“32.—(1) In the specific cases and circumstances laid down in this regulation, contracting authorities may award public contracts by a negotiated procedure without prior publication. General grounds (2) The negotiated procedure without prior publication may be used for public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in any of the following cases:— … (c) insofar as is strictly necessary where, for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting authority, the time limits for the open or restricted procedures or competitive procedures with negotiation cannot be complied with. … (4) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(c), the circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency [must] not in any event be attributable to the contracting authority.”
“They [the pursuers] rely upon the shortest possible period for tendering under the accelerated restricted procedure. However, these periods are only one element in a heavily regulated tendering exercise. Time requires to be taken in relation to, amongst other things, the preparation of offers, the appointment of examiners, and the consideration of tenders and tenderers. The judge heard evidence on the time which the tender process under the accelerated restricted procedure usually takes. He was entitled to have regard to this when he made his findings fact.”
“For the reasons set out above, in my judgment, the Defendant was entitled to rely on Regulation 32(2)(c) of the PCR 2015 in awarding the Contract to Public First: i) the extreme urgency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was unforeseeable, unpredictable and not attributable to the Defendant; ii) the Defendant determined that it needed additional qualitative research carried out immediately to inform its policy and strategy on public communications in response to the pandemic; iii) the time limits for a conventional public procurement could not be complied with and would not have generated a contract for the services that were needed immediately; iv) procuring the services under the Contract was strictly necessary; the Defendant decided that it needed such services as part of its response to the Covid-19 pandemic and failure to provide effective communication of the message necessary to change public behaviour would have put at risk the health of the public.”
“Principles of procurement 18. — (1) Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. (2) The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Part or of artificially narrowing competition. (3) For that purpose, competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators.”
“Conflicts of interest 24. — (1) Contracting authorities shall take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest arising in the conduct of procurement procedures so as to avoid any distortion of competition and to ensure equal treatment of all economic operators. (2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), the concept of conflicts of interest shall at least cover any situation where relevant staff members have, directly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest which might be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement procedure. (3) In paragraph (2) — “relevant staff members” means staff members of the contracting authority, or of a procurement service provider acting on behalf of the contracting authority, who are involved in the conduct of the procurement procedure or may influence the outcome of that procedure; and “procurement service provider” means a public or private body which offers ancillary purchasing activities on the market.”
“The fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Defendant, in choosing to award the Contract to [Public First], and in deciding to award [Public First] a contract with a value of£840,000 , was biased in favour of [Public First], in the light of: (i) The longstanding and close personal and professional connections between (a) [Public First’s] directors and owners and (b) the Rt Hon Mr Gove, Mr Cummings and the Conservative Party…; (ii) The decision to award the Contract to [Public First] without any form of competition; (iii) The ability of other providers, such as YouGov PLC and the Kantar Group, to provide the Contract services; and (iv) The extremely high price of the Contract (£840,000 ) for only 6 months’ focus group and communications services.”
“….. public law has returned to the broad highway of due process across the full range of justiciable decision-making. One effect is that the maxim audi alteram partem is not to be regarded as a free-standing principle covering only proceedings in which there can be said to be sides or parties, but is one application of the wider principle that all relevant matters must be taken into account.”
“…It would have been utterly impractical to instruct someone else. The assumption was that we should use the existing researchers. When I receive a request, I consider how best to deliver it. Because Public First were already in place, with focus groups set up and they were trusted by No. 10, it was reasonable in the circumstances to ask them to continue. It was the most efficient and value for money way of getting desperately needed research urgently.”
"… in my view only two companies in the market had the scale and expertise to provide these services in March 2020, being Public First and Britain Thinks. Both were ultimately needed to provide COVID-19 qualitative research services given the scale of the research sought. Both had the ability to understand a tricky and sensitive brief and how government narrative and policy is made. They were trusted and known to be capable of debriefing under pressure, including to very senior special advisors. Significantly they were both already doing work for the government at the point when the Covid-19 crisis first hit, Public First for us and Britain Thinks for the Department of Health and Social Care ("
“[On 27 and28 February 2020 ] … [i]nfection rates were rising, people were dying and research would be instrumental in helping the government decide the best response to the crisis… By this stage [early March 2020], decisions on Covid-19 were being taken in the space of a day or two and dealt with questions of life or death. We were working 7 days a week. Writing the requirements would have taken up time we did not have… …In March and April 2020, I worked 51 days without a break. For much of this I spent every morning 7 days a week writing reports on the quantitative and qualitative research that was being fed back to us overnight….We were having to get to grips with fundamental changes in our personal and professional lives wrought by the crisis, particularly when schools closed and we were instructed to stay at home… In my position I had additional insight to the scale of the unfolding crisis and its potential impact on the public at large because we saw data and tested policies and messages before they were released. Some of the issues we dealt with were bleak, including the increasing death rate, the preparation of hospitals for mass admittances and arrangements for dealing with widespread deaths. There was an increasing sense that the NHS would not be able to cope. It was a very difficult time…”
“It is important to remember that the situation in respect of coronavirus was developing and evolving almost on a daily basis. The government was required to rapidly communicate information of vital importance as the virus spread... At the peak there were days that I was working 15 hours a day, which spilled over into non-work days and weekends.”
“We were working flat out – we had rotas for 24 hour and weekend cover. We also had to deal as individuals with several new challenges in March 2020 such as working remotely (and managing people remotely, as I was) and with the impact of Covid-19 and the lockdown on our personal lives.”
“Moreover, throughout this period [March 2020] the level of activity going through the CCS sourcing teams (who finalise and formalise the contractual paperwork) was extreme. CCS was involved in sourcing ventilators, repatriation flights, testing labs, hotels for rough sleepers and a whole range of other Covid-19 related goods and services on an urgent basis... We all suddenly had to work remotely and manage factors such as school closures, and in some cases illness with Covid-19, among our teams, as well as an extreme workload... A 6-month direct award, pending re-procurement via a competition, seemed appropriate at the time when it was unclear how the crisis was going to develop. For context, in early April 2020 we had only just reached the first peak of Covid-19 cases in the UK. On8 April 2020 , the highest daily death rate in 24 hours was recorded at 1,000 deaths. This was still a highly uncertain time... The parties who would have been involved in the competition … were fully engaged – everyone was working flat out. Cabinet Office stakeholders were working around the clock on research, communications and advertising for the Covid-19 communications campaign.”