Case No 8001751/2025Venue GlasgowHearing 10, 11, 12 & 13 February 2026
Between
Mrs J O’DonnellClaimantHBOS plcRespondent
Before
Employment Judge M KearnsMr R Bradley (instructed by Advocate) for respondentDate 1 April 2026
JUDGMENT
The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal was that:(1) The claims under sections 13, 18 and 19 Equality Act 2010 are well founded under exception of those dismissed below. The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant compensation including interest amounting to: Nine Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty Two Pounds (£9,532);(2) The claimant was unfairly dismissed by the respondent. The respondent is ordered to pay her compensation for loss of statutory rights in the sum of Four Hundred and Eighty Eight Pounds (£488); The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Benefits) Regulations 1996 do not apply to this award.(3) The claims of direct sex discrimination contrary to section 13 Equality Act 2010 and maternity discrimination contrary to section 18 are dismissed in respect of: E.T. Z4 (WR)a. the respondent’s alleged failure to carry out a risk assessment for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk; andb. the respondent’s alleged failure to provide time or allowances for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk.
REASONS
[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent latterly as an Assistant Manager in their Recoveries Team at 110 St Vincent Street, Glasgow. She worked for them from 1 March 2008 until 6 June 2025, when her employment was terminated by reason of redundancy. On 24 June 2025, having complied with the early conciliation requirements, the claimant presented an application to the Employment Tribunal in which she claimed sex discrimination and maternity discrimination. A further claim of unfair dismissal was later added by amendment.
Issues
[2]The issues for determination at this final hearing are summarised in a list of issues agreed by the parties. These are set out and determined in the Discussion and decision section below. Evidence[3]The parties produced a joint bundle of documents (“J”) and referred to them by page number. The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf. The respondent called the following witnesses: Kelly Green, Head of Credit Operations; Neil White, Manager, Non-Complex Recoveries; and Sharon Hoy, former Senior Manager, Non-Complex Recoveries, who has now left the respondent. Findings in Fact[4]The following material facts were admitted or found to be proved:-[5]The respondent is Halifax Bank of Scotland plc, known as HBOS plc. The claimant worked for the respondent from 1 March 2008 until 6 June 2025, when she was dismissed by reason of redundancy. From around 2010 until 9 November 2023, the claimant worked as a grade D assistant manager in the respondent’s secured recoveries team. The respondent’s secured and unsecured recoveries teams deal with commercial customers whose businesses have defaulted on loans or overdrafts from the respondent. That part of the business has undergone several restructures in recent years. On 30 November 2023, Jason Webster, Director, Business Support Unit & Recoveries Client Management announced changes to ‘simplify the operating model of the Recoveries Client Management Team’ from three teams to two (200). His announcement stated: “These two teams will be called Complex Recoveries Client Management and Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management. The new Complex team will incorporate the former C&RE, Invoice Finance, Asset Finance and Wealth teams and will be led by Louise Miller. The new Non-Complex team will bring together the existing Secured and Unsecured Recoveries Client Management teams and will be led by Sharon Hoy.” Mr Webster stated: “I will be working with the Recoveries Client Management Senior Leadership Team over the coming weeks to ensure a smooth transition to our new operating structure as we head into 2024.” On 26 January 2024, Mr Webster sent an email update (199) announcing that the changes would take place on 29 January 2024.[6]Customers were referred to the Recoveries Client Management team by relationship managers if their accounts were in default. Prior to late January 2024, there were two Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management teams: Secured and Unsecured. With effect from 29 January 2024, they became one team, managed by Sharon Hoy. However, different processes applied to secured and unsecured recoveries work and employees in the combined team were still allocated to work in either secured recoveries or unsecured recoveries. The secured recoveries staff worked with customers whose loans or overdrafts were secured over business or personal assets or who had granted charges or personal guarantees in respect of their loans. The role of a grade D assistant manager in secured recoveries was to assess the case and try and find a repayment solution in the first instance. If the customer was unable to repay the debt, the secured section would look to call up the security. This would often involve liaising with solicitors and other professionals.[7]The unsecured recoveries staff dealt with commercial customers whose loans were unsecured. This was grade C work and was normally done by grade C staff. The customers tended to be more vulnerable and would sometimes need to spend a long time on the phone. If a repayment solution could not be found, the unsecured recoveries team would liaise with debt collection agencies.[8]The claimant was employed by the respondent on full time hours when she joined them in 2008. Beginning in 2015, she had three periods of maternity leave. In 2015, the claimant had her first child. She returned from her first period of maternity leave to the same role of grade D assistant manager, recoveries doing secured work on or about 23 February 2017 on reduced hours of 22.5 per week. From 23 February 2017, she worked Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays. The claimant had her second child in 2019 and returned to work from her second period of maternity leave in or around October 2020. Again, she returned to the same secured recoveries role she had worked in prior to her maternity leave, working 22.5 hours per week. The claimant worked on a hybrid basis, two days a week from home and one day in the office. She was confident and good at her job and a source of advice and support to other secured recoveries team members.[9]The claimant’s terms and conditions of employment (181 – 192) state at paragraph 6. (183): “Job Grade Your job grade is D. You may be required to perform a variety of types of work whilst in this grade and also on a temporary basis work in other grades to provide flexibility to cover staff shortages, holidays, sickness and training.”[10]The claimant’s third maternity leave period started on or about 3 September 2022 and ended on 3 September 2023. She then used her accrued annual leave and returned to work on 9 November 2023 to her normal hours of 22.5 per week. Again, the claimant worked two days from home and one from the office.[11]For most of her time in the Recoveries Client Management team, the claimant’s manager had been Sharon Hoy. However, while the claimant was on maternity leave in 2023, Ms Hoy was promoted to senior manager and Becky Jarrett became the claimant’s line manager. When the claimant returned to work in November 2023, Ms Jarrett told her that a decision had been taken by Ms Hoy that the claimant was not to be allocated secured recoveries portfolios. The claimant was upset about this because she considered herself a ‘secured recoveries portfolio’ assistant manager. The claimant pointed out to her managers that a number of colleagues were on long term sick leave and their secured portfolio customers were not being contacted within agreed time periods. Those secured portfolios would be placed on the daily workflow list and distributed across the team so that different managers would work on them on different days and there was no continuity for those customers. The claimant offered to cover the secured portfolio of one of the colleagues on long term sick leave but was told no by Ms Jarrett.[12]When the claimant first returned from maternity leave and annual leave and was not permitted to return to working a secured portfolio, she was instead put on ad hoc tasks. For example, she was given a spreadsheet with 200 connections that had disappeared from the diary and was asked to investigate the causes and feed it back to management. Between November 2023 and February 2024, the claimant asked on numerous occasions to return to a secured portfolio but this was refused. Meanwhile, full time colleagues were transferred from unsecured to secured portfolios without experience and they repeatedly asked the claimant to help them. She felt humiliated at this time when colleagues asked her what she had done wrong that she was not being permitted to work her secured portfolio.[13]In mid-November 2023, Ms Jarrett had a discussion with Ms Hoy about breastfeeding support for the claimant. Ms Hoy arranged for the claimant to have a private room she could use for breastfeeding and purchased a fridge for her to store the milk until she could take it home. No formal breastfeeding risk assessment was done. Ms Hoy instructed that the claimant be given regular breaks but she was not allocated specific times and in practice, the claimant felt too busy to express regularly as required. Also, she was not given a workload discount to facilitate this. The claimant found it difficult to find the time in her day to express milk. The claimant did not complain to Ms Hoy at the time that a risk assessment had not been done and Ms Hoy was unaware of any issue.[14]From 29 January 2024, the respondent operated a Provision, Criterion or Practice (“PCP”) of excluding from secured recoveries portfolio work grade D employees who worked 4 days a week or fewer. The PCP was applied by the team’s senior manager, Ms Hoy to all grade D employees in the Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management team, male and female alike. However, since no men in the team worked four days a week or fewer and five women did so, a greater proportion of women than men were disadvantaged by it. Indeed, it resulted in all the grade D reduced hours mothers in the new combined team being eligible only for unsecured recoveries or ad hoc work.[15]When the claimant returned from a period of annual leave in February 2024, Ms Jarrett told her she had good news and that the claimant was to be given her own portfolio. However, the claimant was told that this was an unsecured portfolio with unsecured vulnerable customers. This was Grade C work. Furthermore, the claimant was to share the portfolio with another reduced hours colleague who was a grade C. Thus, the claimant was being given grade C work to do with grade C level customers. In general, unsecured recoveries work was less successful in recovering debt and more timeconsuming. The claimant found it was impossible to catch up with the backlog because the customers were vulnerable and phone calls to them were often long, unproductive and sometimes distressing. When the claimant started work on the unsecured portfolio, she discovered there was a large inherited backlog affecting around 200 customers and that the target levels were unachievable, which made the work stressful. A lot of the customer contact details were out of date and there were many incomplete strategies. All this had to be put right before the portfolio could be worked properly. The claimant’s training and experience were in secured recoveries. She considered that giving her unachievable levels of grade C work would lead to her becoming de-skilled. She was upset about not being allowed to do the job she had done well before her maternity leave. When she had been working her secured recoveries portfolio prior to her maternity leave, she had been one of the only colleagues able to keep their diary up to date, despite working reduced hours. However, this was not possible in the Grade C unsecured role because of the inherited backlog and unachievable work levels.[16]Secured and unsecured work had different processes and the claimant was not familiar with the processes for unsecured work. Although there were process maps, she found that these were not always correct. There was no training given regarding the different unsecured recovery processes. The unsecured character of the work meant the claimant also had to deal with debt collection agencies which she had not done before. Full time colleagues were given the secured work and ‘reduced hours colleagues’ were no longer permitted to do it. When the claimant had worked in secured recoveries, she had worked with solicitors and insolvency practitioners, administrators and trustees. This did not happen in unsecured work. Furthermore, when full time colleagues came across problems they did not know how to handle in their secured work, they would come and ask the claimant what to do, which took up her time and added to her stress.[17]The claimant regularly pleaded with the respondent to allow her to go back to her secured recoveries role but she was not permitted to do so. She pointed out that she had been managing a secured portfolio on reduced hours for many years and the only thing that had changed was that she had had a baby (397).[18]The claimant and her job share partner operated their unsecured portfolio as best they could despite the inherited backlog. By being required to share an unsecured portfolio with a Grade C employee, the claimant was confined to Grade C work and she was becoming deskilled and losing self-confidence. She was also concerned that it was not clear to those managing her which aspects of the shared portfolio were done by which job share partner.[19]In July 2024, Ms Jarrett left the respondent and the claimant was told she would now be managed by Neil White. On 26 July 2024, not long after he had started managing the claimant, the claimant asked for her portfolio to be split from her job share partner’s. Mr White sent her a message in the following terms: “Morning Julie. Please take it forward as discussed with Sharon. Re your email around splitting the portfolios, Sharon is firm on this point and I understand she explained it to you. Anyone working less than 4 days p/w will need to be in a shared portfolio. I’m not really in a position to make any decisions contrary to her wishes.”[20]On 6 September 2024 the claimant emailed Neil White (397) in the following terms: “Hi Neil …..I was going to speak to Sharon about my concerns regarding no longer being permitted to manage a secured portfolio as a reduced hours colleague, but I wanted to see if you could find out the answer for me please.// You mentioned that this was due to the hours that I work, and that due to those hours, it was not deemed appropriate for someone working my hours to manage a secured portfolio due to potential customer impact that doesn't arise with the unsecured portfolios. // I have worked in secured recoveries for 14 years. // For 7 years I successfully ran a reduced hours, 3 day a week secured portfolio with no concerns/ issues raised and at times was praised for its management/ organisation and overall effectiveness of my work. I was on occasion asked to provide insight to others on how I kept my diary up to date to see if colleagues could adopt any of these behaviours to aid with their diary management. // Can you provide clarification as to why it is now deemed that I am unable to manage a secured portfolio on reduced hours as the only thing that has changed is that I have had a baby.”[21]Mr White did not respond. However, the next working day, Ms Hoy took the claimant into a room. She told the claimant that because she worked reduced hours despite having done so previously for 7 years, it was not deemed appropriate for reduced hours colleagues to work secured customers any longer. The claimant questioned her and said she had always got good results and never had any complaints from customers or colleagues but all Ms Hoy would say was that it was because she worked reduced hours.[22]If someone is away from the workplace for more than a certain period of time, they lose their discretion to sanction solicitors’ fees and debt write offs. In order to get their sanctioning discretion back again, the respondent uses a tool called ‘100% hindsighting’. Hindsighting involves a colleague’s casework calls and decisions being listened to and scored under a traffic light system, where green is “sanctioned – no issues”; amber is “sanctioned with feedback”; and red is where the strategy proposed by the employee is “rejected”. The claimant’s hindsighting record covered a period from February 2024 to February 2025 in unsecured recoveries. The vast majority of her results were green. However, there were also 13 ambers and 13 reds. Mr White told the claimant it was only a development tool but it ended up being part of the evidence used for redundancy scoring.[23]On 26 September 2024 the claimant was having a bad day. She was feeling bad about herself because she had always been really successful as a secured recoveries assistant manager and she got upset on a Teams call to Mr White. She sent Mr White a message afterwards apologising (209): “Thanks Neil - apologies for getting upset earlier - I have always been good at my job without any issues and kind of feel like I am rather hopeless at the moment. I am working so hard but just feel kinda rubbish...”.[24]Although the claimant was Grade D and her job share partner, Bethanne was Grade C, Mr White told the claimant that she must not act like she was Bethanne’s manager as Bethanne had her own manager. However, the claimant was regularly contacted by Bethanne’s manager, who asked her to work with Bethanne and help her.[25]A number of the claimant’s full time colleagues had been moved from unsecured work into secured portfolios of which they had no experience. They would come and ask the claimant how to work them and what to do in relation to problems they encountered. This added to the claimant’s stress.[26]From 20 October to 15 November 2024, the claimant was off with work related stress. The claimant was finding work stressful for the reasons given in paragraphs 15 and 25 above. She was used to being able to keep her portfolio work up to date but this was not possible with the unsecured work because the volume of work was unmanageable. The claimant felt under pressure to rush the work and she began to make small errors. The respondent also had a triage line which was serviced by the unsecured recoveries section and this took up a lot of their time. In addition to all of this, the claimant had suffered bereavements and had a lot going on in her private life at the time.[27]The claimant was originally a member of Unite the Union, which was recognised by the respondent. However, she inadvertently allowed her membership to lapse during her third period of maternity leave. Nevertheless, she was still able to ask the union for advice and did so, for example in relation to her absence following a car accident on 28 November 2024.[28]On 28 November 2024, the claimant had a car accident. She was quite shaken after it and she called Mr White and asked if she could take some annual leave. Mr White said she should take sick leave and there was a disagreement about this. The claimant took advice from Unite and they sorted it out with Mr White so that the claimant was able to take the leave as annual leave. The claimant came back to work on 2 December 2024. Mr White was generally very encouraging to the claimant and often told her she was doing a good job. When the claimant got her 2024 year-end review (J288 – 95), she was rated in all but one area as having had a “clear impact” and the claimant received a full bonus for the year.[29]In very early December 2024, Mr White and Ms Lipsett (another Band E manager) were confidentially asked to assist with the scoring of their direct reports in respect of a restructuring project with possible redundancies resulting. They were given a Scoring Manager Support Guide (101 - 117) dated 20 November 2024 to assist them. The Guide contained a scoring matrix (106) setting out the criteria applicable to each score between 1 and 5.[30]On 10 December 2024 the respondent initiated collective consultation with its recognised trade unions, Unite and Accord in relation to “Project Seville” which related to its Risk Function (233 – 275). The consultation document (234) announced that “The proposed changes of Project Seville will impact 6 areas across risk…. There are separate sections in this document setting out the proposed change and colleague impact for each area. These change [sic] will result in an overall reduction of 153 roles impacting 323 colleagues. The breakdown by business area is detailed further in this pack.” In the claimant’s section: “Credit” (246/7), it was stated that “Risk Function has a long-standing relationship with a BPO provider in India. Following careful consideration, the business is looking to further expand this offering through the offshoring of activities currently undertaken by c.150 roles. This will involve activities across credit analysis and the administrative elements of the commercial recoveries team. ..” It was stated in relation to Grade D colleagues that there would be a reduction by 27 and that 36 Grade D colleagues will go into selection for 9 roles. Appendix 1 of the document related to collective consultation on the selection criteria. The selection criteria for Grade D Recoveries Assistant Managers which the unions were to be consulted upon (267) were: Capability Weighting Capability wtg Capability wtg capability 4 wtg Capability 5 wtg 1 2 3 Call 25% Customer 25% Develops 20% Risk 20% Stakeholder 10% handling centric people management management[31]The selection criteria for the Grade C role of Recoveries Manager’s Assistant were: Capability Weighting Capability wtg Capability wtg capability 4 wtg Capability wtg 1 2 3 5 Call 25% Customer 25% Customer 20% Communicated 20% Conduct 10% handling centric focus effectively risk[32]Appendix 2 contained a summary of roles to be removed and showed that 23 Grade D Recoveries Assistant Manager roles were to go (271).[33]The proposed timeline (239) was as follows: Date Activity 21 January Share advanced copies of communications material with (2025) unions 21 January Pre A-Day selection only: Selection outcome consultation with unions 28 January AO’Day (announcement and outcomes day): issue divisional communication to colleagues and communication of outcomes to colleagues if appropriate 28 January Immediately at risk: commence support for at risk colleagues 25 February Proposed date notice will be served Commencing New organisational structure takes effect March 2025[34]Following consultation with the unions, the proposals were adopted by the respondent, although the timeline slipped and the events scheduled for 28 January moved to 12 February. At some point in late December 2024 or early January 2025, using the Guide and matrix he had been given earlier (101 – 117), Mr White applied the selection criteria to his direct reports, including the claimant and these were subsequently reviewed by Ms Hoy and HR. Ms Green then reviewed across the 101 employees affected to ensure consistency of scoring. With regard to call handling, Mr White scored the claimant at 2 (beginning to demonstrate capability with considerable support required) out of a maximum 5, stating: “Julie has been afforded time off the phones and also at a reduced priority, to allow her focus time to work through backlogs and reduce errors caused by rushing her work…”. With regard to ‘Customer centric’, Mr White scored the claimant at 1 (demonstrates insufficient evidence), stating that whilst there had been an existing backlog of work, support had been provided from the wider team to catch up. “However, the portfolio continues to operate outside of SLA, resulting in delays to customer communication and strategy decisions. Julie is still working towards regaining her CAD, but 100% hindsighting has identified numerous instances of inappropriate strategy decisions and failure to adhere to defined processes.” With regard to ‘develops people’ the claimant was scored at 3 (demonstrates capability with minimum support). For risk management, the claimant scored 2 “No proactive escalation evidenced to demonstrate that Julie has identified or considered risks in processes.….” Stakeholder management was also 2: “No evidence to suggest Julie engages with other stakeholders in respect of identifying and managing risks/issues, as she’s solely focused on her own portfolio work.”[35]On 12 February 2025, the claimant got a call from Ms Hoy on a non-working day asking her to attend a Teams call at 10am. The claimant was at her mother’s house, so she went back home to log into her work laptop. There were a large number of colleagues present on the call, which was hosted by Kelly Green, Head of Credit Operations at the respondent’s Chief Credit Office. All those present – including the claimant - were told they were at risk of redundancy. At 10.30 another call was held at which a different group of employees were told they were keeping their jobs. Around 12 noon the same day, Ms Green sent an email (299) which was cascaded to all at risk staff containing background information. As 12 February was a non-working day for the claimant, she first saw the email on 13 February. Put shortly, the email stated amongst other things that a number of roles were being ‘off-shored’ to India and that: “These changes will impact all line management in our current structure and colleagues who operate within Credit Operations. This results in a reduction of our headcount onshore of 101 roles at band F-B grade.”[36]After the ‘exit’ call on 12 February 2025, the claimant received an ‘at risk of redundancy’ letter (J302 – 3). The letter contained the following paragraphs: “Your line manager can answer questions about the meeting you had If you'd like your line manager to recap anything that was discussed when you talked, or answer any questions, please just ask them. They'll set aside the time you need to go through any questions or concerns you have. You can appeal within the next 14 days If you want to appeal the decision to make your role redundant, please talk to your line manager first. If you then want to formally appeal the decision, you should write to them explaining why. You will need to do this within 14 days of the date of this letter.”[37]The letter also contained a link to the respondent’s internal job application process. There was also a link to a one to one support programme delivered by an external provider paid for by the respondent. This offered internal job search and interview guidance; confidential one to one coaching sessions; and help with CV writing and interview skills, networking and LinkedIn; use of an external career portal and help with options such as re-training, selfemployment or retirement. The letter stated: “Next steps if you’re not able to find another internal role “We hope you're able to use the tools and support available to find another role within the Group. If this doesn't happen, the next step would be for us to send you a notice of redundancy. This is a formal notification in writing, setting out when your employment will end. We’ll also tell you more about any redundancy pay you are due. Your line manager will be able to give you an idea of timings for this.”[38]The claimant did not follow either the link to the respondent’s internal job application process or the link to their one-to-one next steps support programme. The reason for this was that she felt the respondent had treated her badly when she returned from maternity leave.[39]At this time, Ms Hoy had also just been told she was at risk of redundancy herself. The claimant had a Teams meeting with Ms Hoy and Mr White around 15 February 2025. In the meeting, Ms Hoy told the claimant there was no point in her appealing the redundancy selection decision because it would not change the outcome. She said 50% of the department’s grade Ds were selected. Ms Hoy gave the claimant the impression that she had scored highly in the redundancy scoring exercise. She told her that owing to the numbers of jobs being lost, some of the high scorers ‘had to go’. When the claimant spoke to Unite after the meeting, they told her she could get a copy of her scores, so the claimant emailed Mr White and asked for them. Mr White sent the claimant her score and she was dismayed to find that she had been scored at 39, which was second from bottom (J360). The claimant felt it was very unfair of the respondent to have benchmarked her against other grade Ds when making her do a grade C role.[40]The claimant was scheduled to have a further face to face discussion with Neil White, her line manager. However, when she received Mr White’s scoring of her work against the redundancy selection criteria, she corresponded with him (305 – 315) and informed him she did not want a face-to-face meeting. Ms Hoy had been very surprised by the claimant’s low score and she challenged Mr White and Ms Lipsett to justify it. She was taken aback that in her view they were able to do so. Ms Hoy considered that the claimant, and indeed the whole team had become overwhelmed with work. However, she concluded ultimately that the score was a fair reflection of where the claimant was sitting at that time.[41]Following the imposition of the PCP in around February 2024, as at February 2025, when the redundancy selection exercise was done, there were 31 Grade D members of staff across the Complex and Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management Teams (360). The latter team (Non-Complex Recoveries) was the claimant’s team. Excluding from the Grade D redundancy score list on page (360) those employees from Wealth C&R, IFR and AFR (who were all in the Complex Recoveries Team (see 200)), there were 24 Grade D members of staff in the Non-Complex Recoveries Team (360). Of these, 15 were female (including one member of staff who was seconded out). Of the females, 10 were full time and 5 were part time. There were also 9 male members of staff, all of whom were full time and none of whom were part time (202) and (360). Four of the five part-time females were selected for redundancy.[42]On Friday 28 February 2025, the UK Parliament House of Commons Library published a briefing entitled ‘Women and the UK economy’ (J418). The briefing stated that “In the UK, 16.37 million women aged 16 and over were in employment in October to December 2024, according to the ONS UK Labour Force Survey.” ….The female employment rate was 71.8% and the male employment rate was 78.2%.// There were 10.42 million women working full time, while 5.96 million were working part time. 36% of women in employment worked part-time, compared with 14% of men”.[43]On or about 5 March 2025, the claimant received a further letter from the respondent (324). It was headed: “This is your formal notice of redundancy”. The letter stated that as the claimant had not yet secured another role within the Group, she was now being given formal notice of redundancy and that her employment with the respondent would end on 6 June 2025. The letter said that to appeal against notice being served, she should first discuss it with her line manager and if she decided to formally appeal, she should write to them within 14 days of 5 March 2025 explaining why. The claimant received 3 months’ notice of dismissal. The letter again informed the claimant of the range of support available in seeking alternative internal and/or external work and contained a link to the Employee Assistance Programme.[44]By letter dated 31 March 2025 (J329 – 31) the claimant was given her severance quote and redundancy terms. The letter stated that she had 17 years’ service and would be aged 46 at the date her employment would end (6 June 2025). It stated she would receive an enhanced redundancy payment of £45,080, which included her entitlement to a statutory redundancy payment of £11,135. The claimant self-certified sickness absence on 17 March 2025. She was signed off by her doctor with work related stress until the expiry of her notice period on 6 June 2025.[45]On 4 June 2025, the claimant emailed Kelly Green and HR stating that she wished to lodge a grievance about her treatment since her return from maternity leave (J335 – 6). Ms Green did not receive the email sent to her. Although the claimant’s email to HR was automatically acknowledged (J337), it was not followed up. The claimant’s email (335) gave her personal email address and asked that future correspondence be sent to her at that email address. The terms of the grievance were not attached or sent. The claimant did not hear further about the email from either Kelly Green or HR. Neither she nor the respondent did anything to take it further.[46]The claimant received an enhanced redundancy payment of £45,080 from the respondent. Of this enhanced redundancy payment, the first £30,000 was paid to her tax free. The remaining £15,080 was subject to tax. Income tax of £4,972.63 was deducted (394). £15,080 - £4,972.63 = £10,107.37. Thus, the total she received from the respondent net of tax was £30,000 + £10,107.37. The statutory redundancy payment element of that was £11,135. The total received by the claimant from the respondent net of tax in addition to the statutory redundancy payment was £28,972.37 (£40,107.37 - £11,135).[47]The claimant’s net pay per month when employed by the respondent was £2,201.31. She also received employer pension contributions of £212.13 per month, making a net monthly total of £2,413.33.[48]The claimant’s employment terminated on 6 June 2025. She notified ACAS of her claim on 13 May 2025 and received her early conciliation certificate on 24 June 2025. The claimant presented her ET1 to the Employment Tribunal on 17 July 2025. Observations on the
Evidence
[49]The respondent’s position from the outset of this case has been that the PCP at question 1. in the list of issues below was applied as described and that it was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The grounds of resistance stated in terms: “12. On or around February 2024, the Respondent had increased need for case officers to manage the large volume of unsecured portfolio work. Given the secured portfolio work was often more time critical and required consistent communication with customers and solicitors, particularly where relating to court action, the Respondent considered that it was not appropriate for secured portfolios to be shared between employees, and that customers would be better served if employees were dedicated to specific portfolios. The Respondent therefore decided that full-time employees should work on secured portfolios, and employees who worked less than four days per week should work on unsecured portfolios which were shared with other employees. 13. The Claimant was therefore asked to manage unsecured portfolios to assist with the workload. Whilst this is a Grade C role, the Claimant’s salary remained unchanged and several other Grade D colleagues were also asked to work on unsecured portfolios.”[50]Mr White confirmed in his evidence that the PCP of excluding from secured portfolio work Grade D employees who worked 4 days per week or fewer was applied to the Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management Team. He offered some rationales he thought might apply but said he had not been included in the decision. Asked who had made the decision, he said it was Sharon Hoy but he did not know if it had been made collectively with other colleagues of her grade or above. His testimony was consistent with the claimant’s evidence, the respondent’s pleadings and at least two contemporaneous documents in the bundle; the document at (397) quoted in paragraph 20 above and Mr White’s response to the claimant on 26 July 2024, not long after he had started managing her, when the claimant asked for her portfolio to be split from her job share partner’s and Mr White sent her a message in the following terms: “Morning Julie. Please take it forward as discussed with Sharon. Re your email around splitting the portfolios, Sharon is firm on this point and I understand she explained it to you. Anyone working less than 4 days p/w will need to be in a shared portfolio. I’m not really in a position to make any decisions contrary to her wishes.” (206)[51]The claimant was clear that she had repeatedly been told of the PCP as the reason why she could not go back to doing the secured portfolio work she had done in her 22.5 hours per week for many years prior to her most recent period of maternity leave. Mr White was equally clear that Ms Hoy had said this to the claimant and that the claimant was vocal and unhappy about it. Mr Bradley asked him: “Did you know what Sharon Hoy had explained to the claimant regarding her rationale for refusing [a secured portfolio]? Mr White replied: “Just that she had been told the same thing I had regarding the rationale for the decision”.[52]Initially, Ms Hoy acknowledged the PCP: Mr Bradley: “The claimant says when she came back to work she was doing ad hoc work regarding spreadsheets? Ms Hoy: I don’t know. That would be a discussion between Becky Jarrett and Julie”. Mr Bradley: “She said she was no longer allowed to do secured work? Ms Hoy: “Yes. We’d gone through the restructure.” Confusingly, at other times in her testimony to the tribunal, Ms Hoy appeared to suggest that no such PCP was applied. She stated in evidence that it was not that the claimant was not permitted to do secured work but that the work was not there. She said the claimant’s secured caseload had been split among others and that the caseload coming in was all unsecured work. Indeed, at one point she said: “All our Band Ds were doing unsecured work in the last 10 months.” This did not appear to be consistent with the redundancy selection analysis at (360) which suggested that at the point of the selection exercise in December 2024/January 2025, 14 employees were engaged in secured work and 9 were doing unsecured, of whom 5 were part time. Mr Bradley asked Ms Hoy whether the claimant could have been given the secured caseload of one of the long-term sick absentees. Ms Hoy replied that the problem was that they would have had no cover for the 2 days per week the claimant did not work. She said it was an option but they had “a bigger fire to put out on the other side”. On the other hand, in cross examination she stated: “We did not have part time people in secured.” I found her evidence on this matter inconsistent. On the one hand she appeared to imply that the PCP was not applied. On the other hand she seemed to suggest it was applied and was justified by the need of secured clients for consistency. This produced a somewhat perplexing and unexpected conflict in the evidence which it was necessary to resolve. I preferred the claimant’s evidence on the point because it was consistent with the position the respondent had taken in this case from the outset; and also consistent with the evidence of Mr White and with the documents in the bundle at (206), (360) and (397). Discussion and Decision Indirect sex discrimination[53]The parties had agreed a list of issues. The first issue was whether the respondent indirectly discriminated against the claimant in relation to the protected characteristic of sex, contrary to section 19 Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”).[54]Section 19 EqA provides as follows: “19 Indirect sex discrimination(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”[55]The issues for determination by the Tribunal in relation to indirect sex discrimination are as follows: 1. Did the respondent operate a provision criteria or practice (PCP) of excluding from “secured” portfolio work grade D employees who worked 4 days per week or fewer?[56]The respondent conceded this point. The answer is yes. The respondent accepted that it operated a PCP of excluding from secured portfolio work grade D employees who worked 4 days per week or fewer. 2. If so, did that PCP disproportionately discriminate against women?[57]In answering this question:(i) it is first necessary to identify the group or ‘pool’ affected (positively or negatively) by the PCP;(ii) then to identify the particular disadvantage; and(iii) then to determine whether the protected group is put at the particular disadvantage. (i) identification of the group or pool affected by the PCP[58]The case of London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No.2) 1999 ICR 494, CA, concerned the alleged discriminatory effect of imposing changes to the rostering arrangements of train operators employed by London Underground. When considering the proper pool for comparison, Potter LJ stated at paragraph 23: ‘The identity of the appropriate pool will depend upon identifying that sector of the relevant workforce which is affected or potentially affected by the application of the particular requirement or condition [now PCP] in question and the context or circumstances in which it is sought to be applied. In this case, the pool was all those members of the LU workforce, namely train operators, to whom the new rostering arrangements were to be applied… It did not include all LU employees. Nor did the pool extend to include the wider field of potential new applicants to LU for a job as a train operator. That is because the discrimination complained of was the requirement for existing employees to enter into a new contract embodying the rostering arrangement; it was not a complaint brought by an applicant from outside complaining about the terms of the job applied for.’[59]The Equality and Human Rights Commission's Code of Practice on Employment states at paragraph 4.18: “In general, the pool should consist of the group which the provision, criterion or practice affects (or would affect) either positively or negatively, while excluding workers who are not affected by it, either positively or negatively. In most situations, there is likely to be only one appropriate pool, but there may be circumstances where there is more than one. If this is the case, the Employment Tribunal will decide which of the pools to consider. Example: A marketing company employs 45 women, 10 of whom are parttimers, and 55 men who all work full-time. One female receptionist works Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. The annual leave policy requires that all workers take time off on public holidays, at least half of which fall on a Monday every year. The receptionist argues that the policy is indirectly discriminatory against women and that it puts her at a personal disadvantage because she has proportionately less control over when she can take her annual leave. The appropriate pool for comparison is all the workers affected by the annual leave policy. The pool is not all receptionists or all part-time workers, because the policy does not only affect these groups.”[60]Mr Bradley submitted that there was no good evidence that the PCP disproportionately disadvantaged women. I disagreed with that submission for the following reasons. The application of the PCP in this case is conceded. The PCP was: excluding from secured portfolio work Grade D employees working 4 days a week or fewer. It was clear from the oral evidence of the claimant and Mr White and from the information to which I was taken (especially the email from Mr Webster dated 30 November 2023 (200) and the superseded and new organisational charts (J202) and (372), spoken to by Mr White and Ms Hoy); and from the respondent’s analysis of the scoring for redundancy of the Complex and Non-Complex Recoveries teams’ Grade Ds (J360), that the pool or group of employees to whom the PCP had been applied was all grade D employees in the respondent’s Non-Complex Secured and Unsecured Recoveries Client Management team (J360). (Secured and Unsecured Recoveries had been combined into one team under the senior management of Ms Hoy around 29 January 2024). The claimant put the documents at (360) and (372) to Mr White in cross examination and he accepted (as 360 clearly shows) that there were five parttime females and no part-time male Band D employees in the Non-Complex combined (secured and unsecured) recoveries team. He accepted that of the 5 reduced hours colleagues, 4 had been made redundant. Either way, the relevant information had been provided and referred to in evidence.[61]The PCP was said by the claimant and Mr White to have been applied by the senior manager of the section, Sharon Hoy, and I found that as fact on the preponderance of the evidence. The pool affected, either positively or negatively by the PCP is therefore the respondent’s Grade D employees working in the Non-Complex combined Secured and Unsecured Recoveries Client Management team (202) at the relevant time (between February 2024 and June 2025 when the claimant’s employment ended.) (ii) identification of the particular disadvantage[62]The next step is to identify the particular disadvantage suffered. Disadvantage is not defined by the Equality Act 2010. The EHRC Employment Code states: (para 4.9): ‘Disadvantage’ is not defined by the Act. It could include denial of an opportunity or choice, deterrence, rejection or exclusion. The courts have found that ‘detriment’, a similar concept, is something that a reasonable person would complain about – so an unjustified sense of grievance would not qualify. A disadvantage does not have to be quantifiable and the worker does not have to experience actual loss (economic or otherwise). It is enough that the worker can reasonably say that they would have preferred to be treated differently..'[63]I considered the facts found in relation to disadvantage. Put shortly, unsecured recoveries work was Grade C work as the respondent admitted in the ET3 (paragraph 13 of the grounds of resistance). I accepted that asking Grade D employees to do Grade C work long term or permanently was disadvantageous. The claimant was concerned about deskilling. It appeared to me that an employee who was being required to do the work of the grade below could reasonably say they would have preferred to have been treated differently.[64]I concluded that the claimant had identified a particular disadvantage in being excluded from secured recovery work. Put shortly, she was being permanently required to do the work of the grade below her with all that that entailed for her confidence, career and prospects. (iii) Whether the protected group was put at the particular disadvantage.[65]I was taken to the organisation charts at (202) and (372) and to the analysis of the sex; secured/unsecured and part-time/full-time status of those Grade D employees in the relevant teams at (360) which appear to provide the necessary information and were spoken to by Mr White, Ms Hoy and the claimant. Following the imposition of the PCP in around February 2024, as at February 2025, when the redundancy selection exercise was done, taking the data at page (360) and focusing only on those grade D staff allocated to secured and unsecured recoveries (i.e. excluding the Complex Recoveries divisions of Wealth C&R, IFR and AFR), the pool affected (positively or negatively) was the 24 Grade D employees working in Secured and Unsecured Recoveries (including one who was seconded out). Of these, 15 employees were female, of whom 10 were full time and 5 were part time. There were 9 male employees, all of whom were full time and none of whom were part time (360).[66]I considered whether the PCP put persons with whom the claimant shares the relevant protected characteristic of sex (here female grade D employees in the Non-Complex Secured and Unsecured Recoveries Client Management team) at the particular disadvantage identified above when compared with persons with whom she does not share the characteristic (male grade D employees in the Non-Complex Secured and Unsecured Recoveries CM team). I found that of those described as doing secured and unsecured recoveries in the analysis document at (360) - that being the pool of employees to whom the PCP was applied - a greater proportion 5/15 (approximately 33%) of women than men 0/9 (0%) were disadvantaged by it.[67]In addition to the information provided and spoken to by the respondent’s witnesses, the claimant lodged some workforce statistical information published by the ONS (418) in February 2025 stating that 36% of women in employment work part-time and that 14% of men in employment work parttime. Mr Bradley argued at paragraph i. of his written submission that that evidence does not show that the PCP puts or would put women at a disadvantage. He also argued at paragraph iii. of his submission, that it would be manifestly unfair on the respondent if the issue turned on this very late “evidence” which it did not have the opportunity to counter. I did not accept this submission. Firstly, In terms of the over-riding objective, I would expect a large, well-resourced and well-represented respondent to assist the tribunal and the other party by making the necessary statistical information available in a case such as this with such inequality of arms and it appeared to me that in fairness, they had done so by providing the necessary information at (360). Secondly, the ONS information is unsurprising and publicly available. It is well known and not generally disputed that more women than men in the workforce work part time. The issue of ‘judicial knowledge and national ‘statistics’ was famously discussed in London Underground v Edwards at paragraph 23: “…. Mr. Bean has placed emphasis on the restricted nature of the pool when asserting that the industrial tribunal were not entitled to look outside it in any respect. Thus he submitted they should not have taken into account, as they apparently did, their own knowledge and experience, or the broad national “statistic” that the ratio of single parents having care of a child is some 10:1 as between women and men. 24. In my view Mr. Bean was incorrect in that last respect. An industrial tribunal does not sit in blinkers. Its members are selected in order to have a degree of knowledge and expertise in the industrial field generally. The high preponderance of single mothers having care of a child is a matter of common knowledge. Even if the “statistic,” i.e., the precise ratio referred to, is less well known, it was in any event apparently discussed at the hearing before the industrial tribunal without doubt or reservation on either side. It thus seems clear to me that, when considering as a basis for their decision the reliability of the figures with which they were presented, the industrial tribunal were entitled to take the view that the percentage difference represented a minimum rather than a maximum so far as discriminatory effect was concerned.”[68]Mr Bradley submits that (418) is not evidence of corresponding percentages within the respondent’s workforce. This is correct, though it is broadly consistent with the more detailed workforce evidence and appears more favourable to the respondent. In any event, I did not place much reliance on it and the issue did not turn on it. 3. If so, did that PCP disadvantage and discriminate against the claimant?[69]Yes. See paragraphs 15 and 18 above. It also resulted in her selection for redundancy. 4. Was the aim of the PCP (ensuring that secured recoveries, which can involve more complex cases and time sensitive legal processes, were managed with sufficient continuity, availability and accountability to safeguard customer outcomes and minimise operational and regulatory risk) a legitimate one?[70]The respondent’s position from the outset has been that the PCP at question 1. above was applied as described and that it was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Given Ms Hoy’s testimony, as Mr Bradley very properly accepted, there was no evidence that the PCP had the aim pleaded by the respondent as set out in question 4 above. 5. If so was the PCP a proportionate means of achieving it? The respondent will say that it was, in that it provided greater day to day availability, reduced handovers, safeguarded single point ownership, and enabled prompt action on urgent matters.[71]Again, as Mr Bradley submitted – standing the answer to question 4, the answer must be no.[72]I did not understand it to be in dispute that the claim of indirect discrimination was in time. For the avoidance of doubt, I concluded that the application to the claimant of the PCP was conduct extending over a period ending with the date her dismissal took effect for the purposes of section 123(3)(a) Equality Act 2010. It is therefore to be treated as done at the end of the period. The claim of indirect discrimination is consequently in time.[73]The issue of remedy is considered below. Unfair dismissal 6. What was the reason for the claimant’s dismissal on 6 June 2025?[74]As Mr Bradley submitted, the claimant did not challenge the reason for dismissal, which was redundancy. In view of the evidence, I find that section 139(1)(b)(ii) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) is satisfied.[75]That section states so far as relevant that: “139 Redundancy. (1) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to— (a) ……….. (b) the fact that the requirements of that business— (i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or (ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.”[76]In this case, the dismissal was wholly or mainly due to the fact that the requirements of the respondent for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer had diminished. 7. In deciding to dismiss the claimant by reason of redundancy was it unfair by:- a. The method of selecting the claimant in the scoring process; in particular, her scoring being based on unachievable workloads when working on unsecured portfolios?[77]The starting point for consideration of whether a dismissal for redundancy was fair or unfair is the speech of Lord Bridge in Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd 1988 ICR 142, HL, where he said: “the employer will not normally act reasonably unless he warns and consults any employees affected or their representative, adopts a fair basis on which to select for redundancy and takes such steps as may be reasonable to avoid or minimise redundancy by deployment within his own organization”.[78]The claimant submits that her selection for redundancy was unfair she points particularly to the scoring done. Mr Bradley submits that there is little or no evidence to support the (necessary) finding that the claimant’s scoring was based on unachievable workloads when working on unsecured portfolios. He argues that the scoring of the pool was done consistently using agreed criteria and weightings; and that the claimant’s score was arrived at by a fair consideration of various materials. He submits that that score was corroborated by Sharon Hoy who(i) had known and worked with the claimant for a number of years and(ii) was satisfied based on the material presented to her that the score was fair. Mr Bradley referred to the guidance of the EAT, broadly agreed (but for one exception by the Court of Appeal) in Haycocks v ADP RPO Ltd [2025] IRLR 123 at paragraph 40 in which Underhill LJ said this: “At paras 13–22 the EAT addresses the applicable law. It sets out section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and then conducts a review of the authorities relating to the requirements of a fair consultation procedure. Its conclusion appears at paras 21–22 and is in the following terms: '21. What emerges from the above authorities is that the statute is always the keystone to ET decision making. That being the keystone, the guidance provided by various authorities in respect of specific circumstances is just that, guidance; it does not create a stricture on ET decision making. If, despite the guidance, the process adopted by the employer falls within the band of reasonableness an ET must find so. However, the purpose of guidance from the appeal courts is to inform the question of reasonableness and if the guidance does not apply, ETs would be expected to explain why it did not in the particular case. 22. The authorities set out the following guiding principles:a. The employer will normally warn and consult either the employees affected or their representative; Polkey v A.E. Dayton Services Ltd [1988] AC 344.b. A fair consultation occurs when proposals are at a formative stage and where adequate information and adequate time in which to respond is given along with conscientious consideration being given to the response; R v British Coal Corporation ex p Price [1994] IRLR 72.c. Whether in collective or individual consultation, the purpose is to avoid dismissal or ameliorate the impact; Freud v Bentalls Ltd [1983 ICR 77.d. A redundancy process must be viewed as a whole and an appeal may correct an earlier failing making the process as a whole reasonable; Lloyd v Taylor Woodrow Construction [1999] IRLR 782.e. The ET's consideration should be of the whole process, also considering the reason for dismissal, in deciding whether it is reasonable to dismiss; Taylor v OCS Group Ltd [2006] ICR 1602.f. It is a question of fact and degree as to whether consultation is adequate and it is not automatically unfair that there is a lack of consultation in a particular respect; Mugford v Midland Bank plc [1997] ICR 399.g. Any particular aspect of consultation, such as the provision of scoring, is not essential to a fair process; Camelot Group plc v Hogg UKEATS/0019/10.h. The use of a scoring system does not make a process fair automatically; British Aerospace plc v Green [1995] ICR 1006.i. The relevance or otherwise of individual scores will relate to the specific complaints raised in the case; British Aerospace v Green.'2 41 I broadly agree with what the EAT says in para 21, save that the final sentence should not be treated as stating a rule of law. I also agree that the various propositions in para 22 reflect the effect of the authorities cited so far as relevant to this case, though they are of course in very summary form.”[79]Mr Bradley submitted: “1. There is some evidence to support a finding that the respondent required to comply with its “collective consultation” obligations with its recognised unions, including the claimant’s union UNITE [page 273] 2. Project Seville document [pages 233 to 275] is evidence of the respondent consulting with its recognised unions, including the claimant’s union 3. That consultation took place at a formative stage 4. The tribunal is invited to find that [pages 302 and 303]a. on 12 February 2025; the claimant was “at risk”; and her role was redundant; but she was not being made redundant at that stageb. the claimant had the opportunity to appeal the redundancy of her role which she did not take upc. between 12 February and 6 June the claimant had access to numerous resources some of which were intended to find an alternative role with the respondent.”[80]The question for the tribunal in an ‘ordinary’ unfair dismissal claim is whether the selection criteria themselves and their application to the selection pool were within the band of reasonable responses available to a reasonable employer in the circumstances. The tribunal is not permitted to substitute its view of the outcome for that of the employer. On balance and subject to the consideration of the effect of the discrimination below, I find that they would have been had it not been for the effect of the PCP. b. The means by which she was advised of her redundancy?[81]I concluded that at the Teams meeting conducted by Ms Green on 12 February 2025 the claimant and others present were told that they were at risk of redundancy. This was later confirmed in the letter of that date (302-4). The letter said that the claimant was “at risk” of redundancy and that her “role” was redundant. As Mr Bradley submits, that did not mean that the claimant “was redundant” at that point in time because the purpose of the various support options set out in the letter was to try and find her alternative employment with the respondent to avoid her being dismissed by reason of redundancy. Nevertheless, Ms Green referred to the call attended by the claimant and 100 others on 12 February as the “exit call”. With regard to the terms of the 12 February call, Ms Green said she had “covered off what would have been part of a one to one call had the respondent not had so many colleagues to speak to at the same time.” The second group were told they had been successful in securing roles. Mr Bradley asked Ms Green whether there was a difference between a role being redundant and an individual being made redundant. With disarming honesty, Ms Green responded: “There is no difference”. In her cross examination of Ms Green, the claimant asked her: “The first call was an exit call for unsuccessful colleagues and the 10.30 call was for successful colleagues?” Ms Green replied: “Correct”. Thus although the script which Ms Green used made the distinction between a redundant role and a redundant colleague clear, it was not a distinction that was appreciated by those on the ground, including those delivering the message and those receiving it. c. The application of the PCP above?[82]On behalf of the respondent, Mr Bradley submitted that: “Standing the selection method, there is no basis to support a finding that the PCP played any part in determining the claimant’s score.” The claimant’s argument, as put to Ms Green in cross examination was that the work she (the claimant) was doing was grade C work. (This was admitted in the ET3). She stated to Ms Green that it was unfair that she was benchmarked against other Grade D colleagues for the purposes of redundancy selection because the selection criteria and weightings were different for Grade C (see (267) and paragraphs 30 and 31 above). Ms Green replied that call handling and Customer Centric were equal. It is correct that these capabilities were required from both Grades. However, the capabilities for the other 50% of the weighting were different. Also, what would be required for a good score under call handling and customer centric from a Grade D might be more exacting than from a Grade C. The claimant’s point was that there were fewer opportunities for a Grade D employee to demonstrate the evidence required to attract the higher scores if they were confined to Grade C work. This appeared to be borne out to some extent in the evidence (or expressed lack of it) Mr White gave to justify the scores. For example, stakeholder management and risk management appear among the Grade D selection criteria (267). Mr White marked these at 2 citing inter alia lack of evidence. The corresponding criteria for Grade C were ‘communicated effectively’ and ‘conduct risk’.[83]I concluded that the discriminatory exclusion of the claimant from the Grade D role she had before her maternity leave and had carried out successfully in 22.5 hours per week for seven years and the requirement that she carry out Grade C work instead put her at a disadvantage when it came to the redundancy selection because it meant she did not have the evidence necessary to meet the Grade D selection criteria capabilities. Thus, the scoring exercise was tainted by the discrimination and not within the band of reasonable responses in the circumstances of the case and the resulting dismissal was discriminatory and unfair. d. Being directly discriminated against in that her “allocated workload scoring” was negatively impacted by breastfeeding?[84]Mr Bradley submitted that there was no evidence to support a finding that the claimant’s score was in any way negatively impacted by breastfeeding. I accepted that submission. The thrust of the claimant’s evidence was that she was too busy to express milk and that the breastfeeding was adversely impacted by the work, rather than the other way round. I did not find 7d. to have been established in evidence. Maternity/ Direct sex discrimination 8. Was the claimant discriminated against contrary to section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 in the period November 2023 to February 2024 by the respondent a. Failing to carry out a risk assessment for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk?[85]In Otero Ramos v Servicio Galego de Saude and another [2018] ICR 965 the ECJ held that direct discrimination on grounds of breastfeeding is direct sex discrimination and consequential amendments were made to sections 13 and 18 Equality Act 2010 to continue the effect of EU law to include work related claims in the EqA’s protection against discrimination on the grounds of breastfeeding as direct discrimination beyond 1 January 2024. This preserved the effect of the decision in Otero Ramos so that a woman can still bring such claims.[86]The evidence in the present case was that Ms Hoy arranged for the claimant to have a private room she could use for breastfeeding and purchased a fridge for her to store the milk until she could take it home. No formal breastfeeding risk assessment appeared to have been done but the claimant did not request one or communicate any issue at the time. Ms Hoy instructed that the claimant be given regular breaks but the claimant stated that this had not happened in practice and that she felt too busy to express regularly as required. As Mr Bradley submits, crucially, there was no evidence that the failure to carry out a formal risk assessment was “because of” the claimant’s pregnancy or because she exercised her right to maternity leave. The obligation to carry it out arose because of her pregnancy. But that is not evidence of the reason why there was any failure. In the absence of evidence of pregnancy or maternity leave being the reason for the failure, this claim fails. b. Failing to provide time or allowances for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk?[87]As stated at 8a. above, there was no evidence that the above failure - being the alleged unfavourable or less favourable treatment - was because of the claimant’s pregnancy or because she exercised the right to maternity leave. c. Blocking the Claimant from doing secured grade D assistant manager recoveries portfolios/work?[88]Mr Bradley stated that the respondent did not accept that the claimant was “blocked” from doing secured grade D assistant manager recoveries portfolios/work in the period in question. He submitted that on the respondent’s evidence she was not given that work in the period November 2023 to February 2024 because(i) there was insufficient of that work for her to do and(ii) the respondent was anticipating the change which was formally implemented on 29 January 2024 (pages 200 and 199) whereby the claimant became part of the Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management Team within which she was required to do unsecured recoveries work. Mr Bradley said that the claimant’s contract of employment expressly provided for the respondent’s right to require her to perform a variety of types of work whilst in grade D. He suggested the unsecured work required of her was done whilst in that grade. I did not accept Mr Bradley’s submissions regarding the claimant’s contract. He took the claimant to the relevant clause in cross examination. This clause is set out at paragraph 9 above. On my reading, it only permits: “on a temporary basis work in other grades to provide flexibility to cover staff shortages, holidays, sickness and training”. However, on the evidence I accepted, that was not shown to be the basis on which the claimant and her reduced hours colleagues were being asked to do it.[89]With regard to(i) above, I did not accept Ms Hoy’s evidence that there was insufficient secured recoveries work for the claimant to do for the reasons given in the Observations on the Evidence above. That evidence was not consistent with documentary and other witness evidence, which indicated that Ms Hoy took a definite decision to exclude from secured portfolio work Grade D employees who worked four days per week or fewer. With regard to(ii) it appears to be correct that Ms Hoy anticipated the change which was formally implemented on 29 January 2024 (200 and 199) whereby the claimant became part of the Non-Complex Recoveries Client Management Team within which she was required to do unsecured recoveries work. The evidence I accepted suggested that the rule about those working fewer than four days a week not being permitted to do secured recoveries work was applied to the claimant from her return to work from maternity and annual leave on 9 November 2023 and was formalised on 29 January 2024. The question is why?[90]Regulation 18 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations (“MAPLE Regs”) provides, so far as relevant as follows: “18 Right to return after maternity or parental leave](1) ………..(2) An employee who returns to work after— (a) a period of additional maternity leave, or a period of parental leave of more than four weeks, whether or not preceded by another period of statutory leave, or (b) …….. is entitled to return from leave to the job in which she was employed before her absence or, if it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to permit her to return to that job, to another job which is both suitable for her and appropriate for her to do in the circumstances.(3) The reference in paragraphs (1) and (2) to the job in which an employee was employed before her absence is a reference to the job in which she was employed— (a) if her return is from an isolated period of statutory leave, immediately before that period began; (b) if her return is from consecutive periods of statutory leave, immediately before the first such period.”[91]Regulation 18A provides so far as relevant as follows: “18A Incidents of the right to return(1) An employee's right to return under regulation 18(1) or(2) is a right to return— (a) with her seniority, pension rights and similar rights as they would have been if she had not been absent, and (b) on terms and conditions not less favourable than those which would have applied if she had not been absent.”[92]Thus, an employee returning from Ordinary Maternity Leave (“OML”) is entitled to return to exactly the same job she left and to be treated as if she had never been absent. An employee returning from AML (which was the claimant’s situation) “is entitled to return from leave to the job in which she was employed before her absence or, if it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to permit her to return to that job, to another job which is both suitable for her and appropriate for her to do in the circumstances.” I concluded that the claimant’s right to return to her previous job, failing which, another suitable job which was appropriate for her to do in the circumstances was not respected in this case. This is very clearly set out in the paper apart to the ET1 (29) and is articulated in the Note of the Preliminary Hearing on 13 October 2025 (71) in the following way: “The claimant further clarified her claim under section 18 for unfavourable treatment because of maternity leave. She focuses on the period from November 2023 when she returned from maternity leave through to February 2024 before she was allocated the unsecured portfolio. Given that such treatment, if proved, would be either unfavourable treatment because of maternity leave or which failing direct sex discrimination, the claimant will argue in the alternative that the treatment amounts otherwise to direct sex discrimination.”[93]During the period from 9 November 2023 to February 2024, the claimant was given ad hoc work to do and was refused secured portfolio work, even on the basis of sick absence cover and in circumstances where long-term sick absent colleagues’ work went onto daily workflow and was distributed across the team, so that it was done by different colleagues on different days. The work the claimant was given in this period was not Grade D work. This claim is framed in the list of issues as a section 18 EqA claim and in the PH Note as direct sex discrimination in the alternative.[94]Under section 18 EqA, the question would be whether the claimant was treated unfavourably because of the pregnancy or because she had exercised the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave? Under section 13, the basic question would be what was the reason why the claimant was not allowed to return to the job she had prior to her maternity leave or, if that was not reasonably practicable, “another job which is both suitable for her and appropriate for her to do in the circumstances”? I cannot see that requiring the claimant to exclusively perform the work of the Grade below hers would meet this test.[95]In relation to this issue, there are in my view facts from which the tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that the claimant was treated as she was either because she took maternity leave or because she was a part time mum returning to work from maternity leave. Indirect sex discrimination has been shown to have occurred in the period immediately following the claimant’s return. The claimant had the right to return to her job, failing which a suitable and appropriate job. Despite her protests this right was not respected. On her return, the claimant was not given any portfolio work to do but was instead given ad hoc tasks. Meanwhile, full time colleagues were transferred from unsecured to secured portfolios without experience and they asked the claimant to help them. As the claimant put it: ‘she had done the job successfully part time for 7 years and the only thing that had changed was that she had had a baby’. There were colleagues off on long-term sick absence whose secured portfolios the claimant asked to work on. She was refused and their portfolios went into daily workflow and were distributed across the team, where they would be performed by whichever full time secured colleague happened to be allocated them that day without consistency. When she was finally given portfolio work to do, it was at the grade below her own. She was an assistant manager and was given manager’s assistant work to do. This calls for an explanation and no cogent explanation was forthcoming. 9. Was the claimant treated less favourably than a comparable man contrary to section 13 of the 2010 Act in the period November 2023 to February 2024 (prior to being allocated an unsecured portfolio) by the respondent a. Failing to carry out a risk assessment for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk.[96]The position is set out at answer at 8 a above. As Mr Bradley submits, the obligation to carry out a risk assessment arose because of the claimant’s pregnancy. But that is not evidence of the reason why there was any failure. b. Failing to provide time or allowances for breastfeeding and/or expressing milk.[97]Again, the position is set out at answer at 8 a above. Time limits 10. Are the claims at 8 and 9 out of time?[98]With regard to the claim at 8c, the claimant says they are not in that they are part of a “continuing act” which continued to 6 June 2025, the date of her dismissal. Mr Bradley made the following submission: “None of the three complaints is linked to the claimant’s dismissal. The period in question ended in February 2024. The claimant’s pregnancy, maternity, or sex were irrelevant to the application of the criteria used to score her, which score resulted in her redundancy dismissal. There was no “ongoing situation of continuing state of affairs” (Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Hendricks 2003 ICR 530 CA). One relevant but not conclusive factor is whether the same or different individuals were involved in those incidents (Aziz v FDA) 2010 EWCA Civ 304. Clearly, Neil White had no involvement in decisions the time of which was in February 2024.” I disagreed with that submission for the following reasons: Although the claimant was managed first by Becky Jarrett from 9 November 2023, when she returned from AML until June 2024, and then by Neil White, the claimant’s senior manager for the whole of the relevant period was Ms Hoy. It was Ms Hoy who took and enforced the relevant decisions about the claimant’s return to work; her not being allowed to do secured recoveries work on her return; and the application to her of the PCP. I considered this was an “ongoing situation or continuing state of affairs” as defined in Hendricks. The decision to give the claimant and other reduced hours Grade D colleagues Grade C work to do impacted the claimant’s redundancy scores and made it more likely she would be selected. I concluded that this amounted to conduct extending over a period, ending at the end of the claimant’s employment and the claim is therefore in time. b. Alternatively, the claimant will say that it is just and equitable to extend time.[99]It was not necessary to address this question.
Remedy
[100]Section 124 Equality Act 2010 provides so far as relevant as follows: “124 Remedies: general(1) This section applies if an employment tribunal finds that there has been a contravention of a provision referred to in section 120(1).(2) The tribunal may— (a) make a declaration as to the rights of the complainant and the respondent in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate; (b) order the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant; (c) make an appropriate recommendation.(3) An appropriate recommendation is a recommendation that within a specified period the respondent takes specified steps for the purpose of obviating or reducing the adverse effect on the complainant of any matter to which the proceedings relate— (a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(4) Subsection (5) applies if the tribunal— (a) finds that a contravention is established by virtue of section 19 or 19A, but (b) is satisfied that the provision, criterion or practice was not applied with the intention of discriminating against the complainant.(5) It must not make an order under subsection (2)(b) unless it first considers whether to act under subsection (2)(a) or (c).(6) The amount of compensation which may be awarded under subsection (2)(b) corresponds to the amount which could be awarded by the county court or the sheriff under section 119.(7) ………” 11. If the claimant’s dismissal was an act of discrimination, what amount of compensation should the respondent be ordered to pay for: a. Loss of earnings and other benefits Financial loss[101]Section 124(6) and section 119 EqA provide that the tribunal may award compensation on the same basis as the Sheriff Court would award damages for reparation. The aim is to put the claimant in the position she would have been in but for the unlawful conduct. Thus, the task of the tribunal is to try and ascertain the position the claimant would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. I accepted the claimant’s case that the application to her of the PCP resulted in her being required to perform a Grade C role and duties. This discrimination then caused her to be selected for redundancy since she could not evidence Grade D competencies when being made to perform a Grade C role. Past Loss[102]The claimant’s net pay per month with the respondent was £2,201.31 plus £212.13 being the employer pension contribution, giving a total net pay per month of £2,413.33. This figure was accepted by Mr Bradley on behalf of the respondent. I worked out net weekly pay as follows: £2,413.33 x 12 = £28,959.96/52 = £556.92. To the date of hearing, the claimant has been unsuccessful in finding alternative employment. The respondent bears the onus of proof in relation to a failure to mitigate loss. Mr Bradley accepted that the respondent had not adduced any evidence about jobs the claimant should have applied for. From 6 June 2025 to 10 February 2026 is approximately 36 weeks. 36 x £556.92 = £20,049.12. The claimant’s net financial loss to the date of hearing was £20,049.12. Future Loss In her schedule of loss, the claimant states she has been unsuccessful to date in obtaining alternative employment and she estimates it may be another 8 months before she is able to find a role at the same salary. However, she did not give any detail of the steps she has taken to seek alternative work. Mr Bradley submitted that it would be reasonable to expect the claimant to have found alternative employment within a year from the date of termination of her employment and that a year’s net salary would be a reasonable estimate of past and future loss. He stated: “Absent any documentary evidence about past attempts to find alternative work, the tribunal should be wary of making a compensatory award for future loss for a significant period beyond 6 June 2026.” I accept that submission. The claimant testified that she had applied for jobs and kept all the rejection letters but she did not lodge them in the bundle or refer me to them in evidence. In the circumstances and on the information available, I accept Mr Bradley’s submission and I estimate the claimant’s net (past and future) financial loss at £28,960. Set off of enhanced redundancy payment The claimant’s position was that if she had been permitted to return to her secured recoveries role on return from maternity leave, she would not have been selected for redundancy. Mr Bradley also approached past and future loss on this basis. He submitted that on his analysis the period “covered” by the “overage” is 52 weeks from the date of dismissal. The net figure received by the claimant after deducting her statutory redundancy payment is £28,972.37 (see paragraph 46 above). I therefore conclude that the claimant has no past or future loss of earnings or benefits as Mr Bradley submits. Indirect discrimination – remedy issues[103]If an employment tribunal finds that indirect discrimination is established under section 19 but ‘is satisfied that the PCP was not applied with the intention of discriminating against the complainant’, then per section 124(4) and (5), it must not make an order for compensation unless it first considers whether to make a declaration or a recommendation. Thus, where a claim of indirect discrimination is proved but it is found that the respondent did not intend to discriminate against the claimant, there is an obligation on a tribunal, when considering the issue of remedy, to consider first whether a declaration or a recommendation should be made before considering whether to make an order for compensation.[104]With regard to the meaning of ‘intention’ in section 124(4), the EAT’s decision in JH Walker Ltd v Hussain and ors 1996 ICR 291, EAT (a case decided under the Race Relations Act 1976) is helpful. In that case, the respondent’s policy of not permitting holiday to be taken during a period that included the Muslim festival of Eid had been found to indirectly discriminate against Asian employees, and the discrimination was found by an employment tribunal not to be objectively justified. On appeal, the EAT held that the employer could not rely on the forerunner of section 124(5) because it knew about the adverse effect of its policy on its Muslim employees. The EAT stated that ‘intention’ here refers to the employer’s state of mind with regard to the consequences of its actions. So the relevant intention would be present if, at the time the act complained of was done, the employer(a) wanted to bring about a state of affairs that constituted the prohibited result of unfavourable treatment on racial grounds, and(b) knew that that prohibited result would follow. Thus, although the employer introduced the policy for genuine business reasons and not as the result of any animus towards employees of a particular race, its decision to apply the policy regardless of the detriment it knew it would cause meant that it had applied the policy with the intention of treating the complainants unfavourably on racial grounds.[105]It appeared to me that in the present case, the respondents were well aware of the detriment to the claimant and other ‘reduced hours Grade D mums’ of imposing the PCP of excluding them from secured portfolio work. I accepted the claimant’s evidence to the effect that she was vocal about this. Her evidence was consistent with Mr White’s evidence as her manager. Mr Bradley asked Mr White: “Over what period of time were there discussions about the claimant having her own secured portfolio?” Mr White replied: “From this point [when he took over as her manager in June/July 2024] to the point of notification of redundancy in mid-February 2025”. It was clear from the preponderance of the evidence that this was an intentional policy and that Ms Hoy was aware of the detriment to the claimant and others. (See paragraphs 20 and 21 above.) I therefore consider it is appropriate in this case to award compensation for indirect discrimination. b. Injury to feelings (Vento) Injury to feelings[106]I considered the facts in relation to injury to feelings. There were no medical records in the bundle and I was not taken to any medical reports. The discrimination the claimant experienced lasted from 9 November 2023 when she returned to work from maternity and annual leave until 6 June 2025 when her dismissal took effect. It culminated in her selection for redundancy and consequent dismissal. I considered the impact of the discrimination on the claimant. During the relevant period, the claimant was absent from work with work related stress on two occasions. Prior to her treatment on return from maternity leave, the claimant had been confident, good at her job and a source of advice and support to other secured recoveries team members. When she had been working her secured recoveries portfolio prior to her maternity leave, she had been one of the only colleagues able to keep her diary up to date, despite working reduced hours. However, this was not possible in the Grade C unsecured role she was given on her return from maternity leave because of the inherited backlog and unachievable work levels. The unsecured work was Grade C work. I accepted the claimant’s evidence that she felt humiliated on her return from maternity leave when colleagues asked her what she had done wrong that she was not being permitted to work her portfolio. She considered that giving her unachievable levels of grade C work would lead to her becoming de-skilled. She began to lose confidence in herself and sometimes got upset in front of her manager. On 26 September 2024 the claimant sent Mr White a message (209): “Thanks Neil - apologies for getting upset earlier - I have always been good at my job without any issues and kind of feel like I am rather hopeless at the moment. I am working so hard but just feel kinda rubbish...”.[107]A number of the claimant’s full time colleagues had been moved from unsecured work into secured portfolios of which they had no experience. They would come and ask the claimant how to work them and what to do in relation to problems they encountered. This added to the claimant’s stress and from 20 October to 15 November 2024, the claimant was off with work related stress. The claimant felt under pressure to rush the work and she began to make small errors.[108]Because she was a Grade D assistant manager but doing a Grade C manager’s assistant role (267), when it came to the redundancy selection, the claimant did not have the evidence to demonstrate all the Grade D competences and she was accordingly selected for redundancy, which again led to loss of confidence.[109]The Vento bands applicable to cases presented on or after 6 April 2025 are as follows:• a lower band of £1,200 to £12,100 (for less serious cases);• a middle band of £12,100 to £36,400 (for cases that do not merit an award in the upper band), and• an upper band of £36,400 to £60,700 (for the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £60,700.[110]Mr Bradley reminded me of the recent decision of the EAT in Eddie Stobart Ltd v Graham [2025] IRLR 334 particularly, paragraphs 51 and 52 where guidance is given regarding assessing impact. The facts of the Graham case are not similar to those of the present case. The only part of Ms Graham’s claim that succeeded related to the respondent’s inadequate response to her grievance. The tribunal had awarded her £10,000 citing ‘a degree of upset’. The parties were agreed that the only evidence before the tribunal concerning the claimant's ‘degree of upset’ in respect of the unanswered grievance was that she said was 'shocked' and 'upset' because of a 'dismissive' attitude towards 'what [she] had to say and her 'rights'. The EAT reduced the award to £2,000.[111]The claimant in the present case claims an award for injury to feelings of £45,000, which is in the top Vento band. I agree with Mr Bradley that this is not a case within the top band of Vento. I have carefully considered the findings in fact made on the evidence before me regarding the impact of the discrimination as set out at paragraphs 106 to 108 above. On the basis of those facts, I assess the case as being between the middle and upper end of the lower Vento band applicable at the relevant time. Taking into account the impact of the direct and indirect discrimination, and the claimant’s discriminatory dismissal, it appears to me that the appropriate total award for injury to feelings in respect of all heads of discrimination is £8,000. Uplift for failure to comply with ACAS Code[112]The claimant also sought an increase of her award to reflect the respondents' failure to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary & Grievance Procedures 2015 (“Code of Practice 2015”). Section 207A(2) of the Trade Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides that; “If, in the case of proceedings to which this Section applies, it appears to the employment tribunal that(a) the claim to which the proceedings relate concerns a matter to which a relevant Code of Practice applies;(b) the employer has failed to comply with that Code relation to that matter, and(c) that failure was unreasonable, the employment tribunal may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances to do so, increase any award it makes to the employee by no more than 25 per cent”.[113]Section 207A(3) contains reciprocal provisions in relation to a failure by an employee to comply with a Code of Practice, in which case the tribunal may reduce an award by up to 25% if it considers it just and equitable to do so. It was not in dispute that the claim concerned a matter to which the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2015 (“CoP”) applies. In relation to an employee grievance, the CoP states: “Let the employer know the nature of the grievance32. If it is not possible to resolve a grievance informally employees should raise the matter formally and without unreasonable delay with a manager who is not the subject of the grievance. This should be done in writing and should set out the nature of the grievance.” Once the employer receives a grievance from the employee, paragraph33. of the CoP provides: “Hold a meeting with the employee to discuss the grievance 33. Employers should arrange for a formal meeting to be held without unreasonable delay after a grievance is received.” It appears to me that although the claimant indicated her intention to lodge a grievance, she did not in fact send in anything that set out the nature of the grievance in writing. Of course, the respondent ought – as a matter of courtesy - to have replied to her email and assisted her but their failure to do so is not a failure to comply with the Code. Ms Green testified that she did not receive the claimant’s email. However, HR did appear to have done so as the claimant got a receipt (337). I concluded that the effect of the respondent’s lack of response was to excuse the claimant in the circumstances from failing to proceed further, since she was quite reasonably awaiting a response from the respondent’s HR department. However, I did not conclude that the respondent failed to comply in the circumstances. Interest on award[114]Under Regulation 2 of the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 SI 1996/2803 the Tribunal is required to consider whether to award interest even if the claimant does not specifically apply for it. In the absence of any agreement by the parties regarding how much interest to award, interest is calculated under the Rules set out in Regulation 3. For injury to feelings awards, the interest runs from the date of the act of discrimination complained of and ends on the day the Tribunal calculates interest (‘the day of calculation’). In Scotland, regulation 3(2) provides that interest accrues at the rate prescribed from time to time by the Act of Sederunt (Interest on Sheriff Court Decrees or Extracts) 1975. The current figure is still 8%, set by the Act of Sederunt (Interest on Sheriff Court Decrees or Extracts) 1993.[115]With regard to interest on the injury to feelings award, 8% of £8,000 gives an annual figure of £640 and a weekly figure of £12.308. The relevant period began on 9 November 2023. The calculation day is 30 March 2026 (124 weeks and 4 days). 124.5 x £12.308 = £1,532 rounded to the nearest whole pound. 12. If the claimant’s dismissal was unfair (section 98 of ERA 1996) a. What basic award (if any) should be made[116]None. The claimant was paid a statutory redundancy payment. b. What compensatory award (if any) should be made[117]This is largely precluded by the principle that overlapping heads of compensation may not be awarded twice. It is fair to award the claimant £500 for loss of statutory rights. All other losses have been compensated above.