Ms M Ramage v Perduco Law Ltd and Lawyer UP Group (UK) LLP: 6013654/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6013654/2024
Between
Ms M RamageClaimant(1) Perduco Law Limited (2) Lawyer UP Group (UK) LLP RECORD OF A PRELIMINARY HEARINGRespondent
Before
Employment Judge JoffeMr Evans (instructed by lay representative) for claimantDate 1 January 2026
JUDGMENT
The first respondent’s response is struck out under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1)(b) because the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious, alternatively under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1)(c) because the first respondent has not complied with Tribunal orders.
REASONS
[1]This matter came before me to consider: - The claimant’s application to strike out the first respondent’s response on the basis of failure to comply with orders and/or unreasonable conduct of the proceedings; - Whether to accept the second respondent’s response. Findings
The hearing
[2]I had a bundle running to 311 pages provided by the claimant and also written submissions. The respondents had provided written submissions and witness statements. I heard submissions from both parties and gave an oral judgment and reasons. The claimant subsequently requested written reasons. Law Rule 38(1)(b)
Law
[3]This subrule provides that a claim or response (or part) may be struck out if ‘the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent… has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious’.[4]In order to strike out for unreasonable conduct, the tribunal must be satisfied either that the conduct involved deliberate and persistent disregard of required procedural steps or that it has made a fair trial impossible; in either case, striking out must be a proportionate response — Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James 2006 IRLR 630, CA: The first object of any system of justice is to get triable cases tried. There can be no doubt that among the allegations made by Mr James are things which, if true ,merit concern and adjudication. There can be no doubt, either, that Mr James has been difficult, querulous and uncooperative in many respects. Some of this may be attributable to the heavy artillery that has been deployed against him – though I hope that for the future he will be able to show the moderation and respect for others which he displayed in his oral submissions to this court. But the courts and tribunals of this country are open to the difficult as well as to the compliant, so long as they do not conduct their case unreasonably. It will be for the new tribunal to decide whether that has happened here.[5]In considering whether a claim should be struck out on the grounds of scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct, a tribunal must generally consider whether a fair trial is still possible: De Keyser Ltd v Wilson [ 2001] IRLR 324, EAT. Conduct such as deliberate flouting of a tribunal order, can lead directly to the question of a striking-out order, however in ordinary circumstances, neither a claim nor a defence can be struck out on the basis of a party’s conduct unless a conclusion is reached that a fair trial is no longer possible.[6]In Bolch v Chipman 2004 IRLR 140, the EAT set out the steps that a tribunal must ordinarily take when determining whether to make a strike-out order: - before making a striking-out order under what is now rule 37(1)(b), an employment judge must find that a party or his or her representative has behaved scandalously, unreasonably or vexatiously when conducting the proceedings; - once such a finding has been made, he or she must consider, in accordance with De Keyser Ltd v Wilson whether a fair trial is still possible, as, save in exceptional circumstances, a striking-out order is not regarded simply as a punishment. If a fair trial is still possible, the case should be permitted to proceed; - even if a fair trial is unachievable, the tribunal will need to consider the appropriate remedy in the circumstances. It may be appropriate to impose a lesser penalty, for example, by making a costs or preparation order against the party concerned rather than striking out his or her claim or response.[7]In Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd and ors [2022] ICR 327, EAT, Choudhury P said: I do not accept Mr Kohanzad’s proposition that the power can only be triggered where a fair trial is rendered impossible in an absolute sense. That approach would not take account of all the factors that are relevant to a fair trial which the Court of Appeal in Arrow Nominees [2000] 2BCLC 167 set out. These include, as I have already mentioned, the undue expenditure of time and money; the demands of other litigants; and the finite resources of the court. These are factors which are consistent with taking into account the overriding objective. If Mr Kohanzadis proposition were correct, then these considerations would all be subordinated to the feasibility of conducting a trial whilst the memories of witnesses remain sufficiently intact to deal with the issues. In my judgment, the question of fairness in this context is not confined to that issue alone, albeit that it is an important one to take into account. It would almost always be possible to have a trial of the issues if enough time and resources are thrown at it and if scant regard were paid to the consequences of delay and costs for the other parties. However, it would clearly be inconsistent with the notion of fairness generally, and the overriding objective, if the fairness question had to be considered without regard to such matters. It was a highly relevant factor, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Blockbuster, that the strike-out application was being considered on the first day of the hearing. The parties were agreed that a fair trial was not possible in that hearing window. In other words, there were no options, such as giving the respondents more time within the trial window to produce its witness statements or prepare a bundle of documents, other than an adjournment. If adjournment would result in unacceptable prejudice (a conclusion that is not challenged by the respondents), then that leaves only the strike-out. The tribunal did not err in considering the prejudice to the respondents; indeed, it was bound to take that into account in reaching its decision. Rule 38(1)(c)[8]In deciding whether to strike out a party’s case for non-compliance with an order under rule 38(1)(c), I must have regard to the overriding objective set out in rule 2 of seeking to deal with cases fairly and justly. That requires me to consider all relevant factors, including: - the magnitude of the non-compliance - whether the default was the responsibility of the party or his or her representative - what disruption, unfairness or prejudice has been caused - whether a fair hearing would still be possible, and - whether striking out or some lesser remedy would be an appropriate response to the disobedience. Weir Valves and Controls (UK) Ltd v Armitage [2004] ICR 371, EAT. In that case the EAT found that a Tribunal had erred in striking out an employer’s response for failure to comply with an order for simultaneous exchange of witness statements. The employer had not in fact taken any unfair advantage, the claimant was not prejudiced and a fair trial was still possible , Even if there had been unfairness the Tribunal had power to exclude all or part of a witness statement if it was proportionate to do so.
Conclusions
[9]It is relevant to consider the history of this case. The claimant is a family law solicitor employed previously by the first respondent. She commenced money claims against the first respondent in a claim form dated 2 October 2024.[10]The claimant had resigned from her employment on 6 August 2024, giving contractual notice.[11]On 21 August 2024, the first respondent put the claimant on garden leave on the basis that the claimant had registered a company on 8 August 2024.[12]On or about 2 September 2024, the first respondent wrote to say the claimant’s employment was terminated.[13]The matter was initially set down for a short hearing on 28 November 2024, which was postponed until 29 May 2025. At that hearing Mr Peter Pearcy, of the first and second respondents, represented the first respondent himself although he had previously instructed Croner. Mr Pearcy is the founder and MD of both respondents and the two respondents share a COLPA and COFA.[14]Mrs Buchanan-Shill of Croner was present at that hearing and available to advise Mr Pearcy and shortly afterwards I am told she was again instructed to represent the first respondent.[15]That hearing was converted to a case management hearing for the reasons set out in Employment Judge Walker’s case management orders. The issues were too complex, a full merits hearing could not have taken place in the available hearing time and the case was not ready for trial.[16]The claimant applied to join the second respondent at that hearing as she considered that there had been transfer of the undertaking between the first and second respondents and she was concerned that the first respondent was being wound up.[17]Employment Judge Walker allowed that amendment and ordered that there should be a public preliminary hearing to decide the TUPE question. Unfortunately that hearing had to be converted to a hearing to hear the claimant’s strike out application in the events which then took place.[18]The second respondent was given leave to serve grounds of response by 19 June 2025. Ms Buchanan-Shill told me that she was not instructed by the second respondent at that point.[19]Employment Judge Walker also made orders for both general disclosure and specific disclosure.[20]The claimant had made a previous application in November 2024 setting out various documents which had been requested from the first respondent but not disclosed.[21]Orders were made for general disclosure by 19 June 2025 and specific disclosure by the same date of: 1 The claimant’s payslips for July, August and September 2023 2 The claimant’s P60 3 The claimant’s P45 4 Documentation to prove the payment of outstanding sums to Nest in relation to the claimant. This must show the monies having been paid and if there is not a statement from Nest showing the receipt of the monies and the fact that Nest has attributed them to the claimant, this should be respondents’ bank statements and any email or other correspondence with Nest. 5 Documentation to show the status of Lawyer Up Group (UK) LLP (formerly Perduco Law Group LLP) between its incorporation on 17 October 2023 and 2 September 2024, including:5.1 Application for and all ancillary correspondence regarding ABS status5.2 Application for and registration with HMRC as employer for PAYE5.3 Copies of all Employers Liability insurance certificates for the period5.4 Any agreement between Perduco Law Limited and Perduco Law Group LLP (whether formal or informal) to acquire any of its assets including staff, customers and equipment.[22]Mrs Buchanan-Shill told me that Mr Pearcy misunderstood the position as to whether the second respondent had been joined and hence did not comply with the direction about submitting a response or instruct Croner on the second respondent’s behalf at this point. This is difficult to understand given Croner’s involvement with the first respondent and Mrs Buchanan-Shill’s presence at the hearing. It is also difficult to square with the fact that on 19 June 2025 Mrs Buchanan-Shill wrote to the claimant asking: Can we agree to a short extension on disclosure and Grounds of Response please? Can we agree to Tuesday 24 June?[23]The claimant had asked earlier that day: Please kindly confirm whether you are representing the Respondents in this matter. In addition, could you please confirm whether 4:00 PM today is suitable for the mutual exchange of disclosure?[24]The claimant replied to Mrs Buchanan-Shill that she did not agree to an extension of time for the response and would be applying for strike out. She agreed to exchange documents as proposed by Mrs Buchanan-Shill.[25]On 24 June the claimant asked if the respondents were ready to exchange documents and received no reply.[26]On 25 June 2025, the claimant made her strike out application.[27]On 30 June 2025 Ms Buchanan-Shill wrote to the Tribunal: 1. Response to Specific Disclosure Order – Paragraph 5.1.1 The Respondents confirm that the documents referred to in paragraph 5.1.1 of the Case Management Order do not exist, for the following reasons: ·(a) Application for ABS status: No such application has ever been submitted. The Second Respondent does not hold ABS status and has never applied for it. ·(b) HMRC PAYE registration for the LLP: The Second Respondent has never registered as a UK PAYE employer. All staff were retained by the First Respondent, who operated payroll during the relevant period. ·(c) Employers’ liability insurance certificates: No such policy was taken out by the Second Respondent as it did not employ staff in the UK during the period in question. ·(d) Agreement between Perduco Law Ltd and Perduco Law Group LLP to transfer assets or staff: No such agreement, formal or informal, exists.[28]I note that the assertion about the second respondent’s ABS status is not correct. The second respondent’s ABS status is a matter of public record which Croner could have checked at any time.[29]Furthermore a screenshot from the SRA website confirming the position was provided as part of the first respondent’s disclosure for the May 2025 hearing.[30]The assertion about the second respondent’s ABS status was repeated in a written submission submitted by Mrs Buchanan-Shill for this hearing.[31]I am now told that the respondents accept that the previous assertion is incorrect and there is an application form for ABS status but that the respondents propose to disclose it in redacted form.[32]There has been no application to vary EJ Walker’s case management orders.[33]On 21 July 2025, Mrs Buchanan-Shill wrote to the Tribunal: The Respondent wishes to raise with the tribunal at this point, concerns regarding the provisions of disclosing sensitive commercial information. While the Respondent understands the importance of sharing information for the benefit of the case, they are not comfortable or prepared to disclose such information to the Claimant. They are more the prepared to disclose anything commercially sensitive to the judge and panel members.[34]She did not apply to vary EJ Walker’s order or say which documents these concerns were raised in respect of.[35]She also said this: The Respondent wishes to also notify the Tribunal that the Claimant is confused concerning her association with the proposed Second Respondent (who are not formally part of these proceedings) Lawyer Up (UK) LLP. The Respondent wishes to reiterate that the latter has no connection or involvement with the Claimant in this case, and as such has not been transferred under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE).[36]It was incorrect to say that the second respondent was not formally part of the proceedings. The second respondent had been joined at the 29 May 2025 hearing which Mrs Buchanan-Shill attended and she had previously asked for more time to enter a response for the second respondent.[37]On 25 July 2025, the date she told me she was formally instructed represent the second respondent, Mrs Buchanan-Shill wrote to the Tribunal: We represent the Second Respondent in the above claim and write with an application requesting the Tribunal accept the Respondent’s amended response to the claim (a draft of which is enclosed). The Second Respondent is a lay person, and the additional information added into the ET3 response now provides more detail for the benefit of the Tribunal and the Claimant. It is submitted it would be in the interests of justice that this updated version of the response be accepted, as this will help the Tribunal and the Claimant understand the Respondent’s response to the claims. The Claimant wishes to join the Second Respondent to the proceedings, and in light of this it is sensible and in the interests of justice that the Second Respondent have the opportunity to defend the claim. It was the understanding of the Second Respondent that they were not formally party to the proceedings and the hearing scheduled to take place on 29 August 2025 would be dealing with this. The Second Respondent now realises that they should file a response. They should not be penalised for this misunderstanding and humbly requests that the Tribunal allow their response.[38]The alleged misunderstanding is inexplicable in circumstances where the case management orders were clear, the second respondent had access to advice from Mrs Buchanan-Shill and was not a lay person but a law firm.[39]Furthermore the claimant had written to the respondents copying in Mrs Buchanan-Shill on 17 June 2025 saying: I refer you to Judge Walkers Order dated 29 May 2025, whereby Lawyer Up Group (Uk)LLP has been cited as a Respondent and to Paragraph 4 whereby it states: ''The claimant’s application to join Lawyer Up Group (UK) limited (formerly Perduco Law Group LLP) was granted and that party is now the second respondent".[40]In a brief response, the second respondent denied that there was a transfer of undertaking and denied that it had ever employed the claimant.[41]The day before this hearing, Mrs Buchanan-Shill provided the payslips and P60 ordered. She was not able to tell me why the first respondent had not previously disclosed these documents.[42]The claimant raised issues with the July 2024 payslip, which does not marry up with information provided to HMRC or the amount received by the claimant.[43]The claimant made the point that there was insufficient time to investigate the discrepancies and the authenticity of the payslips prior to the full merits hearing due to start on 15 September 2025.[44]No documents were provided about payments to NEST despite the first respondent having said that payments were made. The first respondent said no documents exist. Conclusions on strike out of the first respondent[45]The situation is that the first respondent has failed to comply with Tribunal orders in respect of disclosure. The reasons for that failure have not been explained adequately or at all given the history which I have described.[46]The first respondent is a law firm and it has instructed a firm of employment consultants. It is not a litigant in person. In respect of documents relating to the ABS application for the second respondent, the instructions given to Croner and repeated on a number of occasions were demonstrably untrue. Mr Pearcy appears to be the controlling mind of both entities and the failure to deal honestly with the Tribunal infects the dealings of both respondents.[47]The conduct of proceedings, including the attempts to mislead the Tribunal and the very late disclosure of documents which must have been readily available to the first respondent easily meets the threshold for unreasonable conduct.[48]It is clear that a fair trial cannot happen in the existing trial window, given the fact that there has still not been full disclosure, important documents such as the ABS application have yet to be provided and considered, and the claimant has only recently seen and challenges the payslips now provided.[49]I further conclude a fair trial is not possible at all, given the dishonesty about the position of the second respondent which affects documents due from both respondents and of course instructions given by Mr Pearcy, who is responsible for both respondents. I cannot in the circumstances have any confidence in what the respondents have said about the existence of other documents.[50]If there is no fair disclosure process, there cannot be a fair trial of the issues at any time. I do not consider that there is a lesser sanction which would allow a fair trial to occur and I concluded that this was an appropriate case in which to exercise the discretion to strike out and accordingly struck out the first respondent’s response in its entirety.
Conclusions
[1]The second respondent’s applications to strike out the claimant’s claim against it, or for deposit orders, are dismissed.[2]The claimant’s application to strike out the second respondent’s response is dismissed.[3]I gave my decision at the hearing to dismiss the second respondent’s strike-out application, and was asked to provide written reasons. I reserved my decision on the claimant’s strike-out application.
Background
[1]Unless stated otherwise, page references in these orders are to the claimant’s 1077-page bundle.[2]The claimant initially brought proceedings against Perduco Law Limited. There was a case management hearing on 29 May 2025. EJ Walker’s case management order is contained at page 252 of the claimant’s 1077-page bundle (“EJ Walker CMO”).[3]EJ walker:a. Granted the claimant’s application to join the second respondent (para 4 of EJ Walker CMO).b. Listed an OPH on 29 August 2025 to decide whether there was a TUPE transfer from Perduco Law Limited to the second respondent.c. Listed the final hearing to take place in person with a full panel, for 4 days (15-18 September 2025).d. Gave orders for disclosure, and set out a case summary with a list of issues.e. Made an order for specific disclosure (Schedule 2 of EJ Walker CMO, page 264 of bundle).[4]There was a preliminary hearing before EJ Joffe on 3 September 2025. EJ Joffe’s case management orders are at page 349 onwards of the bundle. EJ Joffe’s judgment is at page 347, and the written reasons are at page 353 onwards of the bundle. EJ Joffe ordered that neither respondent would be permitted to participate in the full merits hearing (para 5.2, page 350). EJ Joffe stated the following:a. The hearing to decide the TUPE question (as ordered by EJ Walker) was converted to a hearing to decide the claimant’s strike-out application. (Para 17, page 357 of the bundle).b. The response of the first respondent (Perduco Law Limited) was struck out because the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted had been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious, alternatively under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1)(c), because the first respondent had not complied with Tribunal orders.c. The first respondent had failed to comply with Tribunal orders in respect of disclosure: para 45 (page 361 of bundle).d. Mr Pearcy appears to be the controlling mind of both respondents and the failure to deal honestly with the Tribunal infects the dealings of both respondents: para 46. The conduct of proceedings, including the attempts to mislead the Tribunal and the very late disclosure of documents which must have been readily available to the first respondent easily met the threshold for unreasonable conduct: para 47.[5]There was a hearing before EJ Hodgson 15 and 16 September 2025. EJ Hodgson’s decision is at page 853 onwards of the bundle.a. EJ Hodson varied or revoked EJ Joffe’s order of 3 September 2025 insofar as it affects the position of the second respondent. The second respondent was given permission to file a response: paras 3 and 4 of EJ Hodgson’s case management orders.b. EJ Hodgson stated that the claimant’s position when she first made an application to amend indicated the first respondent remained her employer at the time she resigned. Her position at that hearing was that her employment transferred prior to her resignation. However, the basis of this was not set out in any document: para 32.c. Permission was granted to the claimant to amend her claim to allege there was a TUPE transfer from Perduco Law Limited to the second respondent on 4 April 2024: para 92.d. EJ Joffe’s decision was varied to allow the second respondent to present a response: para 103. The claimant agreed that the second respondent should be allowed to file a response: para 94.e. The case was listed for a one-day open preliminary hearing, to consider any application to strike out or any further case management. Second respondent’s applications 4. The second respondent submitted that the claimant’s claim against it had no reasonable prospects of success, or in the alternative that the claimant’s claim had little reasonable prospects of success. I do not accept the second respondent’s submissions, for the reasons below. 5. First, the claimant has set out pleaded facts which, if established, are capable of demonstrating a TUPE transfer (see para 2.4 of amended particulars of claim at pages 909-910 of the claimant’s bundle). Whether those facts are established will depend on documents that are disclosed by the parties, and evidence that is presented at the final hearing and tested in cross-examination. I do not accept, on the evidence before me today, that the claimant has no or little reasonable prospects of establishing those facts.[6]Second, in support of the claimant’s case, both respondents give the same contact name (Peter Pearcy) and address on their ET3 forms. Further, the second respondent’s termination letter refers simply to “Perduco” or “Perduco law” (page 164 of the claimant’s bundle), and the second respondent’s name at the time of the claimant’s termination was “Perduco Law Group LLP”.[7]The claimant has filed a witness statement from a former employee of the second respondent, which supports the claimant’s case on transfer (page 206 of claimant’s bundle). In reaching my decision on the respondent’s applications, I have placed little weight on this witness statement, as the date in the witness statement is clearly wrong (it is stated to be signed on 21 May 2024, ie before the claimant’s termination).[8]Third, the second respondent submitted the claimant was an intelligent individual who should be presumed to know who her employer was, yet the claimant brought her claim initially just against the first respondent. The claimant responded saying it took time for the evidence about the TUPE transfer to emerge.[9]Fourth, the second respondent submitted that the claimant’s allegation of a TUPE transfer was in response to winding up proceedings against the first respondent. However, this submission is not supported by the evidence. The winding up proceedings began around April 2025, whereas the claimant applied to join the second respondent to these proceedings in October 2024. Further, the claimant’s witness statement dated 22 November 2024 (page 166 of claimant’s bundle) refers to a TUPE transfer in April 2024 (see, eg, para 2.62, page 174 of claimant’s bundle).[10]Fifth, the second respondent submitted that the claimant could not have been transferred because at the time of the alleged transfer, the second respondent did not have permission to carry out regulated activities or employ the claimant. However, the fact that a transfer may have been in breach of regulatory requirements does not necessarily mean there was no transfer. Claimant’s application to strike out the second respondent’s response[11]The claimant applied to strike out the second respondent’s response, on the basis of unreasonable behaviour, or not complying with the Tribunal’s orders. The claimant’s submissions are at page 1062-1064 of the claimant’s bundle. The claimant also relies on allegedly false statements set out in her application for wasted costs and preparation time order at page 1065 of the bundle.[12]Many of the claimant’s submissions about the second respondent’s behaviour concern matters which were considered by EJ Joffe and EJ Hodgson. The new points raised by the claimant (ie points not considered by EJ Hodgson or EJ Joffe) include the following:a. the second respondent misrepresented its name, including in its ET3 form – it described itself as Lawyer Up Group (UK) Limited, whereas its name (as reflected in Companies House) was Lawyer UP Group (UK) LLP.b. False statement by Mr Pearcy (at para 2.2, at page 332 of the bundle) that the second respondent was granted authorisation on 4 October 2024, and did not carry out any regulated activity before that date. However, the SRA’s records show the second respondent was granted an SRA licence effective from 3 September 2024.c. False statements by the second respondent about whether the first respondent paid the holiday pay due to the claimant, or made pension contributions on her behalf.[13]I do not accept that the second respondent’s conduct meets the bar for unreasonable behaviour, at this stage. First, as stated above, many of the claimant’s submissions concern matters which were considered by EJ Joffe and EJ Hodgson. However, I note the claimant agreed before EJ Hodgson that the second respondent should be allowed to present a response. Second, at this stage, without the benefit of oral evidence that is tested in cross-examination, it is unclear whether the error in the second respondent’s name (referring to ‘Limited’ rather than ‘LLP’) was a deliberate and dishonest error, or whether it was an inadvertent typographical error. I note that Mr Pearcy’s statement at page 332 of the bundle contains the correct name of the second respondent (see para 1.1). Likewise, without the benefit of oral evidence that is tested in cross-examination, it is unclear whether Mr Pearcy’s statement about the date of SRA authorisation was a deliberate error. Third, as regards the allegedly false statements about holiday pay and pension contributions, these are the very issues to be decided at the final hearing.[14]The claimant’s submissions in support of her application to strike-out the second respondent’s response because of failure to comply with disclosure orders also rely on EJ Joffe’s decisions. I do not accept the claimant’s submissions for the following reasons. First, as explained above, EJ Hodgson varied EJ Joffe’s orders, and the claimant agreed at that stage that the second respondent should be able to participate in the proceedings. Second, given the strike-out applications made by both parties, it is consistent with the overriding objective for full disclosure to be made after the determination of the strike-out applications.