Mr A Thomas v Ricoh UK Ltd and ASOS.com Ltd: 6004535/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6004535/2024

Between

Mr A ThomasClaimant

Ricoh UK Ltd and ASOS.com LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Brown

In person for claimant

1. Mr A Line (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 30 July 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant has permission to amend his claim to add the words, “The Claimants (philisophical) [sic] belief is there is no real requirement to wear ASOS uniform. The Claimants belief is he was protected by his Employment Contract & Employee Handbook. Any other request is unlawful, detrimental, taking advantage of their employee(s).”

[2]The Claimant does not have permission to amend his claim to include any other further particulars of his claims.

[3]The Claimant’s automatic unfair dismissal claim on the grounds of protected disclosures and his indirect discrimination complaints were both struck out on 10 February 2025 when the Claimant failed to comply with an UNLESS Order made at a hearing on 20 January 2025. It is not in the interests of justice to give relief from sanction by reconsidering and setting aside those UNLESS Orders. Those claims remain struck out. 1 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[4]The Claimant’s complaints of religion and belief direct discrimination and harassment are struck out because they have no reasonable prospects of success.

[5]The Claimant’s complaints of race discrimination and unfair dismissal against the Second Respondent, ASOS, are also struck out because they have no reasonable prospects of success.

[6]In any event, the Claimant’s complaints against the Second Respondent were brought out of time, so the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider them.

[7]The Claimant’s complaint of ordinary unfair dismissal and direct race discrimination shall proceed against the First Respondent only.

[8]All the claims against the Second Respondent are struck out.

REASONS

[1]This hearing was listed to consider all or any of the following matters at the Tribunal’s discretion: 1.1. whether any claims have been struck out pursuant to any unless order; 1.2. any application to amend; 1.3. identify those claims which are proceeding; 1.4. to consider whether any claims should be struck out on any of the grounds contained within rule 38 Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, including that they have no reasonable prospect of success; 1.5. whether all or any of the claims are out of time, and if so whether time should be extended; 1.6. any further case management. Procedural History

[2]The Claimant contacted ACAS on 15 May 2024 regarding a claim against the First Respondent. An EC certificate was issued on 20 June 2024.

[3]The Claimant presented this claim on 26 June 2024, for unfair dismissal, race discrimination, religion/belief discrimination and harassment and whistleblowing.

[4]The First Respondent defended the claim. It said that the claim was poorly and insufficiently pleaded, and sought strike out, or alternatively deposit orders.

[5]The Claimant provided a lengthy reply to the First Respondent’s response. 2 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[6]The claim against the Second Respondent was initially rejected by the Tribunal. The Claimant contacted ACAS in relation to the Second Respondent on 9 November 2024 and the certificate was issued on 13 November 2024. His claim against ASOS was then accepted by the Tribunal as from 13 November 2024.

[7]The Second Respondent also defended the claim. It sought further particulars of the Claimant’s claim. The Claimant responded to that request, by a 28 page document, and he also responded to the Second Respondent’s Response..

[8]There was a case management preliminary hearing on 20 January 2025 before EJ Hodgson. EJ Hodgson noted that the ET1 was accompanied by a long narrative and that the Claimant accepted that the narrative did not set out all of his claims clearly.

[9]The Claimant confirmed that he relied on being a Black British citizen in his race discrimination complaints.

[10]EJ Hodgson identified the complaints in the claim as follows: “Unfair dismissal 2.7 The claimant alleges the respondent unfairly dismissed him. The respondent relies on a reason related to conduct. Direct discrimination 2.8 The claimant fails to set out what is said to be the religion or belief. 2.9 The sole allegation of direct discrimination is the dismissal. 2.10 This claim may proceed as an allegation of direct discrimination. 2.11 The claimant must apply to amend to set out what is the belief relied on, and whether the allegation of discrimination may proceed on the basis of religion or belief will be subject to further determination. Indirect discrimination 2.12 The claim form contains limited reference to indirect discrimination. It fails to set out adequately or at all what is said to be provision criterion or practice and what is the particular disadvantage. The claimant specifically conceded that the indirect discrimination claim is not pursued on the basis of race. He has failed to identify the belief relied on. 2.13 He stated that the provision criterion or practice relied on was the first respondent’s requirement that members of his 3 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version department wear an ASOS labelled uniform. 2.14 The particular disadvantage is not set out in the claim form. I sought clarification and the claimant stated the disadvantage was “wearing the type of uniform takes us away from doing our initial workload and job main duties of the day.” I was not satisfied he had clearly identified the alleged disadvantage. 2.15 As the belief relied on is not set out adequately or at all, it is not possible to say whether those with the same belief suffered a particular disadvantage. Whistleblowing 2.16 The claimant alleges that he was dismissed because he was a whistleblower. The claim form identifies no other detrimental treatment. 2.17 The claim form refers to “both disclosures.” It fails to identify the disclosures. Harassment 2.18 It is claimant’s case the requirement to wear uniform was a continuing act of harassment. He does not rely on race. He relies on what he describes as a philosophical belief. He failed to set out the belief. “

[11]EJ Hodgson made an UNLESS order, that the Claimant to provide further particulars of his direct and indirect religion and belief discrimination and religion/belief harassment complaints and his protected disclosure detriment complaints: “3.7 On or before 16:00, 10 February 2025, the claimant’s must apply to amend to set out full details of the religion or belief he relies on for the purposes of this claim. 3.8 Unless, on or before 16:00, 10 February 2025, the claimant makes the application as set out above to give full details of the religion or belief he relies on, the following claims will be dismissed without further warning order:3.8.1 any direct discrimination claim that relies on the protected characteristic of religion and belief;

3.8.2 any indirect discrimination claim which relies on the protected characteristic of religion or belief; and

3.8.3 any claim of harassment relies on the protected characteristic of religion or belief. 4 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version 3.9 Unless, on or before 16:00 10 February 2025, the claimant applies to amend to identify what is said to be the disclosure or disclosures that are protected for the purposes of the whistleblowing claim, the claim pursuant to section 103A Employment Rights Act 1996 will be dismissed without further warning order. In order to comply with this order the claimant must provide the following details:

3.9.1 what is said to be the disclosure of information;

3.9.2 whether the information was disclosed orally or in writing;

3.9.3 if it is oral, he must identify, as far as practicable, the date, the wording, and to whom it was made; and

3.9.4 if in writing, he must identify the written document and the wording relied on. 3.10 Unless, on or before 16:00 29 December 2023 the claimant applies to amend to identify what is said to be the particular disadvantage for the purpose of the indirect discrimination claim, the indirect discrimination claim pursuant to section 19 will be dismissed without further warning order.”

[12]EJ Hodgson set out reasons for having made the unless orders.

[13]I noted that the date in 3.10 must have been wrong – it must have meant 10 February 2025. None of the parties took any issue with this.

[14]The Claimant sent a new version of his ET1 claim form to the Tribunal on 23 January 2025. In his covering email, the Claimant said, “I have made amendments and included additional information to my ET1 Claim form as requested by the Judge EJ Hodgson…”.

[15]Both Respondents sent letters in response, contending that the claims affected by the unless order should be regarded as struck out, or alternatively, that the claims should for other reasons be struck out or have a deposit order imposed against them. At This Hearing

[16]I asked the Claimant to confirm, at the start of the hearing, which paragraphs of his 23 January 2025 ‘amendment’ ET1 responded to each of EJ Hodgson’s UNLESS orders.

[17]The Claimant confirmed that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 23 January 2025 amendment ET1, as follows, “5. The Claimants (philisophical) belief is there is no real requirement to wear ASOS uniform. 6. The Claimants belief is he was protected by his Employment Contract & Employee Handbook. Any other request is unlawful, detrimental, taking advantage of their employee(s).” were the “full details of the religion or belief he relies on”, as ordered by EJ Hodgson. 5 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[18]The Claimant conceded that he had not provided any particulars of his alleged protected disclosures, ordered at UNLESS Order paragraph 3.9. He also conceded that he had not provided any particulars of the particular disadvantage ordered at UNLESS Order paragraph 3.10.

[19]The Claimant told me, orally, first that his protected disclosures were letters he sent to the Respondents in November and December 2023. He said that he had provided particulars of those letters in a witness statement for this hearing dated 23 July 2025. However, when he later referred to that witness statement, it only said that the Claimant drafted a letter in January 2024. The statement did not say who the letter was directed to.

[20]Later still, in oral submissions, the Claimant said that he had made protected disclosures to ASOS in 2022. He was vague in his account of these and gave no details of the disclosures themselves.

[21]In his submissions the Claimant also confirmed that his allegation of “indirect discrimination” was that ASOS was implementing a uniform policy ‘indirectly’ through Ricoh.

[22]At the start of the hearing, the First Respondent, RICOH, made clear that it was not seeking to strike out, or obtain a deposit order in relation to, the Claimant’s complaints of ordinary unfair dismissal and race discrimination as regards dismissal. Those complaints would proceed to a Final Hearing.

[23]The Claimant’s complaint of race discrimination in relation to the dismissal relied on a comparator, Mr Comeford, whom the Claimant says RICOH did not dismiss, but moved off site for gross misconduct.

[24]The Second Respondent sought strike out of all the claims against it.

[25]In his submissions, the Claimant agreed that he contended that RICOH made the decision to dismiss him and also made the decision not to dismiss his comparator, Mr Comeford. The Claimant said that he believed he had not alleged race discrimination against the Second Respondent, but he was not sure.

[26]There was a Bundle of documents. Both Respondents provided written skeleton arguments. The Claimant had produced a 56 page witness statement, with additional appendices, dated 23 July 2025.

[27]I heard evidence from the Claimant regarding time limit issues alone.

[28]All parties made submissions. Amendment Application and Compliance with UNLESS Order

[29]I decided the Claimant’s amendment application first, because it would fair to the Claimant to do this before considering whether to strike out his claim. This also touched on the UNLESS Order and the Claimant’s compliance with it.

[30]The amendment application related to the Claimant’s new version of his ET1 claim dated 23 January 2025. His covering email had said, “I have made amendments and 6 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version included additional information to my ET1 Claim form as requested by the Judge EJ Hodgson…”.

[31]The Claimant’s 23 January 2025 email and attached new ET1 were clearly intended to comply with EJ Hodgson’s UNLESS order.

[32]I took into account the provisions of r39 ET Rules of Procedure 2024, the guidance in Minnoch and ors v Interserve FM Ltd

[2023] ICR 861

at [37] “Stage 2—giving notice of non-compliance 33.7 at this stage the employment tribunal is giving notice of whether there has been compliance—it is not concerned with revisiting the terms of the order 33.8 particularly if there has been some asserted attempt at compliance, careful thought should be given to whether an opportunity should be given for submissions, in writing or at a hearing, before the decision is taken 33.9 the question is whether there has been material compliance 33.10 the test is qualitative rather than quantitative 33.11 the approach should be facilitative rather than punitive 33.12 any ambiguity in the drafting of the order should be resolved in favour of the party who was required to comply.”

[33]I also took into account Johnson v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council

[2013] Eq LR 866

in which Langstaff J (President) gave the following guidance on the meaning of “material compliance” “…’material’ may be a better word than ‘substantial’ in a case in which what is in issue is better particularisation of a claim or response. That is because it draws attention to the purpose for which compliance with the order is sought; that it is within a context. What is relevant, i. e. material, in such a case is whether the particulars given, if any are, enable the other party to know the case it has to meet or, it may be, enable the employment tribunal to understand what is being asserted.”

[34]I considered that it was clear that EJ Hodgson had ordered the Claimant to amend his claim to provide proper particulars of his ‘belief’, his protected disclosure(s) and the alleged particular disadvantage in the indirect discrimination complaint.

[35]The Claimant himself conceded that he had only provided particulars of the ‘belief’ he relied on.

[36]I decided that the Claimant had, indeed, provided particulars of the belief he relied on, at paragraphs 5 and 6 of his 23 January 2025 ET1 amendment. Whether that belief amounted to a philosophical belief within s10 Equality Act 2010 was a separate matter. The Claimant had provided particulars which enabled the Respondents to understand what he said was his belief – and for them to be able to provide cogent arguments as to why that belief was not a philosophical belief within s10 EqA 2010. 7 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[37]Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 23 January 2025 ET1 amendment, had amounted to material compliance with paragraph 3.7 and 3.8 of the UNLESS order.

[38]However, the Claimant himself conceded that none of the other parts of the 23 January 2025 new ET1 provided the particulars EJ Hodgson ordered.

[39]He did not explain how the other parts of the 23 January 2025 ET1 related to any of his claims. He did not say that he wanted to add new complaints. It was not at all clear to me what was the purpose of the other parts of the 23 January 2025 amendment. The 23 January 2025 appeared to seek to add many more words to the claim, but to no obvious effect.

[40]I took into account the ETs (E & W) Presidential Guidance – General Case Management 2018 Note 1: Amendment, and the well-known guidance in Selkent Bus Company v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

[41]I allowed the Claimant to amend his claim to include paragraphs 5 and 6 of his 23 January 2025 ET1. This was a minor amendment, adding particulars to discrimination and harassment claims already pleaded, so the time limits did not apply. It would cause substantially greater hardship and injustice to the Claimant to refuse that amendment than it would to the Respondents to allow it. If the amendment were not permitted, the belief claims would be liable to be struck out as the Claimant would have failed to articulate any protected characteristic required to constitute a basic element of such claims. On the other hand, the Respondents would be able to have their arguments on strike out and / or their substantive response, determined fairly on the merits.

[42]I did not allow the Claimant to amend his claim to include any of the other contents of his 23 January 2025 ET1. They sought to add many words to the claim, with no obvious purpose, or effect. There would be no hardship or injustice to the Claimant in refusing such an amendment. On the other hand, there would be hardship to the Respondents in having to spend time and money responding to an opaque amendment. The balance of hardship and injustice clearly pointed to refusing that amendment.

[43]I make clear that my refusal of this amendment does not prevent the Claimant from giving evidence, in his continuing claims, of any of the facts in his 23 January 2025 ET1, insofar as they are relevant to those existing claims. I have simply not permitted them to be added to his legal claim. UNLESS ORDER - Strike Out of the Protected Disclosure and Indirect Discrimination Complaints

[44]The Claimant did not dispute that he had wholly failed to comply with EJ Hodgson’s UNLESS Orders paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10, by 10 February 2025. There had been no material compliance with those orders by the required date.

[45]The effect of the UNLESS Order was that the protected disclosure automatic unfair dismissal complaint was struck out and the indirect discrimination complaint was struck out 8 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[46]The Claimant told the Tribunal he had been busy with his new job, which is why he had not provided the particulars by 10 February 2025.

[47]At this hearing, I asked the Claimant about his protected disclosures. During the course of the hearing, he repeatedly changed his contentions as to the protected disclosures he relied on: 47.1. First, he said that he relied on disclosures by letter in November 2023 and December 2023 to the Respondents. He gave no particulars of these alleged disclosures, for example the information allegedly disclosed. He said the details were in his witness statement, but they were not; 47.2. Later, he referred to his witness statement dated 23 July 2025, which set out a 10 January 2024 letter, but did not say to whom the letter was sent; 47.3. Later still, the Claimant said he had made protected disclosures to ASOS in 2022. He did not say what information he had disclosed.

[48]Given the changing nature of his assertions, even at this hearing, regarding protected disclosures, I considered that, he had still not made any material compliance with the UNLESS Order at 3.9. It was impossible to understand what he was saying about his protected disclosures, given his constantly changing contentions.

[49]I noted the very extensive documentation the Claimant had already produced, setting out his claims – these ran to well over 100 pages. None of them had provided clarity as to the protected disclosures he relied on.

[50]I had no confidence that, if was he given more time, the Claimant would make clear the protected disclosures he relied on, as EJ Hodgson had asked him to in January 2025.

[51]I considered whether it would be appropriate to give relief from the sanction of strike out in respect of the automatic unfair dismissal and indirect discrimination complaints.

[52]I considered Governing Body of St Albans Girls' School v Neary

[2009] EWCA Civ 1190

[2010] IRLR 124

, in particular [49]–[52], and noted that that a tribunal considering relief from sanctions is not constrained by any particular checklist of factors, but must consider all the factors relevant to the interests of justice and avoid considering irrelevant ones. The decision on whether to grant relief must be rational and not capricious and it should be clear in the tribunal's decision what facts have been regarded as relevant, that the factors affecting the proportionality of the sanction have been weighed and a tenable decision reached: 'it must be possible to see that the judge has asked himself whether in the circumstances the sanction had been just' (at [52]).

[53]I did not consider that it was in the interests of justice to reconsider and set aside the UNLESS order in relation to the automatic unfair dismissal claim. EJ Hodgson had given cogent reasons for making the order. EJ Hodgson had made very clear to the Claimant what was required. The Claimant had not complied with the order at all. The protected disclosures were still not clear. It was, in any event, unsatisfactory for the Claimant to give vague details of protected disclosures orally to this hearing. The Claimant had sent numerous very lengthy documents setting 9 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version out his claim to the Respondents, all of which must have required expenditure of time and money by the Respondents to review. This was the second preliminary hearing and the Claimant had still not provided the necessary clarity. There was no prospect, in my view, that the Claimant would provide any clarity as to his protected disclosures, even if given more time. All these things indicated that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the automatic unfair dismissal claim to proceed when the Claimant could still not articulate it, despite all the time and resources already devoted to that claim. Given all those factors, it was proportionate to allow the strike out to stand.

[54]In considering proportionality, I also took into account the Claimant had an ordinary unfair dismissal claim which was continuing, so there would be less injustice in striking out of the automatic unfair dismissal claim. If the reason or principal reason for dismissal was not conduct, contrary to the First Respondent’s contention, the Claimant could succeed in his ordinary unfair dismissal claim anyway.

[55]I did not consider that it was in the interests of justice to give relief from sanction by reconsidering and setting aside the UNLESS order in respect of the indirect discrimination complaint, either. Again, EJ Hodgson had given cogent reasons for making the order and had made clear to the Claimant what was required. The Claimant had not complied with the order at all. The Claimant explained that, when he alleged ‘indirect discrimination’, he meant that ASOS was implementing a uniform policy ‘indirectly’ through Ricoh. His indirect discrimination complaint was therefore misconceived. He was using ‘indirect’ to describe a principal/agent arrangement, not the application of a rule which caused a particular disadvantage based on a protected characteristic. It would not be in the interests of justice to allowed a misconceived claim to proceed. Strike out was a proportionate sanction in all the circumstances.

[56]The Claimant’s automatic unfair dismissal claim on the grounds of protected disclosures and his indirect discrimination complaints were both struck out on 10 February 2025 when the Claimant failed to comply with an UNLESS Order made at a hearing on 20 January 2025. It is not in the interests of justice to reconsider the strike out and set aside those UNLESS Orders. Those claims remain struck out. Strike Out – r38 ET Rules of Procedure 2024. Strike out of the: Religion and belief direct discrimination and harassment complaints against both Respondents Race discrimination and unfair dismissal complaints against the Second Respondent

[57]I struck out the Claimant’s religion and belief direct discrimination and harassment complaints because they had no reasonable prospects of success under r38(1)(a) ET Rules of Procedure 2024.

[58]I did so because his alleged protected characteristic was not capable of being a philosophical belief in law. 10 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[59]This was not a case of strike out where there are relevant issues of fact to be determined, A v B

[2011] EWCA Civ 1378

, North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Ezsias,

[2007] ICR 1126

; Tayside Public Transport Co Ltd (t/a Travel Dundee) v Reilly

[2012] CSIH 46

[60]The Claimant relied on “5. The Claimants (philisophical) belief is there is no real requirement to wear ASOS uniform. 6. The Claimants belief is he was protected by his Employment Contract & Employee Handbook. Any other request is unlawful, detrimental, taking advantage of their employee(s).” as his philosophical belief.

[61]By s10 Equality Act 2010, “10 Religion or belief … (2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief.

[62]In Grainger plc and ors v Nicholson

[2010] ICR 360

, the EAT indicated that, in order to be a belief capable of protection under the ECHR and the Equality Act 2010 ([24]), the belief must fulfil the following criteria, '(i) The belief must be genuinely held. (ii) It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. (iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. (iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. (v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.''

[63]Regarding the distinction between a belief and an opinion, in McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs

[2008] IRLR 29

, the EAT drew an distinction between a belief qualifying for protection and 'an opinion based on some real or perceived logic or based on information or lack of information available'. In that case, the alleged belief was not found to be a protected belief because the Claimant’s views were based, not on a question of principle, but rather on the ground that there was insufficient scientific evidence to show that same-sex adoptions were in the interest of the child. In Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police

[2016] IRLR 481

the EAT commented on McCIintock: the claimant 'took [his] view not as a matter of principle but as a matter of that which the evidence 11 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version then available showed to him. It was not so much therefore a matter of belief as of opinion based upon the facts then available to him.'

[64]I decided that the Claimant’s belief, in this case, related to the facts of the particular situation in which the Claimant found himself – that, as a matter of fact, there was no real requirement to wear ASOS uniform in the Employment Contract & Employee Handbook. That was an opinion, not a philosophical belief.

[65]The Claimant suggested in oral submissions that he also believed that the uniform he was required to wear was a misrepresentation. However, that, again, was an opinion on the specific facts of the situation and thus fell into category of an opinion of viewpoint.

[66]The belief did not satisfy all the requirements explained in Grainger and there was no reasonable prospect of his complaints based on that belief succeeding.

[67]I also struck out the Claimant’s complaint of race discrimination against the Second Respondent.

[68]His race discrimination complaint is that his employer, the First Respondent, did not dismiss a comparator, Mr Comeford, but moved him off site, for gross misconduct.

[69]In his submissions, the Claimant agreed that he contended that his employer, the First Respondent, made the decision to dismiss him and also made the decision not to dismiss his comparator, Mr Comeford. The Claimant said that he believed he had not alleged race discrimination against the Second Respondent, but he was not sure.

[70]He has set out no factual basis for any contention that the Second Respondent could be responsible for those decisions which he acknowledges and alleges were made by his employer, the First Respondent.

[71]Given that there were no disputes of fact in this regard, in that the Claimant does not allege any factual basis on which the Second Respondent was involved in any way in the decision not to dismiss Mr Comeford, but to dismiss the Claimant, I considered that there was no reasonable prospect of the Tribunal finding that the Second Respondent subjected the Claimant to race discrimination by dismissing him, whether as agent, or principal, or in any other way.

[72]I also struck out the ordinary unfair dismissal claim against the Second Respondent. By s94(1) Employment Rights Act 1996, “An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.” The Second Respondent was not the Claimant’s employer.. There was no reasonable prospect of the Claimant succeeding in claim of unfair dismissal against it. Claims Against Second Respondent Out of Time

[73]In any event, the Claimant’s complaints against the Second Respondent were out of time. 12 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

[74]The facts I state here are for the purposes of this preliminary hearing and are not intended to bind the final hearing on the substantive claims.

[75]The Claimant was dismissed on 19 March 2024. The primary limitation period expired on 18 June 2024.

[76]The Claimant was able to contact ACAS in relation to the claim against the First Respondent on 15 May 2024, following his dismissal.

[77]Even if I accepted, as the Claimant contended, that he did not know that he needed to obtain separate EC Certificates for 2 different Respondents, he was told in a letter from the ET on 2 September 2024 that his claim against the Second Respondent had been rejected because he had not provided an ACAS EC number; and that ACAS did have power to conciliate his claim against the Second Respondent. The Tribunal provided a booklet, answering questions regarding the rejection.

[78]However, rather than undergoing ACAS Conciliation in respect of the Second Respondent and obtaining another EC certificate from ACAS, the Claimant applied to the Tribunal to set aside its rejection.

[79]It ought to have been clear to the Claimant that he needed to conciliate with the Second Respondent in order to bring a claim against it, from 2 September 2024.

[80]The Claimant did not commence conciliation against the Second Respondent until 9 November 2024. Conciliation occurred out of time and cannot have the retrospective effect of extending a time limit which has already expired, Pearce v Bank of America Merrill Lynch

UKEAT/0067/19

[81]EJ Glennie permitted the Claimant’s claim to proceed against the Second Respondent following the Claimant engaging in mandatory conciliation with the Second Respondent.

[82]When the claim was accepted on 13 November 2024, it was almost five months out of time.

[83]I considered that there was no proper explanation as to the further delay of 2 months in conciliating and then bringing the claim against the Second Respondent.

[84]I therefore concluded that, even if it had not been reasonably practicable for the Claimant to have brought his unfair dismissal claim against the Second Respondent in time because he was mistaken about the need for a second ACAS EC certificate, he did not bring the claim within a reasonable period thereafter. A further delay of 2 months was very substantial and not explained.

[85]Further, it was not just and equitable to extend time to present the claims under the Equality Act 2010. The burden was on the Claimant to show that it was just and equitable to extend time but he had failed to do so – the further lengthy delay was not justified. Conclusion 13 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version

Conclusion

[86]All the complaints against the Second Respondent were struck out.

[87]I conducted a private case management preliminary hearing in the Claimant’s surviving unfair dismissal and direct race discrimination complaints against the First Respondent. Employment Judge Brown Date: 30 July 2025 8 August 2025 .................................................................................. .................................................................................. 14 ph outcome jment and case mngmnt 1.5.14 version