CARLA BENNETT v LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK [2001] EWCA Civ 711

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
[2001] EWCA Civ 711Case No NO: A1/2001/0441Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2, Monday, 14th May 2001
CARLA BENNETTLONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK
Lord Justice LongmoreMR JOE SYKES (instructed by Philip Glah & Co, 259/260 Temple Chambers,Temple Avenue, London EC4Y 0HP) appeared on behalf of the ApplicantDate 14 May 2001

LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE:

This

[1]is a most unfortunate case originated by a claimant in the Employment Tribunal; the applicant which was dismissed in the mid-1990s and began proceedings for racial discrimination and/or unfair dismissal.[2]The first tribunal after ten days hearing disqualified themselves because they considered that the representative of the applicant had accused the tribunal of racial bias. The matter was left in the air. There was then an application by the respondents to a second employment tribunal for an order striking the case out on account of the vexatious nature of the conduct of the appellant's representative. That application succeeded.[3]The matter then went to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which held that the first tribunal was wrong to have disqualified themselves and to stop the hearing after ten days, that there was therefore no ground for the invocation of the services of a second employment tribunal but that they themselves, the Employment Appeal Tribunal, having all the powers of an employment appeal tribunal, would decide whether the case should be struck out, and they did decide that the case should be struck out, thereby effectively agreeing with the decision of the second tribunal.[4]Although this is a second-tier appeal, it seems to me it is right to grant permission to appeal. It is in my judgment arguable first that questions of principle as to the correct approach to both the employment tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal are in issue where a question is raised as to the possible bias of the tribunal, and, secondly, it is arguable that the consequences of allowing the appeal from the discontinuance order of the first employment tribunal were not fully or accurately addressed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.[5]It is a most unfortunate fact that the applicant was dismissed many years ago, as she was, but the other unfortunate fact is that no hearing has yet been brought to a conclusion. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be right to grant permission to appeal in what I repeat is a very unfortunate case. (Application to appeal allowed)

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