Ms E Shanklin v The Chief Constable of North Wales Police: 6028215/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6028215/2025
Between
Ms E ShanklinClaimantThe Chief Constable of North Wales PoliceRespondent
Before
Employment Judge R HarfieldMr Hoar (instructed by Counsel) for claimantMr McLean (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 27 May 2026
JUDGMENT
The decision of the Tribunal is:(1) The identity of the Respondent is reduced to one Respondent correctly identified as the Chief Constable of North Wales Police;(2) The Claimant was not an applicant for employment within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the Claimant’s claim, and it is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]Introduction and the preliminary issue to be decided1.1 The Claimant applied for a position as a Role Play Actor (RPA) with the Respondent. Her application was rejected at vetting stage. In her substantive claim, if it proceeds, the Claimant seeks to bring a complaint of direct philosophical belief discrimination about that decision to reject her application. The Claimant’s case is that if she obtained the position she would have been in “employment” within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act. The Respondent disputes the claim, arguing, amongst other things, that the Claimant was applying to be a volunteer and, if successful, would not have been in “employment.” A case management preliminary hearing took place on 24 October 2024 where this public preliminary hearing was listed to determine as a preliminary issue: “Was [the] position of “role play actor”, applied for by the Claimant, employment within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act 2010.”1.2 I had before me a preliminary hearing file and a separate file containing the witness statements of the Claimant, her witness Nicky Morgan, and the Respondent’s witness Mark Owen. I heard oral evidence from those witnesses. I also had a skeleton argument from the Claimant’s counsel and heard oral closing submissions from both counsel. I do not set out their submissions here, but I took them fully into account and they are referred to at appropriate places in my decision below. There was not time on the day to deliberate and hand down an oral Judgment, and it was therefore reserved to be delivered in writing. I apologise for the delay in handing down this Reserved Judgment.1.3 At the start of the hearing I clarified with the Claimant’s counsel that I need only determine the question of “worker status” rather than the higher threshold of “employee status”, because that is all the Claimant need establish to be able to bring her Equality Act 2010 complaints. I also clarified that I was being asked to determine the question of “worker status” when an RPA is actually undertaking RPA duties on a particular day or days, and not whether there is an overarching “umbrella” worker contract.[2]The legal principles The Statute2.1 Under section 39(1) of the Equality Act 2010 an employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against a person(b) (B) - (a) in the arrangements A makes for deciding whom to offer employment; (b) as to the terms on which A offers B employment; and(c) by not offering B employment.2.2 Section 83(2) then defines “Employment” as meaning (as relevant) “(a) employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work.” Here I am concerned with whether what happened to the Claimant was the rejection of an application for “employment under…a contract personally to do work.”2.3 The relevant test in the Employment Rights Act 1996 at section 230(3) is put differently as: “In this Act “worker”… means an individual who has entered into or works under… (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by that individual.” Key case law principles on worker status2.4 It is not in dispute that the Equality Act and ERA tests of worker status amount to the same despite the difference in wording. In particular in Pimlico Plumbers Ltd and another v Smith [2018] UKSC 29 the Supreme Court said: “14. As it happens, however, this distinction has been held to be one without a difference. Part 5 of the Equality Act, which includes section 83, primarily gives effect to EU law. Article 157(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union requires member states to ensure application of “the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value”. In Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College (Case C-256/01) [2004] ICR 1328 the Court of Justice of the European Communities, at paras 67 and 68, interpreted the word “workers” in what is now article 157(1) as persons who perform “services for and under the direction of another person in return for which [they receive] remuneration” but excluding “independent providers of services who are not in a relationship of subordination with the person who receives the services”. In Hashwani v Jivraj [2011] UKSC 40, [2011] 1 WLR 1872, the Supreme Court applied the concepts of direction and subordination identified in the Allonby case to its interpretation of a “contract personally to do … work” in the predecessor to section 83(2)(a). In Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co LLP [2014] UKSC 32, [2014] 1 WLR 2047, Lady Hale observed at paras 31 and 32 that this interpretation of the section yielded a result similar to the exclusion of work for those with the status of a client or customer in section 230(3) of the Act and in regulation 2(1) of the Regulations. She added, however, at para 39 that, while the concept of subordination might assist in distinguishing workers from other selfemployed people, the Court of Appeal in that case had been wrong to regard it as a universal characteristic of workers. 15. Notwithstanding murmurs of discontent in the submissions on behalf of Mr Smith, this court is not invited to review its equation in the Bates van Winkelhof case of the definition of a “worker” in section 230(3) of the Act with that of “employment” in section 83(2)(a) of the Equality Act. I therefore proceed on the basis that the three decisions of the tribunal referred to at para 4 above stand or fall together; and that it is conceptually legitimate as well as convenient to treat all three of them as having been founded upon a conclusion that Mr Smith was a limb (b) worker within the meaning of section 230(3) of the Act.2.5 In Clyde & Co LLP and other v Bates van Winkelhof [2014] UKSC 32 (as just referred to) Lady Hale extensively reviewed the law and said: “31. As already seen, employment law distinguishes between three types of people: those employed under a contract of employment; those selfemployed people who are in business on their own account and undertake work for their clients or customers; and an intermediate class of workers who are self-employed but do not fall within the second class. Discrimination law, on the other hand, while it includes a contract "personally to do work" within its definition of employment (see, now, Equality Act 2010, s 83(2)) does not include an express exception for those in business on their account who work for their clients or customers. But a similar qualification has been introduced by a different route.[32]In Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College (Case C256/01) [2004] ICR 1328, the European Court of Justice was concerned with whether a college lecturer who was ostensibly self-employed could nevertheless be a "worker" for the purpose of an equal pay claim. The Court held, following Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-66/85) [1987] ICR 483 that "there must be considered as a worker a person who, for a certain period of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration" (para 67). However, such people were to be distinguished from "independent providers of services who are not in a relationship of subordination with the person who receives the services" (para 68). The concept of subordination was there introduced in order to distinguish the intermediate category from people who were dealing with clients or customers on their own account. It was used for the same purpose in the discrimination case of Jivraj v Hashwani.[33]We are dealing with the more precise wording of section 230(3)(b). English cases in the EAT have attempted to capture the essential distinction in a variety of ways. Thus in Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd v Baird [2002] ICR 667, Mr Recorder Underhill QC suggested, at para 17(4), that "[t]he reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are in a subordinate and dependent position vis-a-vis their employers: the purpose of the Regulations is to extend protection to workers who are, substantively and economically, in the same position. Thus the essence of the intended distinction must be between, on the one hand, workers whose degree of dependence is essentially the same as that of employees and, on the other, contractors who have a sufficiently arm's-length and independent position to be treated as being able to look after themselves in the relevant respects."[34]In Cotswold Developments Construction Ltd v Williams [2006] IRLR 181, Langstaff J suggested, at para 53, that ". . . a focus on whether the purported worker actively markets his services as an independent person to the world in general (a person who will thus have a client or customer) on the one hand, or whether he is recruited by the principal to work for that principal as an integral part of the principal's operations, will in most cases demonstrate on which side of the line a given person falls".[35]In James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] ICR 1006, Elias J agreed that this would "often assist in providing the answer" but the difficult cases were those where the putative worker did not market her services at all (para 50). He also accepted, at para 48, that ". . . in a general sense the degree of dependence is in large part what one is seeking to identify – if employees are integrated into the business, workers may be described as semi-detached and those conducting a business undertaking as detached – but that must be assessed by a careful analysis of the contract itself. The fact that the individual may be in a subordinate position, both economically and substantively, is of itself of little assistance in defining the relevant boundary because a small business operation may be as economically dependent on the other contracting party, as is the self-employed worker, particularly if it is a key or the only customer."[36]After looking at how the distinction had been introduced into the sex discrimination legislation, which contained a similarly wide definition of worker but without the reference to clients and customers, by reference to a "dominant purpose" test in Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd v Gunning [1986] ICR 145, he concluded, at para 59: ". . . the dominant purpose test is really an attempt to identify the essential nature of the contract. Is it in essence to be located in the field of dependent work relationships, or is it in essence a contract between two independent business undertakings? . . . Its purpose is to distinguish between the concept of worker and the independent contractor who is on business in his own account, even if only in a small way."[37]The issue came before the Court of Appeal in Hospital Medical Group Ltd v Westwood [2012] EWCA Civ 1005, [2013] ICR 415, a case which was understandably not referred to in the Court of Appeal in this case; it was argued shortly before the hearing in this case, but judgment was delivered a few days afterwards. The Hospital Medical Group argued that Dr Westwood was in business on his own account as a doctor, in which he had three customers, the NHS for his services as a general practitioner, the Albany Clinic for whom he did transgender work, and the Hospital Medical Group for whom he performed hair restoration surgery. The Court of Appeal considered that these were three separate businesses, quite unrelated to one another, and that he was a class (b) worker in relation to the Hospital Medical Group.[38]Maurice Kay LJ pointed out (at para 18) that neither the Cotswold "integration" test nor the Redcats "dominant purpose" test purported to lay down a test of general application. In his view they were wise "not to lay down a more prescriptive approach which would gloss the words of the statute". Judge Peter Clark in the EAT had taken the view that Dr Westwood was a limb (b) worker because he had agreed to provide his services as a hair restoration surgeon exclusively to HMG, he did not offer that service to the world in general, and he was recruited by HMG to work as an integral part of its operations. That was the right approach. The fact that Dr Westwood was in business on his own account was not conclusive because the definition also required that the other party to the contract was not his client or customer and HMG was neither. Maurice Kay LJ concluded, at para 19, by declining the suggestion that the Court might give some guidance as to a more uniform approach: "I do not consider that there is a single key with which to unlock the words of the statute in every case. On the other hand, I agree with Langstaff J that his "integration" test will often be appropriate as it is here". For what it is worth, the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal in that case. 39.I agree with Maurice Kay LJ that there is "not a single key to unlock the words of the statute in every case". There can be no substitute for applying the words of the statute to the facts of the individual case. There will be cases where that is not easy to do. But in my view they are not solved by adding some mystery ingredient of "subordination" to the concept of employee and worker. The experienced employment judges who have considered this problem have all recognised that there is no magic test other than the words of the statute themselves. As Elias J recognised in Redcats, a small business may be genuinely an independent business but be completely dependent upon and subordinate to the demands of a key customer (the position of those small factories making goods exclusively for the "St Michael" brand in the past comes to mind). Equally, as Maurice Kay LJ recognised in Westwood, one may be a professional person with a high degree of autonomy as to how the work is performed and more than one string to one's bow, and still be so closely integrated into the other party's operation as to fall within the definition. As the case of the controlling shareholder in a company who is also employed as chief executive shows, one can effectively be one's own boss and still be a "worker". While subordination may sometimes be an aid to distinguishing workers from other self-employed people, it is not a freestanding and universal characteristic of being a worker.” 2.6 I should add that in that particular case there was no dispute about the existence of a contract between the parties, the dispute was about (in the context of an LLP) what kind of contract it was. 2.7 Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40 concerned arbitrators appointed under a contract, and whether that was “employment under a contract personally to do work.” It was said: “The essential questions in each case are therefore those identified in paras 67 and 68 of Allonby [2004] ICR 1328, namely whether, on the one hand, the person concerned performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he or she receives remuneration or, on the other hand, he or she is an independent provider of services who is not in a relationship of subordination with the person who receives the services. Those are broad questions which depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.” It was also said (having reviewed some authorities): “In particular, the cases did not focus on the fact that the "employment" must be employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work. Given the importance of the EC perspective in construing the legislation, including the Regulations, the cases must now be read in the light of those decisions. They show that it is not sufficient to ask simply whether the contract was a contract personally to do work. They also show that dominant purpose is not the test, or at any rate not the sole test. That is not to say that the question of purpose is irrelevant but the focus is on the contract and relationship between the parties rather than exclusively on purpose. Elias J, sitting as President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, recognised some of the difficulties in James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] ICR 1006. He discussed the relevance of dominant purpose in this context by reference to the cases at paras 53 to 68. At para 59, after quoting from the judgment of Balcombe LJ in Gunning [1986] 1 WLR 546, he said that the dominant purpose test is really an attempt to identify the essential nature of the contract. In the context of the case he was considering he posed the question whether it was in essence to be located in the field of dependent work relationships or whether it was in essence a contract between two independent business undertakings. At paras 67 and 68, after referring to a number of cases and observing at para 65 that the description of the test as one of identifying the dominant purpose was perhaps not an altogether happy one, he said this:"67. An alternative way of putting it may be to say that the courts are seeking to discover whether the obligation for personal service is the dominant feature of the contractual arrangement or not. If it is, then the contract lies in the employment field; if it is not - if, for example, the dominant feature of the contract is a particular outcome or objective - and the obligation to provide personal service is an incidental or secondary consideration, it will lie in the business field.68. This is not to suggest that a tribunal will be in error in failing specifically to apply the 'dominant purpose' or indeed any other test. The appropriate classification will in every case depend upon a careful analysis of all the elements of the relationship, as Mr Recorder Underhill QC pointed out in Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd v Baird [2002] ICR 667. It is a fact sensitive issue, and there is no shortcut to a considered assessment of all relevant factors. However, in some cases the application of the 'dominant purpose' test may help tribunals to decide which side of the boundary a particular case lies." It is noteworthy that the European cases were not cited in many of the cases, including that before Elias J. In the light of the European cases, dominant purpose cannot be the sole test, although it may well be relevant in arriving at the correct conclusion on the facts of a particular case. After all, if the dominant purpose of the contract is the execution of personal work, it seems likely that the relationship will be, in the words of Allonby [2004] ICR 1328, para 67, a case in which the person concerned performs services for and under the direction of the other party to the contract in return for remuneration as opposed to an independent provider of services who is not in a relationship of subordination with him or it. This may not be so however because, although the dominant purpose of the contract may be personal work, it may not be personal work under the direction of the other party to the contract. All will depend upon the applications of the principles in Allonby to the circumstances of the particular case. 2.8 In Revenue and Customs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd [2024] UKSC 29 it was said: “It is an essential element of a contract of employment that the employee provides his or her personal service for payment by the employer. This requirement has been variously described, for example as "the wage-work bargain": see Cotswold Developments Construction Ltd v Williams [2006] IRLR 181, para 48 (EAT, Langstaff J). This perhaps more clearly pinpoints its focus than the usual but bland term "mutuality of obligation", which could be applied to all bilateral contracts of any description. However, in this case, as in many others, it has been adopted as the label for the first pre-requisite of any contract of employment and, with some reluctance, I shall also use it.[41]This requirement of payment for personal service cannot, however, itself establish that the contract in question is a contract of employment. It is likewise an essential element of contracts for services whereby independent contractors agree to provide their personal services for payment, and of the broader statutory categories of "worker" under, for example, regulation 2(1) of the Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1833) and of "employment" under the Equality Act 2010 (section 83(2)(a)). Beyond simply establishing the existence of a contract, it has been said to locate the contract in "the employment field": see James v Greenwich London Borough Council [2007] ICR 577, paras 16-16 per Elias J.[42]Although this element will usually be obvious, cases arise where that is not so. For example, in Quashie v Stringfellow Restaurants Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1735, [2013] IRLR 99, a contract existed between the defendant and dancers working at its clubs, but they were not contracts of employment because the dancers were paid by customers, not by the defendant. It is commonly an issue in tripartite cases, involving individuals who are contracted by employment agencies to provide work for clients of the agency: see, for example, McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment [1997] ICR 549 (CA) ("McMeechan").” 2.9 In Match Officials it was held that the case law authorities did not establish that where there is a single engagement there must be mutual obligations in existence before the engagement commences. A contract of employment (because the case was concerned with employment status not worker status) could exist covering only the period while the employee was carrying out the work for which they were paid. It was noted this was summarised in The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Atholl House Productions Limited [2022] EWCA Civ 501 as “a single engagement can give rise to a contract of employment if work which has in fact been offered is in fact done for payment.” It was also held that it did not follow from the right of either party to cancel the engagement without penalty meant that, while the contract remained in being, the parties were not under mutual obligations to each other. On the contrary those mutual obligations existed from the time of acceptance of the match (as the case was about football referees), unless the engagement was terminated. The right to terminate was irrelevant at the first stage of determining whether there existed the mutuality of obligation required for a contract of employment (but was a relevant factor later on in the analysis when determining whether in fact in its nature the contract was one of employment). 2.10 In Byrne Brothers (already referred to above), and an oft quoted EAT decision, the EAT addressed the issue of the boundary between being an employee, or a worker, or neither in the ERA. It was said: “(4) It seems to us that the best guidance is to be found by considering the policy behind the inclusion of limb (b). That can only have been to extend the benefits of protection to workers who are in the same need of that type of protection as employees stricto sensu - workers, that is, who are viewed as liable, whatever their formal employment status, to be required to work excessive hours (or, in the cases of Part II of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, to suffer unlawful deductions from their earnings or to be paid too little). The reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are in a subordinate and dependent position vis-à-vis their employers: the purpose of the Regulations is to extend protection to workers who are, substantively and economically, in the same position. Thus the essence of the intended distinction must be between, on the one hand, workers whose degree of dependence is essentially the same as that of employees and, on the other, contractors who have a sufficiently arm's-length and independent position to be treated as being able to look after themselves in the relevant respects. (5) Drawing that distinction in any particular case will involve all or most of the same considerations as arise in drawing the distinction between a contract of service and a contract for services – but with the boundary pushed further in the putative worker's favour. It may, for example, be relevant to assess the degree of control exercised by the putative employer, the exclusivity of the engagement and its typical duration, the method of payment, what equipment the putative worker supplies, the level of risk undertaken etc. The basic effect of limb (b) is, so to speak, to lower the pass-mark, so that cases which failed to reach the mark necessary to qualify for protection as employees might nevertheless do so as workers. (6) What we are concerned with is the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract - not, as such, with what happened in practice. But what happened in practice may shed light on the contractual position: see Carmichael (above), esp. per Lord Hoffmann at pp 1234-5." 2.11 In Uber and ors v Aslam and ors [2021] ICR 657 Lord Leggatt JSC identified that worker status has three elements:(1) a contract whereby an individual undertakes to perform work or services for the other party;(2) an undertaking to do the work or perform the services personally; and(3) a requirement that the other party to the contract is not a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual. 2.12 The dispute in Uber was about the first requirement, with Uber arguing that the contract lay between the driver and the passenger and not the driver and Uber. The Supreme Court in their decision referred to the principles in Allonby, Hashwani and Bates van Winkelhof. It was also said: “In determining whether an individual is a “worker”, there can, as Baroness Hale said in the Bates van Winkelhof case at para 39, “be no substitute for applying the words of the statute to the facts of the individual case.” At the same time, in applying the statutory language, it is necessary both to view the facts realistically and to keep in mind the purpose of the legislation. As noted earlier, the vulnerabilities of workers which create the need for statutory protection are subordination to and dependence upon another person in relation to the work done. As also discussed, a touchstone of such subordination and dependence is (as has long been recognised in employment law) the degree of control exercised by the putative employer over the work or services performed by the individual concerned. The greater the extent of such control, the stronger the case for classifying the individual as a “worker” who is employed under a “worker’s contract”. 2.13 In Uber the Supreme Court was concerned with whether there was worker status when actually working, rather the analysis of an umbrella contract. The tribunal’s decision, on the particular facts, that the Uber drivers were workers, was upheld. In the Judgment it was said: “Equally, it is well established and not disputed by Uber that the fact that an individual is entirely free to work or not, and owes no contractual obligation to the person for whom the work is performed when not working, does not preclude a finding that the individual is a worker, or indeed an employee, at the times when he or she is working: see eg McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment [1997] ICR 549; Cornwall County Council v Prater [2006] EWCA Civ 102; [2006] ICR 731. As Elias J (President) said in James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] ICR 1006, para 84: “Many casual or seasonal workers, such as waiters or fruit pickers or casual building labourers, will periodically work for the same employer but often neither party has any obligations to the other in the gaps or intervals between engagements. There is no reason in logic or justice why the lack of worker status in the gaps should have any bearing on the status when working. There may be no overarching or umbrella contract, and therefore no employment status in the gaps, but that does not preclude such a status during the period of work.” I agree, subject only to the qualification that, where an individual only works intermittently or on a casual basis for another person, that may, depending on the facts, tend to indicate a degree of independence, or lack of subordination, in the relationship while at work which is incompatible with worker status: see Windle v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 459; [2016] ICR 721, para 23. 2.14 In the Judgment it was also said: “The fact, however, that an individual has the right to turn down work is not fatal to a finding that the individual is an employee or a worker and, by the same token, does not preclude a finding that the individual is employed under a worker’s contract. What is necessary for such a finding is that there should be what has been described as “an irreducible minimum of obligation”: see Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, 623 (Stephenson LJ), approved by the House of Lords in Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] 1 WLR 2042, 2047. In other words, the existence and exercise of a right to refuse work is not critical, provided there is at least an obligation to do some amount of work.” The Supreme Court, in effect, found that there was an irreducible minimum of obligation on drivers to accept work given the drivers were required to be generally willing and available to take trips when logged into the app. A repeated failure to accept trip requests was treated as a breach of that requirement and Uber could log drivers off the app if they failed to maintain a prescribed rate of acceptances. By logging into the app, a driver was working by entering into a contract with Uber where he undertook to perform driving services personally. There was an obligation to do some work. It was said: “I do not consider that the third condition identified by the tribunal that the driver was in fact ready and willing to accept trips can properly be regarded as essential to the existence of a worker’s contract; nor indeed did the tribunal assert that it was. But it is reasonable to treat it, as the tribunal did, as a further condition which must be satisfied in order to find that a driver is “working” under such a contract.” 2.15 In Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville [2022] EWCA Civ 229 the Court of Appeal was concerned with a claimant who periodically sat on fitness to practice panels. The Court of Appeal upheld the tribunal’s finding that the overarching contract, whilst being a contract, was not a worker contract because it was not a contract under which the claimant undertook to do or perform personally any services. nor was the council obliged to offer any panel hearing. But the individual contracts, where each time the council offered a hearing date and the claimant accepted it, the claimant agreed to attend the hearing and the council agreed to pay him a fee, were found to be worker contracts where the claimant agreed to provide his services personally. It did not matter that the claimant could withdraw from the agreement to attend a hearing even after accepting the booking, because he still entered into a contract that existed until it terminated, and if it was not terminated he would have worked under a contract personally to perform services. Nor did it matter that the parties were not obliged to offer or accept future work. In the course of the Judgment it was said: 45. … there must be a contract. That is, there must be legally enforceable obligations owed by the parties. As Elias LJ expressed it in Quashie v Stringfellows Restaurants Ltd. [2013] IRLR 99 at paragraph 10: "Every bilateral contract requires mutual obligations; they constitute the consideration from each party necessary to create the contract". Next, the contract must include a certain type of obligation, so far as the individual is concerned, if he is to be able to claim that he falls within limb (b) of the definition of "worker". The obligation must be one whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform any work or services and to do so "personally". Finally, the other party must not be a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual. The various elements of the definition can be differently described, and enumerated. They are summarised in Uber at paragraph 41 in the following way: "41. Limb (b) of the statutory definition of a "worker's contract" has three elements: (1) a contract whereby an individual undertakes to perform work or services for the other party; (2) an undertaking to do the work or perform the services personally; and (3) a requirement that the other party to the contract is not a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual."” 2.16 In Sejpal v Rodericks Dental Ltd [2022] EAT 91, the EAT (referring to Quashie) said: “23. The concept of mutuality of obligation goes principally to the issue of whether there is a relevant agreement, or agreements. There must be mutuality of an obligation for there to be a contract at all. It was also said in Ter-Berg v Malde and Hancock [2025] EAT 23 (rejecting an argument that mutuality of obligation is not an essential ingredient of worker status): “21. The concept of mutuality, or an irreducible minimum, of obligation, is a usage which dates back at least to the speech of Stephenson LJ in Nethermere (St. Neots) Limited v Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, at 623C- F. As subsequent authorities have discussed, it may be used refer to the fact that (whether for employee or worker status) there must, at the relevant time, be a contract, in which both parties have undertaken legally binding obligations to the other, and/or to the fact that those obligations must be of a kind which fulfils the essential elements of a contract of that type.”… 23. In Nethermere Stephenson LJ referred to what MacKenna J went on to say about (i) at 515DE, which I will cite a little more fully: "As to (i). There must be a wage or other remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract of any kind. The servant must be obliged to provide his own work and skill. Freedom to do a job either by one's own hands or by another's is inconsistent with a contract of service, though a limited or occasional power of delegation may not be: see Atiyah's Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) pp. 59 to 61 and the cases cited by him." 24. In Nethermere Stephenson LJ then observed: "There must, in my judgment, be an irreducible minimum of obligation on each side to create a contract of service. I doubt if it can be reduced to any lower than in the sentences I have just quoted …".” Key case law principles where there is a dispute about the existence of a contract 2.17 There is a body of case law concerned whether certain relationships are contractual relationships as opposed to some other kind of relationship or no relationship at all: for example, office holders such as judges, the clergy, and volunteers. 2.18 In Gilham v Ministry of Justice [2019] UKSC44 the Supreme Court considered the position of judges and whether their work is performed pursuant to a contract with the recipient of the work, or pursuant to some other legal arrangement. Baroness Hale considered the test to be applied to determine whether an office holder has a contract with the person or body for whom they are undertaking to perform work and said: “It is clear, therefore, what the question is: did the parties intend to enter into a contractual relationship, defined at least in part by their agreement, or some other legal relationship defined by the terms of the statutory office of district judge? In answering this question, it is necessary to look at the manner at which the judge was engaged, the source and character of the rules governing her service, and the overall context, but this is not an exhaustive list.” 2.19 The conclusion was that the judge had not entered into a contract. Whilst it might look like there was classic offer and acceptance, the manner of appointment was in fact laid down in statute and some provisions were expressed in terms of expectations rather than contractually binding obligations. The essential components of the relationship were derived from statute and were not a matter of individual negotiation. 2.20 In Catt v English Table Tennis Association Ltd and others [2022] EAT 125, [2022] IRLR 1022, the EAT considered the position of a non-executive director where there was a dispute whether there was a contract in existence. The EAT said that applying Somerville the first issue to be resolved was whether there was a contract between the parties at all: “that is, whether they had entered into an agreement containing legally enforceable obligations such as to 'constitute the consideration from each party necessary to create the contract'; per Elias LJ in Quashie.” It was also said: “the question for the ET was more akin to that identified in Gilham… that is, whether the parties intended 'to enter into a contractual relationship, defined at least in part by their agreement'? In answering that question, the ET would have been assisted by considering the matters identified in Gilham (albeit mindful that this is not an exhaustive list): the manner of the claimant's engagement, the source and character of the rules governing his service, and the overall context. The “Volunteer” Cases 2.21 As Mr Hoar describes, in X v Mid Sussex CAB [2012] UKSC 59, the Supreme Court considered whether “occupation” in art 3(1)(a) of the Framework Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC which refers to “conditions for access to employment, to self employment or to occupation”, would cover the activities of an unpaid volunteer. The Supreme Court held the Directive’s reference to “occupation” did not extend to an unpaid volunteer without a contract. It did not overturn, and indeed subsequent cases have repeated the observation of Elias LJ in the Court of Appeal that “Volunteers come in many shapes and sizes, and it cannot be assumed that all will have the same status in law.” 2.22 In South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v Grayson [2004] IRLR 353 the dispute was about the status of unpaid CAB “volunteers.” The volunteers had a written volunteer agreement which stated it had been created to clarify the reasonable expectations of the volunteer and the CAB. This included a usual minimum weekly commitment of 6 hours. There was a rota and volunteers were asked to give the CAB notice of holidays so the rota could be rearranged. Expenses were paid on the basis that volunteers should not be out of pocket and therefore included things like travel. There were confidentiality terms about client matters and an expectation that volunteers would adhere to their equal opportunities policy. There was a requirement to undertake basic training before the volunteers could start client work, and an expectation to attend ongoing training, amongst other things. The advisers were on a rota and committed to the rota appointment, but no sanction could be applied to an adviser who failed to keep to it; other than ultimately the CAB could remove them from the rota. The advisors could give notice to come off the rota or to take holidays or any other absence. The tribunal found the advisors were employed under a contract of service, stating there was an intention that work would be done by the advisers in return for the payment of expenses, the provision of training, the opportunity to gain experience, and the indemnification for legal liabilities for the advice given to clients. Alternatively, the tribunal found there was a contract personally to do any work, amounting to worker status. The EAT upheld the appeal. It was said: “We start from the point that the question for the tribunal was whether the Bureau’s volunteer workers were subject to a contract under which they were obliged to work for the Bureau. So expressed, it would appear to us surprising if the answer to that question were yes, since it is of the essence of volunteer workers that they are ordinarily under no such contract. As volunteers, they provide their services voluntarily, without reward, with the consequence that they are entitled to withhold those services with impunity. However, that starting point is not necessarily also the finishing point. In every case, including this one, if a question arises as to the legal relationship between an alleged employer and a so-called voluntary worker, it is always necessary to analyse that relationship to see exactly what it amounts to. But if the proposition is that the volunteer worker is in fact an employee under a contract of service, or under contract personally to do work…then in our view it is necessary to be able to identify an arrangement under which, in exchange of valuable consideration, the volunteer is contractually obliged to render services to or else to work personally for the employer.” 2.23 It was also said: “At least one test which may help in this identification exercise is to consider whether, if the volunteer should decline without prior notice to perform any work for the employer, the latter would have any legal remedy against him; and similarly to consider whether, if the volunteer attends to do work and there is none, he had any legal remedy against the employer…” and “… in considering the key questions in this case, it is necessary to focus on the “volunteer agreement” and to consider, in particular, whether it imposes any contractual obligations on the volunteers actually to do any work for the Bureau in exchange for consideration…” 2.24 The EAT noted on the facts that the volunteer agreement was directed at clarifying each side’s “reasonable expectations” of each other which was not the language of contractual obligation. The EAT commented that a contract of service or for services will ordinarily have its primary obligations expressed in terms of unqualified obligation, such as the hours of work and reward for it. The evidence was not supportive of there being a legal obligation to do 6 hours work a week. Instead, the expression of the usual minimum commitment to hours was there to help the CAB organise their services in an orderly way and make the most efficient use of their resources. The same applied to, for example, expecting a volunteer to give as much notice as possible of a holiday, with there being no limits on the amount of holiday that could actually be taken. The EAT said the most striking point against it being a contract of the type in question was also that the volunteers were not paid for their services. 2.25 The EAT said of the arrangement to the reimbursement of true expenses, that this was: “entirely unsurprising. It would, in our view, be very surprising if unpaid volunteers were expected to bear their expenses incurred in the course of their work for the Bureau, and we do not regards this feature of the agreement as providing support for the contention that in truth the agreement was one of service or for the personal provision of services. We are prepared to accept that this element of the agreement, and also the provision in it to the effect that the Bureau will indemnify advisors against negligence claims by disgruntled clients, probably do, or at least may, evidence a binding contractual relationship between the Bureau and the volunteer, namely a unilateral contract in the nature of what is sometimes referred to as an “if” contract, one which can be expressed as follows: “if you do any work for the Bureau and incur expenses in doing so, and/suffer a claim from a client you advise, the Bureau will indemnify you against your expenses and any such claim”. But that contract is still not one which imposes on the volunteer any obligation actually to do any work for the Bureau.” 2.26 It was said: “The critical question, in our view, is whether it is possible to extract from the agreement, read as a whole, a contractual obligation on the part of the volunteer to provide any services at all to the Bureau. The inclusion in the arrangements between the Bureau and the volunteer of an “if” contract of the type we have just identified does not enable this question to be answered in the affirmative, since such a contract imposes no obligation on the volunteer to do anything…” 2.27 The EAT noted that there was no suggestion that cessation by the volunteer of his services would entitle the CAB to any remedy against the volunteer for breach of contract. The EAT said they did not regard provision of training as amounting to consideration for a commitment by the volunteer to provide services in exchange. The training could not be regarded as consideration for some form of reciprocal undertaking to honour some minimum commitment. It was said: “The notion that the acquisition of experience which the doing of a particular job will give can be regarded as consideration for the performance of the job itself is one which we cannot understand.” It was said: “We consider that the crucial question which was before the tribunal was not whether any benefits flowed from the Bureau to the volunteer in consideration of any work actually done by the volunteer for the Bureau, but whether the volunteer agreement imposed a contractual obligation upon the Bureau to provide work for the volunteer to do and upon the volunteer personally to do for the Bureau any work so provided, being an obligation such that, were the volunteer to give notice immediately terminating his relationship with the Bureau, the latter would have a remedy for breach of contract against him. We cannot accept that the volunteer agreement imposed any such obligation.” A volunteer could at any point either with or without notice withdraw his services and the Bureau would have no contractual remedy against him. As has been noted in this case, Grayson was about whether there was an umbrella employment or worker contract and did not focus on whether there was such a contract in place for each individual engagement. 2.28 In Melhuish v Redbridge CAB [2005] IRLR a CAB volunteer failed to establish he was an employee. Similar to Grayson, the EAT rejected arguments that an obligation to reimburse expenses amounted to remuneration, or that the provision of training was similar consideration to remuneration. The absence of agreement to provide remuneration was fatal to the claim. As subsequently described by the EAT in Groom (see below), the difficulty in Melhuish was not with the potential existence of an “if contract” / a unilateral contract because a unilateral contract can still be a contract with mutuality of obligation. The mutuality is just staggered in the sense that one party offers something if in due course, the other party does something in return, then by doing that act, the second party accepts the offer and provides the consideration. The essential difficulty was the absence of remuneration. 2.29 Groom v Maritime and Coastguard Agency [2024] EAT 71 concerned a Coastal Rescue Officer (CRO) in the Coastal Rescue Service who was found at first instance not to be a worker. There were terms set out in a Volunteer Handbook which described the relationship as voluntary two-way commitment with no contract of employment. There was a Code of Conduct CROs were expected to abide by. CROs were able to submit monthly claims for payments for certain activities, although some CROs chose not to do so. The payments were said to cover minor costs associated with volunteering and to compensate for any disruption to their personal life and employment and for unsocial hours call outs. Remuneration was paid for most activities, with non-remunerated activities being marginal. 2.30 The case was brought on the basis that there were contracts in respect of each CRO activity, rather than on the basis of an overarching umbrella contract. The EAT held that CROs were paid sums properly characterised as remuneration and that “a payment in compensation for interference in a person’s use of their time is in the essence of remuneration.” It was argued that if there was a contract then it was not a contract for the provision of work or services but a separate contract following on from the work that had been carried out, and collateral to it, for the payment of expenses. The EAT rejected that argument saying this was an artificial distinction because the remuneration was paid for the activity attended/ the service being provided by the CRO, and a unilateral contract once complete was still a contract. It was said that in Grayson the “if” contract caused difficulties for the Claimant because (a) the Claimant there was seeking to establish an umbrella contract and not a contract for a particular attendance and (b) the agreement was only to repay out of pocket expenses. It was observed those factors were not relevant in Groom. 2.31 The EAT held the tribunal had erred in holding there was no contract at all between the parties. The right to remuneration was an important factor that pointed in favour of the existence of a contract. The EAT accepted the observation that it would be bizarre to say there was no contract because it would mean a CRO who attended an activity to which remuneration attaches would be unable to sue for payment. A contract came into existence when a CRO attended an activity in respect of which there was a right to remuneration and the contract was for the provision of services, not a collateral contract for the reimbursement of expenses. The EAT substituted a finding of worker status other than in respect of situations where CROs were conducting activities for which there was no remuneration, which remained an open question for the tribunal, if required. 2.32 On appeal in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6 the MCA’s appeal was unsuccessful. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Bean held that there was a coherent set of documents showing that while a CRO was not obliged to attend for work on any particular occasion, and could specify the time for which he was willing to do so, if he did attend he was bound to obey reasonable instructions and was entitled to claim remuneration for much of that work. It was said: “In those circumstances it seems to me quite unreal to say there was no intention to create legal relations between the parties. As the EAT found, a contract comes into existence when a CRO attends for an activity in respect of which there is a right to claim remuneration.” An argument that there was no mutuality of obligation was also rejected. There were basic obligations on the CRO to comply with reasonable instructions while on duty, and on the part of the MCA to make payment. It was a wage/work bargain. 2.33 Bean LJ said: “As Elias LJ said in X v Mid-Sussex CAB [2011] ICR 460, "volunteers come in many shapes and sizes, and it cannot be assumed that all will have the same status in law". The true volunteer cases such as Grayson are quite different from the present case. The critical distinction is that the CAB volunteers in Grayson were not paid at all (other than the reimbursement of travel expenses, which it is common ground is insufficient on its own to create worker status). There was no legal obligation on the CAB to provide work when the volunteers attended, still less to pay for work done; and no legal obligation on the volunteers either. By contrast, the MCA’s remuneration document has a section dealing with "claims for time (hourly rate) remuneration", and describes the payments as "compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment". As the deputy judge said in the EAT a payment in compensation for interference with a person's use of their time is the essence of remuneration.” 2.34 It was observed that it was clear from two Supreme Court decisions that it is not a bar to worker status that the individual is under no obligation to attend for work (Uber and Match Officials). It was said: “A contract of employment could be limited to the period during which the employee carried out paid work, and there might be sufficient mutuality of obligation even if the obligations only subsisted during that period.” 2.35 Lord Justice Stuart-Smith (with whom Lord Justice Popplewell agreed) said that the absence of an umbrella contract nor the fact that a person is under no obligation to work at any particular time for any minimum number of hours is not of itself a bar to the person being a “worker” though it may be a relevant indication tending to that conclusion. The existence within a relationship of remuneration being paid to a person who has agreed to carry out work will in most cases be a strong indication both of an intention to create legal relations, and where the remuneration is to be regarded as consideration for carrying out the work, for the existence of a contract. It was said: “An agreement by one person that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration by another, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for that other is the class first indication (necessary but not necessarily sufficient) of a contract of service.” Further: “Conversely the absence of payment is likely to be a striking indicator that a person is a “pure” volunteer and not a “worker”; the fact that a person provisions their services voluntarily and without payment supports the conclusion that they are consequently entitled to withhold their services with impunity.” 2.36 It was held that the proposition that there was no intention to create legal relations was unsustainable; it would mean that an CRO would have no legally enforceable right to claim payment. On its facts there was for the CROs a classic wage/work bargain. It was held that the terminology in the documents did not accurately reflect the reality of the wage/ work bargain struck. There was an intention to create legal relations from the time the CRO agrees to serve the MCA on the terms set out in the document. The relationship was not consistent with a purely voluntary set of mutual agreements. There was also an undertaking to do or perform work or services for the MCA; CROs were no obligated to respond to a particular call but if they did they were undertaking to carry out the work necessary to respond to the call and act in accordance with the code of conduct. Where that undertaking was accepted, the MCA offered renumeration in consideration for the work done or services provided. There was an intention to create legal relations and an agreement pursuant to which the CRO undertakes to do the work or perform the services in consideration of which the MCA agrees to pay the CRO. Stuart-Smith LJ did not see the arrangement as being an “if contract”, but also said he could see no reason why such a contract, in suitable circumstances, should not satisfy the statutory test. The underlying nature of the agreement was not affected if either party was entitled subsequently to cancel it. Statutory interpretation 2.37 It was said in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and others [2011] UKSC 41 that in the cases of contracts concerning work and services, where one party alleges that the written contract terms do not accurately reflect the true agreement of the parties, the court or tribunal has to consider whether or not the words of the written contract represent the true intention or expectations of the parties, not only at the inception of the contract, but also, if appropriate, as time goes by. The court or tribunal has to determine the actual legal obligations of the parties by looking at all the relevant evidence, including the terms of any written agreement but which also can include how the parties conducted themselves in practice, because that may demonstrate the true obligations of the parties. 2.38 It was said in Uber BV v Aslam that: “68. The judgment of this court in the Autoclenz case made it clear that whether a contract is a "worker's contract" within the meaning of the legislation designed to protect employees and other "workers" is not to be determined by applying ordinary principles of contract law such as the parol evidence rule, the signature rule and the principles that govern the rectification of contractual documents on grounds of mistake. Not only was this expressly stated by Lord Clarke but, had ordinary principles of contract law been applied, there would have been no warrant in the Autoclenz case for disregarding terms of the written documents which were inconsistent with an employment relationship, as the court held that the employment tribunal had been entitled to do. What was not, however, fully spelt out in the judgment was the theoretical justification for this approach. It was emphasised that in an employment context the parties are frequently of very unequal bargaining power. But the same may also be true in other contexts and inequality of bargaining power is not generally treated as a reason for disapplying or disregarding ordinary principles of contract law, except in so far as Parliament has made the relative bargaining power of the parties a relevant factor under legislation such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 69. Critical to understanding the Autoclenz case, as I see it, is that the rights asserted by the claimants were not contractual rights but were created by legislation. Thus, the task for the tribunals and the courts was not, unless the legislation required it, to identify whether, under the terms of their contracts, Autoclenz had agreed that the claimants should be paid at least the national minimum wage or receive paid annual leave. It was to determine whether the claimants fell within the definition of a "worker" in the relevant statutory provisions so as to qualify for these rights irrespective of what had been contractually agreed. In short, the primary question was one of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation. 70. The modern approach to statutory interpretation is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and to interpret its language, so far as possible, in the way which best gives effect to that purpose. … 76. Once this is recognised, it can immediately be seen that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of this legislation to treat the terms of a written contract as the starting point in determining whether an individual falls within the definition of a "worker". To do so would reinstate the mischief which the legislation was enacted to prevent. It is the very fact that an employer is often in a position to dictate such contract terms and that the individual performing the work has little or no ability to influence those terms that gives rise to the need for statutory protection in the first place. The efficacy of such protection would be seriously undermined if the putative employer could by the way in which the relationship is characterised in the written contract determine, even prima facie, whether or not the other party is to be classified as a worker. Laws such as the National Minimum Wage Act were manifestly enacted to protect those whom Parliament considers to be in need of protection and not just those who are designated by their employer as qualifying for it.” 3. Findings of fact3.1 Mr Owen is the Citizens in Policing Manager for the Respondent. Citizens in Policing is the umbrella term used across police forces to describe all aspects of, what they term, police volunteering. In particular, Mr Owen manages what he describes as Police Support Volunteers, and Special Constables. Within the Police Support Volunteers, there are the Role Play Actors (RPA) in question.3.2 The Respondent’s position in this case is that the RPAs are volunteers who freely give up their time for the benefit of the community. Whereas the Claimant argues they are, and she would have been, a “worker.” Many of the documents and the Respondent’s evidence is therefore couched in the language of “volunteers.” If I am reciting what a document or witness says in this Judgment I will try use the language/wording of the document. Otherwise, I will try to use the neutral terms RPA or the carrying out of an RPA duty.3.3 The Claimant and her friend, Nicky Morris, expressed an interest in becoming RPAs for the Respondent in April 2024 and were invited to attend an introductory day on 3 August 2024. They were told that on the introductory day, they would volunteer alongside experienced RPAs and [66]: “you will be regarded as “visitors” as neither of you are formal police volunteers. This also means that we can’t reimburse you for travel expenses. That being said we are looking for more actors and, should you enjoy the experience, you can opt to join us formally. Actor opportunities are a great way to volunteer and don’t require a huge commitment. Plus as a formal volunteer you would be paid expenses.”3.4 The Claimant and Ms Morris were then sent a link to a portal to apply join the RPA team. They were told they needed to be vetted and would not be able to role play again until after the process was completed. They had to complete an online application which was relatively detailed, giving information such as education details, employment details and a statement of their reasons for and perceived suitability for the role. There are nationality restrictions and right to work restrictions. Some criminal convictions may exclude a person from the RPA role. There is a section headed “Financial” which says that applicants to the police service should normally be able to manage existing loans and the management of sensible debt, and this can include mortgages, loans and hire purchase agreements etc.3.5 The Claimant’s application form is at [616]. There is a section that obtains medical information and which talks about reasonable adjustments for the job or workplace. The form also refers to disability and the Equality Act prohibiting discrimination in employment, including recruitment, and that the police service welcomes the recruitment of people who have disabilities [619].3.6 The declaration section includes: “I understand that the application form forms part of my terms of employment or volunteer agreement and any false statement or deliberate omission may disqualify me from the recruitment process or if appointed, render me liable to disciplinary action which could result in dismissal” [625].3.7 There is a section on the form headed Equal Opportunities [628] which refers to no job applicant being treated more or less favourably on the grounds of sex, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, marital status, pregnancy and maternity, ethnicity, colour, nationality, ethnic or national origins, religion or belief or disability. It refers to positive action schemes. The section then captures equal opportunities information for monitoring purposes, which it says will be processed separately to the recruitment process.3.8 Ms Morris attended an interview where she had to provide identity documents. I would presume the Claimant potentially attended an interview too, but it is not mentioned in her witness statement. Ms Morris recalls that Ms Hadfield-Jones gave a presentation covering roles that volunteers could do, called “Civilians in Policing.” She was told that if successful on the day they would need to pass a Welsh Language Test and undertake medical screening. She then had an interview conducted by an experienced RPA lasting around 15 minutes, covering questions such as why she wanted to do the role, and could she communicate confidently. She was photographed for an ID badge.3.9 Both Ms Morris and the Claimant had to study to prepare for a Welsh Language Test. Mr Owen explains this is to ensure the Respondent complied with the Welsh Language Act which mandates equal treatment for Welsh and English in Public Services.3.10 The Respondent also took up references. The Claimant and Ms Morris also went through a medical assessment process.3.11 The RPAs also have to go through vetting. Mr Owen says this is Non Police Personnel Vetting Level 1 which is different to that applied to employees and is the lowest vetting level available. The Claimant disputes this was the level applied to her or that it was the applicable level but I do not need to determine that point to decide the issue before me. 3.12. The College of Policing “Vetting Authorised Professional Practice” document of May 2025 is a lengthy document in the bundle and says that it applies to (amongst others) individuals working on a voluntary basis with police forces. Volunteers are required to maintain valid vetting clearance [99]. The policy says: “To ensure adherence to the standards of professional behaviour and Code of Ethics, all members of the policing profession must act with the highest levels of integrity ensuring their behaviours, both on and off duty, do not compromise their ability to maintain their vetting clearance. They should, therefore, disclose all relevant information during the vetting process and throughout the lifetime of the vetting clearance…” Volunteers, depending on role and risk, can fall within NPPV level 1 [119]. Appendix B at [215] is concerned with an annual integrity and vetting review and says that performing any role in the police service places restrictions on an individual that can affect their personal life and that the annual integrity and vetting review is designed to ensure every member of the police force understands and is regularly reminded of the obligations and support available. There is a section headed “Social media” which includes: “You have a duty to immediately challenge any content publishes by your colleagues that is inconsistent with the standards of professional behaviour and/or to report it appropriately, for example to your line manager or counter corruption unit. Improper use, or failure to respond to it, could lead to misconduct proceedings. Criminal offences may also be committed.” It also says: “Your use of social media must remain professional and not bring policing into disrepute.” 3.13 The Respondent’s website has information on vetting and says that it applies to all members and prospective members of the Force including police officers, special constables, community support officers, police staff, volunteers, contractors, subcontractors and any other persons who require access to NWP premises, systems of assets [447]. It says that all applicants will have their financial status verified through a credit reference check. Applicants with outstanding county court judgments or non-discharged bankrupts will not be considered [447]. Mr Owen says that the volunteer section of the Respondent’s website says: “Due to the nature of the Police Service, voluntary roles will require security checks to be completed. You will be subject to the same criteria as all members of the Force, and as such your application may not be accepted if there is a conflict in your professional or personal life.” 3.14 The Claimant did not ever take up the full role because she was rejected at vetting stage. The vetting decision at [632] includes: “Although the applicant will only be working in a voluntary role she will be working with NWP staff and representing the force.” Ms Morris made it through the appointment process, being told in December 2024 she was successful. 3.15 The RPA will be given scenarios to act out with a trainee responding to it, and that trainee is assessed. The Force wants the RPAs to represent a wide demographic of the community so that they will react as a member of the public would in a situation, to give greater realism to the police training environment. 3.16 Ms Morris undertook her first RPA duty on 18 January 2025. At the time of giving evidence Ms Morris had completed around 13 role plays and thinks she has met about 7 or 8 other RPAs. On some duties she has been only one of two RPAs, and on other occasions there have been 7 or 8. Ms Morris will interact with the police trainees and trainers and after each scenario she says she is invited to give feedback to those who took part. Mr Owen’s evidence is not materially different to that of Ms Morris, saying there are 11 bespoke RPAs on top of around 70 other volunteers and that the role plays also get offered to the other volunteers too who do about half of the role playing every year. 3.17 The RPAs are supervised in the scenario. With an ID badge they have some freedom of movement on the premises; for example, they can go to the canteen without direct supervision. But they cannot access other parts of the site that require fob access. They do not have access to IT and information systems. They have more freedom of movement compared to visitors who have to be escorted at all times. 3.18 The week after her first duty Ms Morris attended an online training session where she and her fellow new starters were taken through an electronic “Dutysheet” and shown how to complete a “duty” and claim expenses. There is no specific training for the role itself, such as role play actor training, because the actors are playing the part of members of the public. 3.19 The online Dutysheet system contains details of occasions where RPAs may be needed. An automated email sends a message saying there is a new duty, and each RPA decides to accept or decline the offer. Ms Morris describes the frequency of these opportunities as being very ad hoc. Where there is a request for RPAs that is short notice (such as within a week) the request may instead be sent as a text message asking for a Y or N (yes or no). If the RPA says Y then it is added to the individual’s duties on the Dutysheet. 3.20 There is no obligation or expectation to accept any particular or minimum number of duties or hours. No questions are asked if the RPA says no to an offered duty. There is no sanction if opportunities are declined or if an RPA makes a low level of contribution. Ms Morris confirmed she had refused offered duties before with no consequences. 3.21 Mr Owen describes the RPAs as being the most flexible of the Respondent’s volunteering roles, saying that some individuals volunteer on a regular basis and some who seldom do, and that both approaches are perfectly acceptable. He says that some volunteers do quite a lot, and some are on the books but might do no duties in 12 months. He said the RPA role was flexible and was of the least concern to the Respondent if an individual did not show commitment, because the RPAs are not embedded in the organisation. Mr Owen said that in fact given they are playing the role of the public, the least duties an RPA does the more credible they tend to be in the role play. Mr Owen was asked if an RPA did no duty for over 12 months how long they would be kept on. He said that in reality it would not be likely to be beyond 3 years as that is the vetting period, and if an individual reached the vetting requirement again there would have to be a conversation about whether they wished to continue in the role or not. Ms Morris postulates that if she kept on repeatedly saying no to every request that Ms Hadfield-Jones would probably contact her to find out why, although it is not something she has experienced or has actual knowledge about; she was hypothesising. 3.22 Ms Hadfield-Jones told Ms Morris’ group when they started that if they were not going to be available for a time, such as holidays, they should tell her so she would know and it would help her with planning and also reduce unnecessary requests being sent to the RPAs. 3.23 An RPA can contact the Respondent if their circumstances change and they are no longer available for a duty they have agreed to do. In such circumstances the RPAs do not arrange a substitute. Ms Morris says that on one occasion she was scheduled to do a duty but, on the morning, could not come and was unable to get hold of Ms Hadfield-Jones and therefore sent a text apologising. She says Ms Hadfield-Jones later messaged to wish her well and to say that Ms Hadfield-Jones had taken her off the next duty too to give her time to recover. 3.24 Ms Morris says she has never been in the position of wanting to leave halfway through the an exercise, and says she feels professionally obligated to carry out the role she has been asked to do as a matter of her professional conscience rather than that being written down or told to her. She speculates that if she did leave halfway through, Ms Hadfield-Jones would want to know why, what was wrong, or what was not working for her. She again speculates that if she abandoned a role play repeatedly then presumably the Respondent would expect the RPA to say they did not want to do it anymore. 3.25 Mr Owen said he had never known the situation of an RPA leaving halfway through a duty giving no reason in his 10 years of working in his role. He said if it happened then it would be covered by a trainer and there would not be consequences for leaving. He said, he thought, if for example it happened on successive occasions there may be enquiries made in a supportive way to find out why the individual had walked out, and whether it was due to something traumatic in the role play or something else, such as an emergency at home. A hypothetical example was put to him of a RPA leaving and giving no good reason for doing so, and repeatedly doing so. Mr Owen said hypothetically they may reach the point (having made the type of welfare enquiries already set out above) they would be reluctant to invite the individual to that type of event again because of the impact on the training scenario, and it is likely there would ultimately be a professional discussion with the individual about whether they did want to continue as a RPA or not. 3.26 Following completing a duty, the RPA updates the system to show the start and finish time. There is the opportunity to give feedback, for example, if a duty was badly managed or to give praise. Ms Morris recalls that for one duty an evaluation form was sent and a one hour online meeting held to discuss it and share learning lessons. 3.27 The Dutysheet is also used to claim expenses. The expenses guidance document entitled “Submission and Authorisation of Claims” is at [425]. It says everybody is encouraged to claim what they are entitled to claim. Under the heading of Claim Entitlements, it provides that the mileage rate is currently 0.45p per mile with an additional 5p for each passenger carried. Ms Morris explains that RPAs can claim mileage expenses from home to the venue and acknowledges that the rate is probably more than the petrol cost because it includes wear and tear and insurance costs. There is a travel mileage cap of 50 miles round trip [489]. The rate is within the HMRC threshold for out-of-pocket, non-taxable, expenses. Ms Morris accepts it is standard HMRC mileage rate. 3.28 There is a policy section headed subsistence entitlements (refreshments /food) [491] which says: “The periods of retention for duty or engagement on duty after which you become eligible to claim the subsistence allowance and the maximum associated allowance amounts for those periods as follows...” It then sets out an amount for different time periods (not including travel to or from duty). For 4 hours, but under 8 hours, they can claim for a sum up to £7.23. Over 8 hours, but less than 12 hours, they can claim £14.66. Over 12 hours they can claim up to £24.15. The policy says that those amounts are the maximum amounts that can be claimed per tour of duty and: “However, the amount that can be claimed can only be that which was spent and MUST be accompanied by a receipt.” 3.29 Most of the time the role play is between 2 and 5 hours long. If the duty is anticipated to be a full day, then Ms Morris explained in her evidence that in fact often Ms Hadfield-Jones or someone else will bring food and drink instead for the group. She said she would not then, personally, in those circumstances make her own subsistence claim. 3.30 There is also an Expenses and Allowances Policy starting at page [458]. This sets out that HMRC approved mileage allowance payments are 45p for the first 10,000 miles and 0.25 thereafter. 3.31 Mr Owen says that the RPAs are only reimbursed actual expenses incurred for travel or food costs and that the Respondent believes that their volunteers should not be out of pocket, but that there is no profit element to any of the expenses. 3.32 Ms Morris says she was required to attend force-wide training on ethics, having to complete 8 College of Policing modules online in a 3 hour session. Mr Owen accepted the training was important, and the ambition was to give the training to everyone in North Wales Police. He said that because the times and dates were difficult for volunteers they had set up specific provision for volunteers. He said he had looked at the returns rate, and in fact not every volunteer had attended the training and there had been no sanction for those who had not attended. 3.33 Ms Morris says that she and the other RPAs were given the opportunity to join a 6 week mindfulness and resilience training course. The opportunity was communicated on the Dutysheet for North Wales Police Volunteers [672] attaching an information post about the NWP offer of two mindfulness courses that the RPAs could apply for if they wished [672]. The courses were 2 hour sessions on Microsoft Teams for 8 weeks. Mr Owen said they were offered out to all in North Wales Police, the course was generally paid for anyway, there was no obligation to attend, and it was simply about being a supportive organisation and giving people the opportunity to attend if they wished. 3.34 Ms Morris and the other RPAs were given the chance to act as a student for trainees attending a 2-day Firearms Instructor training. Mr Owen explained that this was an RPA opportunity to facilitate the training and testing of trainee firearms instructors. The RPA would get the benefit of some instruction in the use of a firearm by a trainee instructor but obtain no qualification because they were there as RPAs. 3.35 Ms Morris was sent a questionnaire and resources about psychological safety screening and says she understands this happens annually. Mr Owen said there is no obligation to undertake the screening, but it is sent to all North Wales Police members, and the RPAs can avail themselves of support through the questionnaire if they wish to do so as a welfare measure. There are no repercussions or sanctions for not doing so. Indeed, the information about who does or does not participate is confidential and held by occupational health. 3.36 There is no requirement on RPAs to wear a uniform. However, some RPAs have been given police T-shirts or other clothing such as a fleece if they are attending, for example, a carol concert. Mr Owens explained that generally this did not apply to RPAs unless there was some specific need. 3.37 Ms Morris was able to use her ID badge to obtain a Blue Light Card (a well-known public sector scheme) giving her access to various discounts, for example in hotels, or airport parking or leisure activities. 3.38 The RPAs are not given and do not sign a formal written contract or written agreement. No form of wage or retainer is paid. I have dealt with subsistence and travel expenses above which are the only monetary elements paid to RPAs. Those that fall within the Respondent’s Police Support Volunteers category are allocated a volunteer number which has a V prefix to it to distinguish them from employees on the Force systems. 3.39 There is an Extended Policing Family Policy which says that Special Officers, Police Support Volunteers and Police Cadets are valued members of the extended policing family who not only provide additional resources to the Force, but also provide a vital link between the police and the community, providing opportunities for individuals to make a positive contribution to their local area. There is a booklet about Police Support Volunteers starting at [525]. It talks about Police Support Volunteers being people who choose to spend their free time helping “us to help others” and “they all give up their precious spare time free of charge for the good of the local community.” There is a section called “Why be a Police Support Volunteer” which talks about benefits including the satisfaction of helping the community, developing new skills, working as part of a close knit team and making friends, getting a unique insight in to policing and that: “It’s a two-way relationship – North Wales Police benefit as much from you volunteering as you do. We value the time and experience you give us and in return we will offer you opportunities that are unique and help you develop on a personal and professional level too.” 3.40 There is a question headed “What hours do Police Support Volunteers do?” which says: “All our PSV roles are flexible and that includes duty time. We know volunteering needs to fit around day-to-day commitments. A few hours a week or indeed as many as you wish to offer, will all be welcomed at North Wales Police.” 3.41 The policy also says academic qualifications are not necessary, but “it is essential you are honest, have integrity and possess basic numeracy and literacy skills. You will also have a positive and friendly approach towards the public, an ability to work in a team, together with a willingness to learn news skills.” There are nationality requirements and a candidate must have resided in the UK for 3 continuous years immediately prior to the application [539]. 3.42 There is a section headed “Positive Action” under the Equality Act [535]. There is information about Staff Support Networks [536]. There is a section about the Welsh Language which says they ask all new entrants to demonstrate basic spoken Welsh skills for posts prior to an offer of appointment being made [538], at Level 1. This is described as basic skills in the Welsh language and will be tested in an informal manner with a sympathetic Welsh speaker. 3.43 The policy sets out the application process, made up of application forms, short listing, interview, and then a conditional offer. Thereafter there are personal and previous employment references, background enquiries, medical health questionnaire and vetting [529]. After that there is a Welsh language assessment and then current references before an offer of appointment. 3.44 There is a section in the booklet about vetting [540]. It states that RPAs fall into Level 1. There are checks on criminal convictions for the applicant and close family members. There are financial and credit checks. 3.45 There are restrictions on certain types of tattoos (for example swear words) [541]. 3.46 There is a section on training, explaining there is an initial induction including Dutysheet training, the website ultilised by volunteers to record their duties and submit their mileage and subsistence claims. There is also a Health and Safety checklist to complete. The booklet explains there are also modules allocated on an individual basis via the College Learn platform such as lone working, office safety, manual handling and Anti-Terrorism. 3.47 The policy booklet said the Respondent is a “Disability Confident Employer” and sets out 5 commitments that includes for example interviewing all disabled applications who meet the minimum criteria for a job vacancy, and to have discussions with disabled employees at least once a year [542]. There is also a section headed “Disability (Equality Act)” which talks about the requirement to make reasonable adjustments for a disabled person who applies for a job, is offered employment, or is an employee. It talks about, for special constables, they would still need to be able to fill an operational role, for example to chase after and arrest a suspect. 3.48 The Respondent’s insurance document describes employees as including voluntary workers [558]. 3.49 There is a job description and person specification for Role Play Actor (also described as Role Play /Acting Volunteer) starting at [662]. It describes the activities/tasks of the role as supporting the training by performing role plays and offering feedback on situations following the role play. It also refers to attending at Special Constabulary or Police Officer Development Days and other force wide training events where required. The role specific skills are described as “Volunteer as part of a team; Excellent communication and interpersonal skills, Demonstrate confidence to act in any given scenario.” There is a section head “other” that refers to undertaking an induction; undertaking Dutysheet training and update the DutySheet system with volunteer hours and activities; understand and comply with policies, both in service delivery and the treatment of others; to ensure the confidentiality of information whether computer based or otherwise in compliance with legislation, especially Data Protection Act 1998; learn more about force priorities, values and mission statement, therefore supporting the force in its journey to be the safest place to live, work and visit in the UK. It again refers to the Welsh language and vetting requirements and also refers to positive action initiatives in the recruitment process. There are sections about how the RPA can benefit from the role and also how the organisation can benefit. There is a section headed “Preferred commitment” which says: “Ad hoc basis, usually between 1 and 3 times per month.” 3.50 Mr Owen said that while the job description uses the word “required” in relation to attending training, that there was in fact no obligation to attend training. He gave the example of an activity the following week where all volunteers had been invited and Ms Morris had declined and he said that was ok because there was no obligation or requirement to attend. I accept that was the practical reality, although clearly the job description says what it says. 3.51 There is a document at [661] which refers to benefits of joining team NWP as including access to on-site gyms and fitness classes; paid membership to the Police Federation; Discounts from retailers via the Blue Light Scheme; Support from Health and Wellbeing Centre including Welfare Officers, counselling, physiotherapy and mental health peer supporters; sports and social clubs; savings and insurance offers; opportunities to gain paid employment. Mr Owen said this document refers to Special Constables and I agree that it is doing so because it refers to Special Constables (and not any other kind of volunteer) at various places on the page. 4. Discussions and Conclusions4.1 I do not find that that the Claimant, in applying for the RPA role, was an applicant for employment under a contract personally to do work (i.e. a “worker”).4.2 I do not find that RPAs are employed (in the wider, worker sense) under a contract personally to do work. The difficulty is not with personal performance; clearly RPAs are recruited to personally perform the role. Nor is this a situation in which the Respondent would be a client or customer of a profession or business undertaking carried out by the RPA. But I do not find that there is employment under a contract to do work within the meaning of section 83(2). Any contract that exists is only in relation to the reimbursement of expenses if properly incurred and claimed, and not one whereby the RPA undertakes to perform work or services for the other party in return within the meaning of section 83(2). My core reasoning is as follows.4.3 In terms of the obligations or expectations placed on a RPA, the Claimant argues that there is a requirement to give some commitment to the Respondent, given that the email to the Claimant [614] says that: “actor opportunities are a way to volunteer and don’t require a huge commitment,” as opposed to saying there is “no commitment.” In my judgement, that is an overliteral interpretation of an email sent in the context of encouraging the Claimant to consider pursuing an application to be an RPA. It would be a very odd thing to say in that context, that you could in fact never undertake a single RPA duty. In my judgement, the reality of the situation is as set out in Mr Owen’s evidence; there is no obligation on an RPA to carry out any particular or minimum number of RPA duties.4.4 I appreciate that the focus can be on worker status on any particular occasion on which an RPA actually does perform duty. But when they do, I do not find they are doing so under any contractual or legally enforceable obligation to do so. The Claimant argues that an RPA is under a requirement to continue with their duties once they have agreed to start a duty. It is said this is the clear inference from the evidence given that if an RPA were to leave an ongoing session they would be dismissed. I do not agree. An RPA is, in my judgement, free to leave a duty part way through if they wish to do so, even giving no reason for doing so if they do not wish to, with no consequences (although experience shows the eventuality is practically speaking an unlikely one), as set out in the evidence of Mr Owen. The reality of the situation, in my judgement, is that the Respondent would not be in a position to sue an RPA who left part way through, for no good reason, for breach of contract. That the Respondent might ultimately terminate the relationship at the 3 year mark if there were no RPA duties undertaken, and/or after this hypothetical, wholly unrealistic scenario of a sustained period of an RPA walking out of duties giving no good reason and not responding to welfare checks (and the individual did not mutually agree the relationship was best at an end), does not in my judgement substantially alter the position. It is always possible in a true “volunteer” situation for one party to ultimately terminate the relationship. For example, a CAB could terminate a relationship with a CAB volunteer, or to use examples from the Claimant’s own volunteering experiences, a caving rescue organisation could terminate their relationship with a volunteer, or a scout group with a scout leader volunteer (or vice versa), without necessarily meaning there was a contractual obligation in place to see through a particular duty/volunteering session on a particular day, once started. It really is nowhere near to the kind of exercise of power that was actually in play, for example, in Uber.4.5 The Claimant also argues that there are considerable duties owed by a RPA to the Respondent including: to comply with policies in service delivery and the treatment of others; to undertake Dutysheet training and accept duties and then update the Dutysheet system with volunteer hours and activities (start time and finish time); to “learn more about force priorities, values and mission statement, therefore supporting the force in its journey to be the safest place to live, work and visit in the UK” (taken from the job description); to undergo annual psychological screening; to maintain Welsh language aptitude; to report fellow members of the force for breaches of social medical policy [216], to accept the vetting of their own social media when applying for the role, and that it ongoing social medica use “must remain professional and not bring policing into disrepute” [216]. The Claimant further argues that the Respondent requires adherence to various legislation, rules and regulations that are typical of an employment/worker type relationship including nationality/right to work restrictions, eligibility restrictions relating to criminal convictions, restrictions on certain types of tattoos, a requirement for RPAs to adhere to Equality Act principles, and also a reference to failure to adhere to internal rules and regulations will result in “dismissal” [619]. It is also said that a RPA is required, at least when on duty to provide benefits to the Respondent, being to work for each duty from time to time and “to act within a training environment undertaking a specific-scenario based role play” (a quote from the job description). It is said an RPA when on duty is required to perform that duty in accordance with the responsibilities set out. It is further said that an RPA is required to attend at Special Constabulary or Police Officer Development Days and other force wide training events where required (taken from the job description). It is said there is an obligation to “maintain and support the highest ethical and professional standards” and “act with the utmost integrity” [83]. There is a requirement to pass vetting NPPV level one every three years. There are obligations to meet financial status eligibility requirements through various credit checks. The Claimant argues the duties owed by an RPA are extensive and go far beyond many “volunteer” scenarios, and are combined with a high degree of control.4.6 I do not find that there is a duty or requirement on RPAs to attend annual psychological screening; it is simply a confidential welfare option made available to RPAs should they choose to do so. I accept there are expectations on RPAs to complete Dutysheets and I accept to attend the training to allow them to complete those Dutysheets (and indeed it is in their interest to do so, so that they can reclaim their expenses). It is an essential part of how the relationship functions on a practical level. I have addressed above that I do not accept there is an obligation to work for each duty from time to time. But I do accept (as does the Respondent) that when an RPA does attend and fulfills a duty there is an expectation they will undertake the specific scenario-based role play that they are given and follow directions in that regard; that is the whole point of the role.4.7 I accept there are basic Welsh language requirements for the role, the source of which is a Welsh language statutory requirement. There are eligibility requirements relating to the right to work/nationality, criminal convictions, financial checks, tattoo restrictions, social media scrutiny and three yearly vetting requirements (where much of this is again repeated) borne of the fact that this a role with a police force. I would add that there will be many other traditional “volunteering” roles which will have some similar requirements; for example, when the role involves engaging with children or other vulnerable individuals there will be safeguarding requirements. So, the requirements are not necessarily indicative of worker status. There are stated obligations on RPAs to adhere to Equality Act principles, to challenge and/or report social media content that is seen to be inconsistent with standards of professional behaviour and the ongoing requirements in respect of an RPA’s own social media output. Although I accept the Respondent’s point that this is again linked to the nature of the Respondent as a police force, and it being a large organisation with largescale management and HR structures in place. Again, there will be other traditional “volunteering” roles that may have some similar expectations, for example within a CAB advisor setting. So again, it is not necessarily indicative of worker status, albeit of course each case is ultimately assessed on its own facts.4.8 The job description does speak of a “requirement” to attend training events. But I ultimately except Mr Owen’s evidence that whilst RPAs will be encouraged to attend what is seen as important training (such as ethics training) there is ultimately no obligation on an RPA to attend, and RPAs have not attended training previously with no consequences being faced.4.9 In terms of expectations or obligations on the part of the Respondent, I find that the Respondent is not under an obligation to offer RPA duties. I appreciate the practical reality is that RPAs might expect that there would be some RPA duties offered; otherwise, why even bother with recruiting them. But there is in my judgement no obligation to actually offer a minimum amount. There would be no legally enforceable right for an RPA to insist on some minimum provision. In my judgement, (although again in reality unlikely), if an RPA turned up for duty but in fact there was no duty to be done, there would be no obligation on the Respondent to provide some RPA duties on the particular day.4.10 Again, I appreciate that the focus can be on worker status on any particular occasion on which it turns out an RPA actually does perform duty. But in my judgement crucially there is then no obligation on the Respondent to pay a wage/ remuneration. The extent of the obligation is to reimburse out of pocket expenses of fuel and food and drink subsistence (if the expense claim is within limits and backed by any required receipt).4.11 The Claimant’s counsel accepted that there needs to be adequate consideration and that pure reimbursement of true out of pocket expenses would not be sufficient to be consideration in a worker status contract. However, it is argued there is adequate consideration made of multiple factors, namely: the subsistence allowance described by the Claimant as being dependent on time work and undefined; access to a firearms course; access to a mindfulness course; clothing that is not required for the role; a blue light card; and alleged additional benefits such as access to the gym, fitness classes, membership of the Police Federation and other offers.4.12 I do not consider the access to the firearms course as being of any particular relevance, because it was a type of RPA duty that was being offered. That the Claimant would personally have derived enjoyment from it because of her own personal interests is neither here nor there; it may well be the case that any particular RPA duty would appeal more to one individual than another depending on personal interests. The range of benefits cited at [661] such as gym access and Police Federation access is also not relevant because these are special constable benefits not RPA benefits. The Claimant relies on provision of clothing not required for the role such as police T-shirts. These are provided. However, this is on an ad hoc and as needed basis, for example to support attendance at a carol concert. It is not in my judgement anywhere near being valuable consideration as part of a wage/work bargain for the performance of RPA duties on a particular occasion. The blue light card is provided by a third party not the Respondent, albeit the Respondent’s ID card or the like would be required to successfully access the scheme. It is a third party discount scheme widely known and available across the public service sector (for example it includes the NHS). I do not consider that facilitating access to the scheme or indeed even encouragement to apply to it comes anywhere near to being sufficient consideration for a wage/work bargain. Access to the mindfulness course is also relied upon to which the Claimant equates to an open market value of £175 [71/72], with the point being made it is not essential training for the RPA role. It was a course that was already being run, offered out for the benefit of the RPAs and other volunteers as a general well-being initiative. There was no obligation to provide it or to attend. Again, I do not consider it comes anywhere close to being part of consideration for a wage/work bargain, rather than being the offer of a wellbeing initiative. How would you even know that doing an RPA duty on a particular day would give you the opportunity to access such a course?4.13 The Claimant also relies on the subsistence provision, arguing there is a lack of clarity in its definition, and given it is dependent on the time “worked”, meaning that it could amount to valuable consideration. I do not agree. The policy links it to food and drink (by reference to the length of the period of duty) backed by a receipt and within the set limits. It is perfectly standard for expense systems to vary according to the length of a session, given obviously people need to eat and drink more the longer they are engaged within a 24 hour period. Mr Owen explained to claim it, it had to be linked to a performed duty on the system. Ms Morgan explained she would not claim, if in fact food and drink was provided because there was no need to. The practical reality of the situation is that everyone knows what the subsistence payments are for and they operate within the parameters of the provision; – claiming food and drink within permitted limits, backed by a receipt, unless it happens that the Force provided food and drink directly. It is not a system in reality where RPAs were able to or did profit from the provision. It is not remuneration.4.14 Likewise, the mileage rate is set within standard HMRC rates, which Ms Morgan recognised in her evidence included an element towards insurance and general wear and tear. Again, I do not consider there is any remuneration element. The Claimant refers to the fact that after 10,000 miles an RPA could profit if they continued to claim the 45p rate. In fact, one part of the policy states that the mileage rate would then drop in line with HMRC approved rates. But in any event, it is wholly unrealistic that the eventuality would ever occur. These things are simply provision of out-of-pocket expenses and are not remuneration or valuable consideration that forms part of a wage/work bargain.4.15 Looking at all of the Claimant’s arguments about consideration across the board, I also remain of the view, when looking at it from a global perspective, there is no obligation to pay remuneration or valuable consideration by the Respondent to a RPA for a duty that is performed. The Claimant also relies on the fact the Respondent describes the arrangement between the force and RPA as a “two way relationship”, in which “North Wales Police benefit as much from you volunteering as you do. We value the time and experience you give us and in return we will offer you opportunities that are unique.” It is said a relationship of obligation is shown by valuable consideration because why else would the consideration be available, and it is how the Respondent gives value to RPAs and their services. I do not consider, however, that this materially affects the situation. An organisation will always benefit from, and value, a volunteer’s services. It Is then simply a statement that the RPA role gives access to unique RPA experiences; which it does. That the Respondent on any particular occasion provides RPA duty to an RPA, that an RPA then performs, cannot of itself be valuable consideration or the formation of a wage/work bargain.4.16 The Claimant argues that the Respondent owes other duties to a RPA that include various references to the Equality Act (such as the provision of reasonable adjustments, a commitment to not treating job applicants less favourably on the grounds of protected characteristics, an Equal Opportunities statement, and positive action initiatives). It is argued that the documents are written in a way that seems to accept an RPA will be protected by the Equality Act and that protection will extend to the jurisdiction of the employment tribunal if the Equality Act is breached. There is terminology also used such as “job description” and also a referral to “dismissal”. The Claimant points to the fact that there is a lengthy, detailed application form and application process akin to a worker or employee situation, and the restrictions placed on RPA and RPA applications as discussed already above. The Claimant also argues that there is sufficient control exercised by the Respondent over an RPA.4.17 I take the point about that and the terminology that is used at times. Albeit by way of balance, at other times the language of volunteering is also clearly used. Looking at the whole context, I do not think it can realistically be said that either the Claimant or Ms Morgan or indeed any other RPA is likely to have taken up the role thinking anything other than they were ad hoc volunteering, and with no expectation of a wage or remuneration. It is not a relationship dynamic where there is a risk of the abuse of vulnerable putative workers. It is also notable, particularly in the context of what the Claimant refers to about the manner of the engagement process, that whatever the sophistication of the application and vetting processes, there is no written agreement between RPAs and the Respondent. That position will significantly differ from those in the Respondent’s employ that the Respondent recognises as workers or employees (or the detailed statutory terms and conditions of service that police officers have).4.18 In my judgement, the fundamental difficulty with the Claimant’s case is the absence of remuneration / sufficient consideration by the Respondent to the RPA and therefore the non-formation of the essential wage-work bargain between Respondent as putative employer and the RPA as putative worker. That by itself means that the Claimant cannot succeed in establishing worker status even when an RPA performs RPA duty on any particular occasion.4.19 I would accept (as indeed the Respondent did in closing submissions) that once an RPA has provided a voluntary duty there is likely to be a contract for the reimbursement of expenses properly incurred in the performance of duty, such that if not paid by the Respondent a RPA would have a legally enforceable right to claim the sums incurred and not reimbursed. But that is not, as stated, a wage-work bargain that makes this a contract personally to perform work. This limited contract does not lie in the worker/employment field. Indeed, as I have already said, the Claimant’s counsel accepted in closing submissions that mere reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses would not be sufficient.4.20 In the language of Allonby whilst RPAs may be performing services for and under the direction of another person, it is not in return for remuneration. In the language of Match Officials the RPAs may be providing personal service but it is not in return for payment by the employer. There is no wage-work bargain or mutuality of obligation in that sense. In Groom, again a cornerstone of the success of the CROs lay in the fact that when CRO attended for an activity he had the right to claim remuneration / there was the existence of a wage-work bargain which in my judgement does not apply here. This case is not one in which there is an agreement an RPA, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, they will provide their own work and skill in the performance of service for the Respondent. Instead, the RPAs provide gratuitous services. As it was put in Groom, the absence of payment is a striking indicator that the RPAs are pure volunteers and not workers, and the fact that they provide their services voluntarily and without payment supports the conclusion that they are consequently entitled to withhold their services with impunity.4.21 Viewed objectively, the Respondent and an RPA do not intend to create legal relations in a contractual relationship in which there is valuable consideration by way of remuneration flowing from the Respondent to the RPA for the personal performance of work. The Respondent and an RPA do not intend to create “employment” under a contract to personally perform work in the requisite sense. The common intention is that an RPA will act as a volunteer. The employment tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the substance of the Claimant’s claim and therefore the claim is dismissed. Approved by: