“1. A national contingent of the MNF shall have the right to apprehend persons who are suspected of having committed criminal acts and are not considered security internees (hereinafter ‘criminal detainees’) who shall be handed over to Iraqi authorities as soon as reasonably practicable. A national contingent of the MNF may retain criminal detainees in facilities that it maintains at the request of appropriate Iraqi authorities based on security or capacity considerations…”
“204. Whilst we have been led to that conclusion by our analysis of the legal principles and the factual evidence, we are seriously troubled by the result, since on our assessment the claimants, if transferred, will face a real risk of the death penalty in the event that they are convicted by the Iraqi court. In all normal circumstances the Convention (as well as theExtradition Act 2003 in extradition cases) would operate to prevent such a result. It arises here only because of the highly exceptional circumstances of the case and the application to them of the principles in R (B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, as we have understood the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case. In that and other respects the issues in the present case are of obvious difficulty and importance...”
“That letter represents President Aref’s considered written position. It is striking that the letter gives no indication whatsoever that the death penalty would not be or even probably would not be imposed.”
“158. Taking the evidence as a whole, we are satisfied that substantial grounds have been shown for believing there to be a real risk of the claimants being condemned to the death penalty and executed, contrary to protocol no.13, if they are transferred into the custody of the IHT. In particular: (a) the penalties for the offences with which the claimants are charged include the death penalty; (b) there is clear evidence that persons convicted of such offences are liable in practice to be sentenced to death; (c) the matters relied on as militating against the imposition of the death penalty are not sufficiently cogent or certain to negative the real risk; (d) in spite of the efforts made on behalf of the Secretary of State, no assurance has been given that the death penalty will not be imposed in this case; and (e) in any event, even if President Aref had given such an assurance, we are not satisfied it would necessarily be effective, because he does not have the authority to bind the appeal chamber which would automatically have to consider the appropriate sentence, whatever decision the trial chamber had reached.”
“57. Moreover, Article 31 § 3 (c) [sc. of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties] indicates that account is to be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. More generally, the Court recalls that the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any relevant rules of international law when examining questions concerning its jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State responsibility in conformity with the governing principles of international law, although it must remain mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty... The Convention should be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which it forms part... ... 59. As to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the relevant term inArticle 1 of the Convention , the Court is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial. While international law does not exclude a state’s exercise of jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive personality and universality) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant states …. 60. Accordingly, for example, a state’s competence to exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals abroad is subordinate to that state’s and other states’ territorial competence... In addition, a state may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without the latter’s consent, invitation or acquiescence, unless the former is an occupying state in which case it can be found to exercise jurisdiction in that territory, at least in certain respects … 61. The Court is of the view, therefore, thatArticle 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case … ... 65. However, the scope of Article 1, at issue in the present case, is determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention system of human rights protection... ... 71. In sum, the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government. ... “80. The Court’s obligation, in this respect, is to have regard to the special character of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order for the protection of individual human beings and its role, as set out inArticle 19 of the Convention , is to ensure the observance of theengagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties... It is therefore difficult to contend that a failure to accept the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the respondent States would fall foul of the Convention’s ordre public objective, which itself underlines the essentially regional vocation of the Convention system, or ofArticle 19 of the Convention which does not shed any particular light on the territorial ambit of that system. ... In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject toArticle 56 of the Convention , in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so far been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention.”
“Moreover, a state may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another state but who are found to be under the former state’s authority and control through its agents operating - whether lawfully or unlawfully in the latter state…. Accountability in such situations stems from the fact thatarticle 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”
“… it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”
“Without further guidance from the European Court, I am unable to reconcile this approach with the reasoning in Bankovic. In these circumstances, although Issa concerned Turkish troops in Iraq, I do not consider that this aspect of the decisionprovides reasoned guidance on which the House can rely when resolving the question of jurisdiction in the present case.”
“76. Another major unresolved difficulty with the decision in Issa is that it is hard to reconcile with the European Court’s description of the vocation of the Convention as being ‘essentially regional’ and of the Convention operating ‘in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the contracting states’: Bankovic, para 80. The Convention, the Court continued, was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of contracting states. In Issa, as the court records in paras 56 and 57 of its judgment, the Turkish government had advanced an argument based on precisely this aspect of the decision in Bankovic. … 78. The essentially regional nature of the Convention is relevant to the way that the court operates. It has judges elected from all the contracting states, not from anywhere else. The judges purport to interpret and apply the various rights in the Convention in accordance with what they conceive to be developments in prevailing attitudes in the contracting states. This is obvious from the court’s jurisprudence on such matters as the death penalty, sex discrimination, homosexuality and transsexuals. The result is a body of law which may reflect the values of the contracting states, but which most certainly does not reflect those in many other parts of the world. So the idea that the United Kingdom was obliged to secure observance of all the rights and freedoms as interpreted by the European Court in the utterly different society of southern Iraq is manifestly absurd. Hence, as noted in Bankovic, para 80, the court had ‘so far’ recognised jurisdiction based on effective control only in the case of territory which would normally be covered by the Convention. If it went further, the court would run the risk not only of colliding with the jurisdiction of other human rights bodies but of being accused of human rights imperialism. 79. The essentially regional nature of the Convention has a bearing on another aspect of the decision in Bankovic. In the circumstances of that case the respondent states were plainly in no position to secure to everyone in the RTS station or even in Belgrade all the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention. So the applicants had to argue that it was enough that the respondents were in a position to secure the victims’ rights under articles 2, 10 and 13 of the Convention. In effect, the applicants were arguing that it was not an answer to say that, because a state was unable to guarantee everything, it was required to guarantee nothing - to adopt the words of Sedley LJ,[2007] QB 140 , 301, para 197. The European Court quite specifically rejected that line of argument. The court held, para 75, that the obligation in article 1 could not be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question.’ In other words, the whole package of rights applies and must be secured where a contracting state has jurisdiction. This merely reflects the normal understanding that a contracting state cannot pick and choose among the rights in the Convention: it must secure them all to everyone within its jurisdiction. If that is so, then it suggests that the obligation under article 1 can arise only where the contracting state has such effective control of the territory of another state that it could secure to everyone in the territory all the rights and freedoms in Section 1 of the Convention.”
“I also respectfully agree with Lord Rodger and Lord Brown on the extent of that jurisdiction. I would only observe that any extra-territorial jurisdiction of one state is pro tanto a diminution or invasion of the territorial jurisdiction of another, which must lead one to the conclusion that such extra-territorial jurisdiction should be closely confined. It clearly exists by international customary law in respect of embassies and consulates. It has been conceded by the Secretary of State that it extends to a military prison in Iraq occupied and controlled by agents of the United Kingdom. Once one goes past these categories, it would in my opinion require a high degree of control by the agents of the state of an area in another state before it could be said that that area was within the jurisdiction of the former. The test for establishing that is and should be stringent, and in my judgment the British presence in Iraq falls well short of that degree of control.”
“127. If and insofar as Issa is said to support the altogether wider notions of article 1 jurisdiction contended for by the appellants on this appeal, I cannot accept it. In the first place, the statements relied upon must be regarded as obiter dicta. Secondly, as just explained, such wider assertions of jurisdiction are not supported by the authorities cited (at any rate, those authorities accepted as relevant by the Grand Chamber in Bankovic). Thirdly, such wider view of jurisdiction would clearly be inconsistent both with the reasoning in Bankovic and, indeed, with its result. Either it would extend the effective control principle beyond the Council of Europe area (where alone it had previously been applied, as has been seen, to Northern Cyprus, to the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in Georgia and to Transdniestria) to Iraq, an area (like the FRY considered in Bankovic) outside the Council of Europe—and, indeed, would do so contrary to the inescapable logic of the Court’s case law on article 56. Alternatively it would stretch to breaking point the concept of jurisdiction extending extra-territorially to those subject to a state’s ‘authority and control’. It is one thing to recognise as exceptional the specific narrow categories of cases I have sought to summarise above; it would be quite another to accept that whenever a contracting state acts (militarily or otherwise) through its agents abroad, those affected by such activities fall within its article 1 jurisdiction. Such a contention would prove altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Bankovic, not least as to the Convention being ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’, operating ‘in an essentially regional context’, ‘not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of contracting states’ (para 80). It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of effective control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a general principle of ‘authority and control’ irrespective of whether the area is (a) effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe? 128. There is one other central objection to the creation of the wide basis of jurisdiction here contended for by the appellants under the rubric ‘control and authority’, going beyond that arising in any of the narrowly recognised categories already discussed and yet short of that arising from the effective control of territory within the Council of Europe area. Bankovic (and later Assanidze) stands, as stated, for the indivisible nature of article 1 jurisdiction: it cannot be ‘divided and tailored’. As Bankovic had earlier pointed out (at para 40) ‘the applicant's interpretation of jurisdiction would invert and divide the positive obligation on contracting states to secure the substantive rights in a manner never contemplated byarticle 1 of the Convention .’ When, moreover, the Convention applies, it operates as ‘a living instrument’. Öcalan provides an example of this, a recognition that the interpretation of article 2 has been modified consequent on ‘the territories encompassed by the member states of the Council of Europe [having] become a zone free of capital punishment’ (para 163). (Paragraphs 64 and 65 of Bankovic, I may note, contrast on the one hand ‘the Convention’s substantive provisions’ and ‘the competence of the Convention organs’, to both of which the ‘living instrument’ approach applies and, on the other hand, the scope of article 1—‘the scope and reach of the entire Convention’—to which it does not.) Bear in mind too the rigour with which the Court applies the Convention, well exemplified by the series of cases from the conflict zone of south eastern Turkey in which, the state's difficulties notwithstanding, no dilution has been permitted of the investigative obligations arising under articles 2 and 3. 129. The point is this: except where a state really does have effective control of territory, it cannot hope to secure Convention rights within that territory and, unless it is within the area of the Council of Europe, it is unlikely in any event to find certain of the Convention rights it is bound to secure reconcilable with the customs of the resident population. Indeed it goes further than that. During the period in question here it is common ground that the UK was an occupying power in Southern Iraq and bound as such by Geneva IV and by the Hague Regulations. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant ‘shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’. The appellants argue that occupation within the meaning of the Hague Regulations necessarily involves the occupant having effective control of the area and so being responsible for securing there all Convention rights and freedoms. So far as this being the case, however, the occupants' obligation is to respect ‘the laws in force’, not to introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. Often (for example where Sharia law is in force) Convention rights would clearly be incompatible with the laws of the territory occupied.”
“Taken as a whole, therefore, and according particular weight to Grand Chamber judgments, so far from weakening the principles established in Bankovic, subsequent Strasbourg case law to my mind reinforces them. Certainly, whatever else may be said of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it cannot be said to establish clearly that any of the first five appellants come within the UK’s article 1 jurisdiction. As for the sixth case I for my part would recognise the UK’s jurisdiction over Mr Mousa only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by analogy with the extraterritorial exception made for embassies (an analogy recognised too in Hess v United Kingdom (1975) 2 DR 72, a commission decision in the context of a foreign prison which had itself referred to the embassy X v Federal Republic of Germany).”
“63. [t]he claimants, by contrast, have been subject to the jurisdiction and legal authority of the Iraqi courts since no later than18 May 2006 , when they appeared before the Basra criminal court and the court issued arrest warrants against them under Iraqi law and made orders authorising their continued detention. What happened was done in accordance with Iraqi law as set out in CPA Memorandum No.3 (Revised)... By section 5(1) of that memorandum the British forces were required to hand over criminal detainees... to the Iraqi authorities as soon as reasonably practicable. In this case the claimants were originally classified as security internees but were handed over to the Iraqi authorities by their production before the Iraqi court. Since that time their further detention in facilities maintained by the British forces has been pursuant to the orders of the Iraqi court and at the request of the court, as also provided for by section 5(1) of the memorandum... “64. The way the claimants have been dealt with is also in accordance with the MoU regarding criminal suspects, which, although not a legally binding document, plainly gives effect to the participants’ understanding of the underlying legal position. The claimants, as individuals who are suspected of having committed criminal acts and who are held at the request of the Iraqi authorities, are ‘criminal suspects’ as defined in section 1 of the memorandum. Section 2(1) states that the Iraqi government has legal authority over all criminal suspects who have been ordered to stand trial and who are waiting trial in the physical custody of the UK contingent of the MNF in accordance with the terms of the memorandum. The reference to the ‘Iraqi government’ is plainly to be understood as encompassing the organs of the Iraqi state, the relevant organ in this case being the court; and although the claimants have not yet been ordered to stand trial and are still awaiting a decision on whether there should be a trial, we think that section 2 is plainly intended to apply to persons in their position in just the same way as if their trial had been ordered. Section 3(1), in laying down procedures for the delivery up of criminal suspects to attend court or for any other purpose connected with the criminal process, is premised on the existence of an obligation on the part of the British forces to deliver up a criminal suspect on request.”
“79. Mr Lewis’s submissions on attribution and responsibility, in putting their entire focus on the jurisdiction and legal authority of the Iraqi courts over the claimants, suggest that the British forces have no autonomous role in the matter of the claimants’ detention or transfer into the custody of the IHT. But plainly they do. They are lawfully present in Iraq as a contingent of the MNF pursuant to a UN mandate, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and independent of the Iraqi state. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s letter annexed to UNSCR 1790... refers to an objective that the government of Iraq will be responsible for arrest, detention and imprisonment tasks, but that letter acknowledges the role of the MNF in carrying out such tasks and it can have no effect on the autonomous status of the national contingents of the MNF in so acting. The British forces have physical custody and control of the claimants. They have it in their power to refuse to transfer the claimants to the custody of the IHT or indeed to release them, even though to act in such ways would be in breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law. Thus the transfer of the claimants into the custody of the IHT would in our view be an action properly attributable in law to the United Kingdom. The case is distinguishable from Drozd and Gentilhomme, in each of which the actions complained of lay altogether outside the control of the contracting state or states against which the proceedings were brought. There is a closer analogy with Munaf v Green, even allowing for the very different legal context. In holding that there was jurisdiction to consider the habeas corpus petitions in that case, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that Munaf and Omar were in the physical custody of US soldiers who answered only to a US chain of command, and observed that ‘it is unsurprising that the United States has never argued that it lacks the authority to release Munaf or Omar, or that it requires the consent of other countries to do so’ (page 8).”
“Thus there is a clash between on the one hand a power or duty to detain exercisable on the express authority of the Security Council and, on the other, a fundamental human right which the UK has undertaken to secure to those (like the appellant) within its jurisdiction. How are these to be reconciled? There is in my opinion only one way in which they can be reconciled: by ruling that the UK may lawfully, where it is necessary for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain authorised by UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee’s rights under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention.”
“We are content to assume (without reaching a positive conclusion on the point) that while in the consulate the applicants were sufficiently within the authority of the consular staff to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purpose of article 1 …”
“The notion of jurisdiction is essentially territorial. However, the ECtHR has accepted that in exceptional cases acts of contracting states performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them within the meaning ofarticle 1 of the ECHR : Öcalan v Turkey(2003) 37 EHRR 238 , 274-275, para 93; Bankovic v Belgium... The effect of the decision of the ECtHR in Soering v United Kingdom(1989) 11 EHRR 439 was that the extraditing or deporting state is itself liable for taking action the direct consequence of which is the exposure of an individual abroad to the real risk of proscribed treatment. The Court of Appeal rightly stated that Soering is an exception to the essentially territorial foundation of jurisdiction. It is important, however, to bear in mind that apart from specific bases of jurisdiction such as the flag of a ship on the high seas or consular premises abroad, there are exceptions of wider reach which can come into play. Thus contracting states are bound to secure the rights and freedoms under the ECHR to all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad: Cyprus v Turkey(1976) 4 EHRR 482 , at p 586, para 8. Moreover, the doctrine of positive obligations under certain guarantees of the ECHR may in exceptional cases require states to protect individuals from exposure to foreseeable flagrant risks of violations of core guarantees caused by expulsions: D v United Kingdom(1997) 24 EHRR 423 .”
“84. In a case such as Soering the Contracting State commits no breach of international law by permitting an individual to remain within its territorial jurisdiction rather than removing him to another State. The same is not necessarily true where a State permits an individual to remain within the shelter of consular premises rather than requiring him to leave. It does not seem to us that the Convention can require States to give refuge to fugitives within consular premises if to do so would violate international law. So to hold would be in fundamental conflict with the importance that the Grand Chamber attached in Bankovic to principles of international law. Furthermore, there must be an implication that obligations under a Convention are to be interpreted, insofar as possible, in a manner that accords with international law. What has public international law to say about the right to afford ‘diplomatic asylum’? … 88. We have concluded that, if the Soering approach is to be applied to diplomatic asylum, the duty to provide refuge can only arise under the Convention where this is compatible with public international law. Where a fugitive is facing the risk of death or injury as the result of lawless disorder, no breach of international law will be occasioned by affording him refuge. Where, however, the receiving State requests that the fugitive be handed over the situation is very different. The basic principle is that the authorities of the receiving State can require surrender of a fugitive in respect of whom they wish to exercise the authority that arises from their territorial jurisdiction; see Article 55 of the 1963 Vienna Convention. Where such a request is made the Convention cannot normally require the diplomatic authorities of the sending State to permit the fugitive to remain within the diplomatic premises in defiance of the receiving State. Should it be clear, however, that the receiving State intends to subject the fugitive to treatment so harsh as to constitute a crime against humanity, international law must surely permit the officials of the sending state to do all that is reasonably possible, including allowing the fugitive to take refuge in the diplomatic premises, in order to protect him against such treatment. In such circumstances the Convention may well impose a duty on a Contracting State to afford diplomatic asylum.”
“I desire to say a word about the reconsideration of a case by this court. The Court of Appeal in civil matters usually considers itself bound by its own decisions or by decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction... In civil matters this is essential in order to preserve the rule of stare decisis. This court [sc. now the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal], however, has to deal with questions involving the liberty of the subject, and if it finds, on reconsideration, that, in the opinion of a full court assembled for that purpose, the law has been either misapplied or misunderstood in a decision which it has previously given, and that, on the strength of that decision, an accused person has been sentenced and imprisoned it is the bounden duty of the court to reconsider the earlier decision with a view to seeing whether that person had been properly convicted. The exceptions which apply in civil cases ought not to be the only ones applied in such a case as the present...”
“166. As regards the reference inArticle 2 of the Convention to ‘the execution of a sentence of a court’”, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber’s reasoning…: ... ‘... Even if the death penalty were still permissible under Article 2, the Court considers that an arbitrary deprivation of life pursuant to capital punishment is prohibited. This flows from the requirement that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’. An arbitrary act cannot be lawful under the Convention… It also follows from the requirement in Article 2 § 1 that the deprivation of life be pursuant to the ‘execution of a sentence of a court’, that the ‘court’ which imposes the penalty be an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the Court’s case-law… and that the most rigorous standards of fairness are observed in the criminal proceedings both at first instance and on appeal… It follows from the above construction of Article 2 that the implementation of the death penalty in respect of a person who has not had a fair trial would not be permissible.’ … 169. In the Court’s view, to impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he will be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to the future generated by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there exists a real possibility that the sentence will be enforced, must give rise to a significant degree of human anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings underlying the sentence which, given that human life is at stake, becomes unlawful under the Convention.”
“140. The overall picture which emerges is that, although initially there were deeply unsatisfactory aspects of the IHT and trial environment, which cast doubt on the ability to provide defendants with a fair trial at that time, there have been many significant improvements since then. We see no reason to reject the evidence of Mr Spillers who, unlike Mr Wiley [sc. the appellants’ expert], is able to give up-to-date information on the IHT and its proceedings and whose witness statements we have found convincing. It is noteworthy, for example, that the IHT has in recent months ordered the release of people whom Mr Spillers describes as ‘high value internees’. Another example, albeit small in itself, is that in the 1991 Uprising trial, at the end of the prosecution closing arguments, the defence asked for 30 days in which to prepare closing submissions but the IHT allowed 45 days for the purpose. 141. To date the claimants have appeared before the Iraqi courts and have denied the allegations made against them; and there can be no complaint about the way in which the courts have dealt with them. As to the future, looking at the various points individually and cumulatively, the evidence before us falls a long way short of establishing substantial grounds for believing there to be a real risk that a trial of the claimants would involve a flagrant breach of the principles guaranteed by article 6. Thus, even if the Convention were to apply in the normal way, we would reject the claim that transfer of the claimants into the custody of the IHT would be contrary to article 6.”
“8. … As I concluded in my assessment for my own government, the trial and trial results demonstrate a competent court that respects the rights of defendants, gives careful consideration of the evidence and exercises sound judgment in distinguishing levels of culpability.”
“The application of international law as part of the law of the land means that, subject to the overriding effect of statute law, rights and duties flowing from the rules of customary international law will be recognised and given effect by English courts without the need for any specific Act adopting those rules into English law.”
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”
“…[I]n principle any substantial and serious suffering of an avoidable nature added to the anguish inevitably resulting from the death sentence may constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The State may not superimpose upon the inevitable consequences of a death sentence further unnecessary agony and suffering.”