‘You ask a number of questions about how the test of whether a company is intending to employ money raised will be applied. A statement by the company that the money raised by the share issue will be employed for the purposes of a qualifying trade carried on by that company or by a qualifying subsidiary, will normally be accepted unless on the facts that appears unlikely. The test will then be whether it does so within the time limits. If it does not do so, or does not wholly do so, any deferred gain will be recovered at the time the time limits expire. Where a company intends to use funds in a subsidiary which has not yet been set up, there is no reason why the subsidiary should not be set up and the money passed on to the subsidiary to enable it to acquire or commence a qualifying trade. …’
‘Assuming the more complex structure, money would be subscribed for shares in the holding company. It is recommended that the trading subsidiary is set up as quickly as possible. When the subsidiary requires funds to acquire a suitable trade, they could be borrowed from the holding company. To be sure that reinvestment relief is given it would be advisable to transfer any trade and assets acquired by purchasing a company into the subsidiary. This is because s.164A TCGA 1992 allows reinvestment relief if a qualifying subsidiary is intending to “… Employ the money raised by the issue of the shares wholly for the purposes of a qualifying trade carried on by it.” (emphasis added). There is a view that the qualifying subsidiary therefore has to exist before the acquisition of the trade and that the subsidiary must carry on the trade acquired. The Inland Revenue have stated that they do not see the perceived problem. In a letter to the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Revenue stated: “… It is not clear what prevents the holding company from lending money raised to its subsidiary which can then acquire the company in question. This would enable a group to retain a holding company and separate trading subsidiaries as required.” ’
‘We recommend that a full review of the corporation tax and VAT position of the group is carried out in order to consider the impact of the hive up arrangements. In view of the timescale envisaged this is unlikely to be possible before the hive up occurs. Hence we recommend that this occurs after the hive up has been implemented. This will have the benefit of ensuring that the position after the hive up can be clarified and any potential planning opportunities may be ascertained.’
‘… The problem was that when Pegasus bought the various businesses much of their value lay in the goodwill built up by each business during the course of its existence and before the acquisition by Pegasus. When the assets of the business were “hived up” to Pegasus, the “base cost” at which Pegasus was taken to acquire those assets for the purposes of corporation tax on capital gains was the original base cost to the acquired business. Since the goodwill had been built up by the acquired business itself, it had not paid anything for it. Thus the value of the goodwill (for which Pegasus had paid) did not form part of the base cost to the acquired business. When Pegasus then came to sell those assets, with their accompanying goodwill, its gain fell to be calculated as the excess of the sale price over the original base cost to the acquired business (not the gain over the purchase price paid by Pegasus). This had the consequence that if Pegasus were to sell one of the businesses for less than the amount that it itself had paid for it, but more than that base cost, it would be making a capital gain for tax purposes and would be liable to corporation tax on that gain. The Particulars of Claim call this problem “the Adverse Consequence”; and I will do likewise [so will I]. The Adverse Consequence could have been avoided if, instead of buying shares in the target businesses, Pegasus had bought the assets of the target companies (including goodwill). If that had been done then Pegasus would only be liable to pay tax on a gain over and above the whole price that it paid for the assets. It could also have been avoided if E&Y had timeously advised that Pegasus should incorporate and fund subsidiaries, which would in turn acquire the businesses. If this had been done, Pegasus would have been able to dispose of an acquired business by a sale of its shares in the subsidiary without triggering a liability for tax on capital gains (save insofar as it made an actual gain on the sale). One of the issues is the timing of the incorporation of subsidiaries in order to take advantage of the tax legislation.’
‘Proof of loss attributable to a breach of the relevant duty of care is an essential element in a cause of action for the tort of negligence. Given that there has been negligence, the cause of action will therefore arise when the plaintiff has suffered loss in respect of which the duty was owed. It follows that in the present case such loss will be suffered when the lender can show that he is worse off than he would have been if the security had been worth the sum advised by the valuer. The comparison is between the lender’s actual position and what it would have been if the valuation had been correct. There may be cases in which it is possible to demonstrate that such loss is suffered immediately upon the loan being made. The lender may be able to show that the rights which he has acquired as lender are worth less in the open market than they would have been if the security had not been overvalued. But I think that this would be difficult to prove in a case in which the lender’s personal covenant still appears good and interest payments are being duly made. On the other hand, loss will easily be demonstrable if the borrower has defaulted, so that the lender’s recovery has become dependent upon the realisation of his security and that security is inadequate. On the other hand, I do not accept Mr Berry’s [leading counsel for the valuers] submission that no loss can be shown until the security has actually been realised. Relevant loss is suffered when the lender is financially worse off by reason of a breach of the duty of care than he would otherwise have been. This is, I think, in accordance with the decisions of the Court of Appeal in UBAF Ltd v. European American Banking Corporation[1984] QB 713 and First National Commercial Bank Plc v. Humberts[1995] 2 All ER 673 . In the present case, the lender defaulted almost at once, well before the date in December 1990 from which Nykredit claims interest. There was ample evidence of relevant loss having been suffered before that date.’
‘… if a claimant does have a cause of action, he may recover damages for the risk that he may suffer further injury in consequence of the same act of negligence, even though (under the principle in Gregg v. Scott[2005] 2 AC 176 ), such risk would not be independently actionable.’
‘… it is accepted that a risk, produced by a negligent act or omission, of an adverse condition arising at some time in the future does not constitute damage sufficient to complete a tortious cause of action: see Gregg v. Scott[2005] 2 AC 176 and Law Society v. Sephton & Co[2006] 2 AC 543 . The victim of the negligence must await events. Here, too, however, it is common ground that if some physical injury has been caused by the negligence, so that a tortious cause of action has accrued to the victim, the victim can recover damages not simply for his injury in its present state but also for the risk that the injury may worsen in the future and for his present and ongoing anxiety that that may happen.’
‘In our judgment, the plaintiff suffered damage on12th April 1973 . On that date, if the solicitors were negligent, she should have received a long lease of the first floor and an interest as joint tenant of the freehold of the house subject to a long lease of the first floor in her own favour and subject to a long lease of the ground floor in favour of the Bodmans. The plaintiff did not receive that which the solicitors ought to have obtained for her. She received something different. Therefore she suffered damage. The quantum of damage depends, and would in any event depend, on the attitude of the Bodmans. If the Bodmans were willing to concur in the grant of long leases, there would have been no significant damage. If the Bodmans were only willing to concur in the grant of the fee simple of the first floor then the damages would have been the difference between the value of the freehold of the first floor on the one hand and the value of a long lease of the first floor and the joint tenancy of the house subject to two long leases on the other hand. If the Bodmans were unwilling to do anything or to commit themselves, the assessment of damages would have involved a valuation by the court of the inconvenience and possible loss which might be suffered by the plaintiff if she were obliged to leave the first floor at the behest of the Bodmans and to allow a sale of the house with vacant possession at some uncertain and unforeseeable date in the future. But, whenever the plaintiff brought her action against the solicitors – whether immediately after the conveyance dated12th April 1973 , or before or after the Bodmans sought an order for vacant possession – evidence could have been adduced of the attitude and intentions of the Bodmans to enable the judge to perform the task of assessing the quantum of damages. We now know that the Bodmans were willing to grant security of occupation to the plaintiff by conveying the first floor to her in fee simple but they were not willing to grant her a long lease. In these circumstances the plaintiff would have been able, and was in fact able, to mitigate her damages by achieving that security of occupation of the first floor which the solicitors should have obtained for her, but she would have been and was unable to obtain the grant of a long lease. In those circumstances the quantum of damages suffered by the plaintiff would have been and is represented by the difference between the value of a freehold of the first floor and the value of a long lease of the first floor, plus a joint tenancy of the house subject to long leases of the first floor and the ground floor. That is the quantum of damages which the plaintiff now seeks. But the fact that the quantum of damages suffered by the plaintiff on12th April 1973 could immediately thereafter, or at any time thereafter, only be established by ascertaining the attitude and intentions of the Bodmans only goes to quantum of damages and does not affect that fact that the damages were suffered on12th April 1973 . Damages were suffered on that date because the plaintiff did not receive the long lease and joint tenancy which the solicitors should have secured for her. She secured instead some other and different interest. She suffered damage because she did not get what she should have got.’ (Emphasis supplied).
‘… if an action had been brought in, say, 1976, the actual assessment of damages would have depended on the evidence as to the likely future attitude of Mr Fenton. But the imponderables which future behaviour presented relates to the quantification of damages and not to the existence of a cause of action.’
‘… the judge rightly rejected the notion that where a solicitor gives negligent advice, damage is presumed to occur at the time when the advice is acted upon. I am satisfied that there is no such presumption. It is a question of fact in each case whether actual damage has been established. In the present case, to use the language of Templeman LJ in Baker v. Ollard & Bentley, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 155 of 1982, the plaintiffs suffered damage “because [they] did not get what [they] should have got.” The plaintiffs’ rights under the two agreements were demonstrably less valuable than they would have been had adequate restrictive covenants been included.’ (Emphasis supplied)
‘It seems to me clear beyond argument that from the moment of executing each agreement the plaintiffs suffered damage because instead of receiving a potentially valuable chose in action they received one that was valueless. Indeed, the invalidity of the covenants against competition rendered the rights which the second and third plaintiffs did obtain, to Mr Fenton’s undivided services, a somewhat double edged benefit. If the quantification of the plaintiffs’ damage had fallen to be considered shortly after the execution of either agreement, problems of assessment would undoubtedly have arisen. It might have appeared that Mr Fenton was unlikely to leave, taking much of the first plaintiff’s business with him, to establish a competing business. If so, the plaintiffs’ damages would have been assessed at a modest figure. But the risk of his doing so could not have been eliminated altogether, and so long as there was any risk that one of the first plaintiff’s two directors might leave, taking much of the first plaintiff’s business with him, to establish a competing business, there must necessarily have been a depressive effect on the value of the first plaintiff’s business and on that of the second and third plaintiffs’ derivative interests. In making his assessment the judge would have had to attach a money value to a possible future contingency, but judges do this every day in awarding claimants damages for the risk of epilepsy, the risk of osteoarthritis, the risk of possible future operations, the risk of losing a job and so on. The valuation exercise is, of course, different, but the difference is one of subject matter, not of kind.’
‘The transaction caused the plaintiff to exchange his valid legal estate for an equitable interest in the proceeds of sale which was dependent on the goodwill and solvency of the wife unless and until protected by a formal declaration of trust and the lodging of a caution. The failure to see that these steps were taken promptly meant that the plaintiff was actually, and not just potentially, worse off than if the solicitors had performed their task competently. The sale in 1986 simply meant that the breach and its consequences were irremediable. As Nicholls LJ has pointed out, the solicitors’ negligence had two different aspects: the failure to obtain the wife’s participation in a formal instrument, and the failure to protect the interests by a caution, but I respectfully agree with his view that this characteristic forms no ground for distinguishing [Baker] and [Moore], which are binding on this court.’ (Emphasis supplied)
‘… much reliance was placed on the cases where the claimant entered into a transaction which through a breach of duty owed to the claimant provided the claimant with less rights than should have been secured, or imposed liabilities or obligations on the claimant which should not have been imposed. Examples of these cases are: [Forster]; Iron Trade Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v. J.K. Buckenham Ltd[1990] 1 All ER 808 and [Bell]. In all those cases, however, the court was able to conclude that the transaction then and there caused the claimant loss, on the basis that if the injured party had been put in the position he would have occupied but for the breach of duty, the transaction in question would have provided greater rights, or imposed lesser liabilities or obligations than was the case; and that the difference between these two states of affairs could be quantified in money terms at the date of the transaction.’
‘From these authorities it can be seen that the cause of action can accrue and the plaintiff have suffered damage one [sic: should be ‘once’] he has acted upon the relevant advice “to his detriment” and failed to get that to which he was entitled. He is less well off than he would have been if the defendant had not been negligent. Applying this to the present case, the plaintiffs paid their renewal premium without getting in return a binding contract of indemnity from the insurance company. They had acted to their detriment: they did not get that to which they were entitled. The fact that how serious the consequences of the negligence would be depended upon subsequent events and contingencies does not alter this; such considerations go to the quantification of the plaintiffs’ loss not to whether or not they have suffered loss. The risk of loss existed from the outset and in the absence of better evidence would have to be evaluated and assessed as a risk and damages awarded accordingly.’
‘20. The Nykredit (No 2) case[1997] 1 WLR 1627 therefore decides that in a transaction on which there are benefits (covenant for repayment and security) as well as burdens (payment of the loan) and the measure of damages is the extent to which the lender is worse off than he would have been if he had not entered into the transaction, the lender suffers loss and damage only when it is possible to say that he is on balance worse off. It does not discuss the questions of a purely contingent liability. 21. Next, there are a number of cases in the Court of Appeal which involve transactions, with both benefits and burdens, into which the plaintiff entered as a result of the negligence or breach of contract of the defendant. None of these cases concerned purely contingent obligations. It is only necessary to observe that in such bilateral transactions the answer to the question of whether damage has been suffered may be different according to whether the liability is for the consequence of the defendant not performing his duty or (as is usual in claims for misrepresentation) the consequences, or some of the consequences, of the plaintiff entering into the transaction. If the liability is for the difference between what the plaintiff got and what he would have got if the defendant had done what he was supposed to have done, it may be relatively easy, as Bingham LJ pointed out in D.W. Moore & Co Ltd v. Ferrier[1988] 1 WLR 267 , to infer that the plaintiff has suffered some immediate damage, simply because he did not get what he should have got. Thus in Knapp v. Ecclesiastical Insurance Group plc [1998] PNLR 172, where the plaintiff paid a premium for a voidable fire insurance policy because his insurance broker had failed to disclose material facts, the Court of Appeal held that he had suffered immediate damage because “he did not get what he should have got”, namely a policy binding on the insurers. On the other hand, if the damage is (as it was in the Nykredit (No 2) case[1997] 1 WLR 1627 and First National Commercial Bank plc v Humberts[1995] 2 All ER 673 ) the difference between the defendant’s position after entering into the transaction and what it would have been if he had not entered into the transaction, the answer may be more difficult. Despite the breach of duty, the transaction may on balance have originally been advantageous to the plaintiff and some evidence may be necessary to show when he was actually in a worse position. …. 22. Thus cases like Bell v. Peter Browne & Co[1990] 2 QB 495 and Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group plc [1998] PNLR 172 are readily explicable as cases in which the damage was the difference between the plaintiff’s position as it was and as it would have been if the defendant had performed his duty and in which it was possible to infer that the plaintiff’s failure to get what he should have got from a bilateral transaction was quantifiable damage, even though further damage which might result from the flaw in the transaction was still contingent. The plaintiff had paid money, transferred property, incurred liabilities or suffered diminution in the value of an asset and in return obtained less than he should have got. But these authorities have no relevant to a case in which a purely contingent obligation has been incurred.’ (Emphasis in paragraph [21]
‘The value in monetary terms of the plaintiff’s tenancy in common in equity of the house sold with vacant possession must exceed the value of a long lease of the first floor.’
‘… In my judgment, an investor who wishes to place£100 in a secure risk-free investment and, in reliance on negligent advice, purchases shares does suffer financial detriment on the acquisition of the shares despite the fact that he pays the market price for the shares. It is no answer to the investor’s complaint that he has been induced to buy a risky investment when he wanted a safe one to say that the risky investment was worth what he paid for it in the market. His complaint is that he did not want a risky investment. A claim for damages immediately upon the acquisition of the shares would succeed. The investor would at least be entitled to the difference between the cost of buying the Government bonds and the cost of buying and selling the shares.’
‘Once the share issue had taken place it was too late to retrieve the situation. This is in itself a strong indication that the damage was sustained at the date of the share issue. In addition I consider that the nub of the complaint is that if Mr Bradbury had been given the correct advice he would have bought shares in a company which was the parent of a group (or at least had already resolved to become the parent of a group). That would have enabled the Adverse Consequence to be avoided. Instead he bought shares in a stand-alone company. Thus the company whose shares he in fact bought had different characteristics from the company whose shares he would have bought but for the breach of duty. On the footing that the correct comparison is between what the client in fact acquired and what he ought to have acquired (or would have acquired if he had been given the correct advice), it is, in my judgment, impossible to say that what Mr Bradbury acquired was no less advantageous to him than what he ought to have acquired. Just as Mr Shore did not invest in the kind of pension scheme he ought to have been advised to invest in, so Mr Bradbury did not subscribe for shares in the kind of company he ought to have been advised to invest in.’
‘21 … A monetary value could have been put upon the loss at that time though the extent of the loss would have depended on subsequent events and an accurate quantification of loss would have been likely to become clearer with the passage of time. The contract into which he entered was of less commercial value than it would otherwise have been, the risk of instant expulsion constituting actual loss. 22. While the amount of loss may be contingent upon future events, there was an actual loss when the agreement was made. The appellant was only a partner-at-will and one who lost the right to the group’s name if he was expelled from the group. If, upon a consideration of the evidence, negligence was established but it was not established that an agreement more favourable to the appellant could have been achieved, the claim would fail on causation but it does not follow that actual loss does not exist upon the making of the agreement, on the assumption, which it is agreed should be made for present purposes, that a breach of duty and causation can be established. What Mr Arnold described as a “true contingency”, whether the appellant would in the event be expelled from the group, is not an event necessary to establish a loss; loss occurs upon the signing of an agreement which, assuming the negligence alleged, is commercially less favourable than it should have been in that the risk of instant expulsion, with its consequences, was present.’