“18. The fact-finding judgment that I provided in these proceedings contains graphic, detailed accounts of sexual abuse, as well as detailed sexualised correspondence between R and others. The content is beyond doubt obscene and perverted. There is, as a result, a considerable level of sensitivity to be attached to this information for a number of reasons. In any care proceedings, there is obviously a legitimate public interest in protecting the children, including from the details of what has occurred with them becoming widely known or shared. Of course, in this case [the children] have a right to privacy arising from their Article 8 rights; and I am satisfied that their Article 3 rights may also be engaged if the contents of the full fact finding judgment were to be released and to be shared for sexual gratification. I consider that that would amount to degrading treatment. 19. [These] are highly vulnerable children. There is a risk pertaining to them, in my judgment, that if their experiences and vulnerability, as identified, were to become widely known, in particular to paedophiles or to people with an unhealthy interest in children, that could potentially place [them] at risk of being targeted or exploited in the future.”
“32. When considering the competing human rights of the children in this case and those of R, I have in mind the words of Munby J in Re B: that it is an exceptional course to restrict a litigant's access to documents and that such a case should require the most anxious, rigorous and vigilant scrutiny. I apply that guidance in this case today. Indeed, the burden on those seeking to restrain or restrict the disclosure is a heavy one; no order should be made unless it is imperatively demanded by the situation. 33. Bearing in mind those stark words, and balancing the competing rights of the children in this case with those of R, I am satisfied that the balance is properly struck by not allowing him to retain a full copy of the judgment in his prison cell. The contents are too graphic, and the potential for harm to the children arising from allowing that to occur is, in my judgment, too great. I remind myself of the practical considerations that are set out in relation to the anonymisation of judgments in the practice guidance from the President, dated December 2018, paragraph 5 of which talks about the treatment of explicit descriptions of the sexual abuse of children and young people. … 34. Whilst I recognise that that guidance was designed with a view to the publication of judgments online, I cannot ignore that R is a predatory paedophile whose offending has taken place for his own sexual gratification. Nor can I ignore that he is a long-term prisoner. I take judicial notice of the fact that he will have to be housed on a sexual offender [sc.Vulnerable Prisoner] wing, no doubt for his own safety. That means, in basic terms, that he is likely to be surrounded by other sexual offenders and paedophiles. 35. A mainstay of R’s evidence was that he said things when he communicated online with paedophiles and then carried out sexual abuse, including raping his own daughter and recording it, simply to please other paedophiles. I was not persuaded that that evidence was entirely true, but I draw from it that I can have no confidence that R would not misuse in some way the full judgment and its contents, whether for his own sexual gratification or to gain favour with other paedophiles in the prison, or potentially even for financial reward. I can place no weight on any of the assurances given by R as to how he would treat any material released to him, because I found him to be a dishonest witness. 36. However, a balance does have to be struck so that R can be made aware of the findings that I have made against him, and I must take into account his memory deficits. I am therefore satisfied that a summary of my findings should be prepared and that he should be provided with a redacted and anonymised version of that summary, setting out only those findings that I have made against him. 37. In addition, in due course an anonymised and suitably abridged version of my judgment will be published on BAILII, and that version can also be provided to R. 38. In my judgment, those two provisions to R, allied to the two opportunities I have made available for him to have the judgment explained to him, supported by an intermediary, are sufficient to meet his right to a fair trial, without, in my judgment, offending the rights of [the children] to privacy, or risking offending their Article 3 rights.”