“The second question, therefore, is what is the essential character of a deprivation of liberty? It is common ground that three components can be derived from Storck 43 EHRR 96, paras 74 and 89, confirmed in Stanev 55 ECHR 696, paras 117 and 120, as follows: (a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; (b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and (c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.”
“29. If and when a (private) deprivation of liberty within Article 5 exists on the ground it then has to be considered whether it is the responsibility of the State, and so an Article 5 Deprivation of Liberty. That involves a staged approach. 30. Firstly, it should be considered whether the direct involvement of the State is sufficient to have that result. If it is, the State is responsible for it as the body or one of the bodies that has put it in place and is implementing it. 31. Secondly, if the State is not directly responsible for the deprivation of liberty within Article 5, it has to be considered whether the domestic regime of law, supervision and regulation satisfies the obligations imposed on the State by Article 5. If it does not, that could of itself make the State responsible for that deprivation of liberty but, on a fact sensitive and backwards looking approach, what the State (or others) did in a given case could avoid that result or create a result that the individual could not establish a breach of his Article 5 right. 32. Thirdly, if the State is not directly responsible and the domestic regime of law, supervision and regulation satisfies, or if properly implemented would satisfy, the positive obligations imposed on a State by Article 5 to create an appropriate regime of law, supervision and regulation it then has to be considered whether the interpretation and application of that regime in the circumstances of the case has satisfied the positive obligations imposed by and further or alternatively the spirit and so the underlying purposes of Article 5.”
"whether the domestic system of law, supervision and regulation of a (private) deprivation of liberty and its application in a given case satisfies the spirit and underlying purposes of Article 5 and so provides practical and effective substantive and procedural safeguards against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of the relevant person."
“101. The Court has consistently held that the responsibility of a State is engaged if a violation of one of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention is the result of non-observance by that State of its obligation under Art.1 to secure those rights and freedoms in its domestic law to everyone within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court has expressly found that Art.2, Art.3 andArt.8 of the Convention enjoin the State not only to refrain from an active infringement by its representatives of the rights in question, but also to take appropriate steps to provide protection against an interference with those rights either by State agents or private parties. 102. Having regard to this, the Court considers that Art.5(1), first sentence, of the Convention must equally be considered as laying down a positive obligation on the State to protect the liberty of its citizens. Any conclusion to the effect that this was not the case would not only be inconsistent with the Court's case law, notably under Arts 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention. It would, moreover, leave a sizeable gap in the protection from arbitrary detention, which would be inconsistent with the importance of personal liberty in a democratic society. The State is, therefore, obliged to take measures providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge.”
“140 … i) an initial decision and reviews leading to further decisions that rely on s. 5 of the MCA and so on a conclusion by the decision makers on the ground that the regime of care and treatment is in SRK’s … best interests because it is the least restrictive available option to best promote those interests, and ii) the performance by the relevant local authority (and the CQC) of their investigatory, supervisory and regulatory roles to monitor the existence and results of that decision making process.” “144 … i) the decisions makers on the ground will apply the same test as the COP and will take into account the stepping stones that are the subject of the DOLS requirements and assessments, and ii) the relevant local authority and other public authorities with adult safeguarding duties will have considered what if any steps they should take”
“i) would necessitate an effective replication of the assessments, and so the stepping stones to a decision, set out in the DOLS because the COP would need and require such evidence to enable it to make a properly informed decision, ii) would introduce an independent decision maker who would have to be satisfied that P’s “voice” is properly before the court, and iii) would introduce a system of review by that independent decision maker which on the existing approach would take place at defined intervals not exceeding one year.”
“57 Because of the extreme vulnerability of people like P, MIG and MEG, I believe that we should err on the side of caution in deciding what constitutes a deprivation of liberty in their case. They need a periodic independent check on whether the arrangements made for them are in their best interests. Such checks need not be as elaborate as those currently provided for in the Court of Protection or in the deprivation of liberty safeguards (which could in due course be simplified and extended to placements outside hospitals and care homes). Nor should we regard the need for such checks as in any way stigmatising of them or of their carers. Rather, they are a recognition of their equal dignity and status as human beings like the rest of us.”