Mrs M Abuayyash v Bristol City Council and Mrs A James: 6000618/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6000618/2023

Between

Mrs M AbuayyashClaimant

Bristol City Council (1) Mrs A James (2) Upon an application made by the Claimant by email, and without a hearing, to reconsider the judgment sent to the parties on 14 May 2025 (the Judgment):Respondent

Before

Employment Judge Youngs

Date 10 April 2025

JUDGMENT

ON RECONSIDERATION The Claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Judgment is refused because there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.

REASONS

[1]Applications for reconsideration are governed by Rules 68 to 71 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

[2]Rule 68 provides that a Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is “necessary in the interests of justice to do so”. This allows an Employment Tribunal a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration of a judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. The discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.

[3]The importance of finality was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v. Burton and anor

[2016] EWCA Civ 714

in July 2016 where Elias LJ said that: “the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board

[1975] ICR 395

) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v Ironsides Ray and Vials

[1994] ICR 384

Mummery J held that the failure of a party's representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review.”

[4]Similarly, in Liddington v. 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust

EAT/0002/16

the EAT chaired by Simler P (as she then was) said in paragraph 34 that: “a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or by adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.”

[5]The Tribunal dealing with the question of reconsideration must seek to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly.

[6]The procedure upon a reconsideration application is for the Employment Judge that heard the case or gave the judgment in question to consider the application and determine if there are reasonable prospects of the original decision or judgment being varied or revoked. Essentially, this is a reviewing function in which the Employment Judge must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of reconsideration in the interest of justice. There must be some basis for reconsideration. It is insufficient for an applicant to apply simply because they disagree with the decision.

[7]If the Employment Judge considers that there is no such reasonable prospect then the application shall be refused. Otherwise, the original decision shall be reconsidered at a subsequent reconsideration hearing. The Employment Judge’s role therefore upon considering such an application is to act as a filter to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked were the matter to be considered at a reconsideration

hearing.

[8]This case was heard from 3-13 March 2025 at the Bristol Employment Tribunal. Both parties were represented at the hearing by their respective counsel.

[9]The case was heard by a full Tribunal panel, which made unanimous findings of fact and conclusions. Full reasons were given orally at the conclusion of the hearing. Written reasons were then requested and provided.

[10]On 10 July 2025, in response to correspondence from the Tribunal, the Claimant forwarded a copy of an application for reconsideration, which she said she had previously submitted on 27 May 2025. Unfortunately, that application was either not received or did not make its way to the Tribunal’s file. There was then a delay in sending the reconsideration request to me, and a lengthy period of annual leave followed. Subsequent to that, on 29 September 2025, the Claimant submitted a further email to be taken into account in considering her application for reconsideration. As the reconsideration outcome had not yet been sent to the parties, it was considered and is dealt with below. We apologise to the parties for the delay in responding to the Claimant’s request for reconsideration. The Claimant’s application

[11]The Claimant’s application for reconsideration was submitted on 25 grounds. I have dealt with each of them by reference to the Claimant’s numbering and headings in her reconsideration application(s).

[12]The Claimant further notes in her introduction to the application that: This application identifies multiple material errors in fact and law, including findings that were not supported by the evidence, or where evidence was misinterpreted, omitted, or accepted without scrutiny. I submit that these flaws render the judgment unsafe. I bring this application as a litigant in person, and due to time and resource constraints, I have done my best to identify and organize the key points that I believe warrant reconsideration. However, this document may not capture every issue or irregularity, and I respectfully ask the Tribunal to consider this context in assessing my application. Ground 1 – “Failure to Order Disclosure of Ms James’s Notes”

[13]The Claimant is referring to the Tribunal’s instructions to Mrs James that she could not take notes with her to the witness stand. The Tribunal did not make enquiries as to whether the notes were contemporaneous or prepared for the purposes of litigation. The Tribunal had before it an agreed Bundle of Documents, and unless specific issues are brought to the attention of the Tribunal, we would not know whether there were disputes as to whether disclosure obligations had been complied with.

[14]If the Claimant felt that there were notes that should have, but were not, disclosed to her, it was open to her to a) make a request for them from the Respondents and b) make a request to the Tribunal for an Order for disclosure. The Tribunal is unaware what discussions were or were not had between the parties, but no request was made for an Order for disclosure by the Claimant or her counsel.

[15]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 2 – “Mischaracterization of My Role”

[16]The finding of fact referred to by the Claimant is at paragraph 5 of the Judgment, and relates to the initial engagement of the Claimant in 2015, not the Claimant’s role in the Resettlement team, which was the subject of this claim. This finding does not extend to describe the Claimant’s role thereafter, or at the relevant time. The Claimant herself notes that the point she makes “was not directly tied to the disputed role”.

[17]The Claimant submits that the “mischaracterizarion” of her role indicates that the Tribunal did not understand “the true nature of [her] work” at the relevant time. A key aspect of the Claimant’s claim was how she characterised her role compared to the Respondents, and the Tribunal understood that the Claimant and the Respondents did not agree as to the extent of the Claimant’s role. The Tribunal understood the two positions and made findings of fact having carefully considered the evidence, including the evidence referred by the Claimant in her reconsideration application in respect of Ground 2. We did not agree with the Claimant’s characterisation of her role at the material times. As referred to above, it is insufficient for an applicant to apply for reconsideration simply because they disagree with the decision.

[18]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 3 – “False Justification That My Role Was Created Due to Illness. Material Error of Fact Regarding Purpose of Engagement (Redacted and Misleading Evidence Misinterpreted)”

[19]The history leading up to the Claimant’s initial engagement in the First Respondent’s Resettlement Team is set out in the Judgment, insofar as it is relevant to the matters in issue. By the time the Claimant’s engagement was confirmed, Mrs James was due to go off sick and the Tribunal found as a fact, having considered the evidence, that Mrs James “wanted to get the Claimant’s engagement sorted out prior to her sick leave, as part of the arrangements for backfilling her role” and that, therefore, the Claimant was “to support the cover required during Mrs James’s sick leave”. The Tribunal did not hear evidence as to who knew about Mrs James’s illness, and that was not relevant to the issues in this case. Whether the Claimant knew and at what stage is not relevant.

[20]I note that the Claimant refers in this ground to “her role”. These paragraphs in the Judgment do not refer to a substantive “role”, but to the Claimant’s initial engagement. The Claimant has not indicated how any alleged error of fact as to the reason why she was initially engaged has caused unfairness in the Judgment, which is what the Claimant appears to be alleging.

[21]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 4 – “Misleading Claims about Dan Berlin’s Qualifications”

[22]The Tribunal did not make any finding of fact about Mr Berlin’s qualifications. Neither did we make a finding of fact, as suggested by the Claimant in her application under ground 4, that the Claimant “would not have succeeded in applying for the role”, which I understand to be the Ukrainian Lettings Manager role, which is the role Mr Berlin was appointed to in 2022. The findings of fact in this regard are at paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Judgment, and the relevant conclusion is at paragraphs 228 and 229.

[23]The process for shortlisting of or selection for the roles in question was not in issue – the Claimant did not apply for the Ukrainian Housing Manager role, which meant she was not considered for the Ukrainian Lettings Manager role.

[24]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 5 – “Manual Addition to Code of Conduct Form”

[25]The Tribunal made its findings of fact based on the evidence available to it. The Claimant simply does not agree. That is not a legitimate basis for reconsideration.

[26]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 6 – “Constructive Denial of Job Evaluation”

[27]I understand the Claimant to be referring to the findings of fact at paragraphs 23 and 27 of the Judgment. The Claimant says in her application for reconsideration that “In August 2021, HR had confirmed my hours and responsibilities no longer met the casual worker definition”. This correspondence was at pages 215 and 216 of the Bundle and is referenced in the Judgment. At this time, the Claimant was still treated as a casual worker, albeit there had been internal discussions. Employment status was subsequently raised by the Claimant’s solicitor in November 2022 (paragraph 62 of the Judgment), and the First Respondent confirmed the Claimant’s employment status on 25 November 2022 (paragraph 74 of the Judgment).

[28]The evidence was considered by the Tribunal and findings made accordingly.

[29]What “should” have happened in respect of job evaluation in August 2021 was not the issue in the case. The allegation (at issue 6.2.1) was that not evaluating the Claimant’s role / withholding the possibility of a job evaluation from her was an act of direct race discrimination, i.e. because of the Claimant’s case. The Tribunal did not uphold the complaint of discrimination.

[30]Neither the Claimant nor her representative asked the Tribunal to Order disclosure of the documents / notes referred to by the Claimant under this Ground.

[31]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 7 – “Misleading Acceptance of PMO Involvement”

[32]The findings of fact in relation to the PMO team’s involvement with the Resettlement Team are at paragraphs 31 to 33 and 41-42. Evidence of the output of the PMO review was presented to the Tribunal, in the form of the proposed Language Policy and witness evidence (including the Claimant’s evidence). We did not make a finding that the PMO team gave advice as to any formal job evaluation process.

[33]It was open to the Claimant to request disclosure of any additional documents. No such application was made to the Tribunal.

[34]As referred to above, the claim was one of race discrimination and we did not find that the Claimant was denied any job evaluation in August 2021 because of race.

[35]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 8 – “Exclusion from Job Evaluation Training Email (Discriminatory Detriment)”

[36]This was pleaded as a claim for direct race discrimination, victimisation and/or whistleblowing detriment. The Tribunal considered why the Claimant was removed from the group email. The Claimant accepted that another employee was not included on the same email, albeit that the circumstances leading to his sickness were not the same. It was open to the Claimant / her representative to draw the Tribunal’s attention to any contradictory evidence in the Bundle. In her application for reconsideration under Ground 8, the Claimant says that she continued to receive other team communications between January 2023 and August 2023. The emails in the Bundle between those dates are direct emails to and from the Claimant relating to the various issues raised by her.

[37]The Claimant does not suggest that she has found evidence now that was not available before. She does not appear to be raising any new points that she couldn’t have raised at the final hearing of this matter. The basis of this ground is contrary to the principle of finality of litigation.

[38]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 9 – “Tribunal Relied on Unsupported and Contradicted Memory”

[39]The Claimant refers to a conversation about her role in the Summer of 2021 “in Redfield”. I understand this to refer to the finding of fact at paragraph 18 of the Judgment. The Tribunal made no finding of fact as to the location of the discussion with the Claimant, or the amount of time the Claimant and Mrs James spent together on the day in question. The Tribunal assessed what the Claimant said about the substance of the discussion, as well as what Mrs James said, along with the contemporaneous related emails (referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Judgment).

[40]The issue of Mrs James’s notes is dealt with above.

[41]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 10 – “Tribunal Heard False Comparator Claim Without Scrutiny”

[42]The Claimant raises matters in relation to this Ground that were not relevant to issues to be determined by the Tribunal. As referred to above, the Tribunal made no finding of fact in relation to Mr Berlin’s qualifications and his qualifications were not relevant to the Claimant’s claims. Neither did the Tribunal make any finding as to whether the process followed by Mrs James in relation to the Ukrainian Lettings Manager (which the Claimant has referred to as “Ukrainian Programme Manager”) was “correct”. That was not the issue. The Tribunal did not make any finding as to whether the Claimant “would not have succeeded” if she had applied for the Ukrainian Lettings Manager role (or the Ukrainian roles by any other name). Again, that was not an issue for the Tribunal to determine.

[43]As referred to above, the findings of fact in this regard are at paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Judgment, and the relevant conclusion is at paragraphs 228 and 229.

[44]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 11 – “Tribunal Misrepresented My Participation in Development Training”

[45]The Claimant’s claim was that In March 2022, Mrs James, the Second Respondent, “made sure that the Claimant did not have a chance to apply for the Housing Management role in the Refugee Resettlement Team by not providing her with training”.

[46]The Tribunal made findings of fact as to the various training offered to the Claimant (paragraphs 39, 40 and 59 of the Judgment). Paragraph 59 deals with the invitation to attend sessions on confidence building, using transferable skills, and Team Leader skills, which the Claimant chose not to attend. No finding was made as to why, and the reason why the Claimant did not attend these sessions is not relevant to the Claimant’s claim that she was denied training opportunities.

[47]Our conclusion, at paragraph 228 of the Judgment was that “when the Claimant asked for training, she was offered it”. The Claimant’s application for reconsideration confirms that she attended a “Team Leader Development Programme”.

[48]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 12 – “Disproportionate Treatment in Job Evaluation Access”

[49]It is not entirely clear which finding or conclusion the Claimant disputes. However, the Tribunal did not make a finding in the terms suggested by the Claimant. There was not an issue before the Tribunal as to whether the Claimant should have been offered a job evaluation in August 2021. The allegation was one of direct race discrimination, and is referred to above. As the Claimant references in her application for reconsideration, she was believed to be a casual worker at this time, and not in a substantive role. She refers in her application to “other colleagues”. However, her substantive colleagues would not be appropriate comparators, as their circumstances were not materially the same as the Claimant’s.

[50]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 13 – “Tribunal Accepted Inconsistent SCP Calculation Without Verifying Method or Policy”

[51]It was open to the Claimant at the final hearing to make submissions on the correct spinal column point. That said, the relevant claim was not what point the Claimant should have been placed on, but whether there was discrimination or an unlawful deduction from wages.

[52]In relation to Mrs James’s evidence that she forgot a previous discussion with the Claimant relating to higher SCP some 14-15 months earlier, the Claimant relies on Mrs James’s email in December 2022, prompted following receipt of a solicitor’s letter.

[53]If any further evidence, such as pay policies, was relevant, it could have been provided at the time.

[54]The Claimant was awarded back pay, and the back pay agreed.

[55]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 14 – “Tribunal Misapplied and Misunderstood the Polkey Reduction”

[56]The Tribunal’s conclusions are at paragraphs 180-187 of the Judgment. In summary, we found that the Claimant’s dismissal was procedurally, but not substantively unfair, and that she would have been dismissed anyway. The reason for dismissal at paragraph 180 falls within “some other substantial reason”, not conduct, disciplinary, or capability. It follows that a conduct, disciplinary or capability process was not required.

[57]In any event, re-engagement was ordered, so no Polkey reduction was applied.

[58]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the basis of this ground. The Claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal succeeded and she was awarded re-instatement. Ground 15 – “Failure to Offer Redeployment Despite Medical Clearance and HR Misrepresentation”

[59]In considering remedy (not an allegation of discrimination in relation to re- deployment) the Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s submission that she was fit to work from 1 February 2024 and that she should therefore receive back pay from that date.

[60]It was open to the Claimant to seek a different amount of compensation at full hearing.

[61]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 16 – “Failure to Offer Mediation During Informal Grievance Process”

[62]Whether the Respondents should have offered mediation was not an issue for the Tribunal to determine. Whether the Respondents correctly followed the First Respondent’s grievance policy was not an issue for the Tribunal to determine. The Claimant did not bring a claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to delays in the grievance process do not include findings as to whether the delay was acceptable or not.

[63]The issues related to whether a delay in dealing with the Claimant’s grievance amounted to discrimination, victimisation and/or detriment and it is in that context that the Tribunal found that “A delay of one month is not unusual, given the complexity and number of issues, particularly in the public sector” and did not uphold the Claimant’s claim that there was delay because of race, a protected act or a protected disclosure.

[64]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 17 – “Tribunal Failed to Recognize Retaliatory Use of Evidence Following Protected Act”

[65]The Claimant did not rely on a “protected act of seeking legal advice”. Neither did we find the Claimant’s solicitor’s letter to be a protected act. Insofar as the Claimant relies on her 9 November solicitor’s letter as a protected act, therefore the claim failed.

[66]In any event, the Tribunal relied on the totality of the evidence before us in reaching our conclusions in relation to the Claimant’s role, not just correspondence produced after the Claimant’s solicitor’s letter was received (as appears to be alleged).

[67]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 18 – “Tribunal Failed to Scrutinize Misuse of Grant Conditions and Misclassification of Employment (Respondents’ Failure to Adhere to Grant Funding Conditions While Creating an Illusion of Compliance)”

[68]The Claimant asserts that the Tribunal “erred in accepting the Respondent’s justification for the decisions based on grant funding conditions, without requiring any supporting documentation”.

[69]The Claimant submitted further evidence to support this Ground on 29 September 2025. She said that this evidence “directly undercut the Respondent’s assertion (accepted at first instance) that my status was dictated by “grant conditions,” for which no grant documents were produced. This amounts to a material mistake of fact accepted without documentary proof and a failure to test a central assertion”.

[70]No such finding of fact was made by the Tribunal.

[71]The Claimant further asserts that the Tribunal “accepted administrative indicators— such as the use of invoices—as justification for self-employment, while overlooking the fact that I was paid via PAYE, had pension contributions removed without consent, and had no written agreement regarding rolled-up holiday or pension pay. These factors are consistent with employee status and trigger statutory protections”.

[72]The Tribunal did not assess the Claimant’s employment status. Employment status was agreed by the parties, having been conceded by the Respondents.

[73]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 19 – “Tribunal Accepted Inaccurate Oral Claim That I Replaced Zaynab Ismail”

[74]The Claimant is incorrect in asserting that the Tribunal sought and relied on oral evidence in relation to the Claimant “replac[ing] Zaynab Ismail”. As set out in paragraph 9 of the Judgment, “The IR35 casual starter form dated 12 August 2019 [184] states the Claimant's role as “casual support worker. Replacing Seynap Ismail”.”

[75]This finding relates to the start of the Claimant’s engagement in 2019. As set out in paragraph 42 of the Judgment, by June 2022, “the Claimant and Mrs James both still considered the Claimant to be a casual member of staff” (it is worth noting for completeness that the Judgment further describes the confusion that existed between self-employed persons and casual workers).

[76]The reference to Zaynab Ismail, and indeed to other persons whose work the Claimant covered, is relevant to the work done by the Claimant. The perceived status of the Claimant is relevant to why certain acts did or did not happen. Those are separate points.

[77]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 20 – “Tribunal Mischaracterized My Role Based on Informal Labels Rather Than Assessing Actual Duties”

[78]The Tribunal found that the Claimant was carrying out the role of a “senior support worker” (not “basic support”). The Claimant did not raise any evidence in Tribunal, and does not raise any points in her application for reconsideration, that suggest she was doing anything beyond what a competent senior support worker would do (as well as interpretation, which other senior support workers also did).

[79]The consistent evidence referred to in the Judgment is of the Claimant undertaking the role of Senior Support Worker. For example, paragraph 12 of the Judgment refers to the duties of Senior Support Workers in Mrs James’s Resettlement Team, and as carried out by the Claimant. The Claimant considered that she could do more (paragraph 28), but the evidence is that she was assigned and doing Senior Support Worker work. Those findings were made based on evidence, including from the Claimant (which the Claimant acknowledges in her application for reconsideration). The Tribunal also noted at paragraph 62 of the Judgment, that the Claimant’s solicitor compared the Claimant to Senior Support Workers, and asserted that the Claimant “performs services which are similar to or substantially the same as those performed by other employees and works alongside these other employees. From the outside looking in people would note no difference between our client and the team's other employees.”

[80]The Claimant does not agree with the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence. That is not sufficient reason to reconsider the Judgment.

[81]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 21 – “Tribunal Failed to Scrutinize Contradictions in Regrading and Appointment Process for Comparator”

[82]It was open to the Claimant to raise points in relation to re-grading or recruitment at the hearing. However, the Claimant was not in a comparable position to Mr Berlin, who was accepted to be in a substantive post and more senior post.

[83]It is not entirely clear what point the Claimant is seeking to make in respect of her claims and Mr Berlin’s alleged change of role in January 2025, (of which no evidence was or is provided), but the points made appear to be speculative.

[84]The matters before the Tribunal were carefully considered. There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the basis of this ground. Ground 22 – “Tribunal Failed to Consider Lack of IT Access as Evidence That My Role Was Unstructured and Reactive”

[85]The Claimant did not raise issues as to IT systems etc. Such matters were clearly known and could have been raised, if relevant, at the hearing. That said, the Tribunal did not make any determination as to the Claimant’s employment status – it was not a matter in issue, the Respondents having conceded the matter.

[86]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 23 – “Tribunal Mischaracterized Isolated Policy Presentation and Misinterpreted Role Justification, Overlooking Racialized Undervaluation”

[87]The Claimant has not accurately reported the findings of fact or conclusions made by the Tribunal.

[88]By way of example, the Claimant says “The Tribunal also wrongly accepted that my duties were removed lawfully because I “knew” Ms James intended to create a BG8 interpreter role”. There is no finding that duties were “removed” from the Claimant, or any finding connecting the fairness of the Claimant’s dismissal to a previous proposal to create a BG8 role.

[89]Whilst the Claimant disagrees with the findings of the Tribunal, and the findings that she thinks the Tribunal has made, that is not a basis for reconsideration.

[90]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 24 – “Racist Comments and Cultural Bias Ignored by Tribunal”

[91]The Tribunal took into account the allegation that Ms Hanley referred to clients as “lazy” and rejected the Claimant’s account based on the contemporaneous evidence (paragraph 50 of the Judgment). In her application for reconsideration, the Claimant refers to page 446 of the Bundle, which is notes of a grievance meeting in February 2023, some 5 months after the alleged comments were made. The Tribunal was aware of this document and it was referred to during the hearing. It did not change our finding.

[92]The Tribunal was also aware of team discussions about racism (and responding to clients’ experiences of previous racism), including the email referred to at page 322. We made our findings of fact based on all the evidence.

[93]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Ground 25 – “Failure to Disclose or Provide Recruitment Policy Documents”

[94]As referred to in this Judgment on Reconsideration, neither the Claimant nor her counsel made an application for specific disclosure of the documents that she now says should have been considered. The Claimant does not indicate what policies should have been available, other than in relation to pay progression.

[95]In relation to SCP (pay) progression, as set out in relation to Ground 13 above, it was open to the Claimant at the final hearing to make submissions on the correct spinal column point. That said, the relevant claim was not what point the Claimant should have been placed on, but whether there was discrimination or an unlawful deduction from wages.

[96]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked on the Concluding remarks

[97]Throughout the Claimant’s application she refers to case law, but not always accurately representing the ratio of the case. I do not consider it necessary to address each case in this Judgment, but the Claimant’s application has been carefully considered. Insofar as there is alleged to be an error of law in reliance on any of those cases, that is a matter for the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

[98]Whilst the Tribunal understands that the Claimant does not agree with the Tribunal’s findings, that is not a proper basis for reconsideration of the Judgment. There must be finality in litigation, and reconsideration is not a right or opportunity for another attempt to litigate the same points, based on the same evidence or evidence that could have been presented before the Tribunal at the original hearing.

[99]There is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked.

[100]The Claimant’s application for reconsideration of the Judgment is therefore refused.

Findings of fact

[101]On 9 January 2023, Mrs Healey suggested by email to Mr Hancock that an occupational health referral may be appropriate to support the Claimant [385]. Mr Hancock replied indicating that he intended to discuss a potential occupational health referral when the Claimant returned to work [384].

[102]On 10 January 2023, the Claimant’s right to work checks still not having been resolved, Mrs Healey wrote to the Claimant setting out the actions that needed to be undertaken [392].

[103]The Claimant responded the same day raising issues with how Mr Hancock should be able to access her share code to check her right to work status, and also making an allegation that Mrs James had “falsified a document to help with her role/ BG10 claims”. The Claimant also asked for an “OT” referral, by which she meant “Occupational Health”.

[104]The Claimant sent a further email the next day expressing worry that her managers may be trying to find a reason to fire her and stating that she needed to know whether the First Respondent understood how to check her status for work. The Claimant said that she needed an answer to that status (right to work) point as soon as possible as this was worrying her and she couldn't sleep [395].

[105]Mrs Healey replied by e-mail the same day saying that she was sorry the Claimant felt like this and recommending the employee assistance programme. She explained that she (Mrs Healey) had been off sick and was catching up with emails and therefore advised the Claimant not to worry if she didn't get a quick response from Mrs Healey. She also assured the Claimant that no one was trying to fire her. She said that the Claimant had rightly pointed out that she had employment status and that the First Respondent was trying to sort that out. The Claimant responded thanking Mrs Healey for her e-mail but reiterating concerns about Mrs James [394].

[106]Mrs Healey emailed the Claimant again on 11 January 2023 responding to previous queries raised by the Claimant [397]. In this e-mail, Mrs Healey advised the Claimant that someone had been assigned to hear her grievance, and Mrs Healey asked whether the Claimant would like that person to contact her. Mrs Healey clarified what the Claimant meant by OT, as she was not sure what the Claimant was referring to, and then subsequently emailed Mr Hancock on 12 January 2023 asking him to make an occupational health referral for the Claimant.

[107]Also on 12 January, the Claimant emailed Stephen Beet, Director – Adult Social Care [740, 739] asking him to investigate an issue of potential fraud by Mrs James. The Claimant did not say what the potential fraud was or provide any details of what she was alleging.

[108]On 12 January 2023, Mr Hancock emailed Mrs Healey to check that the Claimant had consented to an occupational health referral. In the same e-mail, Mr Hancock picked up issues relating to the right to work checks, which he had already been liaising with both the Claimant and HR about [400].

[109]On 13 January 2023, Mrs Healey emailed Mr Hancock about the right to work check and about the occupational health referral. Later that day, Mr Hancock confirmed that there was an issue with his Outlook and that he had a home visit between 2:00 and 4:00 PM. [402]. 13 January 2023 was a Friday. The right to work check and the occupational health referral were both actioned on the following Monday morning, 16 January 2023 [412].

[110]Mr Hancock received a positive response to the right to work check on 16 January 2023. This was received after Mr Hancock made the referral to Occupational Health [415, 421].]

[111]There was subsequently a mix up by Occupational Health, which is not the subject of this claim, where they incorrectly recorded the Claimant as having not attended an appointment. In exploring this, the Claimant mistakenly concluded that Mr Hancock had waited until after receiving the right to work check result to submit an Occupational Health referral. The Claimant believed that she had waited for two weeks for a referral and that a British employee would have been treated more favourably. Her email to Mr Hancock was accusatory and emotional. [419]. In fact, Mrs Healey clarified with the Claimant on 12 January 2023 that the reference to OT was a request for an Occupational Health referred, told Mr Hancock about this the same day, the following day Mr Hancock then clarified with Mrs Healey whether the Claimant had consented to a referral, and then the next working day after that the referral was made.

[112]On or around 26 January 2023, the Claimant emailed Mrs Healey asking for an update in relation to her previous request for information and referring to that previous request as a “DSAR”.

[113]Mrs Healey had not appreciated (did not realise) that the Claimant’s previous requests for information amounted to subject access requests. The Claimant having now pointed this out, Mrs Healey referred the Claimant to the First Respondent’s central Data Protection Team [434]. The Claimant pushed back on this a couple of times, with Mrs Healey repeating that the Claimant should contact the Data Protection Team, which the Claimant then agreed to do [432].

[114]By the start of January, Jayne Clifford and Jane Burstow of the First Respondent had been assigned to deal with the Claimant’s informal grievance. The grievance paperwork was sent to both Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow for review [382].

[115]A grievance meeting was held with the Claimant on 14 February 2023. The Claimant was asked to send Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow a list of her grievances, which were contained in various documents, and the Claimant agreed to do this. The Claimant confirmed this to Mrs Healey by email of 22 February 2023 [442], and Ms Clifford confirmed the same to the Claimant by email of 23 February 2023 [444], attaching notes of the meeting and a covering letter to those notes. Ms Clifford asked for the list of grievances by 3 March 2023 if possible, although it was clear that this was not a strict deadline.

[116]On 2 March 2023, the Claimant responded to Ms Clifford’s 23 February email to say that her trade union representative was unwell. The Claimant had sent him a draft list, but was waiting to hear from him as to whether she would need to work on that list on her own. The Claimant said that if she did not hear back from her trade union representative by 6 March 2023, she would forward her list of grievances by 8 March 2023 [460].

[117]The Claimant’s trade union representative remained off sick. On 7 March 2023, the Claimant emailed Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow saying that they had enough to be able to investigate the Claimant's grievance, and confirming that her main concern was that Mrs James had falsified a document (the 2019 Code of Conduct form) [459].

[118]Ms Clifford responded to the Claimant on 13 March 2023, confirming that that they would investigate the Claimant’s grievances, but not issues that related to her employment status and pay, as those issues were being dealt with elsewhere [458] (i.e. intended to be dealt with between the Claimant and Mrs Healey).

[119]On 20 April 2023, the Claimant emailed Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow, asking for an outcome from the grievance meeting [466]. Ms Clifford responded the same day, saying that they were still investigating and that there was no “outcome” as yet [465].

[120]The Claimant decided to escalate the matter to a formal grievance. She said that she would include in her formal grievance her concerns that Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow were not taking her complaints seriously enough and were allowing Mrs James’s discriminatory recruitment practices to continue [465].

[121]Notwithstanding that the Claimant had indicated that she would be escalating her grievance, Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow continued their investigation and held an interview with Mrs James on 2 May 2023. Mrs James’s evidence to the Tribunal, which we accept, was that at this interview, Mrs James found out that the Claimant had alleged that she had fraudulently amended the code of conduct form [467]. There is nothing to suggest that Mrs James knew about this allegation any earlier.

[122]Mrs James provided further information to Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow on 5 May 2023 [471-474].

[123]On 11 May 2023, the Claimant submitted her formal grievance [475]. Full details of the Claimant’s grievances were contained within this letter.

[124]Ms Clifford acknowledged the Claimant’s formal grievance on 1 June 2023. We do not have a copy of that letter, but the Claimant quoted from it in her subsequent email to Ms Clifford of 2 June 2023 [477]. From the Claimant's email of 2 June 2023, we understand that Ms Clifford referred to having asked the Claimant on 14 February 2023 for further details of her grievances, and not having received those details until the Claimant submitted a formal grievance. The Claimant took this as a "false accusation" that the Claimant did not provide clarity on her complaints previously and believed that Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow were trying to blame the Claimant for the delay in progressing the informal grievance. The Claimant set out her complaints about Ms Clifford, and Ms Burstow, and expressed surprise that they were still managing the grievance process given the delays and complaints. The Claimant asked for new investigators to be appointed.

[125]On 16 June 2023, Mrs Healey emailed the Claimant to ask whether she wanted to continue with a job evaluation process, which she said had been put on hold at the Claimant’s request pending trade union representation [487].

[126]On 22 June 2023, in an exchange of emails with the Claimant about her ongoing employment, Ms Laing, HR Business Parter, apologised to the Claimant for the delay in finding someone to take forward her formal grievance, which she said was due to workload issues [481].

[127]At some point prior to 28 June 2023, the Claimant was advised that Maria Mahood, Head Quality and Practice and Principal Social Worker, would be investigating the Claimant’s formal grievances [279]. Ms Mahood then wrote to the Claimant to introduce herself and to confirm her understanding of the Claimant’s complaints [479].

[128]On 11 July 2023, Mrs Healey emailed the Claimant to encourage her to take part in the job evaluation process [486]. In the event, the Claimant did not participate in the process.

[129]Following correspondence with the Claimant that took place in and up to at least 23 July 2023 [498 and the undated response at 501], Ms Hamood wrote a document commissioning Carol Slater to investigate the grievance [508]. There is no complaint in relation to the handling of the grievance once Ms Slater took over. The investigation was concluded in December 2023 and an outcome provided.

Law

[130]The Tribunal was helpfully referred to applicable law by the parties’ Counsel. We took into account the law (including case law) referred to by both Counsel. A summary of relevant law is set out below: Unfair dismissal

[131]A dismissal occurs where "the contract under which [the employee] is employed is terminated by the employer (whether with or without notice)" (section 95(1)(a), ERA 1996). Dismissal does not require a termination of the employment relationship as a whole, merely a termination of the specific contract.

[132]In Hogg v Dover College

[1990] ICR 39

, the Employment Appeal Tribunal made it clear that where an employer unilaterally imposes radically different terms and conditions of employment which on an objective assessment can amount to a removal or withdrawal of the old contract, there is a technical dismissal of employment albeit that the employee continues to be engaged by the same employer. The Employment Appeal Tribunal said: “It seems to us, both as a matter of law and common sense, that he was being told that his former contract was from that moment gone. There was no question of any continued performance of it. It is suggested on behalf of the respondents that there was a variation, but again it seems to us quite elementary, that you can vary by consent terms of a contract, but you simply cannot hold a pistol to somebody’s head and say henceforth 'you are to be employed on wholly different terms which are in fact less than 50% of your previous contract'”. The EAT confirmed that the principle to be applied was whether "the particular contract under which the employee was employed by the employer at the relevant time [was] terminated by the employer”.

[133]In Alcan Extrusions v Yeates

[1996] IRLR 327

, the EAT referring to the principles established in Hogg v Dover College, made it clear that very substantial departures from the original contract are necessary for there to have been a termination of the original contract by the employer.

[134]In Jackson v University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust

[2023] EAT 102

, the EAT confirmed that the correct test is simply to consider whether the purported variation of a contract is such as to amount, in reality, to a termination of one contract and its replacement by another. Whether the changes are so substantial as to amount to a withdrawal of the original employment contract is a matter of fact and degree for the tribunal to determine.

[135]Sections 98(1), (2) and (4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) set out the statutory framework for unfair dismissal, as follows:(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.

(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (b) relates to the conduct of the employee, (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.”

[136]The Tribunal must not substitute its view for that of a reasonable employer (Iceland Frozen Foods Limited v Jones

[1982] IRLR 439

; Sainsburys Supermarkets Limited v Hitt

[2002] EWCA Civ 1588

[137]Where a Claimant has been unfairly dismissed, if the Tribunal considers that there is some likelihood that the Claimant would still have been dismissed had a fair process been followed, then the Tribunal must make a percentage reduction in the compensation awarded to the claimant to reflect this (Polkey v A E Dayton Services Ltd

[1988] AC 344

[138]If a Tribunal finds that the dismissal was unfair, then pursuant to section 122(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) the Tribunal may reduce the basic award where the Claimant’s conduct before the dismissal makes it just and equitable to do so and pursuant to section 123(6) ERA reduction can be made to the compensatory award where the dismissal was, to any extent, caused or contributed to by any action of the Claimant. Protected disclosures

[139]The relevant statutory provisions are sections 43A, 43B and 43C of the Employment Rights Act 1996 which provide as follows: 43A Meaning of “protected disclosure” In this Act a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection(1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following – (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject... (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, 43C Disclosure to employer or other responsible person (1) A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure –

(2) (a) to his employer…

[140]In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld

[2010] ICR 325

, the EAT held that the ordinary meaning of giving information is ‘conveying facts’, which is distinct from the mere making of an allegation. The Court of Appeal has however subsequently held that ‘information’ can potentially include statements which might also be categorised as allegations (Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth

[2018] ICR 1850

). The statement must however have sufficient factual content that it tends to show one of the matters listed in section 43B(a) to (f).

[141]The disclosure relied upon must pass the sufficiency test in itself, and a claimant cannot rely upon wider context or information not provided in the disclosure (Williams v Michelle Brown AM

UKEAT/0044/19

[142]In order for a disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, the employee must reasonably believe that it tends to show one of the relevant matters. The employee must also reasonably believe that the disclosure is in the public interest.

[143]The test for ‘reasonable belief’ is both objective and subjective. The Tribunal must focus on what the claimant believed (rather than what a hypothetical reasonable worker may believe) but there must also be some objective basis for the claimant’s belief (Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwy University Local Health Board

[2012] IRLR 4

). In Phoenix House Ltd v Stockman

[2017] ICR 84

, the EAT, endorsing the approach taken in Korashi, held that, on the facts that the claimant believed to exist, a judgment must be made firstly as to whether the belief was reasonable and secondly whether looking at matters objectively, there was a reasonable belief that the facts tend to show one of the relevant matters. Whistleblowing detriment

[144]A worker suffers a detriment if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that they have been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had to work. An unjustified sense of grievance is not enough (Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Roval Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

[145]The Claimant bears the burden of proving that she suffered a detriment on the balance of probabilities. If she does so, the Respondent bears the burden of proving the reason for the treatment.

[146]Whether detriment is on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure involves an analysis of the mental processes of the employer when it acted as it did. It is not enough to apply a "but for" causation test (Chatterjee v Newcastle Upon lyne Hospitals NHS Trust [2019] 9 WLUK 556).

[147]The test for causation is whether the protected disclosure materially influenced the employer's treatment of the worker (NHS Manchester v Fecitt and others

[2012] IRLR 64

). Burden of proof – discrimination cases

[148]Section 136 EQA applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of the EQA. By section 136(2) and (3), if there are facts from which the tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person contravened the provision concerned, the tribunal must hold that the contravention occurred, unless A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

[149]In Igen v. Wong

[2005] EWCA Civ 142

, the Court of Appeal issued guidance to tribunals as to the approach to be followed to the burden of proof provisions in legislation preceding EQA. They warned that the guidance was no substitute for the statutory language. We do not recite all of the points raised by the Court of Appeal in this Judgment, although we considered them. We note that the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination. Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of (in this case), race, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent.

[150]It is not sufficient for the employee to only prove a difference in protected characteristic and a difference in treatment in order to shift the burden of proof: Madarassy v Nomura International Plc

[2007] EWCA Civ 33

[151]It is good practice to follow the two-stage approach to the burden of proof, in accordance with the guidance in Igen v. Wong, but a tribunal will not fall into error if, in an appropriate case, it proceeds directly to the second stage. Tribunals proceeding in this manner must be careful not to overlook the possibility of subconscious motivation: Geller v. Yeshrun Hebrew Congregation

[2016] UKEAT 0190/15

[152]We are reminded by the Supreme Court in Hewage v. Grampian Health Board

[2012] UKSC 37

not to make too much of the burden of proof provisions. They will require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination. But they have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or the other. Direct discrimination

[153]Direct discrimination is prohibited conduct under s.13 Equality Act 2010 ("EQA"): A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.

[154]The comparator’s circumstances must be the same as the Claimant’s, or at least not materially different (s.23 EQA).

[155]The protected characteristic need not be the only reason for the less favourable treatment, or the main reason: London Borough of Islington v Ladele

[2009] IRLR 154

(EAT). The decision must be more than trivially influenced by the protected characteristic.

[156]The question of less favourable treatment can be intertwined with the reason for that treatment: the principal question is why was the claimant treated as he was? If there were discriminatory grounds for that treatment then ‘usually be no difficulty in deciding whether the treatment …was less favourable than was or would have been afforded to others.’ There is a single question: did the complainant, because of a protected characteristic, receive less favourable treatment than others’: Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

2003 ICR 337

HL. Harassment

[157]Harassment is defined in s26 EQA, as follows: (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if – (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of – (i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. … (3) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in sub-section (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account – (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

[158]In Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire

[2024] EAT 169

, the Employment Appeal Tribunal emphasised that conduct does not need to be explicitly motivated by a protected characteristic, such as race, to constitute harassment. Conduct may instead relate to or be connected to a protected characteristic, such as comments about an accent. Victimisation

[159]Victimisation is defined in section 27 of the Equality Act 2010. Section 27 - Victimisation(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.

(2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. …

[160]The Claimant does not need to show a comparator, but she must prove that she did a protected act and that she was subjected to a detriment because she had done that protected act. As with direct discrimination, it is not necessary for the Claimant to show conscious motivation, it is sufficient that the protected characteristic or protected act had a significant influence on the outcome (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[2000] 1 AC 502

, as confirmed by Warburton v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police

[2002] EAT 42

)

[161]The need to show that any alleged detriment must be capable of being objectively regarded as such was emphasised in St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Derbyshire

2007 IRLR 540

. Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

2003 IRLR 285

was cited and it was confirmed an unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to detriment, but the threshold for establishing detriment is low, as it is determined based on the view of a reasonable worker (rather than there being an entirely objective test).

[162]In Derbyshire, Lord Neuberger confirmed the detriment should be viewed from the point of view of the alleged victim. Detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the treatment was in all the circumstances to his detriment. Time limits – Discrimination claims:

[163]Section 123 of EQA provides, so far as is relevant: 1. proceedings on a complaint [of discrimination or harassment in the field of work] may not be brought after the end of—(a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. … 3. For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. 4. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.

[164]A one-off act with continuing consequences is not the same as an act extending over a period: Sougrin v Haringey Health Authority

[1992] IRLR 416

[1992] ICR 650

, CA.

[165]The “just and equitable” extension of time involves the exercise of discretion by the tribunal. It is for the claimant to persuade the tribunal to exercise its discretion in his favour: Robertson v. Bexley Community Centre

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

. There is, however, no rule of law as to how generously or sparingly that discretion should be exercised: Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v. Caston

[2009] EWCA Civ 1298

. The discretion to extend time is “broad and unfettered”: Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University v. Morgan

[2018] EWCA Civ 640

. Tribunals considering an extension of the time limit may find it helpful to refer to the factors set out in section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (extension of the limitation period in personal injury cases): British Coal Corpn v. Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

. Holiday pay under the Working Time Regulations

[166]The key provisions of the Working Time Regulations 1998 are set out in Regulations 13, 13A, 14 and 30, which at the time relevant to this claim, the key provisions were as follows: 13. Entitlement to annual leave(1) Subject to paragraph (5), a worker is entitled to four weeks' annual leave in each leave year. … (5) Where the date on which a worker’s employment begins is later than the date on which (by virtue of a relevant agreement) his first leave year begins, the leave to which he is entitled in that leave year is a proportion of the period applicable under paragraph (1) equal to the proportion of that leave year remaining on the date on which his employment begins. … (9) Leave to which a worker is entitled under this regulation may be taken in instalments, but— (a) subject to the exception in paragraphs (10) and (11),] it may only be taken in the leave year in respect of which it is due, and (b)it may not be replaced by a payment in lieu except where the worker’s employment is terminated. [Regulation 13A is similar to Regulation 13 (for the purposes of this claim), and provides for an extra 1.5 weeks a year.] 14. Compensation related to entitlement to leave (1) Paragraphs (1) to (4) of this regulation apply where— (a)a worker’s employment is terminated during the course of his leave year, and (b)on the date on which the termination takes effect (“the termination date"), the proportion he has taken of the leave to which he is entitled in the leave year under regulation 13 and regulation 13A differs from the proportion of the leave year which has expired.

(2) Where the proportion of leave taken by the worker is less than the proportion of the leave year which has expired, his employer shall make him a payment in lieu of leave in accordance with paragraph (3).

(3) The payment due under paragraph (2) shall be— (a)such sum as may be provided for for the purposes of this regulation in a relevant agreement, or (b)where there are no provisions of a relevant agreement which apply, a sum equal to the amount that would be due to the worker under regulation 16 in respect of a period of leave determined according to the formula— (A X B) – C …. … (5) Where a worker’s employment is terminated and on the termination date the worker remains entitled to leave in respect of any previous leave year which carried forward under regulation 13(10) and (11), the employer shall make the worker a payment in lieu of leave equal to the sum due under regulation 16 for the period of untaken leave.

[167]Regulation 30 sets out the three month time limit for bringing claims, subject to ACAS early conciliation and the potential for an extension of time where it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim in time, and the claim is brought within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable.

[168]The cases of King v Sash Window Workshop and anor

[2018] ICR 693

and Smith v Pimlico Plumbers Ltd

[2022] EWCA Civ 70

were helpfully summarised in Employment Judge Bax's case management order. Unlawful deductions from wages

[169]Sections 13(1)-(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provide that:(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless – (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.

(2) In this section “relevant provision”, in relation to a worker’s contract, means a provision of the contract comprised – (a) in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or (b) in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.

(3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.

[170]“Wages” is defined in section 27 of the ERA.

[171]Tribunals dealing with unlawful deduction claims have jurisdiction to resolve any issue necessary to decide whether a sum claimed is properly payable pursuant to section 13, including an issue as to the proper construction of the worker’s contract (Agarwal v Cardiff University and another

[2018] EWCA Civ 1434

Conclusions

[172]Looking at each issue in turn: Unfair dismissal 2.1 Was the Claimant dismissed?

[173]We have been referred to the facts of Hogg v Dover College, and the principle that a unilateral variation of the contract of employment will amount to a dismissal where in effect one contract of employment is replaced with another. Whether a variation amounts to termination will depend on the facts of each case.

[174]In this case, the Respondents have admitted that the Claimant was an employee throughout her employment as a casual member of staff. The terms of that employment were that the Claimant was to be paid £30 per hour, with no additional benefits. It was an all-inclusive rate. The Claimant was able to work on an as-andwhen basis, although latterly regularly worked 5 hours a day on 4-5 days a week, and was required to submit invoices and was paid against those invoices.

[175]The new contract was a full time employment contract paid at the rate of BG10 on the First Respondent’s pay scale, although a written contract was not issued confirming the express terms in relation to the BG10 Senior Support Worker role. That said, as a recognised employee of the First Respondent, it is agreed the terms included an express right to annual leave, enhanced occupational sick pay, and other benefits. The Claimant did not have to submit invoices and was paid monthly in arrears.

[176]We accept that the duties of the role offered to the Claimant were the same duties, or were reasonably believed to be the same, as the Claimant was undertaking under the previous contract. However, pay is a fundamental term of employment, and the terms as to pay and benefits are so different as to amount to a replacement of one contract with a new contract. Even taking into account the additional benefits, day-today the Claimant’s day rate was less under the new contract, albeit that as the Claimant acknowledges, there were other benefits to being an employee.

[177]Having found that one contract was replaced with another, we considered whether that termination was unilaterally imposed by the First Respondent or whether the Claimant mutually agreed to that termination.

[178]It is clear from the Claimant’s evidence that she accepted that she would not continue to be paid £30 per hour and receive the additional benefits available to employees of the First Respondent. The Claimant said that she never expected that to be the case. She accepts that the First Respondent employs staff on pay scales, but she disputes that the point on the scale offered to her was fair or reasonable. Whilst we consider that this is recognition by the Claimant that there was a potentially fair reason for her dismissal, we do not find that the Claimant agreed to the termination of the old contract. She accepted it would be terminated by the First Respondent, but given how vociferously she objected to the First Respondent’s proposal of a new BG10 contract, we do not find that there was an agreement to terminate the old contract.

[179]We find that Mrs Healey’s email of 23 December 2022 constitutes notice of termination of the Claimant’s old contract to terminate on 31 December 2022, with the new contract taking effect on 1 January 2023. 2.2 What was the reason for dismissal?.

[180]We conclude that the Claimant was dismissed from her old contract because she had been engaged outside of the First Respondent’s formal pay scales, and she was significantly out of kilter with those scales. The First Respondent asserts that £30 per hour was agreed on the basis of flexibility of the arrangement and because it was an “all-inclusive” amount. With both of those factors having changed, the Respondent reasonably believed that the issue needed to be resolved and the Claimant brought back in line with the First Respondent’s pay scales, to avoid unfairness and discrimination claims. The Claimant does not disagree with this reasoning, and as referred to above, fairly accepted in evidence that she could not both continue to be paid under her old terms and be recognised as an employee. There was no cross examination of the Respondent’s witnesses on this issue, although it was suggested that it was unfair not to conclude a job evaluation before terminating the Claimant’s contract (we come on to that below). 2.3 Did the Respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the Claimant:

[181]We find that there was adequate consultation with the Claimant and her solicitor, both in correspondence and in respect of meetings being offered. The Claimant knew and understood what the First Respondent’s proposals were, and understood the reason for them, she just did not agree and she was given reasonable opportunity to explain her disagreement and to put suggestions to the First Respondent.

[182]The Respondent ring-fenced an alternative role for the Claimant, which was suitable for her skills and experience. Whilst the Claimant wanted a higher level role, the First Respondent reasonably considered that it was offering the Claimant the role that she was undertaking. Throughout the Bundle there is evidence of the Claimant identifying herself as an Interpreter and identifying herself as a Senior Support Worker. It is pay that causes the Claimant to consider this role as unsuitable. The Claimant sought a more senior role from the point that it was proposed to end the casual relationship, and indeed when she suggested a Co-Ordinator or Manager role in respect of the Interpreters it is clear that she was proposing a new role that she did not yet undertake.

[183]The First Respondent offered the Claimant the opportunity to have her role job evaluated and asked her to complete paperwork setting out where she thought her role was more senior than a Senior Support Worker role. The Claimant did not do this. We do note that the Claimant was not offered the opportunity for a job evaluation process to be concluded prior to the change of contract taking effect, but we do not consider that agreement as to new terms must be reached in circumstances where there is a fair reason for dismissal and attempts have been made to seek and/or offer an appropriate alternative. It was reasonable for the First Respondent to offer a job evaluation process after engaging the Claimant on new terms, with an assurance that back pay would be paid in the event that the Claimant’s role was evaluated at a higher level. 2.4. Was the decision to dismiss a fair sanction, that is, was it within the range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer when faced with these facts?

[184]We find that the decision to terminate the Claimant’s contract and offer a new one was within the range of reasonable responses open to the First Respondent, given our conclusions above, and again, this was not challenged by the Claimant. 2.5 Did the Respondent adopt a fair procedure?

[185]However, we find that the procedure followed was nonetheless unfair. The Claimant was not invited to a meeting and told that the outcome of the meeting may be the termination of her old contract and/or the imposition of new terms. The meeting at which the First Respondent thought that the Claimant had agreed the change of terms was a job evaluation meeting, not a meeting about terminating the old contract. 2.6 If it did not use a fair procedure, would the Claimant have been fairly dismissed in any event and/or to what extent and when?

[186]That said, we find that the Claimant would have been fairly dismissed in any event. The failure is procedural and not substantive. A fair dismissal process would have required an invitation to a meeting (warning the Claimant of potential dismissal and advising her of her right to be accompanied). This was highlighted twice by the Claimant’s solicitor to the First Respondent. Taking into account the Christmas period that followed the meeting on 21 December 2022. We find that a fair process would have been achieved by 13 January 2023, i.e. the end of the second week in January.

[187]The Claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal succeeds. In the event that compensation only was awarded, a Polkey reduction would have been made to the Claimant’s compensation to reflect our finding that the Claimant would have been dismissed in any event by 13 January 2023. Wrongful dismissal; notice pay

[188]We have found that the Claimant was dismissed.

[189]The Claimant did not have a contract of employment, and therefore statutory notice provisions apply. The Claimant was given one week’s notice of the change of contract. Her statutory notice period was three weeks.

[190]The Claimant was not paid for two weeks’ statutory notice.

[191]The Respondents confirmed that they did not rely on any circumstances that would entitled the First Respondent to dismiss without notice.

[192]The Claimant’s claim for wrongful dismissal therefore succeeds. Protected disclosure (‘whistle blowing’) 4.1. Did the Claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The e-mail dated 6 January 2023 to Mr Hancock.

[193]We find that this email did contain a disclosure of information, namely that the Claimant’s right to work and DBS checks had not been done when they should have been, and that this exposed the Respondent to legal risk.

[194]The Respondents conceded that the Claimant believed that she was making the disclosure in the public interest.

[195]We find that that belief was reasonable. The First Respondent is a public body, is responsible for public money and works with vulnerable members of the public.

[196]We find that the Claimant did genuinely believe that the information tended to show that the First Respondent had failed to comply with a legal obligation, namely the right to work legislation and DBS requirements.

[197]We further find that belief to be reasonably held. The Respondents said the Claimant's belief that a legal obligation was being breached was not reasonable, as she knew that the Second Respondent had checked the Claimant’s right to work and the Claimant’s DBS check would have been checked when she joined the Respondent as an Interpreter. There is no evidence that the Claimant knew what the Respondents did behind the scenes to check her status in 2019, if anything. Her belief was based on requests made by the First Respondent to the Claimant, and based on her own knowledge of employment practices. Whilst the Claimant is mistaken as to the level of potential sanction, and when a sanction may be applied, the contents of the disclosure did not need to be true in their entirety or at all in order for the Claimant to hold a reasonable belief in their truth.

[198]The disclosure was a qualifying disclosure and, as it was made to the Claimant’s employer, was a protected disclosure. The email dated 12 January 2023 to Mr Beet.

[199]We find that this email does not contain information. In the emails to Mr Beet on 12 January 2023, the Claimant references that “a potential issue of fraud has come to light”. She does not provide any information about what this potential fraud is, and simply highlights that it is Mr Beet’s obligation to make sure that Mrs James had not committed a fraud. The reference to fraud is a bar allegation, and does not contain any information within the meaning of section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[200]In any event, the Claimant did not have a reasonable belief that a fraud had been committed. The Claimant had seen the Code of Conduct form that she says was amended by Mrs James. On the face of the form Mrs James amended and dated the form in August 2019, at a time when the Claimant was going to be covering for Senior Support Workers. The Claimant was aware that she was undertaking Senior Support Worker work. There is no question of gain or loss in respect of the additions made to this document, no dispute at the time the amendments were made, and no intention to mislead, given that Mrs James was looking for the Claimant to backfill a BG10 role at this time. By the time of the disclosure, the Claimant was aware that Senior Support Workers were at grade BG10.

[201]Accordingly, this is not a protected disclosure. In any event, and for the same reasons as set out below in relation to alleged detriments arising from the 6 January disclosure, we do not find that any of the matters claimed of were because of, on the ground of or influenced by the sending of the 12 January email(s). Detriments 5.1.6. In about January 2023, the Claimant’s e-mail address was removed from a general invitation for training to explain the job evaluation process

[202]Removing an employee from an email list is capable of being a detriment.

[203]As set out in our findings of fact, Mrs James removed the Claimant from the group email list because the Claimant was off sick. She removed another employee at the same time for the same reason. It does not make any difference, in our finding, and contrary to the suggestion made on behalf of the Claimant, that the Claimant’s stress was caused by perceived injustice and discrimination and the other employee’s stress was due to a performance or disciplinary process. We accept that Mrs James thought that correspondence from her would exacerbate the situation. Based on our findings of fact, we conclude that the protected disclosure did not influence the decision to remove the Claimant from the email list. Further, we find that the removal of the Claimant from that email list was not targeted to prevent the Claimant from knowing about training, as is alleged. 5.1.7. In January 2023, Mr Hancock, put the Claimant’s occupational health assessment on hold whilst checking her right to work.

[204]As set out in our findings of fact, the right to work check and the occupational health referral were completed in quick succession on the morning of 16 January 2023. The right to work check had been raised as an issue with Mr Hancock prior to him being requested to make an Occupational Health appointment for the Claimant. He dealt with both issues expeditiously. We find that a reasonable employee would not consider this to amount to a detriment. Further, on 12 January 2023, in response to an email from Mrs Healey about right to work checks, Mr Hancock’s first question is whether the Claimant had consented to an occupational health referral. This issue was not pushed to the back of his mind. Mr Hancock made the referral within one working day of receiving confirmation that the Claimant had consented, having had IT issues on 13 January 2023 and having had a two hour home visit in the afternoon that day. There was no delay in obtaining an Occupational Health appointment, and the Claimant was mistaken about the order of events at the time. She did not suffer any disadvantage. Indeed, prior to this the Claimant had complained to Mrs Healey that not having the right to works checks resolved was worrying her and causing her to not sleep [395]. In these circumstances, a reasonable employee would not consider it to be a detriment to sort out the right to work checks issue quickly and then deal, quickly, with the referral to Occupational Health (and where the request to Mr Hancock to arrange the referral was made after he had been tasked with sorting out the right to work checks). We do not find that there was an intention to delay an occupational health referral – as noted, Mr Hancock raised the possibility of a referral with Mrs Healey himself.

[205]In any event, and for the avoidance of doubt, there is no evidence that any party intended to cause the Claimant a detriment by dealing with the right to work check shortly before the OH referral. As we have stated, the right to work check issue was raised with Mr Hancock first and was in progress prior to the Claimant’s consent to Occupational Health being understood by Mrs Healey and passed on to Mr Hancock. We consider that that is the reason that the right to work check issue was dealt with (shortly) prior to making the referral, not any protected disclosure. 5.1.9. The Respondent failed to progress/properly handle the Claimant’s grievance 5.1.9.3. Unreasonably delaying the grievance investigation. (doc 14)

[206]The length of time between updating the Claimant and the length of time taken to deal with the grievance is capable of being a detriment.

[207]However, we find that the Claimant’s email of 6 January 2023 had no bearing on the length of time it took to deal with the Claimant’s grievances. There is no evidence of this beyond a bare assertion by the Claimant. We do not find that any delay was unreasonable in any event, based on the timeline set out above. There is a period of around one month where it is not possible to ascertain what the First Respondent was doing to progress the grievance, however, there is no evidence that either Ms Clifford or Ms Burstow knew about the 6 January email, which was not addressed to or copied to them. There is a passing reference in the notes of the 14 February meeting where the Claimant says she has to re-do her DBS paperwork, but that is not the same as re-raising or referring to the 6 January email. 5.1.9.4. Declined to include in the grievance the unilateral change of her contract and the process of evaluating her role

[208]Not dealing with these matters in one grievance process is capable of being a detriment.

[209]However, we find that the Claimant’s email of 6 January had no bearing on whether to deal with an alleged unilateral change to her contract or the process of evaluating her role as part of the grievance process. The Respondent considered that an evaluation needed to be carried out to identify the correct grade, and that needed to occur before any complaint about grading was dealt with as part of a grievance. The Claimant’s role was to be assessed and if the Claimant was not happy with the outcome at that stage it could be dealt with by way of grievance. The Respondent essentially separated out the two processes. Whilst this was not what the Claimant wanted, it was unrelated to the whistleblowing, it reflected the First Respondent’s process for assessing job grades, and indeed that decision was made in or before December 2022, and before the date of the Claimant’s protected disclosure. That being the case, there is no causal link between the disclosure and the decision to deal with grievances separately from a contract change and job evaluation process. 5.1.9.5. On 1 June 2023 Ms Clifford accused the Claimant of being the reason for the

[210]The matters complained of are capable of being detriments.

[211]As we have referred to, there is no evidence that either Ms Clifford or Ms Burstow knew that the Claimant had raised concerns about the lack of pre-employment checks. They were dealing with concerns about who was recruited and promoted, and the potential fraud. In any event, there is no evidence that the statement that “you did agree to provide clarity on your complaints … it is still not entirely clear what your complaints are” is as a result of the Claimant’s protected disclosure. It is more likely that Ms Clifford was trying to justify the time taken to deal with the grievance up to the point of writing to the Claimant. There is no evidence of a causal link between the protected disclosure and the detriment complained of beyond the bare allegation by the Claimant and we do not find it plausible that the comment relied upon was motivated by the Claimant emailing Mr Hancock in January 2023. 5.1.12. After the Claimant complained about 1 June 2023 e-mail and asked for someone else to handle it, no response was given within a reasonable time.

[212]We find that a response was given within a reasonable time, taking into account the circumstances.

[213]In any event, we find no evidence of any causal connection between the protected disclosure and the time taken to respond to the Claimant, and nothing from which we could draw an inference. The Claimant was updated on 22 June 2023 and told that it was taking time to assign the grievance due to workloads[481] and by 28 June 2023 knew that the grievance had been reassigned, and we find that a response was given within a reasonable time. Whilst the grievance could have been dealt with more quickly, there is no evidence of whistleblowing detriment as a result of the 6 January 2023 email. 5.1.16. Reduced the Claimant’s pay with effect from 1 December 2022;

[214]Whilst a reduction in pay is capable of being a detriment, the decision to change the Claimant's pay was made, and the Claimant was told about it, prior to her making the protected disclosure. That said, the decision in respect of pay was due to take effect from 1 January 2023. The First Respondent did not intend to reduce the Claimant's pay from December 2022. Rather, it became clear in the course of evidence that the First Respondent had forgotten that the Claimant was paid in arrears by two months, not monthly in arrears. The payment in December 2022 settled an invoice in respect of work done in November 2022. No invoice was sent in respect of December, so the Claimant was not paid for December's work. The pay in January 2023 related to January 2023, when the Claimant started to be paid at BG10 monthly in arrears. Because the Claimant received a pay slip every month, neither the Claimant nor the First Respondent did not realise that the Claimant was not paid for work done in December 2022 until this was discussed during the hearing. The First Respondent confirmed this was an error and said it would make arrangements to pay the Claimant.

[215]In any event, as referred to above, the decision to pay the Claimant at grade BG10 from 1 January 2022, which is the decision complained about here, was made prior to the Claimant making her disclosure. There is therefore no causal link between the protected disclosure and the detriment. 5.1.20. Ms Healey intentionally mishandled the Claimant’s Subject Access Request.

[216]We have found as a fact that Mrs Healey did not realise that the Claimant’s initial request for information was a subject access request (“SAR”). When Mrs Healey did realise, i.e. when the Claimant told her, she referred the Claimant to the correct team. There was no mishandling of the SAR once Mrs Healey realised it was a SAR. At worst, this is a competency issue, in that Mrs Healey was not aware that a SAR does not need to be labelled as a SAR, but we do not find any evidence of intentional delay or that the protected disclosure had any causal connection to any delay in providing requested information to the Claimant. We further note that the requests for information that were SARs, but not labelled as SARs, were made to Mrs Healey prior to the Claimant making a protected disclosure and therefore there is no causal link between the disclosure and the failure to recognise the requests for information as SARs.

[217]Accordingly, all of the Claimant’s claims for whistleblowing detriment fail and are dismissed. Direct race discrimination 6.2.1. In August 2021, the Second Respondent told the Claimant that her hours were no longer considered casual and suggested she applied for a BG10 role, which the Claimant declined. The Claimant asked Ms James to look at her actual work and come up with something more suitable and to provide her training, to which Ms James agreed. This is raised by way of background to the allegations that follow.

[218]At this time in August 2021, Mrs James did not agree to look for a suitable role for the Claimant or agree to provide training. She agreed to review whether to appoint an in-house interpreter and said that she would involve the Claimant in this discussion, which ultimately she did because the Claimant was part of the focus group, liaising with PMO as part of a review of the structure and roles in the Resettlement Team. For the avoidance of doubt, saying that the Claimant’s hours were no longer considered to be casual was a statement of fact, prompted by a comment from HR, and not discriminatory – indeed it’s something the Claimant then relies upon and agrees with in raising issues about her employment status. Compared to a hypothetical comparator who is a long-term casual worker in the same circumstances as the Claimant but whose first language is English, informing the Claimant about the status of her role and inviting the Claimant to apply for roles is not less favourable treatment and was not, in any event, because of race. The Claimant was invited to apply for roles that were within her skillset and in circumstances where her “casual” contract was not going to be continued.

[219]It being the case that Mrs James did not promise to find or create a role for the Claimant, or offer training, the Claimant has not established facts supporting her allegations at6.2.1.1 and

6.2.1.2 and or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn and those claims must fail. For completeness, the reason that Mrs James did not evaluate the Claimant’s role at this time or offer training was not connected to race, but because Mrs James had not committed doing either of those things. 6.2.1.3. Mrs James withheld the possibility of a job evaluation from the Claimant;

[220]We do not find that the possibility of a job evaluation was withheld at this time. There was no process for evaluating a casual role outside of the PMO process, which the Claimant was involved in. The Claimant has not established facts supporting this allegation. For completeness, there is no less favourable treatment compared to the hypothetical comparator – Mrs James believed that there was no process for evaluating a casual role outside of the PMO process. We have found as a fact that at this time, Mrs James was seeking to put the Claimant’s needs above that of the Service, as she attempted to retain the Claimant notwithstanding that she considered that a BG8 Interpreter was all that was required at this time. 6.2.1.4. Claimed to have obtained an extension to the verbal agreement (on casual basis) after HR confirmed that work pattern was not casual.

[221]Mrs James did continue to engage the Claimant on what she thought was a casual basis, and believed that the Claimant was still engaged on a casual basis not withstanding that the pattern of work warranted a permanent post-holder. In keeping the Claimant engaged at this time, Mrs James was treating the Claimant favourably, as the alternative in Mrs James’s mind, and HR’s mind, was to terminate the Claimant’s existing contract. It is clear that Mrs James wanted to retain the Claimant in the team. This is not indicative of less favourable treatment. In this regard, the Claimant has not established facts from which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. There is nothing to suggest that race was a factor in Mrs James’s treatment of the Claimant, which we have found to be favourable in this regard (as referred to above, the Claimant’s needs – or wishes – were put above that of the Service). 6.2.2. In September 2021, the Second Respondent, Ms James, failed to respond to the Claimant’s expression of interest in a secondment to the new Afghani Refugees Hotel management role.

[222]We have found as a fact that no response was sent to the Claimant. However, we accept that this was not because of race but because no such role materialised. The Claimant was not treated less favourably than the hypothetical comparator would have been treated. 6.2.3. In about September 2021, the secondment to the Afghani Refugee Hotel management role was scrapped and the responsibilities of the role were handed to Ms Hanley by the Second Respondent, which she later used to obtain the Housing Manager role in March 2022. The Claimant was not given an opportunity to be considered for the responsibility.

[223]We have found as a fact that Ms Hanley undertook her substantive role as required, which required attendance at the Afghan Hotel for a period. Ms Hanley was not given management responsibilities (including in respect of the Afghan Hotel) prior to securing her Lettings Manager role, and in any event no Afghan hotel management role materialised. Mrs James herself spent more time at the Afghan Hotel to liaise with the interested stakeholders. Accordingly, the Claimant has not established facts to support her claim, or from which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. 6.2.4. In around July 2021 Ms Hanley had “hiring manager” decision on who to hire in the housing team before she became a manager, then in between November 2021 and March 2022 PMO and Ms James gave Ms Hanley assistance to create the Housing Department. Ms Hanley was not management but was given backing to do so, this enabled her to secure the Housing Manager role. The Claimant says she was not given such experience and assistance.

[224]We have found as a fact that Ms Hanley did not make a “hiring manager decision”. She undertook Recruitment training and was able to sit on recruitment panels. The Claimant had the same opportunity to do this training, and did, but did not complete it. As completion of training is a pre-requisite for sitting on recruitment panels, the Claimant was not able to sit on these panels and therefore did not do so. It is entirely unclear what assistance the Claimant says Ms Hanley was given. The Claimant appears to be referring to her belief that Ms Hanley was given Hotel Manager responsibilities for the Afghan hotel, which is not correct. Ms Hanley undertook her substantive role at the Afghan hotel. Ms Hanley subsequently applied for a Housing Manager (or “Lettings Manager”) role that was open to anyone to apply for, including the Claimant, and Ms Hanley was successful. The Claimant did not apply. The Respondents selected Ms Hanley through open competition for a role that she applied for and was qualified to do. Further it is not true to say that the Claimant was not provided with assistance to progress. The Claimant attended a multi-day management course, paid for by the First Respondent. The Claimant has failed to establish facts to support her claim or from which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. 6.2.5. In December 2021 the Claimant met Ms James and discussed her role and it was suggested she spoke to project management (PMO). The Claimant spoke to PMO in December 2021 and was promised feedback through the Second Respondent. No feedback or a response was given.

[225]We do not find evidence of a discussion with Mrs James on this matter in December 2021. There was, however, a previous discussion about the PMO review, and in November 2021 the Claimant emailed Mrs James asking for time with the PMO, which Mrs James agreed. We accept Mrs James’s evidence that she was not as aware of what was happening with the PMO throughout the review period, , as she was busy with the Afghan hotel. The Claimant was involved in that process on a focus group. Mrs James’s direct involvement with the PMO review came later, at which point the Claimant received feedback at the same time as other staff, by Mrs James consulting about the Language Policy, and then the Claimant’s feedback was prioritised in the subsequent consultation process. There is no evidence that Mrs James promised to provide feedback to the Claimant individually, or evidence that the PMO promised anything over and above what Mrs James did in terms of consulting on the Language Policy and the subsequent provision of information about proposed new roles. The Claimant was both heavily involved with the PMO and involved with influencing the Language Policy, with the Claimant’s ideas being accepted by Mrs James, including a proposal to create a new more senior role, ostensibly for the

[226]In our conclusion, the Claimant has failed to establish facts to support this allegation. We do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a hypothetical comparator in any event. The Claimant was treated favourably by Mrs James regarding respect of seeking to accommodate the Claimant’s request for a new, more senior, role. 6.2.6. In about March 2022, two further posts (managing the Ukrainian refugee team and coordinating how to process and organise Ukrainian refugees) were filled in by new members of staff who were English speakers and the Claimant was not given an opportunity to apply for the roles.

[227]We accept Mrs James’s evidence that agency workers were sourced to meet an urgent need in respect of managing Ukrainian refugees. At this time the work needed to be met quickly. No members of the team were given the opportunity to apply, as a business decision was made to source the need through agency staff. The Claimant was not treated any differently to any other member of the team and she was not treated less favourably than the hypothetical comparator would have been treated in these circumstances. This decision was simply not related to the Claimant. 6.2.9. In March 2022, the Second Respondent made sure that the Claimant did not have a chance to apply for the Housing Management role in the Refugee Resettlement Team by not providing her with training. It was ensured that only Ms Hanley could apply for the role (Ms Hanley was given training and appointed to the role).

[228]The Claimant was able to apply for the Lettings Manager role (which the Claimant refers to as Housing Management / Manager) but did not do so. It was advertised and there is no dispute that the Claimant knew about it. She had the same chance to apply as any other potential candidate. Ms Hanley was not the only person to apply for the role. For the avoidance of doubt, Ms Hanley’s previous role was as a Housing Officer and she applied for a promotion in the same field. The Claimant has not specified what training Ms Hanley was given. If the Claimant is referring to Hotel Management of the Afghan Hotel, Ms Hanley had no such management responsibility prior to securing her Lettings Manager role. As previously referred to, the Claimant herself received management training paid for by the First Respondent. She has also attended Recruitment training. The evidence before this Tribunal is that when the Claimant asked for training, she was offered it.

[229]The Claimant has not established facts to support this allegation or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. 6.2.10. In June 2022, the Claimant was handed a ‘weak’ language policy by the Second Respondent and was told it affected her future and ‘I can’t keep hiring you because the crises are over’. This was in front of the team. The Claimant was not included in forming the policy even though she was only person doing language support.

[230]We accept Mrs James’s evidence that she did not highlight the Claimant and say “I can’t keep hiring you because the crises are over”. This is contrary to the way in which Mrs James treated the Claimant up to this point, which was to seek to accommodate the Claimant as far as possible. It is more likely that there was a discussion around Mrs James not being able to continue the casual arrangement, which is something that Mrs James and the Claimant had discussed before. In that context, the need for ad hoc staff had diminished, and Mrs James was looking to put a permanent post in place. We note that Mrs James says that she presented the policy at a team meeting, and she was not challenged on this. The Claimant’s witness statement refers to a discussion between Mrs James and the Claimant not in team meeting, but in an area where the team also sit. We find that it is likely that the Claimant is conflating both a private conversation with Mrs James and what was said at the team meeting.

[231]Mrs James did not intend to keep hiring the Claimant on a casual basis, but did want to retain the Claimant if possible. Insofar as there was any discussion about the Claimant’s role at or around this time, we find that it reflected the First Respondent’s position on not retaining long term casual workers and was not connected to race in any way. The Claimant was not treated any less favourably than a hypothetical (and long-term casual worker) comparator would have been.

[232]We have found as a fact that the Claimant was involved in the formation of the language policy. Her ideas were taken on board, including to the extent that Mrs James sought to create a new role for the Claimant to apply for. The Claimant has not established facts to support the allegation that she was not involved in the formation of the Language policy, or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. 6.2.11. In about June 2022 the Claimant suggested a new role to the Second Respondent in relation to the recruitment and training of language support for all languages. The Second Respondent ensured that the role was lower graded than entailed by the job evaluation by removing budgeting aspect and English for Speakers of Other Languages and changed it from a management to a co-ordinator role at BG11. This was a role that the Claimant was looking to undertake.

[233]The Claimant had suggested a role in response to the Language Policy. The grade of the role was not discussed prior to Mrs James looking to seek approval for the role.

[234]The evidence is that Mrs James thought that a Co-Ordinator job description was the most suitable because the role proposed by the Claimant would not include budget or line management responsibilities. Supervision of Interpreters needed to sit within another team, which was not Mrs James’s decision. The existing Co-Ordinator role profile was a BG11 role. Mrs James considered that it covered all of the aspects that would be required for the Team, and she removed irrelevant matters from the template description, but this did not change the role grade and Mrs James did not intend to change the grade from BG11. Budgeting was removed because the role the Claimant proposed would not require budgetary responsibility, as it was co-ordinating an inhouse resource rather than managing a budget to source resource. Again, this did not change the grading of the role. There is no evidence that Mrs James used an existing Co-Ordinator job description as the basis of this role for the purpose of ensuring that the Claimant was disadvantaged. Rather, Mrs James sought to advantage the Claimant by introducing a role that the Claimant wanted and that she could apply for. Whilst we appreciate that the Claimant would have liked a higher grade, and higher paid role, the role proposed met the needs of the team. The Claimant has not established facts to support the allegation or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. In any event, the Second Respondent’s actions were entirely unrelated to the Claimant’s race. The only connection to the Claimant personally is that the Claimant could have done this role, had she been successful in open competition for it. 6.2.12. In about October 2022, the Claimant was told by Ms James to refrain from e- mailing the team about her concerns in how to continue anti-racism discussions

[235]We have found as a fact that Mrs James did not like long emails to be circulated on group email, and having had been told by colleagues that they were upset by the Claimant’s email, Mrs James emailed the Claimant on 3 October 2022 asking her to send criticisms of management and team members to her (Mrs James) and not to the whole team. The Claimant was asked to refrain from sending group emails for the moment, but told she could bring her ideas about the anti-racism training to the full team meeting. We have found that the email from Mrs James did not seek to stop the Claimant from sharing her thoughts or ideas, but considered that there were more appropriate ways to do this. We do not consider that a reasonable employee would consider this to be a detriment.

[236]We do not find that the Claimant’s race was a factor in Mrs James making this request in any event. The concern was that being critical of management and staff in group email had caused upset. We do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a hypothetical comparator.

[237]The Claimant also suggests that Ms Hanley is a comparator, as she is alleged to have made discriminatory comments about the Senior Support Workers and when the Claimant raised this she was told it was a management issue, whereas the Claimant was told not to send group emails. The Claimant was not in a comparable position to Ms Hanley. Ms Hanley had a management role and was raising concerns verbally. The Claimant had raised concerns via email. Both conversations were in any event shut down from a public forum. The Claimant was not treated less favourably than Ms Hanley. 6.2.13. In September 2022 Ms Hanley made some discriminatory comments about clients being lazy and not bothering to learn English. The Claimant said the comments were wrong. The Second Respondent told her that it was something for managers to discuss, silencing her.

[238]We have found as a fact that Ms Hanley did not make discriminatory comments as alleged. Therefore, the Claimant has not established facts to support this allegation or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. In any event, the Claimant was not a manager, Ms Hanley, Mr Hancock and Mrs James were managers and the issue was appropriately taken “offline” to be discussed between them. The Claimant was not treated less favourably than a hypothetical comparator in the same circumstances. What the Claimant really objected to was the criticism of the Senior Support Workers, including the Claimant, but also including employees whose first language was English. 6.2.15. The Second Respondent never explained or offered to the Claimant a job evaluation prior to seeking to change her contract in about November 2022.

[239]There is nothing to suggest that race was a factor in the decision to deal with job evaluation after the Claimant’s original contract was terminated, save for a bare allegation by the Claimant. The contract was changed because the Claimant had highlighted her employment status, and the First Respondent did not want to have employees on pay outside of their job-evaluated pay scales. The Claimant had asked to be recognised as an employee, and the result was that the First Respondent recognised the Claimant’s continuous service and sought to put the Claimant on the correct terms and conditions. We find that the Claimant was not treated less favourably than a hypothetical comparator. The treatment was unrelated to race. 6.2.16. In December 2022, the Second Respondent accused the Claimant of putting up her rate (the Claimant says that this was based on a racially motivated assumption that she was looking to make a bit of money)

[240]There is nothing to suggest any connection to race apart from a bare assertion by the Claimant. We have found as a fact that Mrs James was genuinely mistaken about the Claimant’s rate of pay, which was reasonable given that the Claimant herself confirmed that her hourly rate as a TIS interpreter was £26 an hour. Prior to the numerous complaints by the Claimant in respect of Mrs James, Mrs James held the Claimant in high regard and there is no evidence to suggest that Mrs James treated the Claimant less favourably because of race. There is no evidence that Mrs James formed a view of the Claimant “looking to make a bit of money” based on the Claimant’s race. The Claimant was not treated less favourably than a comparator would have been, in circumstances where the comparator had also had a second role earning £26 per hour. 6.2.17. In November 2022, the Second Respondent made false claims about the Claimant’s work claiming that she mainly did BG10 work and that some of her work was BG8.

[241]We have found as a fact that Mrs James genuinely believed that the Claimant was undertaking BG10 and BG8 level work. There is nothing to suggest any connection between this genuinely held view and race apart from a bare assertion by the Claimant. The Claimant herself makes numerous references in the Bundle to her doing Senior Support Work and Interpreter work. In light of this, we find that the Claimant has not established facts from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. The consistent view of the Respondents was that the Claimant was undertaking BG10 and BG8 level work.

[242]For the avoidance of doubt, we do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator would be in the same circumstances, given the Respondents’ belief that the work being done was in fact BG10 and BG8 level work. 6.2.18. On 25 November 2022, unilaterally decided to pay the Claimant BG10 according to a job evaluation which the Second Respondent had been involved in and provided an opinion.

[243]The Respondents did unilaterally decide the Claimant’s pay from 1 January 2023, based on the evidence provided by Mrs James. However, there is nothing to suggest any connection between this decision and race apart from a bare assertion by the

[244]The Second Respondent, as the person responsible for engaging the Claimant, was well placed to give a view on what work the Claimant had been engaged to do. However, Mrs James did not conduct a job evaluation, but rather set out reasons for her view as to why BG10 was the correct grade. This was then to be subject to a job evaluation once the Claimant was confirmed in a permanent substantive post. We do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator would be treated. The decision was based on a genuinely held, and evidenced view, of the work the Claimant had been undertaking, and was not related to race. 6.2.19. On 21 and 28 November 2022, Ms James tried to force the Claimant to sign a BG10 role. The Claimant did not accept a BG10 role. The Second Respondent was trying to trick the Claimant into signing the contract and sign away her rights to bring a claim for breach of contract.

[245]The Claimant was not asked to sign any paperwork in November 2022. There was not an attempt to force the Claimant to accept anything at the 21 November meeting, or by email of 28 November 2022. The Claimant was not provided with a contract of employment or a settlement agreement. The Respondents knew that the Claimant was represented by a solicitor. They thought that the Claimant wanted a permanent (substantive) role and offered one to her. There is no reasonable basis for concluding that the Respondent was trying to trick the Claimant. The Claimant has not established facts to support this allegation or from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn.

[246]In any event, as referred to above, the reason for the offer of the role was because the Claimant had asked to be recognised as an employee, not because of race. There was no less favourable treatment compared to a comparator. 6.2.20. In about January 2023, the Claimant’s e-mail address was removed from a general invitation for training to explain the job evaluation process

[247]As set out in our findings of fact and other conclusions, Mrs James removed the Claimant from the group email list because the Claimant was off sick. She removed another employee at the same time for the same reason. We accept that Mrs James thought that correspondence from her would exacerbate the situation. Based on our findings of fact, we conclude that the Claimant was not treated less favourably than a comparator was or would have been. The reason for the treatment was in any event unrelated to race. 6.2.22. In November 2022, the Claimant’s solicitor raised issues in relation to her contract and her manager and said it was raised a grievance. Failed to progress/properly handle the Claimant’s grievance namely by: 6.2.22.1. Refusing to deal with the grievance before the undertaking the job evaluation

[248]We have found that the Respondent considered that an evaluation needed to be carried out before forming part of a grievance, and that if the Claimant was not happy with the outcome at that stage it could be dealt with by way of grievance. Essentially, prior to conducting a job evaluation, the First Respondent considered that there was nothing to grieve about in that regard. The First Respondent instead offered a job evaluation process to take place after engaging the Claimant on new terms, with an assurance that back pay would be paid in the event that the Claimant’s role was evaluated at a higher level. There is nothing to suggest that race was a factor in this decision beyond a bare assertion by the Claimant. The Claimant was not treated less favourably than a comparator, and in any event the reason for the treatment was unrelated to race and was instead based on the First Respondent’s understanding of how its own processes worked. 6.2.22.3. The informal grievance investigation was unreasonably delayed.

[249]We do not find that the time taken to deal with the grievance was unreasonable, based on the timeline set out above. There is a period of around one month where it is not possible to ascertain what the First Respondent was doing to progress the informal grievance, however, there is no evidence that any delay was relating to race. A delay of one month is not unusual for a grievance of this complexity and number of allegations, and particularly in the public sector. 6.2.23. When the Claimant raised her formal grievance on 11 May 2023, there was no response to the grievance in a reasonable period of time

[250]We have found that the Claimant’s formal grievance was acknowledged on 1 June 2023. The Claimant requested an independent investigator. She was updated on 22 June 2023 and knew by 28 June 2023 that someone had been appointed. The process was concluded in December 2023, which given the complexities of the grievance, the investigation being carried out by senior personal with other jobs within the First Respondent, and the general length of time grievances are anticipated to take in the public sector, based on the collective experience of the Tribunal, we do not find the length of time to deal with the grievance to be unreasonable. We do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator would have been. 6.2.24. On 1 June 2023 Ms Clifford, accused the Claimant of being the reason for the

[251]There is no evidence of race discrimination beyond a bare assertion by the Claimant. We have found that it is likely that Ms Clifford was addressing the time taken to deal with the grievance up to the point of writing to the Claimant, rather than making a comment based on race (directly or indirectly). At this point, Ms Clifford and Ms Burstow were carrying on dealing with the Claimant’s grievances, having been assigned to the Claimant’s case. There is no basis to suggest that they were treating the Claimant less favourably than a comparator in this regard and we do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator would have been. 6.2.27. Declined to include in the grievance the unilateral change of her contract and the process of evaluating her role.

[252]As set out above, the First Respondent considered that its processes required the two issues to be considered separately. The Claimant would have been able to raise a grievance had she been unhappy with the result of the job evaluation, but in the end this was not completed. The reason for dealing with the two processes in this way was unrelated to race for reasons already referred to. We do not find that the Claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator would have been. There is nothing to suggest that a different approach would have been adopted for someone in the same circumstances as the Claimant other than in respect of race / English being a second language.

[253]The Claimant’s claims for direct race discrimination fail and are dismissed. Harassment related to race (Equality Act 2010 s. 26) 7.1.1. In July 2022, the Claimant was handed a ‘weak’ language policy by the Second Respondent and was told it affected her future and ‘I can’t keep hiring you because the crises are over’. This was in front of the team. The Claimant was not included in forming the policy even though she was only person doing language support;

[254]We have found as a fact that Mrs James did not make the comments as alleged, and that the Claimant was involved in forming the Language Policy. We refer to our conclusions at paragraphs 41 and 230 above. The Claimant has not established the facts that she relies upon and in any event we find the reason for the proposed new roles and discontinuing casual work, and any discussion about them, was not related to race but to the needs of the team for different job roles. It is unclear why the Claimant believes that statements about ending the casual relationship and creating a permanent post, insofar as those comments were made, are connected to race.

[255]For the avoidance of doubt, the purpose of any discussion about the Interpreter role and the Claimant’s casual role was not to violate the Claimant’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant. It was to discuss with the Claimant that the casual contract could not continue and to highlight to the Claimant what role(s) were available that she could apply for. Given the efforts made by Mrs James to accommodate and appease the Claimant, and the clear preference to retain the Claimant in the team if possible, we do not consider it reasonable for the conduct to have had this effect either. 7.1.2. In about September 2022, the Claimant was told by Ms James to refrain from e-mailing the team about her concerns in how to continue anti- racism discussions

[256]We have found as a fact that the request was not to send criticisms of staff or management in group emails, to refrain from group emails, and to bring concerns about anti-racism in person to a team meeting. The reason for this was because staff had been upset and embarrassed by the Claimant’s perceived criticism of them in front of other staff. Whilst this was unwanted conduct, it did not relate to race. Whether the criticisms related to race or not was not the issue.

[257]For the avoidance of doubt, the purpose of the instruction was not to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant, but rather to try to avoid upset within the team. Given that the Claimant had another forum to raise issues, and had been told of the checks and balances in place should she be unhappy with how Mrs James dealt with issues that she raised, we do not consider that it was reasonable for the conduct to have had this effect either. 7.1.3. In September 2022 Ms Hanley made some discriminatory comments about clients being lazy and not bothering to learn English.

[258]We have found as a fact that these comments were not made as alleged. The Claimant has not established the facts that she relies upon. 7.1.4. During a regular working meeting on 21 November 2022, issues around the Claimant’s employment were brought up.

[259]The offer of a BG10 role was made in response to the Claimant requesting that her employment status be recognised. It was entirely unrelated to race and there is no connection to race beyond a bare assertion by the Claimant.

[260]For the avoidance of doubt, the purpose of the offer was not to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant, but rather to try to address the Claimant’s request to be recognised as a permanent employee, by offering her the job that the Respondents reasonably considered the Claimant to be doing. The Claimant wanted to be recognised as an employee, she was just not happy with the pay for the role available. The Claimant was not pressurised to accept the role at this meeting. For these reasons, we do not consider that it was reasonable for the conduct to have had the effect (of harassment) either. 7.1.5. In an email sent on 1 June 2023 by Ms Clifford blamed the Claimant for delay in the informal grievances, and stated that she will be heading the formal grievances

[261]We have found that it is likely that the reference to the Claimant not providing was likely to have been made to explain the time taken to respond to the Claimant and was not related to race and there is no connection to race beyond a bare assertion by the 7.1.6. Emails 16 June 2023 and 11 July 2023 from Ms Jackie Healey blaming the Claimant for delay and urging the Claimant to continue with the process.

[262]In the 16 June email, Mrs Healey asked the Claimant whether she wanted to continue with a job evaluation process in circumstances where the Claimant had indicated that she would like to pause the process. This is not the same as “blaming” the Claimant. In the 11 July 2023 email, Mrs Healey urged the Claimant to reconsider reviewing that process. She considered that to be in the Claimant’s best interests, and the Claimant had said she wanted a job evaluation process [486]. There is nothing to suggest that these emails are in any way related to race. There is nothing to suggest a negative inference should be drawn.

[263]For the avoidance of doubt, the purpose of raising this issue with the Claimant was not to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant, but rather to try to address the Claimant’s request for her role to be evaluated and to try to resolve an issue of dispute. We do not consider that it was reasonable for the conduct to have had the effect (of harassment) either.

[264]The Claimant’s claims for harassment fail and are dismissed. Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 s. 27) 8.1. Did the Claimant do a protected act as follows: 8.1.1. In September 2022 Ms Hanley made some discriminatory comments about clients being lazy and not bothering to learn English. The Claimant said the comments were wrong; The Second Respondent told her that it was something for managers to discuss, silencing her.

[265]We have found as a fact that Ms Hanley did not make the comments about clients as alleged, and therefore the Claimant cannot have said that those comments were “wrong”. The Claimant did not, therefore, do a protected act as alleged.

[266]We have found that Ms Hanley raised concerns about whether the Senior Support Workers were effectively assisting the clients, which the Senior Support Workers, including the Claimant, objected to. Mrs James considered that this started to escalate and she therefore stopped the conversation (from all sides) and took it “offline”. The Claimant was not singled out to be silenced; the whole conversation was taken offline. For the avoidance of doubt, we find that nothing happened to the Claimant as a result of this interaction - no alleged detriments were because of this interaction. 8.1.2. On 3 October 2022, in an email to the team and the Second Respondent, the Claimant highlighted the lack of opportunities and bias that negatively affected the long-standing ethnic minority staff

[267]The Tribunal carefully considered the contents of the Claimant’s email of 3 October 2022 and whether it raises an allegation of racism contrary to the Equality Act. The email supports diversifying the team and is critical of the way in which recruitment is undertaken, but it does not contain an allegation that could be said to be a contravention of the Equality Act. Before this Tribunal the Claimant has not sought to identify the basis on which this email was said to be a protected act. We find that this email does not amount to a protected act.

[268]In any event, and for the avoidance of doubt, we do not find that the Claimant suffered any detriment as a result of this email raising any unfairness or issues of bias. 8.1.4. In an e-mail to Ms James dated 9 November 2022. This was a letter before action which was arguing mutual obligation between the Claimant and the First Respondent thus the Claimant was trying to affirm her employment contract. Requesting back pay, pension and carer leave. Says that there is potential to bring a discrimination claim.

[269]We find that the letter of 9 November 2022 was not about discrimination. It does not say that there is an allegation of discrimination. Rather it says that the Claimant will consider a discrimination claim if appropriate at a later date. It does not say what protected characteristic may be relied on. We conclude that this is not sufficient to be an allegation that someone has contravened the Equality Act and therefore this is not a protected act. In any event, we find that the fact that the word “discrimination” is used in this letter is not the basis on which any subsequent alleged detriments took place. 8.1.5. In a meeting on 21 November 2022 intended to be about casework with Ms James and Hancock. The Claimant wrote to the Second Respondent confirming what was discussed in an informal meeting that had taken place earlier that day. In that meeting, issues of the grievance and employee status were raised by the Second Respondent. The Claimant wrote confirming that she would be paid at her then current rate until the conclusion of the grievance. She was being discriminated against.

[270]The Respondent accepts that this is a protected act. 8.1.6. In an e-mail dated 12 December 2022 to Ms Healey asking the Respondent to investigate into the fact that the Respondent has known for a while about the issues around her employment status.

[271]We do not have sight of an email of 12 December 2022 that references the matters referred to. The Claimant’s witness evidence did not refer to an email of 12 December. We find there was no protected act on that date. There is an email of 9 December 2022 from the Claimant to Mrs Healey, which is a request for an investigation, but the 9 December email does not raise issues of discrimination. If this 9 December 2022 email is the email relied upon, it is not a protected act. We also note that the description of the email relied on does not refer to the email containing allegations of discrimination or otherwise relating to discrimination issues. An allegation that the Respondent had known about the issues around the Claimant’s employment status is not of itself an allegation of contravention of the Equality Act. 8.1.7. In her grievance dated 14 December 2022 relating to;(1) Employee status,

(2) Unlawfully deducted wages,

(3) Lack of promotion and opportunity,

(4) Hiring practices,

(5) particularly around ethnic minority staff, and

(6) Raising the issue of discrimination.

[272]The Respondent accepts that this was a protected act. 8.1.9. In an e-mail to Ms Healey dated 19 December 2022 about further issues in relation to her grievance, raising issues about potential direct discrimination having taken place within the team. That ethnic minorities are not being afforded the same opportunities for career development and promotion as white colleagues.

[273]The Respondent accepts that this was a protected act. 8.2.1. On 4 October 2022, the Claimant was told by Ms James to refrain from e- mailing the team about her concerns in how to continue anti-racism discussions

[274]The Claimant had not done a protected act prior to receiving this instruction from Mrs James.

[275]For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant was not asked not to send group emails because she had raised issues of unfairness or bias, or to silence her, but because team members had been upset by the email and Mrs James does not like long team emails (which is supported by the generally short emails sent by Mrs James that are included in the Bundle). There was a process in place at this time for any issues or concerns about race discrimination to be discussed, and that was ongoing. We have found that the email from Mrs James did not seek to stop the Claimant from sharing her thoughts or ideas, but considered that there were more appropriate ways to do this. 8.2.2. In November 2022, the Second Respondent made false claims about the Claimant’s work claiming that she mainly did BG10 work and some work was BG8.

[276]We do not find the Second Respondent’s opinion of the Claimant’s role to be false. We have found as a fact that Mrs James genuinely believed that the Claimant was undertaking BG10 and BG8 level work. The Claimant herself makes numerous references in the Bundle to Senior Support Work and Interpreter work. The consistent view of the Respondents was that the Claimant was undertaking BG10 and BG8 level work, and this view was expressed prior to the Claimant making any protected act. It is a view that was expressed as early as August 2019, and has been consistently expressed since then, both before and after the Claimant raised any issues about her employment status. The Claimant was originally engaged in the Resettlement Team to help cover Senior Support Worker work. There is no dispute that the Claimant did that work very well. Mrs James’s view is, therefore, entirely unrelated to the fact of any protected act. 8.2.3. On 25 November 2022, unilaterally decided to pay the Claimant BG10 according to a job evaluation which the Second Respondent had been involved in and provided an opinion.

[277]The Respondents did unilaterally decide the Claimant’s pay should be at the BG10 rate from 1 January 2023, based on the evidence provided by Mrs James. The Second Respondent as the person responsible for engaging the Claimant was well placed to give a view on what work the Claimant had been engaged to do. However, Mrs James did not conduct a job evaluation, but rather set out reasons for her view as to why BG10 was the correct grade. This was then to be subject to a job evaluation once the Claimant was confirmed in a permanent substantive post. The decision was based on a genuinely held, and evidenced view, of the work the Claimant had been undertaking, and was not expressed as a result of a protected act. As we have noted, this view was held by the Second Respondent, and supported by the First Respondent, prior to any protected act being done in any event. 8.2.4. On 21 and 28 November 2022, Ms James tried to force the Claimant to sign a BG10 role. The Claimant did not accept a BG10 role. The Second Respondent was trying to trick the Claimant into signing the contract and sign away her rights to her higher pay grade.

[278]As previously referred to, the Claimant was not asked to sign any paperwork in November 2022. There was not an attempt to force the Claimant to accept anything at the 21 November meeting, or by email of 28 November 2022. .The Claimant was not provided with a contract of employment or a settlement agreement. For reasons previously stated, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that the Respondent was trying to trick the Claimant. The Claimant has not established facts to support this allegation.

[279]We note that no protected act had been done prior to 21 November 2022. Insofar as the Claimant makes a separate allegation about the 28 November 2022, the process and thought processes were already in progress, no protected act having been done.

[280]In any event, as referred to above, the reason for the offer of the role was because the Claimant had asked to be recognised as an employee, not because of any protected act. 8.2.5. In December 2022, the Second Respondent accused the Claimant of putting up her rate (the Claimant says that this was based on a racially motivated assumption that she was looking to make a bit of money)

[281]We have found as a fact that Mrs James was genuinely mistaken about the Claimant’s rate of pay, which was reasonable given that the Claimant herself confirmed that her hourly rate as a TIS interpreter was £26 an hour. Mrs James subsequently corrected this mistake. There is nothing to suggest any connection to a protected act apart from a bare assertion by the Claimant. 8.2.6. In about January 2023, the Claimant’s e-mail address was removed from a general invitation for training to explain the job evaluation process.

[282]As set out in our findings of fact and other conclusions, Mrs James removed the Claimant from the group email list because the Claimant was off sick. She removed another employee at the same time for the same reason. We accept that Mrs James thought that correspondence from her would exacerbate the situation. Based on our findings of fact, we conclude that this was not done because of any protected act. 8.2.9. As a result of the protected act at 8.1.3 (which we have included to take to include 8.1.4, as this is the same act), the Claimant makes allegations 8.2.9.1 to 8.2.9.6.

[283]Having concluded that the letter relied upon is not a protected act, the allegations at 8.2.9.1 to 8.2.9.6 must fail.

[284]For completeness, however, we refer briefly to our findings and conclusions as to the reason for the conduct complained of: 8.2.9.1.1. Refusing to deal with the grievance before the undertaking the job evaluation

[285]We have found that the Respondent considered that an evaluation needed to be carried out before forming part of a grievance (see further detail above). 8.2.9.1.2. The grievance investigation was unreasonably delayed.

[286]We have not found unreasonable delay or any evidence that any alleged delay was because of a protected act. A delay of one month is not unusual, given the complexity and number of issues, particularly in the public sector 8.2.9.4. Unilaterally awarded her a salary on 25 November 2022 that was at a lower rate on the BG10 scale than she had been offered by the Second Respondent for the same job via email on 5 August 2021.

[287]We accept Mrs James’s evidence that she had forgotten in November 2022 that she had suggested that the Claimant could be moved to the top of the spinal column point, and that was the reason for the change in approach, not any protected act. 8.2.9.5. In December 2022 set the Claimant’s pay at BG10, despite the Second Respondent and HR discussing in October 2022 that they would offer her a BG11 salary.

[288]We have found that this decision was based on a genuinely held, and evidenced view, of the work the Claimant had been undertaking, and was not expressed as a result of a protected act. There was no BG11 role available at this time, and the potential BN11 role that had been discussed was a new role, not a role that the Claimant had already been doing. 8.2.9.6 Altered minutes from a meeting held on 21 December 2022 to not record the fact that the Claimant stated during the meeting that she had never been on an IR35 contract.

[289]The First Respondent produced summary notes and gave the Claimant a reasonable opportunity to amend and she did amend them. Both copies were then kept on file. The Respondents did not seek to amend the minutes further. This cannot reasonably be said to amount to a detriment, and in any event there is no evidence that the contents of the notes was produced in the form that they were produced in because of a protected act. We further note that Mrs Healey was not cross examined on the quality of the minutes and whether she produced them deliberately to misrepresent what the Claimant said (although there is no evidence of that either). 8.2.11. On 1 June 2023 Ms Clifford, accused the Claimant of being the reason for the this panel had previously mishandled her grievance

[290]There is no evidence that Ms Clifford suggests a delay by the Claimant because of any protected act. We have found that it is likely that Ms Clifford was trying to explain the time taken to deal with the grievance up to the point of writing to the Claimant, rather than being motivated by a protected act. 8.2.14. Declined to include in the grievance the unilateral change of her contract and the process of evaluating her role.

[291]As set out above, the First Respondent considered that its processes required the two issues to be considered separately. The Claimant would have been able to raise a grievance had she been unhappy with the result of the job evaluation, but in the end this was not completed. The reason for dealing with the two processes in this way was unrelated to race for reasons already referred to. We do not find that this decision was made because of any protected act. The decision was made before any protected act in any event. Holiday Pay (Working Time Regulations 1998) –

[292]The Employment Judge asked the parties for submissions on Regulations 14 and 30 of the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“WTR”), and in particular sought submissions on the application of Reg 30 in respect of time limits, where time appears to run from the date of breach or the date that payment is due, and asked the parties what their submission was in respect of when time started to run in this case, which may be affected by whether or not there was a termination of employment within the meaning of Regulation 14.

[293]The Judge raised that in the normal course of events, where a contract ends, for example in the case of promotion, but employment with the same employer is continuing, a payment in lieu of holiday pay is not expected to be made. The Judge suggested that this may be because of the health and safety purpose of the legislation, as it would not be in the interests of health and safety to deprive a continuing employee of annual leave.

[294]However, the Judge sought submissions on the application in this case, where a Hogg v Dover College dismissal is alleged and based on the facts of this case.

[295]The parties were given additional time to prepare written submissions on this point. The parties made a joint submission stating simply that “we cannot find anything that would assist the Tribunal beyond what is set out in the Statute.”

[296]The Tribunal must consider jurisdictional points and having given the parties opportunity to make submissions, we interpret the law as follows:

[297]Regulation 13 and 13A of the WTR set out the right to annual leave.

[298]Regulation 14 sets out the basis on which a pro rata entitlement to annual leave will be calculated under the WTR in the event of termination of employment during the course of a leave year, and Regulation 14(6) confirms that payment in lieu of annual leave will be made where a worker’s employment is terminated and on the termination date the worker remains entitled to leave in respect of any previous leave year which carried forward under the WTR. There is no right to payment in lieu of annual leave under the WTR other than on termination of employment.

[299]Regulation 30 of the WTR sets out the remedies available for breach of rights under the WTR, including rights under Regulations 13 and 13A. Specifically, Regulation 30(1) includes provision that a worker may present a claim where his employer has refused to permit him to exercise his rights under Regulations 13 and 13A. However, Regulation 30(2) sets time limits for bringing such a claim, namely: 299.1. three months before the end of the period beginning with the date on which it is alleged that the exercise of the right should have been permitted (or in the case of a rest period or leave extending over more than one day, the date on which it should have been permitted to begin) or, as the case may be, the payment should have been made; or 299.2. within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

[300]In relation to leave taken during employment, the payment date must be the normal pay date for that pay period. The Claimant was paid two months in arrears, so for example, payment for leave taken in October 2022 should have been paid at the end of November 2022 if it had been claimed at the time. In relation to holiday accrued and untaken as at the date of termination of employment, the date of payment will be the date of the employee’s last payment of wages in his employment.

[301]The Claimant is seeking payment for annual leave dating back for two years. However, her employment with the First Respondent did not terminate. Her original contract terminated, but her employment continued, and she remains employed by the First Respondent. We asked for submissions on the meaning of “where a worker’s employment terminates” and “termination date” for this purpose, but the parties were unable to assist.

[302]Taking into account the health and safety purpose of the WTR, and that payments in lieu of WTR annual leave are not made to the Tribunal’s knowledge other than where the employment relationship ceases altogether, and further noting that Pimlico plumbers and Sash Windows were cases for payment due in respect of carried-over leave in circumstances where the working relationship had completely ceased, we find that the natural meaning of Regulation 14 is that payment in lieu of annual leave only falls due on termination of the employment relationship where that relationship does not continue at all. Where the relationship continues, leave is carried forward to use subject to the relevant legal limits and provisions.

[303]Accordingly, the Claimant has no right to be paid in lieu of all annual leave claimed on the termination of her original contract. She is able to bring a claim for non-payment of annual leave taken, subject to bringing those claims within the time limit set out in Regulation 30.

[304]The Claimant contacted ACAS on 20 February 2023. Claims in respect of payments for annual leave due on or after 21 November 2022 are therefore in time. As the Claimant was, at this time, paid two months in arrears, any claim for holiday pay where the holiday was taken in October, November or December 2022 is within the three month time limit.

[305]In relation to claims for holiday pay that arose prior to 21 November 2022, those claims may still be brought within the tribunal’s jurisdiction where the tribunal is satisfied it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months, and the claim was in any event brought within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

[306]This is a test of whether it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to bring claims for earlier holiday within the time limit. We are aware that as at 9 November 2022, the Claimant had had legal advice from a solicitor, highlighting her entitlement as a worker or employee to holiday pay. At this point, it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to contact ACAS, but she did not do so until February 2023. Had she contacted ACAS in November, claims in respect of holiday taken in July, August and September 2022 would also have been able to be brought within the three month time limit. We have not been offered any explanation of why the Claimant delayed in bringing a claim for holiday pay. It was reasonably practicable for her to have made contact with ACAS in November 2022, particularly having had legal advice, she failed to do so and those claims are out of time. It follows that any claim for the period prior to July 2022 could reasonably have been commenced in November 2022, and we do not find that the delay until February 2023 is reasonable in the circumstances.

[307]That being the case, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the Claimant’s claims for holiday pay in respect of holiday taken in October, November and December 2022 (there is no claim in respect of holiday in 2023).

[308]It is trite law that workers are entitled to holiday under the WTR. The Claimant was a worker at the relevant times. She was able to take leave, but claims that she was not paid for it. The First Respondent says that the Claimant’s rate of £30 per hour included rolled up holiday. The Claimant clearly understood that she would not receive additional holiday pay, but she based that understanding on an incorrect belief by both parties that she was genuinely self-employed. The Respondent has not identified in writing or on the Claimant’s payslips what proportion or amount of that £30 per hour represents holiday pay. Pursuant to the Robinson-Steele case, sums already paid to a worker under a rolled-up holiday pay scheme can be set off against the holiday pay due to the worker, provided that the arrangements are sufficiently transparent and comprehensible and the sums represented an addition to pay for work done. That bar is not met in this case. Therefore, the First Respondent cannot rely on having made rolled up holiday payments.

[309]Accordingly, the Claimant’s claim for holiday pay in relation to leave taken in October, November and December 2022 succeeds. Unauthorised deductions (Part II of the Employment Rights Act 1996)

[310]During the course of the hearing, the Respondent admitted underpaying the Claimant in respect of(i) pay for December 2022 and

(ii) paying the Claimant at the lowest SCP BG10, rather than on SCP 24. To the extent that this has not now been paid, the Respondent agreed to pay it.

[311]In terms of wages (that are not pay for sickness absence), the Claimant’s claim up to 1 January 2023 was therefore resolved by agreement between the parties.

[312]In relation to the 7 days’ sickness absence in March 2022, at that time, the Claimant did not have a contract of employment entitling her to enhanced occupational sick pay. She should, however, have been paid statutory sick pay, which is three days at nil pay and then up to four days at the statutory sick pay rate. We took submissions on the amount and how the qualifying days should be determined.

[313]In relation to pay from 1 January 2023 onwards, the Claimant’s original contract was terminated by the First Respondent, such that there was no right to continue to be paid under it. Having made that conclusion, there is no basis on which we can make a finding that additional pay was properly payable to the Claimant. Whilst the Claimant indicated she did not want to be a BG10, that is the only basis on which the Respondent agreed to pay the Claimant in 2023. The alternative was dismissal. We have no evidence before us of any deduction from the BG10 wage.

[314]Therefore, there was no unlawful deduction from wages from January 2023 onwards, save that that has been admitted by the First Respondent. Breach of Contract (Extension of Jurisdiction Order 1994)

[315]The Claimant only sought sick pay for 7 days in March 2022, which we have found is payable at the SSP rate. Having determined the position regarding sick pay under the heading of unlawful deductions from wages, we have not gone on to consider whether sick pay could also be payable as a breach of contract. Time limits

[316]For completeness, insofar as is required, we extend time for the Claimant to bring her discrimination claims, it being just and equitable to do so and the balance of prejudice being in the Claimant’s favour, as she would be deprived of a resolution to her claims as a continuing employee of the First Respondent. The Respondents did not indicate any particular prejudice relied on, and the case has now been heard in full.

Remedy

[317]The parties were not in a position at the hearing to confirm exact amounts received or due to the Claimant, but agreed that it was their preference for the Tribunal to give Judgment on remedy issues, with any precise figures to be confirmed after the hearing.

[318]The Claimant sought reinstatement to the role from which she was dismissed or, if reinstatement was not Ordered, re-engagement to another role.

[319]Sections 113 to 117 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 set out the statutory framework in respect of reinstatement and re-engagement. The First Respondent drew our attention to sections 116(1) to (3) in particular, which require the Tribunal to consider:• The wishes of the employee, including, in re-engagement cases, the nature of the order to be made.

• Whether it is practicable for the employer (or, in the case of a re-engagement order, a successor or associated employer) to comply with the order.

• Whether the employee caused or contributed to the dismissal and, if so, whether it would be just to make an order (Section 116(1) and (3), ERA.)

[320]In the case of a re-engagement order, section 115 ERA requires that we must decide the terms on which the Claimant should be re-engaged, including:• The identity of the employer.

• The nature of the employment.

• The remuneration for the employment.

• Any amount payable by the employer in respect of any benefit which the Claimant might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal (including arrears of pay) for the period between the date of termination of employment and the date of re-engagement.

• Any rights and privileges (including seniority and pension rights) which must be restored to the employee.

• The date by which the order must be complied with.

[321]We reminded ourselves that: 321.1. When considering the relevant legislation in force prior to section 116, the Court of Appeal held that the term "practicable" in this context meant not merely "possible" but "capable of being carried into effect with success" (Coleman v Magnet Joinery Ltd

[1975] ICR 46

, approved in Kelly v PGA European Tour

[2021] EWCA Civ 559

). 321.2. While practicability is a question of fact for the tribunal, to be determined at the time of making the order, it requires a "real world" assessment of that which is practicable, not simply that which is possible (Rao v Civil Aviation Authority

[1992] ICR 503

). Moreover, although the tribunal is undertaking an objective assessment, it must keep in mind that the employment relationship has to work in human terms (Kelly,). It is unlikely to be practicable to order that an employee returns to work for an employer when the employer has lost confidence in that employee (Kelly). 321.3. Depending on the specific facts, making an order which would result in a redundancy process or significant overmanning may be "contrary to the spirit of the legislation" (Cold Drawn Tubes Ltd v Middleton

[1992] ICR 318

; Highland Fish Farmers Ltd v Thorburn

UKEAT/1094/94

[322]We heard evidence from the Claimant and from the Second Respondent on both reinstatement and reengagement. Reinstatement

[323]We concluded that it was not reasonably practicable to order reinstatement. There is no agreement on what the role was that the Claimant was doing. We have found that the Respondents believed her to be a BG10 Senior Support Worker, and we find that this reflects the work undertaken by the Claimant for the First Respondent. There are no vacancies for Senior Support Workers and Mrs James’s evidence was that the service is overstaffed. The Claimant believes that she was doing a different, more ad hoc role. That role does not exist in the First Respondent’s structure. To reinstate the Claimant to an unclear and non-existent role is not reasonably practicable. The claim arose because that was the case and as a result of the Respondents trying to fit the Claimant within their role structures and pay strictures. To the put the parties in the position that they were in before the Claimant’s dismissal would create a situation that is unworkable and we accept the Respondents’ submission that that would lead to the Claimant’s dismissal from any such post. We are satisfied that the role the Claimant would like to be reinstated to does not exist. Further, it is not practicable to reinstate the Claimant to a position where she would receive a flat rate of £30 per hour or to a casual arrangement, which is not going to be workable for either party. Re-engagement

[324]We accept the Respondent’s evidence that there are no Senior Support Worker vacancies currently and that work in that team is currently diminishing. That position may change in the future, but as at the date of potential re-engagement it is not practicable to re-engage the Claimant to a Senior Support Worker role.

[325]The First Respondent brought to our attention an available role as a Resettlement Housing Officer in the Bristol Sanctuary Service (formally the Resettlement Team). Having checked vacancy lists, the parties agreed that there were no other suitable vacancies.

[326]Both parties agreed that the Claimant would be able to undertake the duties of the Resettlement Housing Officer role, albeit perhaps with a reasonable amount of training that the Respondents indicated was not a barrier to re-engagement. The role would report to Dan Berlin, Sanctuary Programme Manager.

[327]The Claimant indicated in her evidence, that she would not particularly enjoy this role, but she would value the job and pay security and that therefore she would rather be re-engaged to this role than not re-engaged to an alternative role at all, particularly given the uncertainty around the future of the post she is currently in. The Claimant is currently doing a job that it is not her preference to do, but she appears to be doing it well, and indeed it has given her Housing experience that would be relevant to the potential post that we were considering.

[328]In her evidence as to remedy, the Claimant referred to Mr Berlin having been given a role that was not advertised, i.e. Ukrainian Lettings Manager, and then promoted further into another role that was not advertised, i.e. his current role. The Claimant said that she thinks that she should be in Mr Berlin’s role. She said that reporting to Mr Berlin would be a reminder of what had happened.

[329]Mrs James’s evidence was that she would be prepared to draw a line under all issues and start afresh with the Claimant. She considered that the position would be workable if the Claimant was prepared to do the same. In response to a question about mediation, Mrs James was clear that a line needs to be drawn rather than go over old issues that have been the subject of and addressed by the Tribunal proceedings. We agree (although this does not affect the Claimant’s right to appeal this Judgment, which she was concerned to ensure that she was not prevented from doing should she wish to do so).

[330]We were hesitant about ordering re-engagement in circumstances where the Claimant’s ability to work constructively with Mr Berlin is not clear. We therefore called the parties back and asked them to provide assurances on this point. The Claimant said that she would be able to accept Mr Berlin’s authority and would be able to work constructively with him. The Claimant said that she worked with Mr Berlin previously when he was her interim manager and she did not highlight any issues with that. Both parties confirmed that they are willing to try and there was no clear objection from the Respondents at this hearing to re-engaging the Claimant. The Respondents presented their position positively.

[331]Given that both the Claimant and the Respondents assured the Tribunal that the situation was workable, and that they were prepared to try it, we were satisfied that it was appropriate to make an order for re-engagement and that the tests in the Employment Rights Act were satisfied.

[332]The deadline by which the First Respondent must comply with this Order shall be 14 April 2025.

[333]We have considered what back pay should be awarded to the Claimant. We accept the Claimant’s submission that she was fit to work from 1 February 2024 and that she should therefore receive back pay from that date. The purpose of back pay is to put the Claimant in the position of being paid what she would have been paid in the role. She has accepted that she was off sick until the end of January 2024. We consider it just and equitable to award pay from 1 February onwards at BG10 SCP 25 from 1 Feb to 31 March 2024, and then at SCP 26 from 1 April 2024 to date.

[334]The parties agreed to confirm the SCP rates and amounts received to date by the Claimant so that the precise amount can be confirmed. The parties were required to confirm what amounts the Claimant has received in total between 1 Jan 2023 and 13 April 2025, so that a calculation of the difference and therefore sum to be awarded could be made. If the figures are agreed the parties were required to confirm that is the case and if not they were required to explain why not. The figures were to include what the Claimant has actually received, including the overpayment, and identify where the alleged overpayment was made. Essentially we were looking for a properly itemised schedule of payments.

[335]We confirmed that the back pay due to the Claimant shall be subject to PAYE deduction in the usual way, employee pension deductions and the employer shall make the appropriate pension contributions as well. In the role to which she is reengaged, the Claimant shall be entitled to annual leave, pension and all other benefits that are normally awarded and/or paid to employees of the First Respondent at BG10 after 5 years’ service, and her entitlements shall increase with length of service where due in line with Council policy. The Claimant shall be entitled to benefit from pay awards that would be due in the usual course of business, and which are negotiated with the trade unions as is standard practice.

[336]It was confirmed that as well as back pay pursuant to the Order for re-engagement, the Claimant is entitled to: 336.1. Notice of termination from her old contract, which shall be two week’s pay agreed at £1633.85, less PAYE deductions. 336.2. SSP of £56.77 336.3. Back pay for December 2022 of £2475, subject to PAYE, and in relation to paying the Claimant at the wrong SCP, the SCP figure to be confirmed when agreed. 336.4. Payment for annual leave taken in October, November and December 2022, the days and amounts to be confirmed, based on £30 an hour and the amount of holiday provided for in the WTR (i.e. 5.6 weeks a year).

[337]Following the hearing, the parties agreed net compensation £13207.81, to include all of the elements referred to in paragraph 336 above.

[338]The Claimant is also entitled to a basic award for unfair dismissal, which we understand to be agreed to be £2,569.50