“16. […] As regards rule 29(7), Laddie J in Telsonic AG's Patent [2004] R.P.C. 38 § 26 said that: ‘Reference numerals … are designed to be, and can be, useful tools to elucidate the inventor's intention. As such they may, depending on the circumstances, help to illustrate that the inventor intended a wide or narrow scope for his claim. On the other hand they cannot be used to import into the claim restrictions which are not foreshadowed by the language of the claim itself.’ 17. We think that is not quite right. In particular we do not think that numerals should influence the construction of the claim at all - they do not illustrate whether the inventor intended a wide or narrow meaning. The patentee is told by the rule that if he puts numerals into his claim they will not be used to limit it. If the court subsequently pays attention to the numbers to limit the claim that is simply not fair. And patentees would wisely refrain from inserting numbers in case they were used against them. That is not to say that numbers are pointless. They help a real reader orient himself at the stage when he is trying to get the general notion of what the patent is about. He can see where in the specific embodiment a particular claim element is, but no more. Once one comes to construe the claim, it must be construed as if the numbers were not part of it. To give an analogy, the numbers help you get the map the right way up, they do not help you to read it to find out exactly where you are. ” 38. Paragraph 69 of the judgment is the start of the judge’s consideration of this issue. He approaches the issue by first putting to one side an argument about whether Quintel was relevant to this issue and focussing first on the language of claim 1. It is set out below but for the purposes of argument I have divided the paragraph into four parts and labelled each part (a) to (d): “(a) Before I deal with the submissions as to the relevance of the full patent specification in Quintel, I will consider the submissions based on the language used in the Patent itself. I will start with the wording of claim 1. This describes a socket and a plug. It refers to "the presence of a plug inserted in the socket". The presence of the plug is detected by the socket detector. (b) Claim 1 says that the socket detector includes that which is numbered 45 and 46. The numbers are obviously references to the drawings and, in particular, Figure 3. Accordingly, simply to understand what is referred to in claim 1, it is necessary to refer to the drawings which show the location of the detectors numbered 45 and 46. Figure 3 shows the detectors numbered 45 and 46 at the bottom of the holes which receive the pins of the plug. (c) Claim 1 goes on to provide that the plug detectors (45 and 46) are formed so as to detect the presence of "two contact pins" (53 and 54) of the plug in the socket. The contact pins, 53 and 54, are simply the pins of the plug. The natural reading of claim 1 is that it is describing detection which occurs when the contact pins make contact with the detectors at 45 and 46. That means that the pins of the plug must be inserted so that they make contact with the detectors. There was no technical evidence to the effect that the detectors detect the pins of the plug as they approach the detectors as distinct from when they touch the detectors. In this way, the words "inserted in the socket" and "the plug in the socket" are referring to a state of affairs where the pins of the plug are in contact with the detectors of the pins of the plug and that requires a degree of insertion which brings the pins into contact with the plug detectors. (d) In addition, the natural meaning of the words "inserted in the socket", using the past participle, suggests that the plug has been fully inserted rather than partially inserted although that sense might not have been the only possible reading if there were other wording to contradict the natural meaning.” 39. The appellants make no complaint about part (a) but they argue that in part (b) the judge falls into error because he there takes the reference numerals into account in construing claim 1. I was initially attracted by the appellants’ argument when I first read this paragraph but on closer examination I believe the respondent is correct that there is no such error here at all. In part (a) the judge rightly indicates that he is going to start with the language of claim 1. What is happening in part (b) is that the judge is orienting himself, seeking to understand claim 1 by examining how the claim relates to the illustrated embodiment in the patent. He is right and entitled to do so and there is nothing wrong with using the reference numerals to describe how the claim works by reference to the figure. 40. The respondent argues that what the judge does next, at part (c), is to address what the language of claim 1 provides, and what a natural reading of that language amounts to, taking into account a point on technical evidence (or lack of it). Then at (d) the judge supports his finding at (c) with an additional point also based on the language. The respondent says this is not a ruling based on what is in the drawing, it is a decision based on the natural reading of the language of the claim. I agree with the respondent. In parts (c) and (d) of paragraph 69 the judge is not committing the mistake identified in Virgin . He is doing the opposite, having seen how the claim reads onto the embodiment he then returns to the language of the claim and construes it. Moreover I agree with the judge’s reasoning in parts (c) and (d). The natural way to read the references in the claim to a plug “inserted in the socket” is to a plug which has been plugged in, i.e. fully inserted. It is not talking about a plug being detected as it is being inserted, it is detecting a plug which has been inserted into the socket. 41. Of course, as the judge had clearly observed, the apparatus in figure 3 does operate by detecting full insertion of the plug. A different point is whether the judge committed the error of reading a narrowing limitation into the claim from the description in the patent, irrespective of any issue about reference numerals. However I do not accept that criticism either. For one thing, at paragraph 65 the judge expressly reminded himself of the observation in Adaptive Spectrum that claims may be narrower or wider than embodiments. Nor is there any basis for a case that the judge may have stated the law correctly but did not apply it. Paragraph 69 starts and ends with the claim language itself and then in the remainder of this part of the judgment the judge examines how the claim stands by reference to the rest of the claims and the rest of the specification. This is not an exercise of reading a limitation from one embodiment into the claim. 42. At paragraph 70 the judge compares his reading of claim 1 to see if it is consistent with other claims. The particular question was about claim 5. The point was that claim 5 (with claim 4) requires there to be a detector in the socket which detects the plug casing a minimum distance from the socket. So one could have a set up in which a relatively large minimum distance meant that the casing detector could detect a plug without that plug being inserted fully into the socket. The judge held that this did not detract from his conclusion that claim 1 required full insertion. I agree. The casing detector is there to allow the socket to distinguish between an authentic plug and, for example, the insertion of two safety pins by a child. The fact that the casing detector may be triggered when a plug is not fully inserted tells you nothing about how the pin detectors have to work. 43. At paragraph 71 the judge deals with the description of the patent, notes that the terms “plugged in” and “inserted” are used on numerous occasions and holds that the natural meaning of them is that the plug is fully plugged in. I will refer to an example. At the outset, in paragraph [0002] the patent describes an apparatus which has a socket into which the passenger’s electrical device is “plugged in so that the device can be connected to the supply voltage”
“On that basis, claim 1 and, indeed, the other claims do not appear expressly to deal with the possibility referred to in paragraph [0032].” 47. In other words the judge was holding that what might be disclosed implicitly in [0032] as a possibility was not within claim 1 in any event. The appellants contend that this is another error by the judge in that, first the judge ought to have held that detectors which detect pins without full insertion was actually disclosed by paragraph [0032] and second that this supported their case that claim 1 was not limited to full insertion. The respondent supports the judge’s findings on disclosure and interpretation and also argues under the respondent’s notice that there was no evidence that paragraph [0032] did in fact disclose a system which necessarily would fall outside claim 1 on the judge’s construction. 48. The respondent is correct that there was no technical evidence from either expert to describe how the alternative in paragraph [0032] could or would necessarily work. Counsel submitted that without that evidence the appellants’ case was flawed. He supported his point with a submission that even without that evidence one could see that a switch could be arranged to the side of a plug hole in a manner whereby what it detected was full insertion. To achieve that you mount the switch to the side and at the bottom. 49. Having had the benefit of the assistance of the experts the judge was in a good position to read and interpret the patent. However like the judge I am not prepared to go further than seeing that the passage the appellants rely on might disclose an arrangement which detects partially inserted plugs rather than fully inserted plugs, but then again it might not. The passage certainly does not spell out that that is how it works nor is it clear that that must inevitably be how the alternative arrangement functions. If the disclosure had been clearer then no doubt expert evidence would not have been needed but without it the appellants’ case on this aspect founders. The words as they stand do not provide sufficient support for a conclusion that the inventors were here specifically describing a system which detected partial insertion such that the skilled person would be caused to think that had an impact on their interpretation of claim 1. There is no error in paragraphs 72 to 74. 50. In a related but distinct submission, the appellants submit that the judge also erred by failing to appreciate that the purpose of the invention overall, irrespective of paragraph [0032], does not require the detector to detect full insertion of the plug. As part of this submission the appellants contend that the purpose of the invention, based on paragraphs [0006] to [0012] of the patent, is to create a voltage supply apparatus for aeroplane cabins which ensures increased safety against incorrect application of the supply voltage to the socket. 51. The appellants are right that the judgment does not address this submission about purpose, at least in the context of the construction of “inserted”
“Based on the above considerations, I conclude that claim 1 requires the insertion of a plug in a socket to such an extent that the tips of the pins of the socket make contact with the plug detectors at 45 and 46. I do not think that state of affairs is satisfied by any partial insertion of a plug short of that. […] ” 54. I believe the judge was right in this conclusion for the reasons he gave. 55. The judge then went on to address the respondent’s further argument that Quintel supported their case on “inserted”
“In [Quintel], on which the introductory clause of claim 1 is based, a voltage supply apparatus is described that comprises a socket and a supply device that is arranged away from the socket. The socket and the supply device are connected to each other via signal lines for the transfer of signals and power supply cables for the transfer of power. The socket has a plug detector that detects the presence of the plug casing at the socket. The detection supply voltage via the supply cables to the socket, if the presence of the plug is signalled to the supply device via the signal lines.” 58. The judge held that while this passage was consistent with the plug being fully inserted, there was nothing here which spelled out the method of detection in Quintel, and it could not be said with complete confidence from reading this passage alone that Quintel required full insertion. I agree. 59. The judge then turned to the submission put to him by the patentee that the court should consider not just what the patent says about Quintel, but Quintel itself, and that if one did so then one would see it did require full insertion. The judge rejected that, accepting the appellants’ case that there was no principle of law which required a finding that a skilled reader of the patent would obtain and consider the full specification and take it into account in construing the patent. The cases cited by the appellants before the judge, on which he based his conclusion were Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Eurocell Building Plastics Ltd[2005] RPC 7 per Lewison J at [73] (not affected by anything said on appeal in that case at[2005] EWCA Civ 761 ), Adaptive Spectrum and Signal Alignment Inc v BT at [110] (which cited the relevant statement of Lewison J in Ultraframe ) and Akebia Therapeutics Inc v Fibrogen Inc[2020] EWHC 866 (Pat) per Arnold LJ (sitting at first instance) at [218]. The judge was also shown Virgin Atlantic v Premium Aircraft at [21]. 60. Before us the respondent contends that the judge here erred in law, and also contends that what I said about this on appeal in FibroGen Inc v. Akebia Therapeutics Inc. and or s[2021] EWCA Civ 1279 at paragraphs 145-148 was at odds with paragraph [218] of the first instance judgment in that case which had been cited below. The respondent maintained that the right approach in law meant that Quintel would be read. The appellants supported the judge’s conclusions on this aspect. 61. The law as it currently stands when one is dealing with a reference to another document in a patent specification is that what matters is the way in which the reference to that other document in the patent would be understood by the skilled reader ( Adaptive Signal paragraph [110] citing Ultraframe ). The issue in Fibrogen was about the quality of the cross-reference in that case and in that sense it therefore made no difference to the principle approved in Adaptive Signal . I also said in Fibrogen that I preferred not to resolve the issue but wait for a case in which it mattered. 62. In the present case, given that there is no reason for the skilled reader to think Quintel itself has a bearing on the question of insertion, the judge’s approach was an orthodox application of the law as it stands. Since it cannot assist the appellants I do not propose to examine the issue any further but prefer to take the same course as I took in Fibrogen and leave the question to be addressed in a case in which it actually matters. 63. I would therefore dismiss this appeal on construction issue 1. Construction issue 2 - remotely 64. I turn to the question of the meaning of the phrase “a supply device being provided remotely from the socket” in claim 1. The judge held it meant that the supply device is “kept away” from the socket and “arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger”
“[0010] Due to separate and remote locating of supply device and socket, the supply device, which may be carrying mains voltage, is kept away from the actual power drawing point, namely the socket. The supply device can then be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger for the passenger. Therefore, under normal circumstances, i.e. non-use of the socket, there is only a small signal voltage over the lines between the supply device and socket but not, however, the supply voltage. The supply cables, that are arranged at the seat, therefore only carry a supply voltage if an electrical device is actually connected. In the unused state, the supply cables are free from a supply voltage and therefore do not represent a source of danger for persons.” 69. In the first two sentences this passage explicitly explains what the purpose of the “separate and remote” location of the supply device relative to the socket is. The purpose is to keep the supply device, which may be carrying mains voltage, away from the socket, so that the supply device can be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. These passages make clear that remoteness of the supply device is something to arrange over and above separateness. As the judge put it in paragraph 86, the appellants’ case gives no distinct meaning to the word remote and seeks to equate it with separate. 70. The appellants are correct on appeal that the purpose of the invention is not concerned with the precise location of the supply device but that does not justify a conclusion that the supply device only has to be separated from the socket and could be located anywhere, even very close to the socket. The purpose of this aspect of the invention is to keep the supply device away from the socket and arrange things in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. 71. Before this court the appellants also made a complicated point about supply cables. The argument is that the only source of danger expressly referred to in paragraph [0010] is supply cables. However, say the appellants, the supply cables referred to in that paragraph are only the ones running from the supply device to the socket (item 20 in fig 1). Any danger from these is not mitigated by moving the supply device further away from the socket (or from the passenger). What is true is that there are other supply cables, which supply power to the supply device (item 29 in fig 1) and these can be regarded as always live. It is also true that moving the supply device further away moves these other supply cables further from the passenger, but the appellants say that is not what paragraph [0010] is talking about. 72. I do not accept this submission, which reads too much into the latter half of paragraph [0010]. The appellants are right that the supply cables referred to there are the ones between the supply device and the socket, and those are one source of danger to the passenger, but none of this justifies qualifying the generality of the explanation at the start of paragraph [0010] that moving the supply device away from the socket allows things to be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. 73. Moreover, contrary to another aspect of the appellants’ case, the judge did not reach his conclusion on construction by reference to the drenching problem. Paragraph 90 of the judgment notes that the patent itself does not refer to the drenching problem and also holds that there is no need to decide at that stage if the risk of drenching was part of the common general knowledge. 74. Finally on Quintel, like the judge (paragraph 90), I am able to reach a conclusion on this issue without going beyond what the patent itself says about that in paragraph [0005]. 75. That leaves the question of uncertainty. The appellants’ case on that is hopeless. I can do no better that quote paragraph 94 of the judgment, all of which I agree with: “94. In the present case, I do not consider that there is any conceptual uncertainty in the references to remoteness in the Patent. The concept involved is in fact quite clear. The concept is that the supply device must be kept away from the socket and, as a result, the supply device will be kept away from the passenger who is intended to have access to the socket. The purpose of keeping the supply device away from the passenger is so that there will not be a risk of something happening to the supply device which would cause a problem, such as a short circuit or an electric shock being administered to the passenger. What the Patent does not spell out, I think deliberately, is what design option should be chosen to advance the achievement of the object. However, it is permissible for the Patent to leave that choice to the individual skilled person implementing the Patent. As explained in Anan Kasei , referring to earlier cases, a patent is not insufficient for uncertainty just because the boundary of the monopoly claimed is a “fuzzy boundary”
“(a) Before I deal with the submissions as to the relevance of the full patent specification in Quintel, I will consider the submissions based on the language used in the Patent itself. I will start with the wording of claim 1. This describes a socket and a plug. It refers to "the presence of a plug inserted in the socket". The presence of the plug is detected by the socket detector. (b) Claim 1 says that the socket detector includes that which is numbered 45 and 46. The numbers are obviously references to the drawings and, in particular, Figure 3. Accordingly, simply to understand what is referred to in claim 1, it is necessary to refer to the drawings which show the location of the detectors numbered 45 and 46. Figure 3 shows the detectors numbered 45 and 46 at the bottom of the holes which receive the pins of the plug. (c) Claim 1 goes on to provide that the plug detectors (45 and 46) are formed so as to detect the presence of "two contact pins" (53 and 54) of the plug in the socket. The contact pins, 53 and 54, are simply the pins of the plug. The natural reading of claim 1 is that it is describing detection which occurs when the contact pins make contact with the detectors at 45 and 46. That means that the pins of the plug must be inserted so that they make contact with the detectors. There was no technical evidence to the effect that the detectors detect the pins of the plug as they approach the detectors as distinct from when they touch the detectors. In this way, the words "inserted in the socket" and "the plug in the socket" are referring to a state of affairs where the pins of the plug are in contact with the detectors of the pins of the plug and that requires a degree of insertion which brings the pins into contact with the plug detectors. (d) In addition, the natural meaning of the words "inserted in the socket", using the past participle, suggests that the plug has been fully inserted rather than partially inserted although that sense might not have been the only possible reading if there were other wording to contradict the natural meaning.” 39. The appellants make no complaint about part (a) but they argue that in part (b) the judge falls into error because he there takes the reference numerals into account in construing claim 1. I was initially attracted by the appellants’ argument when I first read this paragraph but on closer examination I believe the respondent is correct that there is no such error here at all. In part (a) the judge rightly indicates that he is going to start with the language of claim 1. What is happening in part (b) is that the judge is orienting himself, seeking to understand claim 1 by examining how the claim relates to the illustrated embodiment in the patent. He is right and entitled to do so and there is nothing wrong with using the reference numerals to describe how the claim works by reference to the figure. 40. The respondent argues that what the judge does next, at part (c), is to address what the language of claim 1 provides, and what a natural reading of that language amounts to, taking into account a point on technical evidence (or lack of it). Then at (d) the judge supports his finding at (c) with an additional point also based on the language. The respondent says this is not a ruling based on what is in the drawing, it is a decision based on the natural reading of the language of the claim. I agree with the respondent. In parts (c) and (d) of paragraph 69 the judge is not committing the mistake identified in Virgin . He is doing the opposite, having seen how the claim reads onto the embodiment he then returns to the language of the claim and construes it. Moreover I agree with the judge’s reasoning in parts (c) and (d). The natural way to read the references in the claim to a plug “inserted in the socket” is to a plug which has been plugged in, i.e. fully inserted. It is not talking about a plug being detected as it is being inserted, it is detecting a plug which has been inserted into the socket. 41. Of course, as the judge had clearly observed, the apparatus in figure 3 does operate by detecting full insertion of the plug. A different point is whether the judge committed the error of reading a narrowing limitation into the claim from the description in the patent, irrespective of any issue about reference numerals. However I do not accept that criticism either. For one thing, at paragraph 65 the judge expressly reminded himself of the observation in Adaptive Spectrum that claims may be narrower or wider than embodiments. Nor is there any basis for a case that the judge may have stated the law correctly but did not apply it. Paragraph 69 starts and ends with the claim language itself and then in the remainder of this part of the judgment the judge examines how the claim stands by reference to the rest of the claims and the rest of the specification. This is not an exercise of reading a limitation from one embodiment into the claim. 42. At paragraph 70 the judge compares his reading of claim 1 to see if it is consistent with other claims. The particular question was about claim 5. The point was that claim 5 (with claim 4) requires there to be a detector in the socket which detects the plug casing a minimum distance from the socket. So one could have a set up in which a relatively large minimum distance meant that the casing detector could detect a plug without that plug being inserted fully into the socket. The judge held that this did not detract from his conclusion that claim 1 required full insertion. I agree. The casing detector is there to allow the socket to distinguish between an authentic plug and, for example, the insertion of two safety pins by a child. The fact that the casing detector may be triggered when a plug is not fully inserted tells you nothing about how the pin detectors have to work. 43. At paragraph 71 the judge deals with the description of the patent, notes that the terms “plugged in” and “inserted” are used on numerous occasions and holds that the natural meaning of them is that the plug is fully plugged in. I will refer to an example. At the outset, in paragraph [0002] the patent describes an apparatus which has a socket into which the passenger’s electrical device is “plugged in so that the device can be connected to the supply voltage”
“On that basis, claim 1 and, indeed, the other claims do not appear expressly to deal with the possibility referred to in paragraph [0032].” 47. In other words the judge was holding that what might be disclosed implicitly in [0032] as a possibility was not within claim 1 in any event. The appellants contend that this is another error by the judge in that, first the judge ought to have held that detectors which detect pins without full insertion was actually disclosed by paragraph [0032] and second that this supported their case that claim 1 was not limited to full insertion. The respondent supports the judge’s findings on disclosure and interpretation and also argues under the respondent’s notice that there was no evidence that paragraph [0032] did in fact disclose a system which necessarily would fall outside claim 1 on the judge’s construction. 48. The respondent is correct that there was no technical evidence from either expert to describe how the alternative in paragraph [0032] could or would necessarily work. Counsel submitted that without that evidence the appellants’ case was flawed. He supported his point with a submission that even without that evidence one could see that a switch could be arranged to the side of a plug hole in a manner whereby what it detected was full insertion. To achieve that you mount the switch to the side and at the bottom. 49. Having had the benefit of the assistance of the experts the judge was in a good position to read and interpret the patent. However like the judge I am not prepared to go further than seeing that the passage the appellants rely on might disclose an arrangement which detects partially inserted plugs rather than fully inserted plugs, but then again it might not. The passage certainly does not spell out that that is how it works nor is it clear that that must inevitably be how the alternative arrangement functions. If the disclosure had been clearer then no doubt expert evidence would not have been needed but without it the appellants’ case on this aspect founders. The words as they stand do not provide sufficient support for a conclusion that the inventors were here specifically describing a system which detected partial insertion such that the skilled person would be caused to think that had an impact on their interpretation of claim 1. There is no error in paragraphs 72 to 74. 50. In a related but distinct submission, the appellants submit that the judge also erred by failing to appreciate that the purpose of the invention overall, irrespective of paragraph [0032], does not require the detector to detect full insertion of the plug. As part of this submission the appellants contend that the purpose of the invention, based on paragraphs [0006] to [0012] of the patent, is to create a voltage supply apparatus for aeroplane cabins which ensures increased safety against incorrect application of the supply voltage to the socket. 51. The appellants are right that the judgment does not address this submission about purpose, at least in the context of the construction of “inserted”
“[0010] Due to separate and remote locating of supply device and socket, the supply device, which may be carrying mains voltage, is kept away from the actual power drawing point, namely the socket. The supply device can then be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger for the passenger. Therefore, under normal circumstances, i.e. non-use of the socket, there is only a small signal voltage over the lines between the supply device and socket but not, however, the supply voltage. The supply cables, that are arranged at the seat, therefore only carry a supply voltage if an electrical device is actually connected. In the unused state, the supply cables are free from a supply voltage and therefore do not represent a source of danger for persons.” 69. In the first two sentences this passage explicitly explains what the purpose of the “separate and remote” location of the supply device relative to the socket is. The purpose is to keep the supply device, which may be carrying mains voltage, away from the socket, so that the supply device can be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. These passages make clear that remoteness of the supply device is something to arrange over and above separateness. As the judge put it in paragraph 86, the appellants’ case gives no distinct meaning to the word remote and seeks to equate it with separate. 70. The appellants are correct on appeal that the purpose of the invention is not concerned with the precise location of the supply device but that does not justify a conclusion that the supply device only has to be separated from the socket and could be located anywhere, even very close to the socket. The purpose of this aspect of the invention is to keep the supply device away from the socket and arrange things in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. 71. Before this court the appellants also made a complicated point about supply cables. The argument is that the only source of danger expressly referred to in paragraph [0010] is supply cables. However, say the appellants, the supply cables referred to in that paragraph are only the ones running from the supply device to the socket (item 20 in fig 1). Any danger from these is not mitigated by moving the supply device further away from the socket (or from the passenger). What is true is that there are other supply cables, which supply power to the supply device (item 29 in fig 1) and these can be regarded as always live. It is also true that moving the supply device further away moves these other supply cables further from the passenger, but the appellants say that is not what paragraph [0010] is talking about. 72. I do not accept this submission, which reads too much into the latter half of paragraph [0010]. The appellants are right that the supply cables referred to there are the ones between the supply device and the socket, and those are one source of danger to the passenger, but none of this justifies qualifying the generality of the explanation at the start of paragraph [0010] that moving the supply device away from the socket allows things to be arranged in such a way that there is no source of danger to the passenger. 73. Moreover, contrary to another aspect of the appellants’ case, the judge did not reach his conclusion on construction by reference to the drenching problem. Paragraph 90 of the judgment notes that the patent itself does not refer to the drenching problem and also holds that there is no need to decide at that stage if the risk of drenching was part of the common general knowledge. 74. Finally on Quintel, like the judge (paragraph 90), I am able to reach a conclusion on this issue without going beyond what the patent itself says about that in paragraph [0005]. 75. That leaves the question of uncertainty. The appellants’ case on that is hopeless. I can do no better that quote paragraph 94 of the judgment, all of which I agree with: “94. In the present case, I do not consider that there is any conceptual uncertainty in the references to remoteness in the Patent. The concept involved is in fact quite clear. The concept is that the supply device must be kept away from the socket and, as a result, the supply device will be kept away from the passenger who is intended to have access to the socket. The purpose of keeping the supply device away from the passenger is so that there will not be a risk of something happening to the supply device which would cause a problem, such as a short circuit or an electric shock being administered to the passenger. What the Patent does not spell out, I think deliberately, is what design option should be chosen to advance the achievement of the object. However, it is permissible for the Patent to leave that choice to the individual skilled person implementing the Patent. As explained in Anan Kasei , referring to earlier cases, a patent is not insufficient for uncertainty just because the boundary of the monopoly claimed is a “fuzzy boundary”