Miss Z Ndagire v North East London NHS Foundation Trust: 6016267/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6016267/2025

Between

Miss Z NdagireClaimant

North East London NHS Foundation TrustRespondent

Date 13 April 2026

JUDGMENT

FOLLOWING RECONSIDERATION The claimant’s application dated 18 December 2025 for reconsideration of the judgment success.

REASONS

[1]By a Reserved Judgment sent to the parties on 17 December 2025 I dismissed the claimant’s complaints of detriment on grounds of having made a protected disclosure on grounds that they had not been brought within the applicable time limit and that it had been reasonably practicable to do so. I also dismissed the complaints of pregnancy discrimination and victimisation on the grounds they had been brought out of time, and it was not just and equitable to extend time. A complaint of “ordinary” constructive dismissal was dismissed on withdrawal.

[2]Within these reasons, references to the “Judgment” are to the Reserved Judgment sent to the parties on 17 December 2025, unless I say otherwise.

[3]The claimant made her application for reconsideration on 18 December 2025. I apologise for the length of time that it has taken for the parties to receive a decision on the application. Unfortunately, the application was not passed to me to deal with until 26 March 2026. I can see from the application that the claimant had also copied the Tribunal into an email that she sent to the respondent on 8 November 2025, and that she sent an email to the Tribunal on 18 November 2025 (copied to the respondent) “to provide an update in relation to my case”. The November 2025 emails did not say that they were making an application, and they were not passed to me at that time.

[4]The key passage of the claimant’s application for reconsideration is as follows: “The Tribunal’s judgment proceeds on the basis that the last relevant act for limitation and victimisation purposes occurred no later than April/May 2025. However, a disciplinary outcome letter dated 17 September 2025 existed prior to the Preliminary Hearing. This letter: arose from the same disciplinary process, was not sent to me at the time, was not disclosed in the Respondent’s Tribunal bundle, and was relied upon by the respondent in correspondence with the Nursing and Midwifery Council. This outcome letter is not mentioned or addressed in the Tribunal’s Reasons. Its existence and use are material to the Tribunal’s analysis of time limits, continuing detriment, and victimisation. I respectfully request that the Tribunal reviews the judgment to clarify whether this evidence was considered and, if not, whether its consideration affects the conclusions reached.” Law: Reconsideration

[5]Rule 68 (1) of the Employment Tribunals Procedure Rules 2024 allows a tribunal to reconsider any judgment where it is “necessary in the interests of justice to do so.” A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked, and if a judgment under consideration is revoked, the tribunal may take the decision again (rule 68 (2)).

[6]A tribunal dealing with an application for reconsideration must seek to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases “fairly and justly” (rule 3). This includes: ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues; avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues; and saving expense.

[7]Whilst the wording in rule 68 confers a broad discretion, the discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation (Outasight VB Ltd v Brown

UKEAT/0253/14

, paragraph 33). This was also a point made clear by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v Burton and another

[2016] EWCA Civ 714

[8]Where an application for reconsideration is based upon new evidence, the principles to be applied are set out in Ladd v Marshall

[1954] 1 WLR 1489

. This means that in most cases, in order to justify the reception of fresh evidence, it is necessary to show:8.1 That the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing;

8.2 That the evidence is relevant and would probably have had an important influence on the hearing; and

8.3 That the evidence is apparently credible.

[9]There are occasions where the interests of justice might permit evidence to be adduced where the requirements of Ladd v Marshall are not strictly met, and some examples of where this might be the case were discussed at paragraph 50 of the decision in Outasight.

[10]Rule 70 sets out the process that must be followed when any application is made under rule 69. Rule 70 provides: “(1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application.”

[11]The procedure for reconsideration is prescriptive. The mandatory stages are summarised at paragraph 22 of the decision of His Honour Judge Tayler in Tesco Stores Ltd v Element & ors

[2026] EAT 33

Discussion and Conclusions

[12]The application dated 18 December 2025 is clearly an application for reconsideration. It was submitted within one day of the Judgment being can be said that there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked (described as ‘stage 6’ in Tesco Stores Ltd v Element & ors). If I consider there is no reasonable prospect, I must dismiss the application (‘stage 7’). If I do not conclude that there is no reasonable prospect, then I must issue what HHJ Taylor described in Tesco v Elements & ors as a “permission to proceed” decision (described as ‘stage 8’).

[13]I did not consider the disciplinary outcome letter dated 17 September 2025 when reaching my decision set out in the Judgment. This is because I was not referred to it by either party, and the claimant’s own application says that it was not in the respondent’s bundle, and that she did not at that time have a copy (so it was not in her bundle). However, in deciding whether there is “no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked” (the ‘stage 6’ decision), I have I have carefully re-read my Judgment, the claimant’s application for reconsideration and the documents (including the disciplinary outcome letter) attached to the claimant’s application.

[14]The claimant’s reconsideration application suggests that the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the last relevant act occurred “no later than April / May 2025”. In fact, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the relevant last act(s) complained of in the claim form were some time before this, specifically:14.1 The last alleged protected disclosure detriment was on 2 May 2024 (Judgment paragraph 43; see also Annex A paragraph 21).

14.2 The last alleged unfavourable treatment relied upon in the pregnancy discrimination claim was 22 August 2023 (Judgment paragraph 54; see also Annex A paragraph 10).

14.3 The last alleged detriment relied upon in the victimisation claim was 2 May 2024 (Judgment paragraph 54; see also Annex A paragraph 14).

[15]In this case, early conciliation started on 29 April 2025 and a certificate was issued on 30 April 2025. The claim form was presented on 5 May 2025.

[16]The application for reconsideration says that the disciplinary outcome letter’s “existence and use are material to the Tribunal’s analysis of time limits, continuing detriment and victimisation.”

[17]I have considered whether the disciplinary outcome letter dated 17 September 2025 means that I was wrong to identify the last relevant acts for the purposes of the claim before the Tribunal as being those identified at paragraph 14 (above).

[18]A Tribunal can only consider and rule on the act, or acts, of which complaint is made to it (Chapman & another v Simon

[1994] IRLR 124

, paragraph 33). This means that, unless a successful application to amend has been made, a Tribunal can only consider and rule on the act or acts of which complaint has been made in the claim form. In this case, that means the claim form presented on 5 May 2025.

[19]At the start of the preliminary hearing on 6 October 2025, I identified with the parties what complaints had been brought in the claim form, and what the issues were (Judgment paragraphs 5 to 7). The claim form did not include any complaint that the respondent’s application of its own disciplinary process was detriment on grounds of having made a protected disclosure, pregnancy discrimination or victimisation. The claimant did not apply to amend her claim at the preliminary hearing to add any complaint(s) that the respondent’s own disciplinary process had been detriment, discrimination or victimisation. The parties’ list of issues did not suggest that the respondent’s own disciplinary process was alleged to be a detriment on grounds of having made a protected disclosure, pregnancy discrimination or victimisation.

[20]Subject to the application to amend that was made by the claimant at the preliminary hearing, the complaints and issues were identified at the start of the preliminary hearing were agreed as being those set out in the parties’ list of issues (see Judgment paragraph 5 and Annex A). One amendment was made to the parties’ list of issues at the start of the hearing by agreement. That was shown in green at Annex A to the Judgment.

[21]The claimant made an application to amend her claim in two other respects, but having considered the representations of both parties I refused those two applications to amend for the reasons set out in the Case Management Order sent to the parties (Judgment, paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and Annex A).

[22]In those circumstances, I have concluded that there is no reasonable prospect of me concluding that I was wrong to identify the last act(s) relevant to the complaints brought in the claim form as being those identified at paragraphs 43 and 54 of the Judgment (see paragraph 14, above). There is no reasonable prospect of me varying or revoking my Judgment on that basis.

[23]The claimant did rely on the respondent’s internal processes (including her suggestion that she had been awaiting internal resolution) as a reason why she had not presented her claim until 5 May 2025. I did take the claimant’s explanation into account when reaching my decision (see paragraphs 48- 49, 59, 63, 69 and 74 of the Judgment). The existence of a disciplinary outcome decision letter dated more than four months after the claim was brought could not explain why the claim (about the complaints brought in the claim form and identified in the list of issues) was brought on 5 May 2025 but not before. In those circumstances, I have concluded that there is no reasonable prospect of me varying or revoking my Judgment that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have brought her protected disclosure detriment claim in time, and / or that it was not just and equitable for me to extend time for the claimant to bring the complaints of pregnancy discrimination or victimisation that she had brought in the claim form presented on 5 May 2025.

[24]As I have concluded that there is no reasonable prospect of me varying or revoking my decision, the application for reconsideration is dismissed in accordance with rule 70 (2). Approved by: