J Tor v Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust: 6007360/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6007360/2024

Between

J TorClaimant

Central and North West London NHS Foundation TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Hutchings

In person for claimant

Ms Elizabeth Grace (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 27 January 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The complaint of unfair dismissal is not well founded. The claimant was not constructively dismissed.

[2]The complaint of race discrimination is dismissed following the claimant’s withdrawal of this complaint at the case management hearing on 2 April 2025.

[3]The complaint of age discrimination is dismissed following the claimant’s withdrawal of this complaint at the case management hearing on 2 April 2025.

REASONS

[1]The claimant, Ms Jay Tor (known as Jenny Storer during the course of her employment), was employed by the respondent, Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (the “Trust”), from 1 January 2021 as a Staff Nurse (Band 5) at HMP Woodhill. She started her employment in the addictions team, moving to the Primary Care Team on 12 December 2022. She was contracted to work 25 hours a week at HMP Woodhill. By email dated 9 January 2024 the claimant gave notice to end her employment; parties agree she had a 2 month notice period and her effective date of termination of employment was 12 March 2024.

[2]By an ET1 claim form and attachment dated 1 August 2024 Ms Tor brought the following complaints to the Employment Tribunal: 2.1. Constructive unfair dismissal; 2.2. Age discrimination; and 2.3. Race discrimination.

[3]At the case management hearing before Employment Judge Tynan on 2 April 2025 she withdrew the age and race discrimination complaints. In the unfair dismissal complaint she asserts that she had no choice but to resign because of breaches by the respondent of the term of trust and confidence which is implied by law into her employment contract (the ‘Term’). ACAS consultation began on 21 May 2024 and a certificate was issued on 2 July 2024.

[4]Mr Tor’s particulars of claim set out several facts to support her assertion that the Trust breached this Term. In summary her reasons are: 4.1. She was subject to restrictions in the handling and administration of medicine. 4.2. The Trust unilaterally changed her working days and hours. 4.3. A conditional job offer for a band 7 role at HMP Aylesbury was withdrawn, it took the Trust approximately 8 months from the offer to inform her of the withdrawal and the Trust failed to provide reasons for withdrawing the offer.

[5]By am ET3 response form and Grounds of Resistance dated 27 September 2024 the Trust contests the claim. At the hearing the respondent accepted it imposed restrictions on Ms Tor’s ability to handle and administer medication. The Trust denies this was a breach of the Term in her contract, asserting that it had reasonable and good cause for so doing to manage issues with the claimant’s storage of medication, errors the respondent says she made in administering medication and concerns it had about patient safety. The Trust contends that (acting by its managers) it did not behave in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence it had with Ms Tor and, therefore, it did not breach the implied term. The Trust does not accept that the claimant resigned in response to the restrictions placed on her practice or as a result of its withdrawal of the job offer. At the hearing the Trust asserted that Ms Tor resigned as she was subject to capability and disciplinary proceedings. Procedure, documents, and evidence

[6]The hearing was listed for 4 days.

[7]Ms Tor represented herself and gave sworn evidence (days 1 and 2). She called evidence from Mr James Gale, a band 7 nurse who was part of her line management chain at HMP Bullingdon (day 4, after the respondent’s witnesses had given evidence due to Mr Gale being unwell)

[8]The respondent was represented by Ms Grace of counsel, who called sworn evidence on behalf of the respondent from: 8.1. Miss Elisha Patel, Deputy Head of Healthcare – primary care lead at Woodhill at the time of the events about which Ms Tor complaints (day 3); 8.2. Mrs Denise Cox, Head of Healthcare at HMP Aylesbury (day 3 and 4); and 8.3. Ms Lisa Basi, Deputy Director Service within Health and Justice Services (which included HMP Woodhill and HMP Aylesbury). On day 1 Ms Grace informed me that Ms Basi was unwell and unable to attend the hearing. On day 2 Ms Grace provided medical evidence in support, from which it was evident that Ms Basi could not attend remotely either. In considering Ms Basi’s written evidence, I have taken account of the fact Ms Tor has not had the opportunity to challenge it (and therefore afforded it less weight), the reasons for Ms Basi’s absence and the contemporaneous written evidence regarding the issues involving Ms Basi.

[9]I considered the documents from an agreed hearing file of 940 pages to include documents admitted during the hearing, as follows: 9.1. datix entries for the claimant and Miss Patel; 9.2. a screenshot of an exert from Mrs Cox’s paper diary for 8 June 2023; and 9.3. a screen shot of a notes pages from Ms Tor’s phone listing working days and locations.

[10]At the start of the hearing, mindful the claimant was not represented and taking account of rule 3(2)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the “Rules”) which requires me to ensure parties are on an equal footing, I explained the process of an Employment Tribunal hearing to the claimant. We agreed the order of witnesses and an outline timetable and the approach for closing statements. During the hearing I assisted with rephasing of questions when it was evidence to me that the claimant was not answering the question. When the claimant had concluded her questions for the respondent’s witnesses, we went through each of the respondent’s witness statement by reference to the list of issues to ensure that the claimant had asked questions about the issues in dispute. I am satisfied that the claimant had a fair hearing in the circumstances of not being legally represented.

[11]On day 4 Ms Grace submitted a written statement to which the claimant told me on day 1 she would like to respond orally. It was agreed that Ms Grace would provide to the claimant a summary of any cases to which she refers in the closing statement.

[12]Having sent to the statement to the claimant and the Tribunal, and taking a longer lunch to allow the claimant time to read the statement, Ms Grace informed me that the claimant had told her before returning to the hearing room she had not been able to read the entirety of the statement. Mindful of what the claimant had told me during the hearing about her need for longer processing times, we agreed that Ms Grace would make short oral submissions and the claimant would respond in writing at a later date so she had time to fully digest what Ms Grace had said and written.

[13]Therefore, I made the following orders: 13.1. by 4pm on 9 January 2026 the claimant must send to the respondent and the Tribunal a closing written statement; and 13.2. by 4pm on 16 January 2026 the respondent may send to the claimant and the Tribunal a written statement in reply.

[14]Employment Tribunal administration referred the following documents to me: 14.1. An email dated 9 January 2026 (15.59) attaching the following titled documents: 14.1.1. LB Witness Statement – Facts and Questions; 14.1.2. Medication Error Facts; and 14.1.3. Comparator Bamford (a reference to the case to which Ms Grace referred the Tribunal in her closing submissions). 14.2. The claimant’s written closing statement dated 9 January 2026 (sent subsequently at 16.06; 17 pages);and 14.3. The respondent’s reply to the claimant’s closing statement (6 pages).

[15]I have read the entirety of these documents prior to reaching a decision in this claim. Mindful the claimant is not represented, I note the following: 15.1. I have considered the comments on Ms Basi’s statement as part of my evaluation of the evidence, mindful that the claimant did not have the opportunity to cross examine Ms Basi. I have also considered Ms Grace’s response to these. 15.2. The documents titled “Medication Error Facts” was not before the Tribunal during the hearing. There is no application by the claimant to admit this additional evidence and the facts contained therein were not put to the respondent’s witnesses. Therefore, I must disregard this document. 15.3. In the claimant’s closing statement she refers to matters she says occurred during a preliminary hearing before EJ Tynan. She did not raise these matters before me in the final hearing. Therefore, they are not matters for this decision. 15.4. The closing statement also refers to evidence which was not included in the claimant’s witness statement nor things she gave oral evidence about. As this evidence was not put to the respondent during the hearing, I cannot as a matter of procedure consider it in making my findings and reaching my conclusions. 15.5. Likewise, where the claimant has suggested what a witness might have said had they been called by the respondent to give evidence, I cannot take account of these comments in reaching my decision as they are speculation. 15.6. In the remainder of her closing statement the claimant addresses the complaints before the Tribunal by reference to issues recorded in the list of issues. The approach is clear and structured and reflects the guidance I gave her at the end of the hearing, mindful she is not represented. However, where the claimant has put forward in her closing statement a recollection of the evidence that she gave at the hearing that differs in substance from my note and the Tribunal’s record, I have preferred by note of her evidence. 15.7. I have not taken account of comments the claimant makes on issues she withdrew at the hearing. Reasonable adjustments

[16]Neither party requested adjustments prior to or at the start of the hearing. During the hearing the claimant told me she has dyspraxia and required additional processing time. Ms Grace noted that there was no reference to the claimant having dyspraxia in the hearing documents, only a reference to the claimant “coming under the umbrella of Neurodiversity”.

[17]Mindful the claimant is not represented, and that she had told me she required more processing time. I allowed the claimant extra time to consider the questions put to her by Ms Grace. Often, it was necessary for Ms Grace to put the question twice, or to rephrase it, to ensure the claimant had full opportunity to answer. Invariably this meant it took longer than anticipated at the start of the hearing to complete the claimant’s evidence, hence the claimant giving evidence over 2 days. Issues for the Tribunal to decide

[18]Parties agreed a list of issues at the case management hearing before Employment Judge Tynan on 2 April 2025. The list is below. At the start of the hearing the claimant told me she had not read the list after the case management hearing, only doing so a the start of this hearing. In so doing she noted that(i) she is not pursuing issue 1.1.1.7; and

(ii) issue 1.1.1.12 is about being treated differently to colleagues of different age and race, and that this was part of the discrimination complaint withdrawn at that hearing. Accordingly, we agreed to delete these issues.

[19]Ms Grace confirmed that the respondent accepted some of the factual allegations took place as alleged by the claimant; these are identified in the list below, as are the issues withdrawn at the hearing before the claimant have evidence. 1. Unfair dismissal1.1 Was the Claimant dismissed?1.1.1 Did the Respondent do the following things:1.1.1.1 On or around 3 March 2023, Elisha Patel imposed a requirement for the Claimant to be supervised when administering controlled drugs (accepted);

1.1.1.2 On or around 25 April 2023, Elisha Patel imposed a requirement for the Claimant to be supervised when administering medication (accepted);

1.1.1.3 In or around mid-July 2023, Elisha Patel sought to unilaterally change the Claimant’s days and hours of work by prohibiting her from working long days and by insisting that the Claimant only work on those days that Ms Patel was on duty, the effect of which was to preclude Sunday working;

1.1.1.4 On or around 24 July 2024, Elisha Patel made the Claimant supernumerary and prohibited her from administering medication;

1.1.1.5 Imposed the restriction in paragraph 1.1.4 without limitation of time;

1.1.1.6 On or around 29 August 2023, Elisha Patel instructed the Claimant to refrain from working on the ‘bank’ (accepted);

1.1.1.7 Commenced a formal capability process in relation to the Claimant on or around 5 September 2023;

1.1.1.8 Took approximately 8 months (namely from March to November 2023) to inform the Claimant that a conditional offer of a Band 7 post at HMP Aylesbury was being withdrawn;

1.1.1.9 Failed to communicate or to communicate adequately with the Claimant regarding the Band 7 post;

1.1.1.10 Failed to provide reasons or adequate reasons for withdrawing the conditional offer of the Band 7 post;

1.1.1.11 Withdrew the conditional offer of the Band 7 post;

1.1.1.12 Treated the Claimant differently to Nyasha and Olu in respect of Band 7 employment opportunities.

1.1.2 Did that breach the implied term of trust and confidence? The Tribunal will need to decide:1.1.2.1 whether the Respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the Claimant and the Respondent; and

1.1.2.2 whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so.

1.1.3 Did the Claimant resign in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the Claimant’s resignation.

1.1.4 Did the Claimant affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that they chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach.

1.2 If the Claimant was constructively dismissed, what was the reason or principal reason for dismissal? Was it the Claimant’s conduct and/or capability?

1.3 Was it a potentially fair reason?

1.4 Did the Respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating it as a sufficient reason to constructively dismiss the Claimant? 2. Remedy for unfair dismissal

2.1 Does the Claimant wish to be reinstated to their previous employment?

2.2 Does the Claimant wish to be re-engaged to comparable employment or other suitable employment?

2.3 Should the Tribunal order reinstatement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether reinstatement is practicable and, if the Claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just.

2.4 Should the Tribunal order re-engagement? The Tribunal will consider in particular whether re-engagement is practicable and, if the Claimant caused or contributed to dismissal, whether it would be just.

2.5 What should the terms of the re-engagement order be?

2.6 If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:2.6.1 What financial losses has the dismissal caused the Claimant?

2.6.2 Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

2.6.3 If not, for what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated?

2.6.4 Is there a chance that the Claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?

[20]It is noted this hearing is to consider liability only.

Findings of fact

[21]The relevant facts are as follows. First, I make a general finding on evidence. Often the claimant did not initially answer the question put to her by Ms Grace. I addressed this by rephrasing the question and allowing the claimant additional time to consider any documents to which she was referred and to gather her thoughts. Where the claimant had a document in mind which she could not identify, mindful of Rule 3, Ms Grace and I sought to identify the document in the hearing file using the claimant’s description. On occasion the claimant sought to reference events she says related to race and age (for example she told me the reason she did not get the Band 7 role was because of her race) and had to be reminded that she had withdrawn these complaints at the case management hearing on 2 April 2025.

[22]Mr Gayle provided the Tribunal with a short character statement. He was not involved in any of the factual allegations made by the claimant and in this regard his evidence did not assist me.

[23]Generally, Miss Patel and Mrs Cox answered the questions put to them by the claimant. On occasion it was necessary for me to clarify the claimant’s question and its relevance to the issues in dispute. Where it was not relevant (for example a question about race), we moved to the next question.

[24]In assessing the evidence in Ms Basi’s statement I have taken account of the fact she was unable to attend the hearing due to an evidenced medical condition. Invariably the fact the claimant did not have the opportunity to challenge her evidence in cross examination affects the weight I have given to Ms Basi’s evidence. Where there is a dispute of fact between Ms Basi’s recollection and that of the claimant, and the claimant’s comments in her closing statement, in the first instance I have considered any contemporaneous documents.

[25]I turn now to my findings of fact relevant to the issues in dispute. Where I have had to resolve a dispute of fact I set out the reasons for my finding below. Employment

[26]Parties agree that the claimant started her employment with the respondent on 1 January 2021 as a band 5 nurse in the addictions team at HMP Woodhill. On 12 December 2022, she transferred to the primary care team, working a 25 hour per week contract, line managed by a band 6 nurse. The respondent accepts that the claimant did not undertake an induction for the primary care team when she transferred; in cross examination the claimant accepted that the same employment policies applied on both departments.

[27]From February 2023 parties also agree that the primary care team was managed by Miss Patel, the Deputy Head of Health (a band 8a role), who was managed by the Head of Health, Ms Chahal.

[28]It is agreed that the claimant resigned twice. First, on 10 May 2023 the claimant emailed Chahal to give notice on her substantive role in primary care at HMP Woodhill, stating that she did not want to return to Woodhill and asking to work her notice elsewhere. She subsequently withdrew this notice. Second, the claimant resigned on 9 January 2024. She worked her notice at HMP Woodhill and her employment ended on 12 March 2025 (the “effective date of termination”). Concerns with the claimant’s medication practices

[29]At the hearing the claimant accepted that she made the following mistakes in the management and administration of medication while working in primary care: 29.1. 22 February 2023: a band 6 nurse reports issues with the claimant’s handling and management of controlled drugs (“CD”) and medication procedures; 29.2. 6 April 2023: failure to mark a dose of CD as administered; 29.3. 10 April 2023; administering the wrong dose of (quetiapine) 29.4. 11 April 2023: administering a CD without second signer (the claimant says a second signer was present); and 29.5. 13 July 2023: administering the wrong dose of DHC; and

[30]Parties disagree as to whether these incidents fall within a definition of “medication error”. There is no agreed definition and it is beyond the scope of these proceedings, and the Tribunal’s expertise, to identity and apply a definition. This is not necessary for me to determine the issues in dispute. In this judgment I have referred to the incidents as “practice issues”.

[31]The claimant says she resigned as a result of the respondent’s conduct in response to these incidences. She alleges the response from her managers was unreasonable and breached the term of trust and confidence in her employment contract. The respondent denies there was a breach of this Term, asserting that, in any event, having assessed the seriousness of the incidences, it had a reasonable and proper cause for the responses. Therefore, I must consider the substance of the incidences, not any labelling of them. March 2023 restrictions

[32]On 27 February 2023 Miss Patel received an email from a band 6 nurse which she was asked to review before it was sent to the claimant’s line manager. The email informed Miss Patel of 3 errors made by the claimant involving the management of medication: 32.1. A medication chart ran out when the claimant was on duty and the claimant did not request a replacement, resulting in a delay in drug administration the following day. 32.2. The claimant put controlled medication which should have been returned to the pharmacy in an unsecured storage box overnight, with a note asking staff the following day to return it to the pharmacy. 32.3. The claimant used the last page of a book used to record controlled medication and she did not re-order a replacement, resulting in a delay to the administration of medication the following morning.

[33]As a result of these issues, on 27 February 2023 Miss Patel sent an email to the band 6 primary care team summarising these incidents and some involving another nurse and informing the band 6 line managers that the incidents have been reported to the respondent’s Chief Pharmacist who had requested those involved have further training. This email references practice issues with another band 5 nurse. The communication of concerns, and subsequent imposition of restrictions, was not personal to the claimant.

[34]On 2 March 2023 Miss Patel emailed the claimant about these issues. I have considered that email. It summarises the issues (inviting the claimant to inform her line manager if she considers any incorrect), and puts in place the following 3 measures for the claimant: 5 supervised sessions with a band 6 nurse for the claimant’s medication run; to complete a medicines competency workbook; and to complete a reflection of the incidents. The respondent asserts that these measure were supportive. I agree. The respondent is an NHS Trust with responsibility to patients and their safety to ensure practice is safe. The claimant did not object to these restrictions on her practice at the time. Furthermore, such measures applied to all practitioners. For example, I have seen evidence that following a practice issue Miss Patel reported about herself, she engaged in reflective practice. April 2023 restrictions

[35]In April 2023 the claimant had 3 practice issues (recorded above). As a result Miss Patel met with the claimant to discuss these, following up with an email dated 25 April 2023. In this email Miss Patel sets out a 5 step plan with the aim of “getting [the claimant] back to administering medication without any supervision”. The claimant is told that the reason the plan is put in place is “due to the number of medication errors and [the claimant’s] attitude towards them”

[36]Miss Patel states that the restriction on administering medication, whereby the claimant could only administer medication if she was supervised and countersigned by a band 6 nurse, will be reviewed in 2 weeks. The claimant is required to recomplete the medication competencies, complete all medication administration workbooks and reflect on the practice issues. She is told that the team leaders (band 6 nurses) will feedback to Miss Patel. These restrictions were not without limitation; they were to be reviewed once the workbook was completed (which was intended to take about 4 weeks). Band 7 role

[37]On 4 March 2023 the claimant attended an interview at a recruitment day for a band 7 role at HMP Aylesbury, where she had been doing bank shifts as a band 5 nurse. A verbal offer was made the same day. At the time she received the offer she had not completed an application form for this role. The claimant accepts that she did not inform anyone of the restrictions Miss Patel had placed on her practice during the recruitment process. It is agreed that as the recruitment process progressed, given the claimant was a band 5 nurse, and it was unusual to progress from a band 5 to band 7 role, first, the claimant would complete an interim period of 6 months in a band 6 position.

[38]By email exchange dated 2 May 2023 with Miss Patel, Mrs Cox seeks to clarify the restrictions having been told about them by a colleague. The claimant says she did not need to inform her managers at HMP Aylesbury as the restrictions were imposed at HMP Woodhill. The respondent disagrees; it says the restrictions were on the claimant’s medication practices, not a particular location, and therefore applied wherever she practices, making it incumbent on her to inform all manager, including when undertaking bank work. Taking account of the NMC guidance to which I was referred, I agree. As the restrictions relate to the claimant’s medication practices, it follows that they are personal to her, not specific to a location. Therefore, I prefer the respondent’s evidence that the claimant should have been transparent in the recruitment process and informed HMP Aylesbury about the nature of the limitations on her practice.

[39]As part of the checking process, the claimant was required to complete a model declaration form, which she did on 3 May 2023. This form was picked up by Mrs Cox, who was by this time the recruitment manager for the role.

[40]In written and oral evidence Mrs Cox told me she was concerned that the restrictions had not been disclosed by the claimant and this is why she made further enquiries of Miss Patel. I find this motivation was entirely reasonable in all the circumstances at that time. Indeed, at the hearing the claimant accepted that Mrs Cox’s approach to find out more about the claimant’s practice restrictions was a reasonable response.

[41]On 3 May 2023 it is agreed that Mrs Cox met with the claimant. I have considered the email dated 9 May 2023 which summarises this meeting. The claimant did not challenge this record of the meeting either at the time (the written record shows she was given the opportunity to do so) or at the hearing. I find that the meeting was as per the email record, to discuss the restrictions on the claimant’s practice, with Mrs Cox telling the claimant they applied everywhere and that the claimant should have informed Mrs Cox (as head of Health at Aylesbury) of the restrictions. I find this exchange meant that when, subsequently, Mrs Cox took over responsibility for finalising the recruitment of a band 7 nurse at Aylesbury, she was aware of the restrictions. She was also aware that the forms completed by the claimant as part of the recruitment process for this role did not reference the restrictions.

[42]At the hearing the claimant put to Mrs Cox that the reason for gap was there was not a specific question. The claimants says that she answered the questions in the forms accurately as they asked about misconduct and she was not subject to any misconduct investigations. On a literal interpretation of the questions in the forms, I agree. However, given the nature of the role, a band 7 nurse role which would involve the management and administering of medication, I find it was incumbent of the claimant to disclose the details of the restrictions even in the absence of a specific and direct question. I find the claimant’s approach lacked transparency, and given the role involved the administration of controlled substances, troubling. Mrs Cox’s concerns that the claimant had not shared this information when applying for the band 7 role were, in my judgement, justified.

[43]In an email dated 11 May 2023 Mrs Cox sought advice from HR about the job offer, given the knowledge she had now about the restrictions on the claimant’s practice. In cross examination the claimant alleged that it was Mrs Cox’s intention to prevent her taking this role. That summary is too simplistic and fails to take account of the questions Mrs Cox asked HR, which are evident from the email. Mrs Cox does ask whether she can withdraw this verbal offer for a band 7 post at HMP Aylesbury. In the circumstances as I have found them (that the claimant was not candid about her practice restrictions). However, she goes on to say: “If necessary could we offer Jenny a Band 5 post at Aylesbury, carrying forward her action plan implemented while she worked at HMP Woodhill.” Mrs Cox also asks where the claimant and the respondent stand, given the claimant had resigned from HMP Woodhill but the offer for HMP Aylesbury remained conditional as the claimant had not completed the necessary pre-employment checks. It is evidence from the wording of this email that Mrs Cox had not made a final decision about the claimant joining HMP Aylesbury; the only decision she had made was that the band 7 role was no longer appropriate. I find that Mrs Cox was contemplating alternatives and was considering the impact on the claimant as well as the respondent.

[44]On 8 June 2023 Mrs Cox tried to contact the claimant. This followed the claimant calling at HMP Aylesbury in person the previous day to try and speak with Mrs Cox. The claimant did not have an appointment and by her own admission called in late in the day on her way back from London on the off chance of speaking with Mrs Cox.

[45]Mrs Cox and the claimant agreed to speak on 8 June 2023. By her own admission, Mrs Cox was just over an hour late in calling the claimant as she had confused the agreed time and entered the wrong time in her diary (which she produced to the Tribunal). The claimant did not answer the phone, she says because the number came through as a caller ID and she had been expecting a call an hour earlier. These things happen. Mrs Cox got the time wrong and the claimant did not answer the call as she did not think it was Mrs Cox. July 2023: changes to the claimant’s contract

[46]The claimant alleges that around mid-July 2023 Miss Patel sought to unilaterally change the claimant's days and hours of work by prohibiting her from working long days and by insisting that the claimant only work on those days that Miss Patel was on duty. The claimant says this prevents the her from working Sundays.

[47]Parties agree that the claimant’s contract was 25 hours and that Miss Patel was responsible for allocating shift patterns. The claimant accepts that the contract was based on hours not days. Miss Patel explained to me that HMP Woodhill the standard shift patterns are 12.5 hour days and 9.5 hour days so it was implied that it was long shifts to 2 x 12.5 hour shifts. The claimant did not challenge this explanation of the shift patterns. Based on this explanation, I found that the claimant’s shift pattern was 2 x 12.5 hours, which accords with her evidence that she worked 2 days (long shifts). Miss Patel accepts she did change the claimant to short shifts. The contemporaneous evidence records that this was so Miss Patel could have some oversight of the claimant’s practice given the restrictions. Given the claimant’s contract did not mandate 2 days, only hours, I find this was not a unilateral change to her contract. A contract based on hours allowed Miss Patel to allocate those hours as she wished. I find she did so to have oversight of the claimant’s practice.

[48]In any event, the claimant accepted that she only worked 1 week of short shifts, then returned to long shifts across 2 days. Miss Patel did not unilaterally change the contract; the claimant only ever worked 25 hours per week under the contract, even for the week she was working short shifts. Furthermore, it was part of Miss Patel’s role to allocate the hours to suit the needs of the service at any time. I find a need includes to allocate shifts to ensure oversight and supervision. July 2023: restrictions on administration of mediation

[49]It is agreed that on 24 July 2023, Miss Patel informed the claimant she was being made supernumerary and prohibited her from administering medication. The respondent does not accept the claimant’s allegation that this restriction was unlimited in duration. For the reasons below I find the period was limited.

[50]The claimant accepts that there were further issues with her medication practices since the April restrictions. I find that the reason Miss Patel made the claimant supernumerary and prohibited her from administering medication was because on 13 July 2023 the claimant administered the wrong dose of DHC, a controlled drug (90mg of 60mg an which she accepts making).

[51]On 24 July 2023 Miss Patel met with the claimant to discuss this error. I have seen the notes of this supervision meeting, which were not challenged by the claimant. Miss Patel explains the reasons for the restrictions and that the restriction is for an initial period of 4 weeks. August 2023: restriction on bank working

[52]The respondent accepts that in a letter from Miss Patel to the claimant in August 2023 she instructed the claimant to refrain from working bank. The letter refers to the restrictions imposed in July as the reason for this instruction. I have considered the notes of this supervision meeting; it is recorded that Miss Patel tells the claimant that she must refrain from doing bank work anywhere while her performance is being managed.

[53]I have seen an exchange of emails in July 2023 between Miss Patel and managers which records that the bank team have been informed that the claimant must not do bank shifts due to safety concerns. Ms Chahal is copied to these emails. I find that the decision that the claimant must not to bank shifts was made by Miss Patel following Ms Chahal’s advice, due to the practice issues concerning the claimant’s handling, management and administering of medication at that time. Several of the colleagues had raised these concerns in May 2023: a band 6 nurse at HMP Aylesbury and Mrs Cox (where the claimant had been doing bank shifts) in May 2023; and Miss Patel in May 2023 due to the April practice issues.

[54]By letter dated 11 August 2023 (which references the July supervision meeting) Miss Patel confirms that the claimant is to “refrain from working bank at present until these concerns [about her practice] have been resolved. The letter refers to completion of supervision sessions and discussion of any support the claimant feels she needs to improve her practice. While there is no express timeframe set out in the letter (indeed the letter states “At present there is no timeframe for how long you are unable to bank anywhere. We will review this at a later date and see your progress”) I find it is implied that the restriction on bank is in place until managers consider it safe for the claimant to start administering medication again.

[55]Given the conversation at the supervision meeting, this written confirmation would have not come as a surprise to the claimant. I find she knew the reason was the issues with her practice and associated safety concerns. Indeed, the claimant accepted at the hearing that Miss Patel had a regulatory obligation to ensure that the claimant understood that she could not undertake bank work while restrictions are in place. Withdrawal of the band 7 role

[56]The respondent accepts that it withdrew the band 7 role. Parties agree that at the time of the withdrawal the conditional offer was for a band 6 development role for an interim period but everyone referred to the role as “the band 7 role”.

[57]Before making any decisions about the band 7 role, the respondent investigation the claimant’s band 7 application, appointing Ms Miles to carry out a fact-finding. Ms Mills interviewed Mrs Cox on 23 June 2023, the claimant on 26 June 2023 and Ms Patel on 7 July 2023. I have considered the contemporaneous records of these meetings, which were not challenged by the claimant at the hearing. I find the report Ms Miles completed on 10 August 2023 takes account of these conversations, accurately concluding that the claimant did inform HMP Aylesbury that she was subject to practice restrictions. The report recommends a formal investigation (the usual next step in these circumstances).

[58]Contemporaneous emails evidence that on 16 August 2023 Ms Basi (HR) picks up the report and is responsible for the next steps in the process. A case review takes place on 25 August 2023. The decision to withdraw the claimant’s band 7 job offer is made. The recorded reason is the fact that the claimant was not candid in disclosing the practice restrictions as part of the band 7 recruitment process and employment checks.

[59]There followed some delay. Contemporaneous documents (which were not challenged by the claimant at the hearing) evidence that in September Ms Basi was on leave for 2 weeks, followed by 1 week’s sick leave. Despite Ms Basi returning to work on 29 September 2025, no further action was taken by the respondent until late October.

[60]Indeed, when this is picked up again by HR an email is sent to Mrs Cox which records that in August 2023 the respondent decided to commence a capability process for the claimant, following the concerns the claimant had about the claimant having further issues with the management and administration of medication (the claimant accepts the errors occurred). I have seen notes of a supervision meeting in July 2023 when Miss Patel raises these concerns with the claimant and a letter dated 5 September 2023 informing the claimant that a capability procedure had been implemented. Whether the capability process was correctly implemented is outside the remit of this complaint. However, it is relevant as it offers some explanation as to why HR picked up (when dealing with this) that the claimant had not been informed of the decision (made in August as a result of the fact finding) to withdraw the job offer.

[61]Following a period of unauthorised absence, the claimant says was due to her was experiencing problems with her car and a period of illness due to a fall (for which the claimant accepts she did not provide a sick note), the respondent decided to commence a disciplinary process for unauthorised absence. The respondent did not challenge the reasons for the claimant’s absence but says the claimant did not follow correct procedure and inform her line manager that she would not be attending work. The claimant’s evidence is that she telephoned someone at the time, but it was not her line manager. The claimant was notified of the decision to start a disciplinary process by letter dated 16 October 2023. Again the validity of this process is outside the remit of these proceedings. What is relevant is that at the time the claimant resigned she was subject to a capability and disciplinary process.

[62]I have seen an exchange of emails on 24 and 25 October 2023 in which Ms Knee (HR) seeks to establish with Mrs Cox who would be informing the claimant of the decision. There is no explanation of this delay; I find it was a case of the respondent “dropping the ball”. There is certainly no evidence it was intentional. Furthermore, during this period I have seen several attempts by the respondent to contact the claimant about her absence from work; at the hearing the claimant accepted that she was reluctant to engage with the respondent at this time, telling me she did not trust her employer. This is evidenced by the fact she had arranged for a friend to be present to listen into the phone call arranged with Mrs Cox on 8 June. When the respondent realised that claimant had not been informed of the decision to withdraw the band 7 job offer, Ms Basi emailed the claimant to set up a meeting to discuss the reasons for the decision. The claimant did not reply. Therefore, on 3 November 2023 Ms Basi emailed the claimant informing her of the decision to withdraw the band 7 job offer. Resignation

[63]On 9 January 2024 the claimant sent her resignation letter. She states her reasons for resigning is her treatment by Miss Patel and the withdrawal of the band 7 role. Relevant law: unfair dismissal

[64]Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the ‘Act’) provides that an employee is dismissed by their employer if: ‘the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct’.

[65]In order to establish constructive dismissal, an employee must show that the employer has committed a breach of contract (express or implied) which causes an employee to resign. The breach must be sufficiently serious (referred to as a repudiatory breach) to justify the employee resigning. It can be a one-off, serious breach (Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp

[1978] IRLR 27

) or a series of acts or omissions, the last of which justify their leaving (often referred to as the “last straw”). In this case the claimant relies on an alleged breach of the implied term of trust and confidence as the employer’s conduct.

[66]It is an implied term of all employment contracts that the employer shall not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated, or likely to destroy or seriously damage, the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee: Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

[1998] AC 20

. A Tribunal must consider whether an employer conducts itself without reasonable and proper cause in a manner calculated, or likely to destroy or seriously damage, the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee (Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew

[1979] IRLR 84

, Mahmud v BCCI

[1997] IRLR 462

, Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office

[2015] IRLR 112

). Specifically a Tribunal must determine: 66.1. Was the conduct likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee? 66.2. If so, was there reasonable and proper cause for the conduct?

[67]A breach of this implied term is likely to be repudiatory. The Court of Appeal considered the characteristics of a repudiatory breach of contract in the case of Tullett Prebon plc & ors v BGC Brokers LP & ors

[2011] IRLR 420

. Maurice Kay LJ, who delivered the leading judgment, held as follows at paragraphs 19 and 20: “The question whether or not there has been a repudiatory breach of the duty of trust and confidence is “a question of fact for the tribunal": Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Limited,

[1982] ICR 693

, at page 698F, per Lord Denning MR, who added: ‘The circumstances … are so infinitely various that there can be, and is, no rule of law saying what circumstances justify and what do not’ (ibid).

[68]The question whether a repudiatory breach of contract has occurred must be judged objectively (Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRLR ; Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation

[2010] ICR 908

). This requires the Tribunal to assess whether a breach of contract has occurred on the evidence before it. Neither the fact that an employee reasonably believes there to have been a breach nor that the employer believes it acted reasonably in the circumstances is determinative of this: the test is not one of ‘reasonableness’ but simply of whether a breach has occurred. When considering the question of constructive dismissal, the focus is on the employers conduct and not the employee’s reaction to it. It is for the employee to establish conduct whose effect, when “judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it” (Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd

[1986] ICR 157

[69]Furthermore, a claimant must show that they resigned in response to this breach and not for some other reason (although the breach need only be a reason and not the reason for the resignation) Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust

[2019] ICR 1

. However, the breach must be a substantial part of the reasons for the dismissal United First Partners v Carreras

[2018] EWCA Civ 323

[70]It is open to an employer to prove that the employee affirmed the contract despite the breach, perhaps by delay or taking some other step to confirm the contract Cockram v Air Products plc

[2014] ICR 1065

, EAT.

[71]A claim for in breach of the implied term of trust and confidence may be based on the ‘last straw doctrine’ (the name of which is derived from the old saying “the last straw that broke the camel’s back”). This doctrine provides that a series of acts by the employer can amount cumulatively to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence even though each act when looked at individually might not have been serious enough to constitute a repudiatory breach of contract. Inherent in the concept of a last straw is that there was one final act which led to the dismissal (‘the last straw’) and the nature of this was considered in London Borough of Waltham Forest v Omilaju

[2005] IRLR 35

where the Court of Appeal held that the last straw need not be unreasonable or blameworthy conduct, all it must do is contribute, however slightly, to the breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. If the act relied on as the final straw is entirely innocuous however then it is insufficient to activate earlier acts which may have been, or may have contributed, to a repudiatory breach.

[72]Ms Grace directed me to the case of Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust

[2018] EWCA Civ 978

in which the Court of Appeal gave the following guidance as to how Tribunals should determine final straw cases (per Underhill LJ at paragraph 55): 72.1. What was the most recent act or omission on the part of the employer which the employee says caused the resignation? 72.2. Has the Claimant since affirmed the contract? 72.3. If not, was that act (or omission) by itself a repudiatory breach of contract? 72.4. If not, was it nevertheless a part (applying the approach explained in Omilaju v Waltham Forest LBC (No.2)

[2004] EWCA Civ 1493

) of a course of conduct comprising several acts and omissions which, viewed cumulatively, amounted to a (repudiatory) breach of the term of trust and confidence? 72.5. Did the employee resign in response (or partly in response) to that breach?

[73]The breach of contract does not need to be the sole reason for the resignation. It is sufficient for the employee to prove, on the balance of probability, that they resigned in response, at least in part, to a fundamental breach of contract by the employer (Nottinghamshire County Council v Meikle

[2004] EWCA Civ 859

[74]Of course, where parties are acting reasonably it is less likely that there will have been a breach of contract when judged objectively but this is not necessarily so. If, on an objective approach, there has been no breach by the employer, the employee’s claim will fail.

[75]This claim identified a grievance procedure as part of the claim for breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. In Abbey National Plc v Fairbrother [2007] UKEAT/0084/0 the EAT held that when considering a grievance procedure in the context of constructive dismissal, the standard against which it should be judged was ‘the band of reasonable responses’.

Conclusions

[76]Ms Tor’s claim turns on the questions I set out in the list of issues. First, when judged objectively, on the balance of probability, and on the basis that Ms Tor resigned on 9 January 2024, I must decide whether the Trust (acting by its managers / employees) behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between Ms Tor and the Trust and (if I find that it did) whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so. I must consider this for any of the factual allegations which Ms Tor alleges caused her to resign which are accepted by the respondent or I have found to have happened as alleged by Ms Tor. March 2023 restrictions

[77]The respondent accepts that on 2 March 2023 Miss Patel imposed a requirement for the claimant to be supervised when administering controlled drugs. I have found that the claimant was required to attend 5 supervised sessions with a band 6 nurse for the claimant’s medication run; to complete a medicines competency workbook; and to complete a reflection of the incidents. The respondent asserts that these measure were supportive. I have found it was clear from Miss Patel’s email that Miss Patel imposed these restrictions in direct response to the issues with the claimant’s handling, management and administration of medication to which she had been alerted by the 27 February 2023 email. I conclude that in this context, the measures were supportive to the claimant and necessary for patient safety.

[78]Therefore, I must consider whether these restrictions breach the implied term of trust and confidence in the claimant’s employment contract, specifically did the respondent behave in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent. At the hearing the claimant told me she considered that the restrictions were likely to seriously damage the trust and confidence between her and the Trust. I disagree.

[79]In reaching this conclusion I direct myself that this is a question of fact and must be assessed objectively. I have found that Miss Patel put in place the restrictions in response to mistakes the claimant accepts she made. While the claimant does not agree the mistakes warranted the restrictions imposed, objectively, I disagree. The claimant was responsible for the storage, management and administration of controlled drugs and associated record keeping. Her line manager had concerns with her practices, concerns which were echoed by the respondent’s Chief Pharmacist in asking that the claimant undertake further training. In these circumstances it was incumbent on Miss Patel to manage the situation as a safeguarding measure. Her imposition of restrictions was reasonable and, objectively, necessary, given the concerns raised, particularly as the claimant was handling and administering controlled drugs.

[80]In reaching this conclusion I have taken account of the case of Bamford, to which Ms Grace referred me in the respondent’s closing submissions as an example of the nursing regulator serious approach to practice issues involving medication. In Bamford the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Fitness to Practise Committee sanctioned a nurse for misconduct for similar practice issues. Objectively, therefore, it is incumbent on an employer to address practice issues. I have found that the respondent did so by imposing restrictions on the claimant and another band 5 nurse.

[81]I have also taken account of the types of measures imposed: supervision from a more senior nurse for 5 sessions, completion of a workbook and reflective practice. None of these have an element of punishment to them, nor are they personal. I agree with the respondent that Miss Patel put in place supportive measures and sensible restrictions to encourage improvement and to ensure patient safety. For these reasons, I conclude that the imposition of restrictions was not a breach of the term of trust and confidence. It was a necessary response to issues with the claimant’s medication practices, particularly as the claimant’s role involved the management of controlled drugs, and to ensure the claimant’s practice was safe. They were not personal to the claimant; another band 5 nurse had restrictions imposed at this time and I have found Miss Patel had also engaged in reflective practice. In my judgement, the measures amount to oversight and safeguarding of practitioners and patients, not a breach of the term of trust and confidence.

[82]Furthermore, in my judgment the respondent had reasonable and proper cause for imposing the March 2023 restrictions to ensure safe practice in the storage, management and administration of controlled drugs, given the errors the claimant accepts she made. April 2023 restrictions

[83]The respondent accepts that Miss Patel imposed a requirement for the claimant to be supervised when administering medication (that she had to be supervised and countersigned by a band 6 nurse). I have found that this requirement was put in place following a supervision the claimant had with Miss Patel at which they discussed practice issues with the claimant’s handling and administering of medication earlier that month.

[84]Objectively these measures do not breach the implied term of trust and confidence. Miss Patel’s motivation for putting in place these restrictions was her concern that, despite the March restrictions, the claimant had continued to have issues with her medication practices in April. Miss Patel’s approach was necessary given the claimant’s role involved the administration of controlled drugs. It was supportive in that the aim of the plan was to enable the claimant to return to administering medication without the need for supervision. Furthermore, the restriction was to be reviewed in 2 weeks. Indeed, in cross examination the claimant conceded that an element of the measure was to support her, citing policy as the main motivation. That being the case, given respondent is an NHS trust, it is not a breach of trust and confidence for the respondent to comply with its policies in the management of its employees and to engage in practices to safeguard practitioners and patients.

[85]For these reasons I conclude that in putting in place the measures the respondent did not behave in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence with the claimant; there is no breach of the claimant’s employment contract. Furthermore, the respondent had reasonable and proper cause for the restrictions; Miss Patel was supporting the claimant following her practice issues to enable her to return to administering medication and safeguarding patients given the claimant had administered the wrong dose of a controlled drug. Change to the claimant’s terms of employment

[86]The claimant alleges that in or around mid-July 2023, Miss Patel sought to unilaterally change the claimant’s days and hours of work by prohibiting her from working long days and by insisting that the Claimant only work on those days that Miss Patel was on duty, the effect of which was to preclude Sunday working.

[87]I have found that the claimant was contracted to 25 hours a week; her contract did not stipulate this was to be worked over 2 days. While I accept that the most likely shift pattern was 2 long shifts, which the respondent accepts would equate to 25 hours, as a matter of fact it was open to the respondent to allocate the 25 hours to suit the needs of the Trust at any time. I have found that Miss Patel allocated the claimant short shifts for 1 week, in order to have some oversight of her work given the repeated practice issues and associated restrictions. However, there is no evidence to support the claimant’s allegation she was prohibited from working long days, Indeed, after 1 week of short shifts, she returned to long days until the end of her employment. There is no evidence that Miss Patel prevented the clamant working long says.

[88]I agree with the respondent’s submission that this allegation is factually incorrect. Miss Patel did not unilaterally seek to change the claimant’s working days or hours. The claimant did not have fixed days and she was contracted to work 25 hours, not 2 days. It was a management decision as to how these hours were allocated. Until the practice issues, the claimant worked long shifts. Following a number of practice issues, Miss Patel changed the allocation to short shifts so she could have some oversight of the claimant’s work. Subsequently Miss Patel took on board the claimant’s concerns about this (which limited her ability to work bank shifts elsewhere) and reinstated the long shift allocation after 1 week.

[89]There is no breach of the term of trust and confidence; a change in shift pattern allowed by an employment contract for a period of one week will not destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent. In any event, Miss Patel had good reason for seeking oversight of the claimant’s work, given the practice issues and need for restrictions.

[90]As events did not occur as alleged, there was no breach of the claimant’s employment contract and Miss Patel had good reason for her actions, I do not need to consider whether the claimant resigned because of Miss Patel’s actions. July 2023: restrictions on administration of mediation

[91]The claimant alleges that on or around 24 July 2024, Miss Patel made the claimant supernumerary and prohibited her from administering medication and that this restriction was imposed without limitation of time.

[92]I have found the reason the restriction was imposed was because on 13 July 2023 the claimant administered the wrong dose of DHC. Given the reason and the nature of the drug (a controlled substance) I conclude that Miss Patel had a good reason for imposing the restrictions. Indeed, I consider it was imperative she do so to protect patient safety. I have found this was explained to the claimant at the supervision meeting. There is no limitation on the amount of time the restriction will be in place.

[93]Objectively, taking account of the circumstances at that time, particularly that the claimant administered the incorrect amount of medication despite having been subject to restrictions in March and April requiring her to reflect on her medication practices, I conclude it was imperative Miss Patel intervene again. In doing so she did not breach the implied term of trust and confidence. Managing practice where issues arise demonstrates good management and safeguarding practices. August 2023: restriction on bank working

[94]The claimant alleges that on or around 29 August 2023, Miss Patel instructed the claimant to refrain from working on the ‘bank’. It is accepted by the respondent that Miss Patel gave the claimant this instruction, in the July supervision meeting and confirmed in writing in August. I have found that the claimant was told her supervision meeting with Miss Patel in July 2023 that she must no longer working on bank shifts anywhere. I have found the reason for this instruction was concerns raised by several colleagues that given the restrictions imposed on her practice by HMP Woodhill, which the claimant accepts she did not disclosure, there were safety concerns about her management and administration of medication which were relevant to wherever she worked.

[95]The restriction is confirmed in a letter from Miss Patel dated 11 August 2023. I have found that while the claimant was not given an express timeline for the restriction, it is clear from the wording of the letter that the restriction applied while the claimant completed supervision and identified support she needed to improve her practice and managers were satisfied that she could administer medication safely.

[96]Objectively, and mindful of the NMC Code and the fact that by her own admission the claimant had incorrectly administered controlled drugs, the restriction on bank working was reasonable and necessary. It did not breach the implied term of trust and confidence. Rather than seeking to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the Trust, it sought to instil confidence about the claimant’s medication practices and demonstrating a responsible employer providing support (which as supervision) where there were issues.

[97]Furthermore, Miss Patel’s decision to restrict bank working was warranted. As well as her own concerns, she as responding to concerns from staff at HMP Aylesbury and her manager, Ms Chahal. In my judgment, Miss Patel had reasonable and proper cause for imposing the restriction without a time limitation. The lifting of the restriction relied on managers being satisfied through supervision that she claimant was safe to administer controlled drugs again. It also depended on the claimant being proactive and identifying support she needed. Band 7 role

[98]The respondent accepts it withdrew the band 7 offer on 3 November 2023. For the below reasons, I consider that the Trust had reasonable and proper cause for this decision.

[99]The claimant alleges that it took approximately 8 months (March to November 2023) to inform the claimant that her conditional offer for a Band 7 post at HMP Aylesbury was being withdrawn.

[100]The claimant received a verbal offer for the role at the recruitment day on 4 March 2023. She accepts that confirmation of the role was subject to checks. The respondent accepts that the claimant was not informed in writing the role had been withdrawn until 3 November 2023. However, I have found that the claimant did not submit her model declaration form until 3 May 2023. Therefore it is not the case that the delay was 8 months, as the respondent could not start to make a decision about confirming the role until it had received the model declaration form.

[101]The claimant alleges that, during this time: 101.1. The respondent failed to communicate or to communicate adequately with her; and 101.2. Failed to provide reasons or adequate reasons for withdrawing the conditional offer of the Band 7 post.

[102]Relevant to my decision is the fact there were periods when the respondent and the claimant did not communicate about the on-going checks. Leaving aside the period following Ms Basi’s return form sick leave where I have found the respondent “dropped the ball” in not contacting the claimant for several weeks (considered below), the facts evidence the lack of communication was not for want of trying on the part of the respondent. Mrs Cox acted quickly after receipt of the model declaration form, and met with the claimant on 3 May 2023. She summarised this meeting to the claimant in an email dated 9 May. The note evidences that at the meeting there was a discussion about Mrs Cox’s concerns with the claimant’s practice and the fact she had become aware (not from the claimant) of the restrictions on her practice at HMP Woodhill. From this meeting alone the claimant was aware that these confirms were being taken into account as part of the recruitment process. Subsequently Mrs Cox seeks HR advice on whether she can withdraw the role.

[103]On 7 June Mrs Cox agreed to have a telephone conversation with the claimant the following day to discuss the role. On 8 June Mrs Cox attempted to discuss options with the claimant by telephone. Unfortunately Mrs Cox confused the time for this and the claimant did not answer when Mrs Cox telephoned an hour later than agreed. On 23 June 2023 Mrs Cox sent an email to the claimant explaining that attempts had been made to contact her and that the recruitment process was paused.

[104]Rather than make a final decision at this stage, the Trust instructed Ms Miles to investigate the issues with the claimant’s practice and the fact she had not told the respondent about these as part of the recruitment process. Ms Miles interviewed the claimant on 26 June. Again, it was apparent to the claimant at this meeting that the respondent was trying to establish the facts regarding her practice issues before moving forward with the Aylesbury role. The claimant was aware that Ms Miles was conducting a fact finding in July. On 9 August 2023 Ms Basi sent that claimant an email informing her she was waiting for the outcome of this process and the would update her further.

[105]Ms Miles report is dated 10 August 2023. It was reviewed on 25 August, having been sent to Ms Basi (who had HR oversight of the decision) on 16 August.

[106]The chronology alone evidences that the respondent was actively looking into the concerns raised by several colleagues about the claimant’s practice and the fact she did not disclose this, by reference to the conditional job offer. By virtue of her involvement in this process, I consider the claimant was aware of the reasons for the investigation. To suggest that there was a failure in communication from March to November simply does not reflect the reality of the situation or what the claimant knew at the time. Certainly, between March and August 2023 there was no breach of trust and confidence. Again, the respondent was acting as a responsible le employer, mindful of its regulatory obligations to establish the facts concerning a nurse who had applied for a band 7 role and had not disclosed in the process that she was subject to practice restrictions. It was reasonable and proper, indeed necessary, that the respondent took the time to fully investigation the situation before making a decision.

[107]At this point the respondent did “drop the ball”. It accepts that once the decision was made on 25 August to withdraw the offer, there was no communication with the claimant until 3 November 2023, just over 2 months. I have found that this was due to Ms Basi taking a 2 week holiday, then a week of sick leave, and some internal confusion about who was going to inform the claimant. I have found the actual delay was a month; Ms Basi returned to work on 29 September and the respondent realised the withdrawal had note been actioned in late October, at which point Ms Basi sought to contact the claimant. The claimant did not respond to Ms Basi. At the hearing she told me this is because she prefers communication in writing rather than telephone calls or meetings, because of her dyspraxia. While I don’t doubt this is the case (however I am mindful that she has not produced any evidence to the Tribunal to support this assertion), she did not tell her employer this. Without this knowledge, it was reasonable for the respondent to contact the claimant attempting to set up a meeting to discuss the Ms Miles findings and what this meant for the band 7 role. These conversations are nuanced. In seeking a conversation (as Mrs Cox had in the June) first I consider the respondent was actually respecting trust and confidence.

[108]By email of 3 November 2023 that the job would be withdrawn on at 9am on Friday 10 November 2023 and Ms Basi twice offered the claimant feedback as to the reasons why. The claimant did not respond to these offers.

[109]For these reasons, I conclude that, as a matter of fact, it did not take 8 months for the respondent to communicate its decision. Overall, the delay was approximately a month. While the respondent did not send the claimant a formal HR letter setting out the reasons for the withdrawal (something it has always accepted), throughout this period the claimant was aware of the concerns the respondent had about her medication practices, and that these were being considered in the context of the job offer, from her the concerns Mrs Cox had raised with her about the claimant not telling anyone at HMP Aylesbury of her practice issues and from the fact finding interview. In so doing I conclude the respondent did communicate adequately and sought to discuss it concerns and reasoning with the claimant. There is no breach of the term of trust and confidence.

[110]In any event the respondent’s actions between March and November 2023 were justified; it was seeking to establish the extent of reasons for the practice issues and why the claimant had not volunteered this information as part of the recruitment process. I agree with the respondent’s submission that, mindful of the NMC guidance, this was the right and responsible approach for the respondent to take. This was in the context of the claimant being subject to both capability and disciplinary processes at HMP Woodhill. Objectively, I cannot see that the respondent had any option but to withdraw the offer.

[111]Furthermore, given the nature of the conversations the claimant had with Mrs Cox and Ms Mile, I am satisfied that by the time in November the claimant was told the decision had been taken to withdraw the offer, she knew the reason was the practice issues and the fact that she had not shared information about the this and the restrictions as part of the recruitment process for this role.

[112]In my judgement the approach taken by the respondent was one of safeguarding of patients and practitioners; the respondent could not appoint someone to a role where there had had been recent issues with medication practices and restrictions imposed, neither of which were disclosed as part of the recruitment process. I conclude that, for these reasons, the respondent acted with reasonable and proper cause in withdrawing the job offer.

[113]Indeed, as a matter of law, the term of trust and confidence is part of the claimant’s employment contract in her role as a band 5 5 at HMP Woodhill. It does not follow that this employment contract can be applied to an employee applying for another role, even with the same employer, as the contract governs the mutual responsibilities for the claimant and respondent for the band 5 HMP Woodhill role. I conclude that there was no contract for the band 7 role (which it is agreed was a more senior role in a different location with a higher salary), only a conditional offer. Something done in relation to this offer cannot breach the claimant’s contract for her band 5 role at HMP Woodhill. I agree with the respondent’s submission that “it cannot be right as a matter of law that C is claiming her contract to work at Woodhill for the Primary Care team was breached by decisions made in respect of an application to work at Aylesbury, particularly where that decision had no effect whatsoever on the Woodhill role.”

[114]On the evidence before me, viewing my findings of fact objectively, I conclude that the Trust has not breached the term of trust and confidence implied into the employment contract with the respondent. For these reasons, in my judgment the complaint of unfair dismissal is not well founded. The claimant was not constructively dismissed. Approved by: