who had Article 1(1)(c) control of Diag SE. It also entails that consideration of who holds the legal right of control is not determinative for Article 1(1)(c) purposes. However, if that concession has to be made, then it provides strong support for the view that Article 1(1)(c) requires consideration of the realities of factual control.”
"Such discussion is not intended to be a complete or definitive list of relevant facts or legal argument, which will be fully developed and supported in Czech Republic's principal pleadings (e.g.in the Memorial on Jurisdiction and, if required, the Counter-Memorial on the Merits)". ii. There was some development of the "intended preliminary objections" with a view to showing that they were sufficiently arguable to merit an order for bifurcation (this being a criterion to be applied when considering whether to make an order for bifurcation identified in Glamis Gold Ltd v United States UNCITRAL Procedural Order No 2 (Revised)31 May 2005 ). In this context, the Czech Republic submitted (at [73]): "
"The claims fail the jurisdictional hurdle because Claimants' claims relate to a dispute that arose long before the BIT's entry into force, and there was never any 'investment' owned by either Claimant that was ever covered by the protections of the BIT. Further still, Claimant Diag Human SE is not a Swiss company, and its standing in this arbitration is entirely derivative of that of co-Claimant (who himself was a Czechoslovak national and became a Swiss national only mid-way through the critical 1990-1992 timeframe during which the key measures challenged by the Claimants occurred)."
"given that the 2008 Award purported to compensate Claimants for the very same harm that is at issue in [the damage to business enterprise case], Claimants in effect are seeking double compensation" ([406(c)]). When summarising the valuation of the Czech Republic's expert, the Counter-Memorial states ([407]): "
"Mr Shopp's analysis assumes that the Claimants owned 100% of Conneco. However, the record shows that Mr Stava did not own 100% of the Swiss entity, Diag Human AG (but rather held only 67% of its shares), and that Diag Human AG in turn held 80% of the shares in Conneco as of July 1992"
"Mr Oršula argued that he should be allowed to participate as a party because Conneco had assigned him a 30% interest in all claims arising out of the liability finding of the 1997 Award. This request generated multiple rounds of briefing, but the tribunal eventually rejected the request without considering the validity or scope of the assignment."
"Had I measured any damages associated with Diag Human AG, I would have allocated 66.7% of the total to Mr Stava. However, the point is moot, given that the Claimants have not been able to establish that the Disputed Conduct harmed Diag Human AG, and have not provided sufficient evidence to estimate the fair market value of Diag Human AG."
"In 2001 CONNECO had assigned 30% of any potential award to Mr Oršula. As Mr Oršula is not a named party to this arbitration, I would reduce any damages to Claimant Diag Human SE by 30%."
"The question of whether the Respondent caused the destruction of Diag Human's business in the Czech Republic was settled years ago in the Interim and Partial Awards in the commercial arbitration. It was held that the Respondent did cause that destruction. It was further held that at a minimum of CZK 326.7 million was indisputably due to the Claimants (being the sum the Respondent's own expert concluded was the loss suffered) plus interest, and that the total sum due to the Claimants would be determined by the tribunal in a further award. That total sum was then determined in the Final Award. However, the Respondent persists in the present proceedings to argue that the causal link between wrongdoing and harm has not been established. While the present dispute considers wider issues than those considered in the commercial arbitration, the critical causation as to the destruction of Diag Human's business in the Czech Republic was established in the Interim and Partial Awards."
"To accept the Respondent's case as to the effect of the Resolution would in any event contravene (i) international law (ii) the public policy of the seat and (iii) the Tribunal's obligation to render an enforceable award …. [and] reward the Respondent's abuse behaviour during the commercial arbitration … The Tribunal should not condone such behaviour in any way and to ensure that, to the extent the Respondent seeks to benefit from such behaviour … it be barred from doing so."
"despite indicating in its [RFB] that it disputed the Claimants' standing to bring the present arbitration, the Respondent has not pursued this preliminary objection in this Counter-Memorial. The Claimants have, therefore, only addressed the preliminary objections which the Respondent is pursuing."
"Mr Shopp's first report assumed that Claimants are entitled to 100% of the alleged damages. However, in 1992, Mr Stava held only a partial ownership in Diag Human AG – and, via Diag Human AG, a partial ownership in CONNECO. Diag Human SE (the predecessor in title of CONNECO) was a subsidiary of Diag Human AG, and therefore would not be entitled to any damages with respect to the 'global business enterprise'. I understand that there is a legal dispute between the parties as to the percentage of damages that Diag Human SE, a Liechtenstein entity, can claim under the Switzerland-Czech Republic BIT. The Czech Republic considers that, under the BIT, Diag Human is only entitled to the percentage of damages that would correspond to the stake that a Swiss national (Mr Stava) owned in Diag Human SE as of the valuation date (i.e. July 1992). If the Czech Republic is correct, Diag Human SE's entitlement to damages with respect to the Czech business would be limited to 53.36% . Moreover, in 2001, Diag Human SE transferred 30% of its claim in the commercial arbitration to a third party, which further reduces Diag Human SE's entitlement to damages. Finally, I understand that, in 2011, Mr Stava sold his own ownership stake in Diag Human SE.229 Accordingly, counsel for Respondent believes Mr Stava cannot claim for any losses arising after 2011. Similarly, since Diag Human SE is only entitled to claim under the BIT to the extent that it is owned by Mr Stava, it too cannot claim for any post-2011 losses."
"It is notable that the Respondent has raised new objections which were not previously raised in its Counter-Memorial, while at the same time it has refashioned some objections and abandoned others."
"They're saying the Czech Republic is barred by issue preclusion from lowering the damages estimate provided by another expert opinion, but they of course are not prevented from inflating their damages … It's a very, very interesting and selective use of issue estoppel." vii. This led one of the arbitrators, Mr Price, asked the following pertinent question: "
"If the Tribunal were to decide that it must apply issue estoppel, at a minimum, it would have to try to be even-handed in its application …" before identifying various matters the Claimants should be estopped from re-arguing, concluding: "
"Claimants' apparent purpose in raising those issues is to encourage this Tribunal to ignore the 2014 Resolution. There is no basis for the Tribunal to do so. First, Claimants have made no effort to establish that any alleged improprieties in the constitution of the Review Tribunal actually affected the outcome of the proceeding that yielded the 2014 Resolution. To the contrary, Claimants' main contention is that the 2014 Resolution was favourable to them and did not affect the validity of the 2008 Award.493 Thus, any request that the Tribunal disregard the 2014 Resolution is unjustified and incoherent. Second, Claimants have made no attempt to establish that the 2014 Resolution, which was issued by a private arbitral tribunal under Czech law, can be second-guessed or annulled by this Tribunal, even if the alleged flaws in the constitution of the Review Tribunal did exist (which they do not). It is simply not the role of this Tribunal to speculate how the Review Proceeding would have unfolded, absent the alleged flaws in the constitution of the Review Tribunal."
"It is not accepted that Mr Stava was telling the truth, or all of the truth, about …the Lawbook Transaction never having been intended to be carried through and its origins."
"Bearer shares are negotiable securities … A Liechtenstein law core principle of securities is that the physical paper not only evidences the holder's ownership rights or clams, but the claim is transferred only with the physical paper and can only be exercised by the person possessing the paper."
"Dr Batliner, you agreed with Mr Dunning that rights in bearer shares are indivisible under Liechtenstein law. In 2012 in Liechtenstein, in general, how would you transfer ownership of bearer shares"? (emphasis added). Dr Batliner replied, "handing them over"
"Well, one remark. I mean handing them over, it would be distinguished between an obligation or a contract; it's the basis and disposal is the handing over. There are two transactions, one is --- you need to have a contractual basis and the one is the handing over."