“1. The occupation of the site hereby permitted shall be carried on only by Archie and/or Julie Brown and their resident dependants. 2. When the land ceases to be occupied by those named in condition 1 the use hereby permitted will cease and all caravans, structures, materials and equipment brought onto the land in connection with the use including the utility block hereby approved shall be removed. Within three months of that time the land shall be restored to its condition before the use commenced.”
“In seeking to determine the availability of alternative sites for residential gypsy use, there is no requirement in planning policy or case law for an applicant to prove that no other sites are available or that particular needs could not be met from another site.”
“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise.”
“(1) On an appeal under s.78 the Secretary of State may: (a) allow or dismiss the appeal or; (b) reverse or vary any part of the decision of the Local Planning Authority (whether the appeal relates to that part of it or not); (c) and may deal with the application as if it had been made to him in the first instance.” (a) allow or dismiss the appeal or; (b) reverse or vary any part of the decision of the Local Planning Authority (whether the appeal relates to that part of it or not); (c) and may deal with the application as if it had been made to him in the first instance.”
“(i) The Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Structure Plan 2003, and (ii) The South Cambridgeshire Local Plan adopted in 2004.”
“(i) Whether, and the extent to which, the development complied with the criteria within Local Plan Policy HG 23. (ii) The provision of and need for additional gypsy sites in the district. (iii) The personal circumstances of the Brown family. (iv) The accommodation needs and alternative accommodation options for the Brown family.”
“There is limited, and over-subscribed, capacity on the local authority owned sites and recent grants of planning permission for additional sites, especially at Chesterton Fen Road have only partially eased the situation there. The Council accept (paragraph 6.19 of Mr Koch’s proof) that other parts of the allocation may not come forward in the near future. While this situation does not justify, on its own, the grant of planning permission for gypsy use on land which fails to meet the requirements of Local Plan HG23, the clear evidence of currently unmet need at a local level and the recent quantative estimates of demand at local and sub-regional levels with limited immediate availability of suitable land it is a material consideration in assessing such proposals, and in particular the realistic alternative accommodation options for the individuals involved.”
“I have no reason to doubt the genuine nature of Mr Brown’s statement that during 2004 he made extensive inquiries locally in and around Cambridge, Huntingdon and Ely for another site but all his inquiries came to nothing, there being no official or legal sites available to them. Nor Mrs Brown’s comment that finding alternative land to move to was the constant topic of conversation amongst the indigenous gypsies on Smithy Fen from around 2002. My own experiences of gypsy inquiries in East Cambridgeshire (May 2004) and Huntingdonshire (January 2006) would support the position that in E. Cambs all three local Council-owned gypsy sites were full and that vacancies rarely arose and that the only public site in Huntingdonshire, at St. Neots, had been full for many years.”
“The fact of the matter is that section 38(6) of the 2004 Act required the inspector to conduct a balancing exercise. That involved first determining whether there were material considerations which might suggest that the development should be allowed even though it conflicted with the provisions of the development plan. If the evidence revealed the existence of one or more such material considerations, the inspector then had to conduct a balancing exercise and decide whether those considerations in fact outweighed the provisions of the development plan and the harm which would be caused if the development was allowed to proceed. I see no basis for saying that if one of those material considerations is said to be the non- availability of a suitable alternative site it is for the (applicant) for planning permission to prove such non-availability. As with any other material consideration, the question is whether the evidence which the parties have chosen to call reveals the existence or non-existence of another site which would meet the needs of the applicant for planning permission. In these circumstances I do not believe that the inspector’s approach to the burden of proof was flawed.”
“Where, however, there are clear planning objections to development upon a particular site then it may well be relevant and indeed necessary to consider whether there is a more appropriate alternative site elsewhere. This is particularly so when a development is bound to have significant adverse effects and where the major argument advanced in support of the application is that the need for the development outweighs the planning disadvantages inherent in it.”
“The extent to which it will be for the developer to establish the need for his proposed development on the application or appeal site rather than for an objector to establish that such need can and should be met elsewhere will vary. However, in cases such as this, when the Green Belt planning policy expressly provides that the need for a motel on the site proposed, not merely in the area generally, has to be established in each case the burden lies squarely upon the developer.”
“15.The issue here turned in part on whether there were alternative sites to which the claimants could move if permission was refused. There was some discussion between Mr Mould Q.C. and the Court in argument about whether in such a case it is incumbent on an applicant for planning permission to demonstrate that no alternative sites exist. There can be a danger of turning the principles derived from Secretary of State v Edwards[1994] 1 PLR 62 (CA) into a test which applicants for planning permission must pass. Edwards is a case on whether the existence of alternative sites can justify refusal, not a case on whether it is necessary to prove that there is an absence of alternative sites in order to gain a consent. An applicant for planning permission will only have to show that there is an absence of alternative sites if: “(a) The relevant Development Plan Policy, Secretary of State’s policy or other policy, which is a material consideration states that an applicant will be expected to do so; (b) His proposal would otherwise cause harm or conflict with policy to a degree which would justify refusal, and he argues that there are reasons why a site must be found to accommodate the use which he proposes. Then the absence of an alternative site may be considered by the decision maker to outweigh the harm done.” 16. Plainly the greater the harmful effects, or the more serious the breach of policy, the harder the applicant will have to work to show that there is no realistic alternative, and that his proposal would effect a real public convenience or advantage which would justify the grant of permission. Thus it is that, at the top end of the scale, in a case of proposed inappropriate development in a Green Belt the evidential and persuasive burden on the applicant is very substantial. It is less substantial, but may still be significant lower down the scale. 17. In this case, all the parties must have appreciated that if the Secretary of State had concluded that there would be harmful effects on the countryside and that the proposal did not for that reason comply with policy HG23, then he would be bound to dismiss the appeals unless the case for provision at this site outweighed the reasons for refusal; see section 38(6) of the 2004 Act. He found that the grant of permission would make a significant contribution to meeting the general need for sites. His conclusion at paragraph 37 shows that he did not consider that that outweighed the reasons for refusing permission. That was a decision which he was entitled to reach. He was then bound to refuse permission unless he had evidence which led him to conclude that there were no alternative sites to which the claimants could relocate. On the evidence, he was not satisfied that the claimants could not relocate elsewhere…… ” “(a) The relevant Development Plan Policy, Secretary of State’s policy or other policy, which is a material consideration states that an applicant will be expected to do so; (b) His proposal would otherwise cause harm or conflict with policy to a degree which would justify refusal, and he argues that there are reasons why a site must be found to accommodate the use which he proposes. Then the absence of an alternative site may be considered by the decision maker to outweigh the harm done.”
“This is not a case where the evidence establishes that no alternative sites are available. The occupants have not looked for alternative sites. They have not sought planning permission for the use of unused land at the Pine Lane site. Nor have they investigated vacant authorised plots at Setchel Drove or Water Lane. Undoubtedly, finding sites is not easy but a structured, thorough search exercise is necessary if it is to be argued that harm in one location has to be accepted because no alternative sites exist. Furthermore, there is no reason for confining any search to South Cambridgeshire District as the occupants have no need to be resident in this district. The individual occupiers have different travelling histories extending to different areas all around the country. They have not searched widely for sites.”