“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if – (a) it considers that – (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; . . . and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.” (a) it considers that – (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; . . . and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
‘Was there conduct by the parties which was consistent only with Mishcon de Reya being retained as solicitors for the claimants?’ (Emphasis added.)
“52. . . . it is, in my judgment, now clear that the chief constable should be treated as owing to his officers the same duties as an employer owes to his employees, subject to such considerations of public policy as arise on the facts of a particular case. That proposition seems to me to be consistent, not only with the authorities to which I have just referred, but also with principle. The relationship between a chief constable and his officers is so closely analogous to that between an employer and his employees as to make it just in principle to hold that he owes the same duties to his officers as an employer does to his employees.”
“(1) In considering, in the context of the common law duty of care, whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the acts or omissions of the employer may cause an employee to suffer a psychiatric injury, such an injury will not usually be foreseeable unless there were indications, of which the employer was or should have been aware, of some problem or psychological vulnerability on the part of the employee – Hatton. (2) That approach is not limited to cases of the Hatton type but extends to cases where the employer has committed a one-off act of unfairness such as the imposition of a disciplinary sanction – Croft and Deadman (also Grieves). (3) However, in neither kind of case should that be regarded as an absolute rule: Hatton contains no more than guidance, and each case must turn on its own facts – Hatton itself, but reinforced by Barber and Hartman. (4) In claims for breach of the common law duty of care it is immaterial that the duty arises in contract as well as tort: they are in substance treated as covered by tortious rules – Walker, Hatton. In order to establish whether the duty is broken it will be necessary to establish, as above, whether psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable; and if that is established no issue as to remoteness can arise when such injury eventuates. (5) . . . ”
“It follows, of course, that although, in the case of the provision of information and advice, reliance upon it by the other party will be necessary to establish a cause of action (because otherwise the negligence will have no causative effect), nevertheless there may be other circumstances in which there will be the necessary reliance to give rise to the application of the principle. In particular, as cases concerned with solicitor and client demonstrate, where the plaintiff entrusts the defendant with the conduct of his affairs, in general or in particular, he may be held to have relied on the defendant to exercise due skill and care in such conduct.”