Ms J McLean v Vallourec Oil & Gas UK Ltd: 8000092/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 8000092/2025Venue GlasgowHearing 3, 4 & 5 June 2025
Between
Ms J McLeanClaimantVallourec Oil & Gas UK LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge CampbellMs D Miller (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 16 June 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant was unfairly dismissed under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and her complaint succeeds;[2]The claimant was not discriminated against within the scope of either section 13 or 15 of the Equality Act 2010 and those complaints are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This is a claim by a former employee of a company specialising in the making of large scale pipes for the oil and gas industry. A redundancy exercise was carried out in the latter half of 2024 and the claimant’s role was identified to be removed. Following a consultation process she was dismissed. She alleges that she was dismissed unfairly and that she was discriminated against on the basis of disability. The respondent resisted the claims.[2]A hearing took place over two days. In advance a joint bundle of documents had been prepared and references to numbers in square brackets below correspond to page numbers in the bundle.[3]A list of issues was also prepared. That is largely reproduced below subject to some changes agreed.[4]Evidence was led first by the respondent, who called Ms Laura Smith (HR and Payroll Manager) and Mr Eddie Graham (Finance Manager). The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf.[5]It had been agreed as part of earlier case management that the hearing would deal only with liability.[6]The claimant relies on the medical condition fibromyalgia as a disability under the Equality Act 2010. Following her earlier provision of further particulars and medical material the respondent accepted that this met the statutory criteria. Legal issues[7]The issues for the tribunal to decide were as follows. This is an adapted version of the list of issues provided by the respondent, to reflect matters to be determined as they stood at the beginning of the hearing. 1. Unfair dismissal (Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) section 94)1.1 What was the reason or principal reason for dismissal? The respondent says the reason was redundancy.1.2 If the reason was redundancy, did the respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant. The Tribunal will usually decide, in particular, whether:1.2.1 the respondent adequately warned and consulted the claimant,1.2.2 the respondent adopted a reasonable selection decision, including its approach to a selection pool,1.2.3 the respondent took reasonable steps to find the claimant suitable alternative employment,1.2.4 dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses. 2 Direct disability discrimination (Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’) section 13)2.1 Was the claimant’s selection for redundancy less favourable treatment compared to a hypothetical comparator? The tribunal took a comparator to be a hypothetical colleague with similar mobility restrictions and a requirement to work from home, but not because of the same condition as hers.2.2 If this was less favourable treatment, was that because of a disability?2.3 The Tribunal will decide in particular:2.3.1 was the claimant’s redundancy selection an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve the respondent’s aims;2.3.2 could something less discriminatory have been done instead;2.3.3 how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced? 3 Discrimination arising from disability (EqA section 15)3.1 Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably by selecting the claimant for redundancy?3.2 If so, was this treatment because of something arising in consequence of her disability? The claimant relies on her restricted mobility and requirement to work from home as the ‘something arising’.3.3 Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says its aims were to make redundancies due to challenging North Sea market conditions and the reduction of the UK’s oil and gas activities.3.4 The Tribunal will decide in particular:3.4.1 was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims;3.4.2 where the treatment is found to be discriminatory, could something less discriminatory have been done instead; and3.4.3 how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?
Findings of fact
[8]The following were found to be relevant facts based on the evidence provided.
Background
[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent between the dates of 28 October 2019 and 11 April 2025. The respondent ended her employment on the latter date.[2]The respondent is a company which is part of a worldwide group having its global headquarters in France. Within the UK its main premises are in Aberdeen. It specialises in selling large sections of pipe to the oil and gas industries, together with ancillary products and services.[3]The respondent had previously operated a manufacturing site at Bellshill in Lanarkshire. At the end of 2022 production ceased and over the following months it was decommissioned. The respondent continued to maintain a satellite office there. It is due to close in late 2025 or in 2026.[4]The respondent’s main premises in the northeast of Scotland had been at Bridge of Don where there was also a manufacturing capability. It also ran a service centre in Aberdeen. As part of the restructure discussed in more detail below the Bridge of Don facility was closed and sold, the respondent ceased production activities, and all remaining operations moved to Aberdeen.[5]The claimant originally was based at the Bellshill premises. As a result of the restrictions brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic she worked from home from around March 2020 and in September 2021 she made, and was granted, a flexible working request to work from home permanently.[6]The claimant’s title was Financial Assistant (also referred to at times as Accounts Assistant) within the respondent’s finance team. Her main duties were to issue invoices to clients and customers and to oversee the payment of those invoices. She was able to perform that role alone from home as any communication required could take place by emails or video calls.[7]The claimant has the condition fibromyalgia which qualifies as a disability under section 7 of EqA. For the purposes of this judgment it is not necessary to go into all the details of the condition or how it affected the claimant. The material facts were that it restricted her mobility and she often needed assistance from another person to move around. Working from home assisted her in this regard and commuting to and working in an office would have been significantly more challenging and at times impossible. Essentially therefore she could only perform her role from home. This was not an issue for the respondent as she capably carried out all of her duties. Redundancy exercise[8]By early 2024 the respondent’s business was in poor financial condition, largely as a result of the effects of the pandemic and reduced activity in the North Sea by its client base.[9]Various worldwide parts of the group were instructed around February 2024 to provide proposals to reduce costs and improve financial performance. A team of Mr Alexandre Valdelievre, the respondent’s Managing Director, Zak Fleming, its Services Director and Laura Smith, HR and Payroll Manager, presented a proposal for the UK which involved ceasing the production of parts at Bridge of Don, closing the facility there, and moving its remaining functions to the Aberdeen premises. Production of the relevant parts would continue but be outsourced to external licensees. In the process around 23 roles would be made redundant. This was approved.[10]In the following months the restructuring plan was developed. It was announced to employees on 30 August 2024. They were provided with a set of ‘FAQs’ providing more details [120-125]. Collective consultation[11]The respondent recognises two independent trade unions, Unite and Community. It consulted collectively with them on behalf of all employees. This began on 30 August 2024 and ended on 19 September 2024 by agreement, when individual consultation meetings began. Two collective consultation meetings took place and they were minuted [128-130, 131-135]. The claimant’s role was not specifically discussed.[12]The claimant was invited to the collective briefing on 30 August 2024 and on the same day was sent a letter confirming that her role was one of those provisionally selected to be removed [126-127].[13]Only Mr Eddie Graham, Finance Manager, was physically based at the Bellshill satellite office as others who were notionally attached to it – essentially IT support and the claimant – all worked remotely. As part of the restructure the Bellshill office would close and any functions associated with it would move to Aberdeen.[14]The respondent’s finance team at the time consisted of the following individuals, in order of seniority:a. Stephane Favrichon, Finance Director;b. Eddie Graham, Finance Manger;c. Kayleigh Stuart, Finance Accountant;d. Lorna Murray, Financial Controller; ande. The claimant as Finance Assistant.[15]The respondent’s plan involved removing the claimant’s and Ms Murray’s roles from the structure and reallocating their duties, mainly to the Finance Accountant role with a smaller number of Ms Murray’s duties going to another individual. Before the restructure was devised there had already been an intention to reallocate Ms Murray’s duties among the team and remove her position. This was incorporated into the restructure plan. Individual consultation[16]On 24 September 2024 Ms Smith wrote to the claimant inviting her to a first individual consultation meeting three days later. This proceeded by video involving Mr Fleming as the chair, a note-taker from Human Resources and the claimant. A note of the discussion was prepared [141-145]. The claimant accepted that it was a suitably accurate summary of the things it covered, but said that she had raised other aspect which Mr Fleming would not discuss, and those are not featured. They principally related to questions about whether she would be at a disadvantage because she worked from home, in response to which Mr Fleming said that was not a relevant issue at that stage. At the meeting Mr Fleming described the situation the business was facing and the steps management had decided on, including the closure of the Bellshill and Bridge of Don premises. He told the claimant her role was at risk of redundancy and said there would be a further meeting to discuss her position. She was told of three vacancies which would exist, none of which were suitable for her. She challenged the decision to remove her role when, she as she saw it, her duties still needed to be performed. Mr Fleming explained that they would be absorbed within the roles which were remaining. He stressed that the claimant’s role was only at risk at this stage and no final decision about it had been made.[17]On 8 October 2024 the claimant was sent a copy of the meeting notes, a provisional redundancy pay calculation and an invite to a final individual consultation meeting scheduled for 15 October 2024. She was asked to review those items in advance of that meeting. She did not raise any issue with the meeting notes either before the second meeting or during it.[18]The meeting on 15 October 2024 proceeded as planned, this time attended by Mr Favrichon and Ms Smith as well as Mr Fleming and the same note-taker as before. Again it was held by video and a note of the discussion was circulated afterwards [147-149]. This was also accepted to be an accurate summary of the aspects of the discussion it covered. By this stage the claimant was being told that her role was being removed and no alternative roles had been identified that she could be considered for. Mr Fleming confirmed that her employment would end on 20 December 2024. The claimant maintained that she did not believe her role was redundant and it was again explained that what remained of her duties were to be reallocated to other roles. Confirmation of decision and appeal[19]The decision was confirmed in a letter dated 16 October 2024 [151]. The claimant was given the right of appeal which she exercised on 21 October 2024 by letter which she emailed to Ms Smith [156]. She was invited to a video appeal hearing on 5 November 2024, chaired by Mr Valdelievre, the Managing Director. The meeting proceeded and was also attended by Ms Smith and a note-taker. Minutes were prepared afterwards [158-164]. A decision was not given in the meeting, but issued by letter emailed to the claimant on 7 November 2024 [169-170]. Mr Valdelievre’s decision was, in summary, that the decision to remove her role and merge her duties with those of the Finance Accountant was justified, he found no evidence of unfairness in the process and that it had been conducted impartially and without discriminating against her. The decision to dismiss her would therefore stand and this was the end of the internal process.[20]In either October or November 2024 Ms Stuart, the Finance Accountant, began a period of illness-related absence from which she did not ultimately return. She made it clear to the respondent that she did not wish to relocate from Bridge of Don to Aberdeen and confirmed she was resigning. This left her role open. Mr Favrichon took the decision to recruit externally for a replacement and did not believe that the claimant was capable of fulfilling the role. He emailed the finance team to tell them about Ms Stuart leaving and his intention to find a replacement. The claimant did not reply then, or at any other time, to suggest to him that she might like to be considered for the role, and that she believed she could perform it. Around December 2024 an applicant named Marta was selected and she joined the respondent around the middle of January 2025.[21]As a result of Ms Stuart’s initial absence Mr Favrichon authorised the engagement of a temporary employee. This was primarily to cover Ms Stuart’s duties and assist Mr Graham with preparing for the financial year end which fell on 31 December 2024. As the absence continued he explored whether the claimant and Ms Murray could stay longer with the company, and by agreement their leaving dates were pushed back from December to April 2025. This allowed them to cover their duties for longer and to provide a handover to the new Finance Accountant after she began.[22]The claimant therefore worked up to the revised date of 11 April 2024 when her dismissal took effect. Discussion and decision[23]Both parties provided closing submissions. The claimant provided hers verbally and Ms Miller provided a note and corresponding bundle of authorities. She summarised some of the points in her note orally. The parties’ submissions are not reproduced here but were considered in detail before a decision was reached. Unfair dismissal claim Was redundancy the reason for dismissal?[24]Where an employer accepts that it dismissed an employee, the onus falls initially on it to show that the reason for doing so was potentially fair. It can only do that if the reason falls within section 98(1) or (2) of ERA. Redundancy is one of those reasons.[25]Redundancy for the purposes of this claim is defined in section 139 of ERA. To paraphrase, it can involve a type of work diminishing or disappearing altogether, or an employer finding a way to carry out activities using fewer people. In that second scenario there may not necessarily be a reduction in the amount of work to be done at all, and it may even increase. What is relevant is that the employer finds a way to carry out the relevant activities using fewer people.[26]It follows that there need not be the complete cessation of a person's duties in order for their employer to be able to restructure its operations, carry out a redundancy exercise and remove the role in question as a free-standing job.[27]As such, the respondent’s proposed restructure of its finance team and the removal of the claimant’s role, followed by the combination of her duties with those of the Finance Accountant, fell within the definition of redundancy set out in section 139.[28]To go a step further, redundancy was also the reason for her dismissal as well as the removal of her role. One does not always follow from the other – for example an employer may use the backdrop of a redundancy exercise to wrongly select a disabled or underperforming employee for dismissal when there was another alternative, and so potentially the real reason for dismissal is something other than redundancy itself. However, on the facts of this claim there were no such factors. The claimant’s dismissal was the culmination of the process which involved the respondent requiring to save money and reconfigure its workforce to match changes in how it would operate. That led it to reallocate the activities of the finance team among fewer roles and base the people performing them in Aberdeen. Clearly the claimant’s belief was that at some point in the process the existence of her disability in itself, or her need to work from home because of it, became the true (i.e. the sole or at least main) reason for her dismissal, but as discussed below in relation to the discrimination complaints, this was not found to have been proven.[29]As discussed in the hearing, any economic rights or wrongs of a decision to restructure are the concern of the business in question and the tribunal cannot generally rule on them. It can only consider how the affected employees are treated as a consequence of the decision. Was the respondent reasonable in dismissing the claimant[30]If a fair reason for dismissal can be established, the next question to decide is whether the employer acted reasonably in carrying out the dismissal for that reason. This is required by section 98(4) ERA. There is no onus on either party to prove their position on this issue. The tribunal must come to a decision based on the evidence available.[31]In deciding if a dismissal was carried out reasonably the tribunal should take into account the employer’s size and administrative resources. There are no further provisions in the ERA about how a redundancy should be reasonably implemented. Another piece of legislation, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, contains rules and procedures for collective consultation, which apply to situations involving at least 20 anticipated redundancies within a 90-day period, and applied in this case. A body of case law has developed which provides further guidance in relation to collective and individual consultation. Key decisions were delivered in Williams and others v Compair Maxam Ltd [1982] IRLR 83, Polkey v A E Dayton Services Ltd [1987] IRLR 503 and R v British Coal Corporation and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Price [1994] IRLR 72. More recently those and other authorities were reviewed in De Bank Haycocks v ADP RPO UK Ltd [2023] EAT 129. Emerging from those decisions, some important features of a redundancy process are:a. Warning and consultation (with the individuals directly or representatives if the group affected is larger) at a suitably early point in time. This usually means when the plans are at a formative stage;b. If there has been collective consultation then some degree of individual consultation should then follow, focussing on the individual’s particular circumstances;c. Provision of adequate information to those affected so they can participate meaningfully in the process;d. Adoption of a fair and objective selection process and following it reasonably and neutrally;e. Exploring alternatives to dismissal for those affected and allowing adequate time for matters to be dealt with; andf. Considering any proposals put by employees or their representatives in good faith.[32]Each of these principles may apply to a greater or lesser extent in a given scenario depending on such factors as how may redundancies are proposed, whether they are in one or more location, how long the employer can allocate to carrying out the process, which jobs are affected and whether a degree of pooling and scoring is required because numbers of particular roles will be reduced but not removed entirely.[33]The respondent in the current claim adopted a reasonable process in many respects. Having decided on its plan to close down all but the Aberdeen site and consolidate its remaining operations there, it gave a briefing to all employees on 30 August 2024 and the process, at least for the claimant, ran for nearly four months until her initially intended termination date. There were two consultation meetings with trade union employee representatives and the option of more, which the union indicated was not necessary. The claimant’s particular position was not discussed in those meetings, although that was understandable as she was in a unique situation in both being based at Bellshill and having her role proposed as redundant. There was more emphasis on the Bridge of Don employees who were almost all going to lose their jobs.[34]From the evidence available, which almost entirely came from the written minutes of those meetings, the focus of the discussions was what was to happen on a site-by-site basis, the terms of redundancy payments and options outside of the business. Whilst the company representatives explained the rationale for the changes, there was no discussion about alternatives to any aspect of the plan. One of the employee representatives Mr Brown, as part of a discussion in the second meeting about the respondent letting go employees with valuable skills, asked whether ‘[the respondent] can’t even keep 2 or 3 roles?’. The response from Mr Fleming was ‘We still need to account for it unfortunately’. This exemplified the respondent’s position in the process. All of the key decisions had been made.[35]Turning to consider the individual consultation which took place with the claimant, there were two meetings. The claimant had been told in the letter she received immediately after the initial briefing on 30 August 2024 that her role was at risk. No further information was provided whilst collective consultation took place, ending on 19 September 2024. Her first individual meeting was on 27 September 2024. The invitation letter she received said no more than the previous one – her role was being placed at risk of redundancy. In the meeting itself she was again told her role was at risk. She was told there would be at least one further meeting and given details of three vacancies, but she was not told what the proposed new structure of the finance team would be or where her duties would be transferred – simply that they would be ‘reallocated within the business’. She suggested that it would be better to retain the finance team as it was, and Mr Fleming’s reply was that there was only so much information he could disclose at that point.[36]By the time of the second individual meeting on 15 October 2024 the decision had been taken both to formally make her role redundant and to end her employment on 20 December 2024. Mr Fleming said that the respondent had ‘been consulting with [the claimant] to identify and discuss any suitable opportunities, however this has been unsuccessful’. There was no evidence of such steps being taken save the raising of three roles in the previous meeting which were clearly not suited to the claimant. Although this second meeting was described as ‘your final consultation meeting’, by the time Mr Fleming had delivered his opening remarks and before the claimant was able to speak it was clear that there was little if anything left on which to consult. The claimant had found out a little more about what would happen to her responsibilities, saying that the company was just taking them and giving them to the Finance Accountant. Mr Fleming said that they were being ‘absorbed into various aspects of the Finance structure internally and externally’. This was as much detail as he could provide. The claimant commented that ‘I don’t agree but you are going to go ahead with it regardless’, and later ‘Is there any point in me asking more questions?’.[37]Considering the process of collective and then individual consultation as a whole, the respondent did not begin consulting when its plans were at a formative stage, it did not appear open to considering changes or alternatives to any aspect of its plan and it did not share with either the employee representatives or the claimant herself sufficient information to allow her to understand the plan as it affected her, then consider and voice any alternative suggestions. This became clear to her in the second meeting when she commented that it was pointless for her to engage further.[38]Additionally, although it was the respondent’s position in the hearing that the claimant would not have been capable of carrying out the Finance Accountant role, whether through a lack of qualifications or experience or both, this was not explained to her during the process. She was told in her appeal meeting that it would not be fair or reasonable to ‘shift their responsibilities downward’ to the claimant and that ‘legally, roles can be assigned upwards but not downwards, so we couldn’t make the Financial Accountant redundant and reassign those responsibilities to you’. That is not the same as saying the claimant was unqualified for the Finance Accountant role, and there is no such legal principle which prevents the more junior person in a pool of two from being selected for a new role which combines aspects of both existing roles.[39]On considering the many case authorities on the subject of what is a reasonable redundancy procedure, it is clear that the answer is heavily dependent on the individual facts of the case. The principles summarised above will usually apply, but may have greater or lesser relevance from one situation to another. In this claim, given the respondent’s size and resources it fell short of too many of those principles in too material a way for the process to meet the test of what is ‘reasonable’. These shortcomings were not remedied at the appeal stage, which it can in some cases be possible to do, because the claimant was still not being correctly informed about the details directly surrounding her role and the finance team, and all indications via the exchanges which took place in the meeting were that the decision had been made and would not be changed. Discrimination complaints[40]The claimant alleges that her dismissal was an act of direct discrimination under section 13 EqA and also discrimination arising from disability under section 15. That is to say, she believes she was selected for redundancy and dismissed both because she has a disability and also because of an effect of that disability, specifically that it restricts her mobility and requires her to work from home.[41]The initial onus of establishing preliminary facts to support such complaints falls on the claimant. She must therefore show that there is at least evidence of the following:a. She had the protected characteristic in question, namely disability,b. For the section 15 complaint, that her need to work from home was ‘something arising in consequence of’ the disability,c. She was treated unfavourably,d. For the section 15 complaint that she was treated unfavourably ‘because of’ the need to work from home,e. In relation to the section 13 claim, that she was treated less favourably than a comparator – in her case a hypothetical one who would be a person in her role and with her experience and capabilities, based where she was and requiring to work from home, but not because of having a disability – because of her disability.[42]If she is able to do so then it falls to the respondent to rebut those provisional findings by providing more compelling evidence that the reason for the treatment in question is something else.[43]On the evidence in this claim, (a), (b) and (c) above were established and not disputed by the respondent. The unfavourable treatment relied on was dismissal.[44]In relation to (e) however, there were no preliminary facts to support the argument that she was less favourably treated than a comparator ‘because of’ her disability. The individuals within the respondent involved in the redundancy process did not know the full details of her medical condition. It was more generally known that she needed to work from home because of restricted mobility. Although that could have been enough for her to be treated a certain way because of her disability, there was also a lack of evidence of the respondent viewing it or reacting to it in any way adversely. The evidence was overwhelmingly that she was viewed as a diligent and competent employee who performed all of her duties to a high standard with minimal supervision, even despite working from home. Her disability in itself did not create any issues for the respondent. The process and related sequence of decisions which led to her being dismissed on grounds of redundancy were not in any discernible way linked to her disability. They were all about the respondent’s need to downscale, shift away from production and consolidate remaining activities in one place. She was assessed on the basis of her perceived capabilities and experience in her job, not her physical limitations. A comparator most likely would have fared the same as her and would not have been treated any more favourably.[45]Turning then to aspect (d) in relation to the section 15 claim, there were at least some preliminary facts which could support this. Unlike the section 13 claim there does not need to be a comparator, and the focus of the unfair treatment becomes the thing which flows from the disability rather than the disability itself. The claimant clearly believed that she had been edged out of the business because she needed to work from home. This was supported by the fact that all finance functions were being consolidated in Aberdeen and that there had been an indication from Mr Favrichon, albeit in April 2025 and after her dismissal was confirmed, that people should revert to working alongside each other in the office more.[46]The onus therefore shifted to the respondent to answer the section 15 claim. However, it was able to do so with the evidence which it led and which was accepted by the tribunal. This was that the claimant was simply not believed to be capable of undertaking the revised Financial Accountant role. That belief was not to do with her inability or unwillingness to relocate to Aberdeen or work in the office there, but because she did not have the experience required of the role with the exception of the parts of her own role which would be incorporated within it. Although the respondent did not establish that it was absolutely essential that the holder of the role either be qualified as a chartered accountant or working towards that, the requirement was based on the types of skills the holder of the role would need. Ms Stuart met that requirement and so did her replacement, but the claimant did not. The claimant may have been right when she asserted that she could have acquired at least some of the skills with training, but the respondent genuinely did not think so. It was not obliged to put that to the test. In short therefore, the claimant was unfavourably treated by being dismissed but the evidence suggested more strongly that it was based on experience and qualifications and not any physical limitations.[47]It followed from the above reasoning that neither discrimination claim could succeed.
Conclusions
[48]The claimant was unfairly dismissed. There was a fair reason for her dismissal, but the respondent did not meet the standard of reasonableness in the way it went about dealing with her as set by section 98(4) ERA.[49]What is clear from the evidence however is that the claimant would have been dismissed in any event, despite any improvements to the process which could have been made. Even had she been given more information about the plan for the finance team at an earlier stage and a better opportunity to provide her views and any alternative proposals, the strong probability is that the respondent would have reached the same conclusion, which was that she would not have been able to fulfil the Finance Accountant role. There may have been discussion about whether she would relocate to Aberdeen. She would have said no, as she confirmed in evidence, and would have argued for the role being performed remotely from her home. The respondent would have insisted that with a smaller team of two, the holders of the finance roles needed to be office based so as to work more effectively with each other and colleagues in other teams. This was the evidence of Mr Graham. The respondent would have been entitled to take that view. And it would be largely academic as she was considered unable to perform the role in terms of skills, experience and qualification.[50]Given that the claimant’s termination date was put back by some four months to allow the new Finance Accountant to bed in, it is difficult to see how the claimant would have remained in her role any longer had a more thorough consultation process been followed. She would still have left on the same date.[51]Therefore, although this hearing was not concerned with calculating remedy, the tribunal’s finding is that despite the claimant’s dismissal being procedurally unfair she would have been fairly dismissed no later than she actually was. This necessarily affects whether she has any claimable losses.[52]Accordingly, the claimant is directed to confirm to the respondent and the tribunal within 14 days of receipt of this judgment whether she requests a remedy hearing, and if so to provide an updated schedule of loss. This should reflect that neither of her discrimination complaints succeeded, and give credit for the payments she received from the respondent on termination. If she does so the respondent is permitted to provide comments on the claimant’s position and schedule within 14 days of receipt of them and should copy in the tribunal at that time. Any further procedure will then be considered.