Ms L Watson v The Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police: 6001129/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6001129/2024
Between
Ms L WatsonClaimantThe Chief Constable of Leicestershire PoliceRespondent
Before
Employment Judge McTigue sitting aloneIn person for claimantMr Roberts (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 7 May 2026
JUDGMENT
The claim is struck out under Rules 38(1)(b), (c) and (e) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024.
REASONS
[1]I had before me today a bundle of documents prepared by the respondent. That bundle ran to 130 pages. When I refer to documents in that bundle, I shall adopt the following reference - [x]. The respondent had also provided a skeleton argument and copies of authorities. The claimant provided me with various documentation that she had previously provided to the Tribunal. She also supplied me with a documents entitled “Position note” prior to making submissions.[2]The parties had made the following applications prior to today’s hearing: 2.1. On 29/09/25, the Claimant applied to strike out the Respondent’s Response [8]; 2.2. On 13/02/26, the Respondent applied for an unless order (requiring the Claimant to comply with the Tribunal’s disclosure orders) and further case management directions. 2.3. On 26/02/26, the Claimant applied for an extension of time to comply with the Tribunal’s disclosure [81]; 2.4. On 11/03/26, the Claimant applied to adjourn the final hearing [95]; 2.5. On 16/03/26, the Respondent objected to the Claimant’s adjournment application and applied to strike out Claimant’s claim [122].[3]To put these applications into context, the period we are now in should have been the trial window for the full merits hearing. That was listed to take place from 20/04/2026 to 29/04/2026. However, on 16/04/2026 Employment Judge Heap determined that the matter was not ready for a full merits hearings. Employment Judge Heap therefore postponed the hearing with the exception of today which was to be used to determine the competing applications of the Claimant and Respondent.[4]Today’s hearing had been listed as in person hearing. However, the day before the hearing at 15.33 the Claimant emailed the Tribunal. She neglected to copy in the Respondent and stated, “I write urgently regarding the hearing listed for 21 April 2026. Please could you confirm whether the hearing is to be conducted in person or remotely. If the hearing is listed in person, I respectfully request permission to attend remotely due to impecunity causing travel difficulty. I apologise for the extreme short notice and would be grateful for urgent clarification.” That email was forwarded to the Respondent by the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not object to the Claimant appearing remotely and so the hearing was converted to a hybrid hearing. The Respondent appeared in person before me. The Claimant attended via CvP.[5]At the outset of the hearing, both parties agreed that it was sensible to deal with the respective strike out applications first. Depending on the outcome of those applications I would then go on to consider the remaining applications and undertake case management if necessary.[6]After the lunch break, the Claimant submitted her position note to the Tribunal. After reading that document it appeared that the Claimant’s position had shifted and that was now no longer applying to strike out the response. However, I was conscious that the document appeared to have been drafted by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and so might not accurately reflect the Claimant’s position. I was also conscious that the Claimant was a litigant in person and so might not appreciate the way in which AI had chosen to set out her position. The Claimant confirmed that this document had been drafted by AI but also confirmed in clear and certain terms that she was now no longer applying to strike out the response.[7]In respect of the Respondent’s strike out application, the Respondent’s position was that: 7.1. The Claimant had conducted these proceedings unreasonably (Rule 38(1)(b) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (ETR); 7.2. The Claimant had not complied with the Tribunal’s Orders (Rule 38(1)(c) ETR); 7.3. As a result of the above, it was no longer possible to have a fair hearing (Rule 38(1)(e) ETR).
Background
[8]I now set out the background relevant to this matter. I have been persuaded by the Respondent’s skeleton argument in respect of the relevant background and draw on it below.[9]By an Order of EJ Ahmed dated 07/04/25 (“the April Order”), the parties were directed as follows: “8. On or before 31 July 2025 the Claimant and the Respondent shall send to each other a numbered and paginated list of all the documents which are in their possession, power, custody or control which are relevant to the issues, whether or not such documents adversely affect their own case.”[10]On 13/08/25, the Respondent applied to vary that order to extend the time for disclosure until 26/09/25. Within its application, the Respondent explained that(a) Gemma Roets, a Senior Lawyer, had recently taken over conduct of the case and(b) was due on annual leave (15/08/25 – 04/09/25) and involved in a hearing (08-17/09/25). The Respondent’s application also highlighted that there was a large volume of disclosure to consider, and that the Claimant had not yet complied with the direction to disclose documents herself.[11]On the same day, the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal objecting to the application and wrongly asserted that the ETR require that any application to extend a deadline must be made before the deadline has expired. That was wrong as Rule 5 makes clear that the Tribunal can extend deadlines, even after their expiry, and Rules 31 and 32 place no such requirement on the parties (though it is often helpful). Notably, the Claimant also failed to comply with the Order and to apply for an extension. The Claimant further erroneously stated that her disclosure was “contingent on their to ensure relevance and proportionality” and asserted that “The Respondent’s breach is the reason I have not yet been able to finalise mine.” That was contrary to the April Order which directed simultaneous exchange.[12]On 29/08/25, the Employment Judge Broughton granted the Respondent’s request but also indicated that the Respondent had not fully explained the reason for its original non-compliance. Employment Judge Broughton made the following orders (“the August Order”): 1. the claimant is to send the respondent her list of documents by 26 September 2025. However, the respondent is to send to the claimant its list and a copy of those documents. 2. The respondent is to request a copy of any of the documents on the claimant's list within 7 days of receiving it. 3. The parties are to agree the bundle by 24 October 2025 and the respondent to provide the claimant with the bundle within 7 days thereafter. 4. witness statements are still to be exchanged by 28 November 2025.[13]On 26/09/24 at 16:48 Mr Ring, a solicitor for the Respondent, sent an internal email to arrange for the creation of an Egress link to enable the Claimant to download 9 PDFs [1]. At 17:11, Mr Ring emailed the Claimant stating that the Respondent was ready to exchange disclosure [2]. Mr Ring noted that because of the size of the documents, he would need to send them by 9 separate emails. However, he offered the Claimant the opportunity to receive them via the Egress system instead if she wished. The Claimant failed to respond to Mr Ring’s email or make any effort to comply with the August Order to implement simultaneous exchange of disclosure.[14]On 29/09/25 at 10:00, Gemma Roets wrote to the Claimant stating that the Respondent had confirmed it was ready to comply with the August Order and asked the Claimant to confirm she was also ready to comply [3]. The Claimant failed to respond to that letter and instead applied to the Tribunal to strike out the response. 15. 13. At 13:19, Gemma Roets of the Respondent emailed the Claimant an Egress link to its disclosure and reiterated that the Respondent had been ready to complete disclosure on 26/09/25 but felt it would be more convenient to set up an Egress link. Ms Roets highlighted that the Claimant “did not respond in respect of this, nor did you confirm that you were in a position to exchange” [10].[16]At 13:39, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent stating that she had applied to strike out the response and that she would revert following the Tribunal’s decision [11]. At 14:34, the Respondent wrote to the Tribunal objecting to the Claimant’s strike out application and explaining the relevant circumstances [12].[17]On 17/11/25, the Respondent provided some further disclosure to the Claimant as part of its ongoing duty of disclosure [20]. The same day, the Claimant replied. Of relevance, she stated [21], “I will review the material in detail and will provide my own disclosure schedule once this review is complete”.[18]On 07/12/25, the Tribunal wrote to the parties stating that before determining the Claimant’s strike out application, the parties were to “confirm what the present position is in relation to compliance with the [August Order]” [31].[19]The same day, the Claimant replied, advancing arguments by email and an attached document, together totalling 34 pages [33]. Despite its length, the Claimant failed to address the Tribunal’s query.[20]On 08/12/25, the Respondent replied to the Tribunal summarising the relevant position [38]. 21. On the same day, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal at 16:16 with a response to the Respondent’s email [41]. She sent another email at 16:22 [45].[21]On 02/01/26, the Claimant sent an email [49] attaching a further document purporting to be a “Consolidated” submission in respect of her application [50].[22]On 13/01/26, the Respondent wrote to the Claimant [53] and addressed the Claimant’s application for access to her old email mailbox. The Respondent highlighted that it had complied with the Tribunal’s Order for standard disclosure and that the Tribunal had made no order for specific disclosure. It also drew the Claimant’s attention to the fact that she had not complied with her disclosure obligations. The Respondent asked the Claimant to comply and indicated that, if she did not, the Respondent would seek an unless order. 23. 25. On 13/01/25, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal at 12:59 [54] and 18:10 [56]. She disputed that she had refused to comply with the August Order. Instead, she stated that she had been “prevented” from complying.[24]On 12/02/26, the Respondent wrote to the Claimant again and drew her attention to the terms of the August Order and repeated, that it required simultaneous disclosure and not, as she had suggested, sequential [61]. The Respondent invited the Claimant to agree to the directions by 16/02/26 (informing her that it would seek an unless order if she did not agree).[25]On 13/02/26, the Claimant replied [56]. She stated she was willing to engage constructively with any timetable but stated that, given the applications and “unresolved disclosure issues”, she was unwilling to agree to the revised directions “outside the Tribunal’s supervision” [63]. She maintained the argument that she was not refusing to comply but had been “prevented” from complying because of R’s “late and incomplete” disclosure.[26]At 12:27, the Respondent emailed the Tribunal [64] attaching an application for an unless order requiring the Claimant to comply with paragraph 1 of the August Order by 27/02/26 and for further case management orders [65]. At 13:17, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal [73] attaching an objection to the Respondent’s application [74]. She advanced several contentions, including that her noncompliance with the August Order had been one of “procedural impossibility”, not refusal.[27]On 19/02/26, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal and Respondent with a document entitled “CLAIMANT’S LIST OF DOCUMENTS” [76]. Specifically, the Claimant stated this was “(Provided pursuant to the Tribunal’s Order for disclosure)”. In it, the Claimant stated that she was disclosing “the following documents presently in her possession, custody or control which are relevant to the issues in these proceedings”.[28]Of particular note, the Claimant also stated: “Save for the categories of documents identified above, the Claimant confirms that she is not presently in possession, custody, or control of any further documents relevant to the issues in these proceedings.” That statement was false because on 24/02/26 the Claimant wrote to the Respondent stating she would provide her disclosure list, thus indicating she did have other documents in her possession. It was also false because on 26/02/26, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal [81] and described her disclosure as “initial disclosure” and stated she required a “short extension of time” to ensure her “disclosure was complete”. The Claimant then sought an extension until 12/03/26.[29]On 02/03/26, the Respondent objected to the Claimant’s request for an extension [82].[30]At 10:05, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal [84] again, repeating her previous assertion that she had not refused to comply with the August Order.[31]On 11/03/26 at 16:27, the Claimant emailed the Respondent [89] complaining about the format of the Respondent’s disclosure. In particular, she raised that it contained scanned images of documents that were “not text-searchable” and which she alleged were of poor quality. Then at 17:57, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal applying to adjourn the hearing [95]. She contended that “additional preparation time is required in order for the Claimant to properly review the documentary evidence”. She also sought to rely on having “severe depression” affecting her ability to prepare, albeit she provided no medical evidence to support this.[32]On 12/03/26, at 11:05, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent seeking documents in relation to the accelerated misconduct hearing [118]. The Respondent replied to the Claimant’s email explaining that the complaints relating to the accelerated misconduct hearing had been struck out [119]. Then at 15:28, the Claimant sent a further email to the Tribunal with additional submissions in support of her adjournment application [120]. The Claimant contended that documents that had been disclosed to her included passages that had previously been redacted as part of the accelerated misconduct process and that, accordingly, she required further time. Again, this was despite the Respondent having sent the Claimant the bundle several months earlier and despite the accelerated misconduct hearing not forming part of the case.[33]On 16/03/26 at 11:46, the Respondent emailed the Tribunal [122] opposing the Claimant’s application for a postponement and applying to strike out her claims. That same day at 14:24, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal opposing the Respondent’s application [126]. At 18:11, she again emailed the Tribunal, repeating her observations about the documents she had received during the accelerated misconduct hearing.
The Law
[34]Rule 38(1) of the ETR provides as follows: 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a)that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (b)that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c)for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d)that it has not been actively pursued; (e)that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).[35]When considering whether to strike out a claim, the Tribunal must first consider whether any of the grounds set out in rule 37(1) have been established; and then, having identified any established grounds, it must decide whether to exercise its discretion to order strike-out. This two-stage approach was confirmed in Hasan v Tesco Stores Ltd EAT 0098/16, EAT.[36]In deciding whether to order strike-out, Tribunals should have regard to the overriding objective of dealing with cases ‘fairly and justly’, set out in rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules.[37]Whilst the striking out of discrimination claims should be rare because of the public interest importance of such claims being determined after examination of the evidence (see Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] 1 W.L.R,638: UKEAT/0128/19/BA – albeit in a different context) that will be a permissible step where there can no longer be a fair hearing, including within a reasonable time frame (see Peixoto v British Telecommunications plc EAT 0222/07 and Riley v Crown Prosecution Service 2013 IRLR 966, CA).[38]Strike-out must be a proportionate response, and cases alleging abuse of process or discrimination are only to be struck out in the most obvious and plainest of cases. In Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] 1 W.L.R. 638, Lord Steyn stated that: "24. …For my part such vagaries in discrimination jurisprudence underline the importance of not striking out such claims as an abuse of the process except in the most obvious and plainest cases. Discrimination cases are generally fact-sensitive, and their proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias in favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits of its particular facts is a matter of high public interest." That point has been reinforced more recently in Xie v E’Quipe Japan Ltd [2024] EAT 176.[39]When considering an application under Rule 38(1)(b) ETR, the Tribunal should consider apply the following two-stage test (see Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James [2006] EWCA Civ 684, [2006] IRLR 630, at paragraph 5): 39.1. Has there been unreasonable conduct by a party which is either(a) deliberate and persistent or(b) which has rendered a fair trial impossible; and, if so, 39.2. Is strike out proportionate in the circumstances?[40]The reference to whether a fair hearing is possible, is a reference to whether it is possible “within that trial window” (see Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd [2022] ICR 327 at paragraph18) not whether it is possible in absolute terms on another date. The reference to “deliberate” does not include “mere oversight or negligence” (Emuemukoro at paragraph 22). When considering proportionality, the question is whether there is a “less drastic means” of resolving the issue, James at paragraph 21.[41]When considering an application under Rule 38(1)(c) ETR, the Tribunal should have regard to the overriding objective set out in Rule 3 of seeking to deal with cases fairly and justly. This requires a tribunal to consider all relevant factors, including: 41.1. the magnitude of the non-compliance 41.2. whether the default was the responsibility of the party or his or her representative 41.3. what disruption, unfairness or prejudice has been caused 41.4. whether a fair hearing would still be possible, and 41.5. whether striking out or some lesser remedy would be an appropriate response to the disobedience — see Weir Valves and Controls (UK) Ltd v Armitage 2004 ICR 371, EAT. Submissions[42]The Respondent submitted: 42.1. That the Claimant had clearly acted unreasonably as demonstrated by the approach she had taken towards compliance with the Tribunal’s Orders regarding disclosure; 42.2. That the Claimant’s conduct was deliberate and could not be described as mere oversight or negligence. 42.3. That the Claimant wilfully refused to comply with Orders despite eminently being able to do so; 42.4. Finally, a fair hearing within the trial window was impossible and there was no other proportionate means of resolving the problem.[43]The Claimant submitted that she had not deliberately failed to comply with the Orders made by the Tribunal. She submitted that the claim had become procedurally complex and that this had presented her from complying with her disclosure obligations. She stated that she had not refused to comply directions but had health difficulties and caring responsibilities. The Claimant however submitted that she was not relying on her health difficulties or caring responsibilities as a reason for non-compliance. She also submitted that it was disproportionate to strike out the claim and that it would be fairer to case manage the claim through to a final hearing instead.
Conclusion
[44]I deal briefly with two of the Claimant’s submissions. 44.1. First, I am unable to accept that the Claimant has been presented from complying with her disclosure obligations. When asked about that matter today, the Claimant said she had presented from complying with disclosure as the Respondent had not disclosed the contents of her email inbox. I do not accept that is a valid reason for the Claimant failing to comply with the relevant Tribunal orders in this matter. The Claimant is only under an obligation to disclose documents which are in her possession or control. She is obviously under no obligation to disclose the contents of her email inbox as they are not in her possession or control. In addition, the Respondent is under no obligation to disclose the entire contents of the Claimant’s inbox, only those documents which are relevant to the issues. Documents relating to the accelerated misconduct hearing are not relevant as that part of the claim has been struck out. Finally, at no point has the Claimant made an application for specific disclosure of any relevant emails or documents in her email inbox. 44.2. In respect of the Claimant’s health and caring responsibilities, the Claimant has provided no medical evidence pertaining to these matters. In addition, despite raising these matters, the Claimant immediately indicated that she was not seeking to rely on them as reasons for her non-comlinace with Orders. In the absence of evidence from the Claimant, I have assumed that the Claimant was fit and able to participate in these Tribunal proceedings since the date the April 2025 Order was made.[45]In relation to Rule 38(1)(b) ETR I conclude that there has there been unreasonable conduct by the Claimant which was deliberate and persistent. In addition, for the purposes of Rule 38(1)(c) I conclude that the magnitude of noncompliance by the Claimant is substantial and that the default is her responsibility. I reach those conclusions for the following reasons: 45.1. On 13/08/2025, the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal and erroneously stated that her disclosure was “contingent on their to ensure relevance and proportionality”. She also stated that “The Respondent’s breach is the reason I have not yet been able to finalise mine.” That was contrary to the April 2025 Order of EJ Ahmed, which directed simultaneous exchange. At no stage has the Tribunal permitted, or the Respondent agreed to allow the Claimant to defer providing disclosure until after the Respondent has done so. This is a unilateral condition imposed by the Claimant, which she had no right to impose. 45.2. Following the August 2025 Order made by EJ Broughton, Mr Ring, a solicitor for the Respondent, emailed the Claimant on 26/09/2024 stating that the Respondent was ready to exchange disclosure. The Claimant failed to respond to Mr Ring’s email or make any effort to comply with the August Order to implement simultaneous exchange of disclosure. The consequence of this was that the Respondent attempted to comply with the August Order, but the Claimant breached it. Notwithstanding that on 29/09/2024 the Claimant made an application to strike out the Respondent’s response. This amounts to unreasonable conduct as it is apparent the Claimant was seeking to game the Tribunal procedure. 45.3. On 17/11/25, the Respondent provided some further disclosure to the Claimant as part of its ongoing duty of disclosure [20]. The same day, the Claimant replied and stated [21], “I will review the material in detail and will provide my own disclosure schedule once this review is complete”. Again, the August Order did not permit the Claimant to unilaterally review the Respondent’s disclosure before complying with the August Order. 45.4. On 13/02/26, the Claimant contacted the Respondent and stated that she was willing to engage constructively with any future timetable but stated that, given the applications and “unresolved disclosure issues”, she was unwilling to agree to the revised directions “outside the Tribunal’s supervision” [63]. She maintained the argument that she was not refusing to comply but had been “prevented” from complying because of the Respondent’s “late and incomplete” disclosure. This was again unreasonable as only the Claimant had breached both the April and August Orders and failed to cooperate with the Respondent in a bid to gain an a tactical advantage. Regarding the alleged “incomplete” disclosure, this concerned the Claimant’s request for access to her mailbox. The Respondent’s disclosure was not incomplete. That is because the Respondent was not required to disclose the entirety of the Claimant’s mailbox. The Respondent asked the Claimant to identify the specific emails she was seeking, but she failed to do so. The Claimant’s mistaken belief that the Respondent has not complied with its disclosure obligations does not justify the Claimant’s unilateral refusal to comply with the Tribunal’s orders. 45.5. On 13/02/2026 at 13:17, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal [73] attaching an objection to the Respondent’s application [74]. She advanced several spurious and false contentions, including that her non-compliance with the August Order had been one of “procedural impossibility”, not refusal. That was not correct. There was no evidence of anything which had prevented the Claimant from complying by 26/09/25, nor at any time in the intervening 3.5 months. Instead, the Claimant’s refusal to disclosure was due to her unreasonable conclusion that the Respondent was obliged to provide all of its disclosure to her before she provided her own disclosure. That was further unreasonable conduct. 45.6. On 11/03/26 at 16:27, the Claimant emailed the Respondent [89] complaining about the format of the Respondent’s disclosure. In particular, she raised that it contained scanned images of documents that were “not text-searchable” (there was no requirement for this). That was also unreasonable conduct as the none of the Orders made by the Tribunal provided that disclosure had to be “text-searchable”. In addition, by this point the Claimant had access to the bundles for approximately five and a half months and had raised no concerns about them.[46]In addition, the Claimant’s conduct has rendered a fair trial impossible within the trial window. The trial window in this claim is 20/04/2026 to 29/04/2026. We are now within that and the Claimant has still not provided her disclosure list despite being ordered to do so by EJ Broughton in August 2025. As a consequence of that, no bundle has been agreed between the parties for the full merits hearing. In addition, witness statements have not been exchanged, and the Claimant has still to prepare a witness statement.[47]In addition, her responses to questions today indicated that she has little intention to comply with her disclosure obligations either within the trial window or indeed at any other point. I reach that conclusion as she provided contradictory responses to simple questions today which indicated to me that she understood her disclosure obligations yet chose to fail to comply with them. I deal with those contradictory responses in the following paragraph.[48]It is clear the Claimant has a good understanding her disclosure obligations as indicated by the statement she provided in her list on 19/02/2026 [76]. That stated, “C. Confirmation of Completeness - Save for the categories of documents identified above, the Claimant confirms that she is not presently in possession, custody, or control of any further documents relevant to the issues in these proceedings”. She initially told the Tribunal today that she had fully complied with her disclosure obligations by sending the list at [76]. When asked why she then indicated to the Respondent on 24/02/2026, at [80], that she was still working on her disclosure list, she stated that was because the list previously sent at [76] was only partial. Not only does the list at [76] not state that it is partial but her statement today runs counter to the “Confirmation of Completeness” included in her list of 19/02/2026 at [76].[49]Is strike out proportionate in the circumstances? I conclude that it is. Given the Claimant’s past performance, I have no confidence that if I were to make a further Order for disclosure today the Claimant would comply with it. The claimant submitted that further case management was a lesser option that should be adopted here. I disagree. As the history of these proceedings demonstrate, the claimant has repeatedly been provided with clear directions and timeframes by the Tribunal. Those directions and timeframes have been ineffective in the past and there is no evidence that they will prove to be more effective in the future. I can think of no lesser alternative other than strike out.[50]I now consider whether I should exercise my discretion to strike out. 50.1. If I were to list this matter again, it would be some considerable time before it is heard. My listings team indicated to me today that it might be possible to find a slot at the end of 2027 but that is not guaranteed. I should also note that the Tribunal in this region is currently listing final hearings of a similar duration to this towards the end of 2028. The disputed matters in this claim concern events which took place approximately 4 years ago. A further delay in this hearing will dim the recollections of all witnesses regarding their recollection of key events. 50.2. I also consider the impact on the Respondent. The Respondent is entitled to have some finality in these proceedings and not have proceedings continuing in the hope that the Claimant will change her behaviour and start to comply with future Tribunal orders. There is also the cost to the Respondent to consider. The overriding objective requires me to deal with cases without delay where possible and save expense. If the matter were relisted, costs for the Respondent would increase even though it is not the cause of the matter not being ready for a final hearing. 50.3. I also consider the resources of the Tribunal and the impact that relisting the claim for a further 8 days of hearing time will have on other users of the Tribunal service. Listing a case for a hearing for 8 days has an obvious and significant impact on the ability of other cases to be heard during that timeframe. Cases are already being listed well into 2028, and a hearing of this length will push back hearing dates of soon to be issued cases even further. Within an 8-day period of time I envisage that somewhere approaching 5 plus cases might be able to be successfully determined. That impedes access to justice for others in the system who are seeking to advance their claims.[51]Taking all matters into account, I conclude that regrettably there is no longer any prospect of a fair hearing taking place and that it is right to strike out the claim. This is not a decision that I have taken lightly given the important public interest in discrimination claims being substantively determined but I cannot determine that there is any lesser course that would achieve a just result for both parties. For these reasons, I have struck out the claims under under Rules 38(1)(b), (c) and (e) ETR. Approved by: