Ms A Lopes and Others v DO & Co Event and Airline Catering Ltd: 3305379/2021 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3305379/2021

Between

Ms A Lopes & othersClaimant

DO & Co Event & Airline Catering LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Maxwell

Ms Crew (instructed by Counsel) for claimant

Mr Samson (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 6 March 2025

JUDGMENT

The Respondent's application for a strike out order is refused.

REASONS

[1]By an email of 13 November 2024, the Respondent applied to strike out the various claims brought by Claimants in these proceedings:1.1 for non-compliance with a Tribunal order to provide updated schedules of loss by 30 October 2024 (16 Claimants);

1.2 for non-compliance with an order for the withdrawal of duplicate claims by 11 August 2023 (3 Claimants);

1.3 because they did not have the required qualifying employment to bring unfair dismissal claims (6 Claimants).

[2]The procedural history included earlier non-compliance with respect to the provision of schedules of loss and I had occasion to observe that the Claimant's solicitors should not undertake litigation on this scale unless they have or are willing to acquire the resources necessary to prepare the matter in a timely fashion. Given this background, I decided to list a preliminary hearing in public to consider the Respondent’s application. The material part of the notice sent to the parties identified the issue for determination as: […] decide on the Respondent’s application (dated 13 November 2024) for claims to be struck out.

[3]As a result of settlements, withdrawals and earlier strike out orders, the number of Claimants who remain the subject of the Respondent’s application has reduced. The claims where strike out is still pursued are:3.1 3305528/2021 Inderpal Dharni

3.2 3305430/2021 Rafal Drag

3.3 3305579/2021 Parminder Sidhu

3.4 3305402/2021 Charith Walgampalage

3.5 3305468/2021 Adam Warsame Duplicate claims

3.6 3305510/2021 Reeta Dhaul

3.7 3306698/2021 Anjna Dhaul

3.8 3305587/2021 Hermick Somal

3.9 3305475/2021 Hermick Soman

3.10 3305557/2021 Ranjit Singh

3.11 3305586/2021 Ranjit Singh

[4]At the hearing today, I received:4.1 a witness statement and oral evidence from Mr Wood, the solicitor with conduct of this matter on behalf of the Claimants;

4.2 a bundle of documents running to numbered page 147;

4.3 written and oral submissions from both parties.

[5]I reserved my decision. Facts

[6]On 30 July 2024, I made a case management order, which included: Updated schedules of loss 6. The Claimants must send to the Respondent fully particularised schedules of loss:6.1 For the Lead Claimants by 30 September 2024;

6.2 For all Claimants by 30 October 2024.

[7]The Respondent must send to the Claimants fully particularised counter-schedules:7.1 For the Lead Claimants by 29 November 2024;

7.2 For all Claimants by 30 January 2025. 7. In the period following my order, the without prejudice correspondence passing between the parties shows the Claimants seeking to accept offers previously made by the Respondent.

[8]The non-lead Claimants listed below failed to provide updated schedules of loss by 30 October 2024:8.1 3305528/2021 Inderpal Dharni;

8.2 3305430/2021 Rafal Drag;

8.3 3305579/2021 Parminder Sidhu;

8.4 3305402/2021 Charith Walgampalage;

8.5 3305468/2021 Adam Warsame.

[9]In each of the above cases, updated schedules were note provided until 14 November 2024.

[10]In the case of Mr Sidhu, Mr Wood said that this had been a complex exercise because he was deceased. For the other Claimants it was said the delay occurred because they had sought to clarify and accept offers of settlement.

[11]I am not persuaded that the death of Mr Sidhu, which occurred a very long time before 30 October 2024, or the belated attempt to accept offers made by the Respondent in July 2024, which Mr Samson fairly characterised as “past their sell by date”, provide either a factual explanation or good excuse for the delay. Whilst both matters occurred, my conclusion is that the default with respect to the late schedules is simply another example of the Claimants’ solicitors failing to do the work necessary to comply with Tribunal orders in a timely way. As I have said before, whilst I do not underestimate the administrative burden of conducting large-scale litigation of this sort, the answer can only, properly, be to ensure that sufficient staff resources are devoted to it. Duplicate claims

[12]On 14 July 2023, I made a case management order including: Duplicate Claims Withdrawal […] 54. By 11 August 2023, any Claimant currently pursuing the same complaint in more than one claim (i.e. under more than one case number) must write to the Tribunal withdrawing any such duplicate (stating which claim is withdrawn under which case number). If this is not done, then I will consider strike out of such claims as an abuse of process.

[13]There is significant volume of correspondence passing between the parties in which the Respondent identified what appeared to be duplicate claims and, quite reasonably, pressed the Claimants’ solicitors to withdraw these.

[14]On 14 November 2024, the Claimants’ solicitor wrote to the Tribunal in the following terms: The Claimants in this matter note that there are two duplicates still within the cohort. For both duplicates they are duplicates within one multiple, so Mr Hermic Somal is a multiple within the Rai case (3305587/2021 and 3305475/2021). Presumably he was allocated two claim numbers as a result of an oversight by the Tribunal and therefore we write to withdraw case number 3305587/2021. Similarly for Miss Reeta Dhaul, she has been allocated two case numbers within the Patel multiple, case numbers 3305510/2021 and 33006698/2021. We withdraw case number 33005510/2021.

[15]On 22 November 2024, the Claimants’ solicitor wrote: […] we wanted to urgently deal with the issue of Reeta Dhaul. We understood from the letter of the Respondents of 13th November 2024 that they said that the point of that letter was that there were still two claims open for Mrs Reeta Dhaul at the Tribunal, 3305510/2021 and 33006698/2021. On the basis that there were 2 duplicate claims, they have applied to strike out both claims. Clearly, Ms Dhaul wants to continue with her claim and therefore on the basis of that correspondence we withdrew one of the Tribunal claims as our understanding was that they were duplicates of the same claim in the same multiples. I now see however in the last paragraph of the email of the 20th November 2024 that it has been suggested by the Respondents that there were not in fact two claims in the name of Reeta Dhaul with two different claim numbers. This is directly contradictory to what their email of the 13th November 2024 says. I am not writing this in order to draw any criticism but just to make the point that it was not the intention of Ms Dhaul to withdraw her only claim, rather to ensure that she only ran one claim so there was not any continuing risk of her claim being struck out based on the Respondents application.

[16]Mr Wood was the author of this letter. He was seeking to undo the withdrawal of Reeta Dhaul’s claim, albeit he set this out in a rather circuitous way. Mr Samson challenged Mr Wood to the effect that he had failed to say this was his error. I have come to the conclusion there is some force in this. It was Mr Wood’s obligation to make sure that one claim only was pursued on behalf of each of the Claimants he represented and not that of the Respondent. Having failed to do so in the first place, when pressed to rectify the position it was for him to ensure that he withdrew the correct claims. Mr Wood’s letter is obfuscatory and seeks, unfairly, to put some blame on the Respondent.

[17]In connection with Mr Somal, Mr Samson referred Mr Wood to his letter of 14 November 2024, in which he suggested the allocation of two case numbers to Mr Somal was “an oversight by the Tribunal”. Mr Wood conceded that was not true and it was his error.

[18]With respect to Messrs Ranjit Singh, Mr Wood said his firm has been acting on behalf of both men. I accept this is so. In cross-examination, Mr Samson referred Mr Wood to the schedule of Claimants attached to the form ET1 in the Rai multiple, in particular there being two separate entries for “Mr Ranjit Singh” with the same date of birth and address. Mr Samson said Mr Spencer’s statement did not include that this was his error. Mr Wood said he “did not mention it specifically”. I find there has been, to some degree at least, a lack of recognition and candour on the part of Mr Wood with respect to the fact that he has made mistakes and then been slow to rectify them.

[19]Mr Samson also challenged Mr Wood’s contention that the Respondent understood there to be claims from two rather than one Mr Ranjit Singh, because it had made documentary disclosure with respect to both men. This was a far less persuasive challenge. Mr Wood’s proposition was a reasonable inference from the objective facts and one that I draw. I can see no likely basis for the Respondent providing copies of private and confidential documents relating to both Messrs Ranjit Singh, save unless it was believed there were claims from each of them and it was under an obligation to make disclosure. The Respondent did not call any witness evidence in this regard.

[20]Following closing submissions and during my deliberation, I checked the Tribunal file with respect to claims against the Respondent and discovered: in the name of Dhaul20.1 3305495/2021 was the claim of Anjna Dhaul as part of the Rai multiple presented on 7 April 2021and this was dismissed on withdrawal by a judgement of 29 August 2024.

20.2 3306698/2021 was the claim of Anjna Dhaul as Patel multiple claim presented on 13 May 2021 and this was dismissed on withdrawal by a judgement of 28 November 2023;

20.3 3305510/2021 is the claim of Reeta Dhaul as part of the Rai multiple and this has not been dismissed;

20.4 Reeta Dhaul was not a Claimant in the Patel Multiple;

20.5 as at the date of the strike out application on 14 November 2024, there was no duplicate claim against the Respondent in the name of Dhaul; in the names of Somal and Soman

20.6 3305587/2021 is the claim of Hermick Somal as part of the Rai multiple and this has not been dismissed;

20.7 3305475/2021 is the claim of Hermick Soman, also as part of the Rai multiple and this has not been dismissed;

20.8 the date of birth and address given in both cases is identical; in the name of Ranjit Singh

20.9 3305586/2021 is the claim of Ranjit Singh as part of the Rai multiple and this has not been dismissed;

20.10 3305557/2021 is the claim of Ranjit Singh, also as part of the Rai multiple and this has not been dismissed;

20.11 the date of birth and address in both cases is identical;

20.12 for the avoidance of doubt, that same address can be found in the P45 at page 74 of the hearing bundle. Qualifying Employment

[21]All of the claims which were said to involve Claimants who lacked sufficient qualifying employment to bring a claim of unfair dismissal have now been struck out. Law

[22]So far as material, rule 38 provides: Striking out 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds—(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing. […]

[23]When determining whether to strike out a claim or response the Tribunal must consider:23.1 firstly, whether one or more of the threshold criteria under rule 38(1) has been satisfied;

23.2 secondly, whether it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to order strike out.

[24]Within the extensive body of case law that has developed in this area, a useful starting point is the decision of the Court of Appeal in James v Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd

[2006] IRLR 630

CA; per Sedley LJ:18. The first object of any system of justice is to get triable cases tried. There can be no doubt that among the allegations made by Mr James are things which, if true, merit concern and adjudication. There can be no doubt, either, that Mr James has been difficult, querulous and uncooperative in many respects. Some of this may be attributable to the heavy artillery that has been deployed against him - though I hope that for the future he will be able to show the moderation and respect for others which he displayed in his oral submissions to this court. But the courts and tribunals of this country are open to the difficult as well as to the compliant, so long as they do not conduct their case unreasonably. It will be for the new tribunal to decide whether that has happened here.

19. In deciding this, the tribunal needs to have in mind that the application before it is one that was made, in effect, on the opening day of the six days that had been set aside for trying the substantive case. The reasons why this happened are on record and can be recanvassed; but it takes something very unusual indeed to justify the striking out, on procedural grounds, of a claim which has arrived at the point of trial. The time to deal with persistent or deliberate failures to comply with rules or orders designed to secure a fair and orderly hearing is when they have reached the point of no return. It may be disproportionate to strike out a claim on an application, albeit an otherwise well-founded one, made on the eve or the morning of the hearing.

20. It is common ground that, in addition to fulfilling the requirements outlined in §5 above, striking out must be a proportionate measure. The employment tribunal in the present case held no more than that, in the light of their findings and conclusions, striking out was "the only proportionate and fair course to take". This aspect of their determination played no part in Mr James's grounds of appeal and accordingly plays no part in this court's decision. But if it arises again at the remitted hearing, the tribunal will need to take a less laconic and more structured approach to it than is apparent in the determination before us.

21. It is not only by reason of the Convention right to a fair hearing vouchsafed by article 6 that striking out, even if otherwise warranted, must be a proportionate response. The common law, as Mr James has reminded us, has for a long time taken a similar stance: see Re Jokai Tea Holdings

[1992] 1 WLR 1196

, especially at 1202E-H. What the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has contributed to the principle is the need for a structured examination. The particular question in a case such as the present is whether there is a less drastic means to the end for which the strike-out power exists. The answer has to take into account the fact if it is a fact that the tribunal is ready to try the claims; or as the case may be that there is still time in which orderly preparation can be made. It must not, of course, ignore either the duration or the character of the unreasonable conduct without which the question of proportionality would not have arisen; but it must even so keep in mind the purpose for which it and its procedures exist. If a straightforward refusal to admit late material or applications will enable the hearing to go ahead, or if, albeit late, they can be accommodated without unfairness, it can only be in a wholly exceptional case that a history of unreasonable conduct which has not until that point caused the claim to be struck out will now justify its summary termination. Proportionality, in other words, is not simply a corollary or function of the existence of the other conditions for striking out. It is an important check, in the overall interests of justice, upon their consequences.

[25]Although not the only consideration, when the Tribunal is considering whether or not strike out is a proportionate sanction, the question of whether a fair trial can take place is almost always likely to be a highly material factor. In Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd [2021] EA-2020-000006-JOJ, Choudhury P addressed the correct approach to this question:18. In my judgment, Ms Hunt's submissions are to be preferred. There is nothing in any of the authorities providing support for Mr Kohanzad's proposition that the question of whether a fair trial is possible is to be determined in absolute terms; that is to say by considering whether a fair trial is possible at all and not just by considering, where an application is made at the outset of a trial, whether a fair trial is possible within the allocated trial window. Where an application to strike-out is considered on the first day of trial, it is clearly a highly relevant consideration as to whether a fair trial is possible within that trial window. In my judgment, where a party's unreasonable conduct has resulted in a fair trial not being possible within that window, the power to strike-out is triggered. Whether or not the power ought to be exercised would depend on whether or not it is proportionate to do so.

19. I do not accept Mr Kohanzad's proposition that the power can only be triggered where a fair trial is rendered impossible in an absolute sense. That approach would not take account of all the factors that are relevant to a fair trial which the Court of Appeal in Arrow Nominees set out. These include, as I have already mentioned, the undue expenditure of time and money; the demands of other litigants; and the finite resources of the court. These are factors which are consistent with taking into account the overriding objective. If Mr Kohanzad's proposition were correct, then these considerations would all be subordinated to the feasibility of conducting a trial whilst the memories of witnesses remain sufficiently intact to deal with the issues. In my judgment, the question of fairness in this context is not confined to that issue alone, albeit that it is an important one to take into account. It would almost always be possible to have a trial of the issues if enough time and resources are thrown at it and if scant regard were paid to the consequences of delay and costs for the other parties. However, it would clearly be inconsistent with the notion of fairness generally, and the overriding objective, if the fairness question had to be considered without regard to such matters. […] 21. In this case, the Tribunal was entitled, in my judgment, to accept the parties' joint position that a fair trial was not possible at any point in the five-day trial window. That was sufficient to trigger the power to strikeout. Whether or not the power is exercised will depend on the proportionality of taking that step. […]

[26]Default with respect to Tribunal orders will not automatically result in a strike out and the Tribunal must consider whether there may still be a fair trial; see De Keyser Ltd v Wilson [2001]

UKEAT/1438/00

, per Lindsay P: 24. As for matters not taken into account which should have been, the Tribunal nowhere in the course of their exercising their discretion asked themselves whether a fair trial of the issues was still possible. In a case usefully drawn to our attention by both sides' Counsel, namely Arrow Nominees Inc -v- Blackledge

[2000] 2 BCLC 167

the Court of Appeal had before it a case where the Judge below had more than once declined to strike out the proceedings on the basis that whilst one party had, in the course of discovery, disclosed forged documents and had lied about the forgeries during the trial, a fair trial was, in his view, still possible. We pause to reflect on the magnitude of the abuse there in comparison with Mr Pollard's and De Keyser's. Whilst in other respects the context of the Arrow Nominees case is very different, there are passages in the judgment in the Court of Appeal of relevance. Thus at page 184 there is a citation from Millett J.'s judgment in Logicrose -v- Southend United Football Club Ltd (1988) The Times 5th March 1998 as follows:— “But I do not think that it would be right to drive a litigant from the judgment seat without a determination of the issues as a punishment for his conduct however deplorable, unless there was a real risk that that conduct would render the further conduct of proceedings unsatisfactory. The Court must always guard itself against the temptation of allowing its indignation to lead to a miscarriage of justice.”

[27]The factors to be considered where non-compliance with orders is at large was considered in Weir Valves & Control (UK) Limited v Armitage

[2004] ICR 371

: and these may include:27.1 the magnitude of default;

27.2 whether the default is that of a party or their representative;

27.3 what disruption, unfairness or prejudice has been caused;

27.4 whether a fair hearing is still possible;

27.5 whether a lesser remedy would be an appropriate sanction.

[28]Where a claim has not been actively pursued, then the Tribunal will consider whether this was intentional and disrespectful or the delay inordinate and inexcusable; see Birkett v James

[1978] AC 297

HL.

[29]In a recent decision of the Smith v Tesco Stores Limited

[2023] EAT 11

, HHJ Tayler reminded Tribunals of the need for caution before striking out claims, notwithstanding that some parties may be uncooperative: 47. This judgment should not be seen as a green light for routinely striking out cases that are difficult to manage. It is nothing of the sort. We must remember that the “tribunals of this country are open to the difficult”. Strike out is a last resort, not a short cut. For a stage to be reached at which it can properly be said that it is no longer possible to achieve a fair hearing, the effort that will have been taken by the tribunal in seeking to bring the matter to trial is likely to have been as much as would have been required, if the parties had cooperated, to undertake the hearing. This case is exceptional because, after conspicuously careful, thoughtful and fair case management, the claimant demonstrated that he was not prepared to cooperate with the respondent and the employment tribunal to achieve a fair trial. He robbed himself of that opportunity

[30]Presidential Guidance has also been given in this regard: 8. Under rule 37 the Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on a number of grounds at any stage of the proceedings, either on its own initiative, or on the application of a party. These include that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success, or the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious. 9. Non-compliance with the rules or orders of the Tribunal is also a ground for striking out, as is the fact that the claim or response is not being actively pursued. 10. The fact that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing is also ground for striking out. In some cases the progress of the claim to hearing is delayed over a lengthy period. Ill health may be a reason why this happens. This means that the evidence becomes more distant from the events in the case. Eventually a point may be reached where a fair hearing is no longer possible. 11. Before a strike out on any of these grounds a party will be given a reasonable opportunity to make representations in writing or request a hearing. The Tribunal does not use these powers lightly. It will often hold a preliminary hearing before taking this action. 12. In exercising these powers the Tribunal follows the overriding objective in seeking to deal with cases justly and expeditiously and in proportion to the matters in dispute. In some cases parties apply for strike out of their opponent at every perceived breach of the rules. This is not a satisfactory method of managing a case. Such applications are rarely successful. The outcome is often further orders by the Tribunal to ensure the case is ready for the hearing. Conclusion

[31]With respect to the updated schedules of loss, these were 14 days late, as my order required them by 30 October and they were not provided until 14 November 2024. As such, the Claimants failed to comply with an order of the Tribunal, within rule 38(1)(c). The threshold for a strike out order is satisfied.

[32]I turn then to the question of whether it is appropriate to order a strike out of the Claimants’ claims. My conclusion is that it would be wholly inappropriate and disproportionate to do so.

[33]The Claimants have already succeeded on liability and it only the question of their remedy which remains to be determined. A remedy hearing has not yet been listed. Because of the large number of Claimants who stand to benefit from the finding on liability and, therefore, the equally large number of remedy hearings that might otherwise be necessary, I have ordered the parties (with their agreement) to cooperate in preparing a schedule, summarising the remedy claim made in each case, the Respondent's response to that and any disputed issues which arise. My intention is thereafter to identify common questions of general principle and list hearings to determine these points, with lead Claimants. Many claims have already been settled by agreement between the parties. Once these general points have been determined, it is likely that other claims will be settled, as the basic mathematics ought to be capable of agreement in many cases.

[34]It follows, therefore, that notwithstanding the absence of any good reason for the Claimants’ default, this modest slip with respect to the provision of updated schedules will have no effect whatsoever on their remedy hearings, to the extent these prove necessary. I did not understand Mr Samson to say the Respondent would be prejudiced, in the sense of being less able to defend the remedy claims, by the elapse of 14 days. Even if this had been asserted, it could not possibly be shown on the facts. Quite obviously, a fair trial of the Claimants’ remedies can still take place. The Respondent is in no better or worse position for these Claimant than the many others who did provide their schedules in time.

[35]There has been an unfortunate history with respect to compliance by the Claimants and it has been necessary for me to comment upon this in the past. There is, however, nothing to suggest the default is deliberate, as opposed to being the result of a lack of care or the allocation of insufficient staff resources. A greater willingness on the part of Mr Wood to ‘hold up his hands’ where appropriate would have made the Claimants’ response to this application rather more attractive, but this is a relatively small point when the question at hand is whether to drive the Claimants from the judgment seat.

[36]Strike out is a last resort and notwithstanding the prior history, the Respondent has come nowhere near satisfying me that it would be proportionate to take that draconian step. Furthermore, late compliance having taken place, there is not even the need for a lesser sanction such as an unless order or a written warning letter saying that I am considering strike out.

[37]Applications for strike out, and indeed the listing of hearings to consider the same, are often enough in themselves to bring a defaulting party into line. That is precisely what happened here. Within 14 days of the Respondent's letter, it had received all of the schedules. It is relevant to note that many case management orders expressly include provision for the parties to agree such short extensions. I also take into account the overriding objective, which requires the parties to cooperate. Not every default should be met with a strike out application and where the application itself quickly rectifies the position, a party ought, reasonably, to consider withdrawing their application. Duplicates

[38]There is no duplicate in the name of Dhaul. There is only one such claim, namely that of Reeta Dhaul under case number 3305510/2021. No noncompliance with respect to the order to withdraw duplicates has been shown in her case.

[39]Mr Somal failed to comply with my order to withdraw duplicate claims by 11 August 2023, namely:39.1 case number 3305475/2021 in the name of Hermick Soman;

39.2 case number 3305587/2021 in the name of claim of Hermick Somal.

[40]Belatedly, on 14 November 2024, the Claimant's solicitor wrote to the Tribunal withdrawing claim number 3305587/2021.

[41]There is, however, ongoing non-compliance with my order for the withdrawal of duplicates in the two cases of Ranjit Singh under case numbers 3305586/2021 and 3305557/2021. In both cases, the same name, date of birth and address has been provided.

[42]Non-compliance having been shown, I turn next to whether and order for strike out is appropriate. In most cases, given the pursuit of duplicate claims is an abuse of process, there would be no alternative. The facts of this case are, however, most unusual. OH Parson has been instructed by and is acting for both Messrs Ranjit Singh, he whose P45 is at p.71 of the bundle and he whose P45 is at p.74. By reason of a mistake on the part of Mr Wood, rather than providing the correct date of birth and address for each of his two clients, when preparing a lengthy multiple claim form the details of one only were repeated, at two nonadjacent points in a long list. The intention had, of course, been for both Claimants’ details to be included. The mistake is almost certainly the result of these two men sharing the same name.

[43]On these unusual facts, the situation can easily be remedied by allowing an amendment, which Ms Crew contended for in her oral submissions, to substitute the date of birth and address details for one of the claims, such that each Mr Ranjit Singh would have their own claim under a separate case number.

[44]I am satisfied there would be no prejudice to the Respondent, beyond the loss of a mere procedural windfall, as it had proceeded on the basis it did indeed have claims from both men. The Respondent has made and received relevant disclosure in both cases, along with updated schedules of loss. Without an amendment, the Mr Singh whose date of birth and address were omitted would have no claim at all against the Respondent, in circumstances where liability has otherwise already been established. Whilst, as Mr Samson argues, Mr Singh may have a remedy against his Solicitors, that it is a far less certain and satisfactory position than benefiting from an existing liability judgment against the Respondent. The balance of prejudice favours allowing an amendment, notwithstanding it has been sought at a very late stage and then only informally.

[45]In these circumstances, I have decided there is a more proportionate course open to me with respect to Messrs Ranjit Singh, namely amending case number 3305557/2021 to substitute for the existing details, the date of birth and address, in the P45 at p.71 of the bundle. Unreasonable conduct and not actively pursued

[46]In both his written and oral submissions, Mr Samson argued for strike out on a much broader basis than the Respondent’s application of 14 November 2024, including that the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted was unreasonable and the Claimants were not actively pursuing their claims. He sought to rely upon the entire history of this litigation to substantiate such an argument, summarising the position as being “enough was enough”. As I told the parties, the only strike out application I was going to determine was that the Respondent made on 14 November 2024. Costs

[47]The Respondent's application for its costs of this preliminary hearing is refused.

[48]Whilst I am satisfied the threshold under rule 74(2)(a) is met by the Claimants’ late compliance with the orders set out earlier in this decision, which amounts to them conducting the proceedings unreasonably, this is not an appropriate occasion for a costs order.

[49]The Respondent's application brought about compliance within a very short period of time. By 14 November 2024, it had the schedules. The Respondent ought to have recognised it was most unlikely that strike out would be ordered where the remedy hearings to which the documents applied, were several months away at least.

[50]The Somal duplicate was withdrawn by 14 November 2024. There was no Dhaul duplicate. This left only Messrs Ranjit Singh. Given the Respondent had itself provided disclosure for both men, it could have adopted a more pragmatic course. Even if the parties were unable to reach agreement, a determination by the Tribunal might have been sought in connection with the Ranjit Singh duplicate only. Rather than narrowing its application, however, the Respondent sought to expand it far beyond its original parameters, which I did not allow.

[51]Whilst the Claimants’ solicitors can be criticised for their repeated failures to act in a timely manner and the Respondent's evident frustration is understandable, its own decision to pursue strike out to a hearing in the way it did was ill-judged and a substantial cause of the costs it had incurred.

[52]It would not be in the interests of justice to make an order for costs in such circumstances. Approved by: EJ Maxwell Date: 6 March 2025 …14 March 2025. …. Case Number Claimant Name 3305379/2021 Ms Anita Lopes 3305391/2021 Mr Leo Fernandes 3305392/2021 Mrs Marzena Rosowska 3305402/2021 Mr Charith Walgampalage 3305411/2021 Mr Dharminder Kahlon 3305413/2021 Mr Navneet Bajaj 3305417/2021 Mr Jeyam Sobasrikaran 3305423/2021 Mr Gordon Kam 3305428/2021 Mr Hardeep Bains 3305430/2021 Mr Rafal Drag 3305433/2021 Mr Tajinder Singh 3305435/2021 Mr Shiv Sandhu 3305437/2021 Mrs Permjit Noorpuri 3305442/2021 Mr Caitan D'Souza 3305446/2021 Mr Satbir Bajwa 3305447/2021 Mrs Sukhjit Wassi 3305452/2021 Mr Jatinder Khera 3305453/2021 Mr Jatinder Singh 3305458/2021 Mrs Jasvir Chaggar 3305459/2021 Mr Davinder Johal 3305461/2021 Mr Hassan El-Husseini 3305465/2021 Mr Mukesh Bhangu 3305468/2021 Mr Adam Warsame 3305471/2021 Mrs Gursharanjit Chahil 3305472/2021 Mr Paramjit Chahil 3305475/2021 Mr Hermick Somal 3305476/2021 Mr Bhagawan Damania 3305477/2021 Mr Subash Dharmarajan 3305478/2021 Mr Paramjit Sidhu 3305479/2021 Mr Dalbir Bhullar 3305485/2021 Mr Tariq Mehmood 3305489/2021 Mrs Gulshan Dhugha 3305490/2021 Mr Husan Lal 3305491/2021 Mrs Violet Lopez 3305494/2021 Mrs Dharmini Jayprakash 3305501/2021 Mrs Gurdeep Kaur 3305510/2021 Mrs Reeta Dhaul 3305514/2021 Ms Gurcharan Sahota 3305515/2021 Mr Balamurali Benoit 3305519/2021 Mr Kulwinder Randhawa 3305521/2021 Mr Dhanesh Rughoo 3305527/2021 Mrs Jasbir Hayer 3305528/2021 Mr Inderpal Dharni 3305537/2021 Mrs Linda Yu 3305540/2021 Mrs Angelique Radcliffe 3305541/2021 Mrs Kiranjit Singh 3305545/2021 Mrs Balvinder Birk 3305546/2021 Mr Dalbir Tut 3305552/2021 Mrs Davinder Sambhi 3305554/2021 Mr Sebastian Rejnisz 3305556/2021 Mr Dedar Singh 3305557/2021 Mr Ranjit Singh 3305558/2021 Mr Jasvinder Singh 3305559/2021 Mrs Sharandeep Grewal 3305561/2021 Mr Mohammed Choudhry 3305563/2021 Mrs Kulwant Chattu 3305566/2021 Mr Tony Bullock 3305567/2021 Mr Kuljit Chauhan 3305571/2021 Mr Vanravan Badiani 3305572/2021 Mr Som Siris 3305574/2021 Mr Ajmer Sidhu 3305575/2021 Mrs Sukhwinder Monjal 3305576/2021 Mrs Satya Rai 3305577/2021 Mrs Amarjit Bhinder 3305579/2021 Mr Parminder Sidhu 3305582/2021 Mr Rashpal Singh 3305583/2021 Mrs Neelam Khullar 3305584/2021 Mrs Neelam Saroyia 3305585/2021 Mr Hasmukh Patel 3305586/2021 Mr Ranjit Singh 3305588/2021 Ms Querubin Dala 3305590/2021 Ms Alka Delvi 3305592/2021 Mr Jaspal Sidhu 3305393/2021 Mr Jose Rebello 3305399/2021 Mr Nazareth Diniz 3305464/2021 Mrs Charnjeet Sidhu 3305522/2021 Mr Peter Betts