"4. SERVING THE LIFE SENTENCE 4.1 The structure of a life sentence A typical male lifer will generally go through the following stages of the sentence prior to release on licence: * Local prison * Life Main Centre * Category B training or dispersal prison * Category C prison * Category D (open) prison * Resettlement facility (eg pre-release employment scheme (PRES)) While no two life sentences will be identical, exceptions to this general pattern will be rare. A gazetteer of establishments holding lifers is at Appendix 4."
"It is the general practice (to which the facts of this case are an exception) not to inform a prisoner of where and why he is being moved before he is moved. Times of transit from one prison to another present a significantly elevated risk of escape. Thus the risk of contact being made with those either within or outside the prison who might assist in an escape is ever present, but can be minimised if there is no opportunity to plan. Experience has also shown that there are real opportunities for disruption where a move is announced in advance. A prison transfer instruction is sent from Headquarters in a case such as this and then transport arranged .... and the move is effective. As a matter of administration, it would be almost impossible to operate retrogressive transfers if time for legal advice, representations, argument and further considerations were to be factored in to the procedure before a move was made. There would necessarily be delays which would be outside the control of the prison or Headquarters and such delays could be very damaging indeed to security and the prison environment as a whole. Operational difficulties which I would see being caused by the delay could include continued misbehaviour of the type which led to the decision to transfer, or avoidance of, or delay to, offending behaviour work to reduce risk. There is also the risk of serious and urgent threats to security and discipline within the prison. My long experience of these situations leads me to believe that there is, generally, a real risk of problems where there is delay in implementing a retrogressive transfer. Further, it is not necessarily possible to distinguish beforehand which situations will produce disruption or difficulty so an 'emergency' policy in parallel with a 'non-emergency' policy would be unlikely to be workable. I respectfully suggest there is nothing intrinsic to the fact that representations are made after transfer that imputes a lack of fairness or objectivity. Institutional entrenchment may be a perception, but I suggest it is an unjustified perception. There are good operational reasons why the full process of protesting a decision must wait until a later stage."
"What does fairness require in the present case? My Lords, I think it unnecessary to refer by name or to quote from, any of the often-cited authorities in which the courts have explained what is essentially an intuitive judgment. They are far too well known. From them, I derive that (1) where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. (2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. (3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken. (5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. (6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer."
"I remain unpersuaded by either of these arguments. Rather, there seem to me compelling reasons why, whatever the practical difficulties to be resolved (and to these I shall return), petitioners should, before the Secretary of State's decision, be given a specific opportunity to make effective representations upon whatever material has been revealed by his inquiries. Inquiries will presumably only be made if the petition itself raises one or more points of sufficient substance to cast doubt on the safety of the conviction. If the inquiries appear to resolve those points against the petitioner, elementary fairness surely requires that he should then have the opportunity to address these fresh obstacles in his path before an adverse decision is taken against him. Once it is conceded that section 17 determinations are reviewable (and it is), principle dictates that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, advance disclosure is required. It is required in the interests both of fairness and informed decision-making. Without it an adverse decision may not be right; and even if it is, it will certainly not be fair. It is no sufficient answer to say that the process of review is continuous. An adverse decision is not a negligible event. In a high-profile case it is likely to have attracted wide publicity. Clearly it represents the culmination of a specific and often intensive investigatory process. Strive as the Secretary of State may to avoid becoming defensive and entrenched in his view, it is difficult to suppose that he can remain as open-minded as if no clear decision had been taken. It is difficult to suppose too that with competing claims on his resources further representations could generate the same momentum towards a fresh decision as representation made in the course of a single determinative process."