Miss G Amissah v London Borough of Islington and others: 3301532/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3301532/2023

Between

Miss Griselda AmissahClaimant

(1) London Borough of Islington (2) Andrew Turnock (3) Theonitsa SergidesRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Michell

In person for claimant

Ms Sinead King (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 28 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant is given permission to amend her claim to add a complaint of racerelated harassment in respect of all the allegations of direct race discrimination already specified in her claim form and Further and Better Particulars dated 26 June 2023 (though all such claims are dismissed pursuant to paragraphs 3-5 below). Otherwise, her application to amend her claim is refused.

[2]The claim of unfair dismissal was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim of unfair dismissal against the first respondent is therefore dismissed.

[3]The claims against the second respondent under ss 13 and 26 of the Equality Act 2010 were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. All claims against the second respondent are therefore dismissed.

[4]The claims against the third respondent under ss 13 and 26 of the Equality Act 2010 were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. All claims against the third respondent are therefore dismissed. 1 of 19

[5]The claimant is to pay a deposit of £700 as a condition of being permitted to continue with her claim of discriminatory constructive dismissal (s. 39(2)(c) EqA) against the first respondent. The terms of the deposit order are set out under separate cover. All other claims against the first respondent are dismissed A. BACKGROUND Listing for today’s hearing

[1]By a claim presented to the tribunal on 29 January 2023, the claimant asserts that she was directly discriminated against on grounds of race (because she is black), and that her acceptance of voluntary redundancy amounted to a constructive dismissal- namely, an acceptance of breach by her employer (R1) of the implied term of trust and confidence.

[2]At a preliminary hearing before Employment Judge Macy on 17 July 2023, the bases for the s.98 Employment Rights Act (ERA) constructive unfair dismissal and the s.13 Equality Act (EqA) direct discrimination claims were set out; albeit the list of issues was said to be a “working” one “that will require further amendment at the public preliminary hearing if that is necessary”.

[3]The matter was also listed for a preliminary hearing in public to consider:a. The claimant’s application to amend her claim to add a further factual allegation to her direct race discrimination claim about the comments made by the second respondent (R2) on 15 September 2022, and to add a complaint of race-related harassment in respect of all the events specified in her claim form and further and better particulars (FBPs); and (if thought necessary)

b. The preliminary issues of jurisdiction:

(i) Whether the complaint of unfair dismissal has been made to the Tribunal within 3 months (plus early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination; (i) If not, whether it was reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit;

(ii) If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period;

(iii) Whether the complaints of race discrimination were made within the time limit of three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates;

(iv) If not, were the complaints made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable.

c. The respondent’s application to strike out the claimant’s claims under Rule 37(1)(a) of the Tribunal Rules, on the grounds that the claims have no reasonable prospect of success; and/or in the alternative, the respondents’ 2 of 19 application for a deposit order in respect of the claimant’s claims under rule 39(1) of the Tribunal Rules.

d. Further case management, if necessary. (There was no time for this, beyond provisionally listing a 3 hour case management preliminary hearing on 5 February 2024 at 10.00am.)

[4]The listing for this hearing was originally in early October 2023, but it was adjourned in order for the claimant to get legal advice. Today’s hearing

[5]Today was a remote hearing on the papers, which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was CVP. A face to face hearing was not held because it was not practicable, and all issues could be determined at a remote hearing.

[6]I was referred to a 92 page bundle prepared by the respondents, a 15 page witness statement from the claimant which had 5 appendices and also set out a variety of detailed legal submissions; a 17 page skeleton argument produced by Ms King; an Agenda produced by the claimant, and a Schedule of Loss totalling about £152,000. I was also given copies of 7 authorities relied upon by the parties, which I read. During the course of the hearing, R1 supplied a copy of the claimant’s contract of employment, a payslip from August 2022, and the claimant’s 2021- 2022 P60. I heard evidence from the claimant, who was questioned by Ms King. Both parties made oral submissions. The claimant presented her case in a particularly cogent and intelligent way. B. THE FACTS

[7]The claimant worked as a teacher at Grafton Primary School (the school) from 28 September 2015 until 31 August 2022 (EDT), following her acceptance of voluntary redundancy and her resignation on 13 May 2022. The school has 81 members of staff, of which 53 are said to be from a BME background. It has an ‘outstanding’ OFSTED rating.

[8]The claimant’s employer was R1. R2 was head teacher at the school until his retirement on 31 August 2022. The third respondent (R3) was the assistant head, and since 1 September 2022 has been the school’s acting head.

[9]The claimant is articulate and capable. During her time at the school, from about September 2020 she acted as a trade union representative. As a member of the union, she also had access to advice and support -which she apparently sought and received when she brought her June 2022 grievance. 3 of 19

[10]The identity of R1 as the claimant’s employer ought to have been clear enough to her. For example:a. Her pay slips (to which she had access at least until the EDT) are from ‘Islington Schools’.

b. Her contract of employment names R1 as the employer. (She said she did not have a copy of her contract. But she sensibly accepted in her evidence that she could have asked for it.)

c. Her P60 for 2021-2022 (which was sent to the wrong address in 2022, but which would have contained substantively the same information about her employer when sent to her at the appropriate address in previous years) also names R1.

d. The HR issues she had with the school from time to time were taken up by her with R1’s HR department

[11]The claimant said in her evidence that she was unaware R1 was her employer until about 7 December 2022, and that until that time she thought she was employed by R2 and R3. I was surprised by that evidence, especially given paragraph 10 above. But in any event, she had the means to find out who her employer was -e.g. during her notice period. She could also have asked her trade union/R1’s HR department/R2 or R3/colleagues at work, both before and after the EDT.

[12]The claimant’s assertion in evidence that she was “not in the mind set” to clarify the name of her employer during her notice period does not, in my judgment, change the fact that she could easily and should have done so.

[13]After the claimant’s resignation, but before her departure from the school, on 13 June 2023 the claimant brought a grievance making a variety of complaints about what she described as “mistreatments” by R2 and R3, going back to early 2020. None of those complaints had been mentioned in her resignation email. There, she simply said she would “like to express my interest in accepting voluntary redundancy given the full time UPS role that has been deleted…”. She did not suggest in her written grievance, or during the grievance process, that any of the conduct at issue was related to her race – this, despite having union assistance with the grievance.

[14]Moreover, the claimant did not bring any other grievance (race-based or otherwise) about any of the matters about which she now complains prior to June 2022, notwithstanding the fact that the grievance procedure provides that complaints/grievances ought to be brought within 3 months.

[15]In her evidence, the claimant did not explain why she had not brought any earlier grievance. She said she did not make any allegations of race discrimination 4 of 19 against any of the respondents in her grievance or prior to the ET1 “due to my lack of awareness of the alleged racial discrimination until I spoke to an ex senior colleague in October [who told her] ‘it's because you're black’”. She also claimed that she spoke with a relative, who “helped me to contextualise my experiences using a comparator” thereby enabling her to “recognise the racial discrimination at play”.

[16]Given the claimant's obvious intelligence, her assured presentation of her case, and her role as a trade union representative, I have to say I found this account very hard to credit.

[17]The claimant worked at the school until 21 July 2022, which was the end of the school term. Thereafter, and until the EDT, she was in the school holiday period. She did not approach ACAS pre-EDT.

[18]The grievance was not determined by R1 until after the EDT, in 2023. (The claimant did not suggest before me that any delay in finalising the grievance process impacted in any material way on the timing of her presentation of the ET1.)

[19]The claimant started a new job the day after the EDT. It is not yet clear when she applied for that job. It paid a slightly smaller salary.

[20]Before the claimant presented her claim, and towards the tail end of the 3 month post-EDT period, she approached ACAS for the purposes of the early conciliation (EC) procedure. She obtained EC certificates in respect of both R2 and R3, for which ‘Day A’ was 25 November 2022, and ‘Day B’ was 6 January 2023. In those two certificates, the names of R2 and R3 are given. In both cases, their address is said to be the school.

[21]The claimant said she asked her trade union for assistance with the EC process in about early December 2022, but did not get that advice until mid December. (She did not explain why she left it so long to ask for advice.) However, as set out above, the claimant was herself a trade union representative, from September 2020. She had trade union assistance for her June 2022 grievance. She could and in my judgment should have sought advice about the EC process/the identity of her employer (if in doubt) from the trade union at an earlier stage. Moreover, as the complex legal arguments contained in her witness statement illustrate, the claimant is capable of doing her own legal and other research in order to establish and articulate her rights.

[22]On 1 December 2023, ACAS sent the claimant an email headed “Amissah v. [R3]” and stating: “we have recorded the employer's name as shown in the title of this email. Please check this is the correct full legal name and let us know if any change is needed. The correct name can typically be confirmed on your contract or pay slips or via the Companies House website” (underlining added). 5 of 19

[23]On 7 December 2023, the claimant then obtained another EC certificate -which named ‘London Borough of Islington Education’1 as a further prospective respondent, and gave R1’s address. On the certificate, ‘Day A’ is 7 December 2022, and ‘Day B’ 18 January 2023. The reason for using ‘London Borough of Islington Education’ is that the claimant apparently looked up the name of her employer on the HMRC website on about 7 December 2022, and those were the details given.

[24]The claimant did not satisfactorily explain the delay between 1 and 7 December 2023.

[25]The claimant then had correspondence with ACAS on 10 December 2023 concerning the interplay between the EC certificates and whether or not she could “change the name of my employer”. By that date, of course, she had already commenced the EC process against R1.

[26]As set out above, she presented her claim on 29 January 2023. In her ET1, the claimant sets out a list of alleged acts/omissions by R2 and R3 as the bases for both claims. That list wholly or mostly replicates the factual allegations in her 13 June 2022 grievance- except, of course, that they were now framed as race discrimination allegations. The last act/omission she relies upon in respect of her claim against R2 occurred on 1 June 2021. The last act/omission for her claim against R3 occurred on 14 January 2022.

[27]One of those historical allegations against R2 relates to an email sent by R2 to R3 on 19 November 2020. In the email, apparently written in response to a query by the claimant2 about pay progression, R2 said “shall we take a contract out?” The claimant says in her witness statement this “involve[s] references to hiring someone to kill an employee (me)” and is a “death threat… that left me with psychological and emotional damage”.

[28]The 19 November 2020 email was not sent to the claimant at the time, and she only “discovered3” it in May 2022. She says it was this email which prompted her acceptance of voluntary redundancy -though she did not mention the connection at the time4. 1 This is the name which the claimant used in her ET1. It was amended without issue at the 17.7.23 hearing. 2 The email does not name the claimant. But I was told by Ms King that the grievance investigator found it was “almost certain” that it referred to her. 3 This is the word she uses in the FBPs. The circumstances of that “discovery” are not entirely clear. It must have been on or before 13.5.22. 4 Of course, as a matter of law, she did not have to mention it, or other issues she says she had. See e.g. Weathersfield Ltd v Sargent

[1999] ICR 425

. But it is perhaps surprising she did not do so, especially if the impact on her was as stark as she says. I was not given a copy of the claimant’s grievance. But the claimant did not say in her evidence that she blamed the 19.11.20 email in the grievance for prompting her acceptance of voluntary redundancy. 6 of 19

[29]In her evidence before me, the claimant accepted that by the time she saw the 19 November 2020 email (18 months on), she no longer thought “someone was going to kill me”. But she considered that the language “contributed to a hostile environment” and was harassment, “even if in jest”.

[30]Following an order from the tribunal made on 5 June 2023, under cover of an email dated 26 June 2023 the claimant provided her FBPs. They included an additional allegation of direct race discrimination and harassment (s26 EqA) in relation to comments made by R2 in the context of a grievance investigation hearing on 15 September 2022. The relevant comments, which the claimant highlighted in her FBPs, are recorded as part of an 11 page transcript: “CH asked if [R2] had spoken to SA but [R2] could not recall. He stated that when he found out SA was on leave. There were elements of exclusivity in the way SA worked. There was another incident in an IT session. [R2] wanted to find out what SA was doing but she was very hard to reach. She was not happy to agree to using the Discovery Channel and was asked to do an action plan which she ignored. SA was essentially in silo and when SLT, not unreasonably, wanted to find out what was happening - and because he had tried to do his best to engage and invite her to the IT lead - he was constantly meeting a brick wall. There were no meeting and no discussions with [R2]. CH asked if there had been no collaboration and [R2] confirmed this. He stated that he does not held [sic] grudges”.

[31]The claimant asserts in her FBPs that R2’s above words “further disparaged my character and perpetuated harmful stereotypes by portraying me as the angry black uncooperative woman [and] reinforced racial biases and discrimination”. In her witness statement for the preliminary hearing, she says: “this portrayal of me as uncooperative and resistant to engagement creates a narrative that aligns with racial stereotypes, painting me as an obstructive individual... the language used, such as ‘constantly meeting a brick wall’, further perpetuates a negative image of me and undermines my professionalism based on racial biases... This characterisation of my behaviour and attitude not only unjustly tarnishes my reputation but also reinforces harmful stereotypes associated with black individuals. By labelling me as uncooperative and obstructive without considering potential underlying factors or alternative perspectives, it perpetuates discriminatory treatment and creates a hostile work environment.”

[32]The claimant did not receive a copy of those notes from R1 until some time after presentation of the ET1, in April 2023. 7 of 19

[33]The claimant further sought to allege by way of amendment that all the other matters said in the ET1 to be acts of direct race discrimination by R2 and R3 were also harassment for s.26 EqA purposes. C. LEGAL PRINCIPLES (1) Early conciliation

[34]It is mandatory for most claimants who wish to bring an employment tribunal claim to first contact ACAS and provide certain basic information to enable ACAS to explore the possibility of resolving the dispute by conciliation via the EC process.

[35]If the tribunal exercises its discretion to add a respondent to a claim, that claim is not invalidated because the EC undertaken was with the original respondents. Nor is it necessary for EC to have been undertaking in respect of the newly added respondent. See e.g. Drake International Services Ltd v Blue Arrow Ltd

[2016] ICR 445

, EAT.

[36]Exact precision in the detail given to ACAS for EC purposes is not required. If e.g. a prospective claimant has done enough to identify the prospective respondent to comply with the requirements notwithstanding an error in the latter’s name, that will suffice. See Mist v Derby Community Health Services NHS Trust

[2016] ICR 543

. This is because one of the purposes behind the whole EC process is “to avoid formalities fettering a fast and fair process of justice” (Drake, para 35) (2) Time limits Unfair dismissal

[37]The time limits in relation to a claim for unfair dismissal are in section 111 ERA. Subsection (2) provides: "… an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint … unless it is presented to the tribunal -(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months."

[38]That provision is to be read subject to section 207B ERA, which in effect extends the time limit to accommodate the EC procedure.

[39]As to the meaning of "not reasonably practicable", the issue is pre-eminently one of fact for the employment tribunal. The burden of proof is on the claimant. 8 of 19 Whether something is "reasonably practicable" is “a concept which comes somewhere between whether it is reasonable and whether it is physically capable of being done” (per HHJ Shanks, Stratford on Avon DC v. Hughes [2020] 12 WLUK 628). Various matters may be relevant for an employment tribunal to consider. See further Northamptonshire County Council v. Entwistle

[2010] IRLR 740

(para 5, per Underhill LJ). They include whether or not the claimant was aware of the right to claim unfair dismissal, or understood/was confused about the time limit for bringing such a claim. (These are not matters relied upon by the claimant here.) The question of what the substantial cause of the failure to present the claim within time was, and whether there was any "substantial fault" on the part of the claimant, is also relevant. See Palmer v Southend Council

[1984] ICR 372

. Discrimination

[40]Section 123 EqA provides that (subject to any EC extension afforded pursuant to s140B EqA) proceedings ought to be brought within three months of the act of the date to which the complaint relates, or such other period as the tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[41]When the discriminatory act is said to be a dismissal, time runs from the effective date of termination rather than the date of notice. See e.g. Gloucester Working Men’s Club & Institute v. James

[1986] ICR 603

[42]Conduct “extending over a period” is to be treated as done at the end of the periods.123(3) EqA. That applies to a continuing course of discriminatory conduct/maintenance of a continuing policy/state of affairs. Hendricks v. MPC

[2002] EWCA Civ 1686

. The correct test is whether the acts complained of are linked -as distinct from “a succession of unconnected or isolated specific acts.” A relevant factor is whether the same individuals were involved. See Aziz v. FDA

[2010] EWCA Civ 304

[43]The test to be applied at a preliminary hearing is that the claimant must show a prima facie case- in other words, a “reasonably arguable basis for the contention that the various complaints are so linked as to be continuing acts or to constitute an ongoing state of affairs”. Aziz. Just and equitable extension

[44]As regards any ‘just and equitable extension’ pursuant to s.123(1)(b) EqA, the onus is on the claimant to satisfy the tribunal that they should be treated as a suitable exception to the general rule that claims are to be brought in time. Robertson v Bexley Community Care

[2013] IRLR 434

. 9 of 19

[45]Factors such as the reason for delay5, whether the claimant was aware of their rights to make a claim, the conduct of the employer, the length of the extension sought, and the balance of prejudice as between the parties, are all material. Tribunals do not need to follow a formulaic approach to factors which may be relevant, especially when no reliance is placed on them. Chohan v. Derby Law Centre

[2004] IRLR 685

[46]Other points to note for present purposes are:a. A failure to provide a good excuse for the delay in bringing a relevant claim will not inevitably result in an extension being refused. Concentrix CVG Intelligent Contact Ltd v Obi

[2023] IRLR 35

, per HHJ Auerbach at [49]–[50]. However, it is important. As is put in Harvey: “even without a formal rule, the absence of a good reason for the delay is likely to weigh heavily in the balance of whether it would truly be 'just and equitable' to extend time”.

b. An important factor in deciding whether or not to extend time may be whether the delay has affected the ability of the tribunal to conduct a fair trial of the issues. See DPP v. Marshall

[1998] ICR 518

c. If there is forensic prejudice to a Respondent, that will be “crucially relevant” in the exercise of the discretion, telling against an extension of time. It may well be decisive. But the converse does not follow. If there is no forensic prejudice to the Respondent, “that is (a) not decisive in favour of an extension, and (b), depending on the ET's assessment of the facts, may well not be relevant at all. It will very much depend on the way in which the ET sees the facts.” Miller v. MoJ [2016]

UKEAT/0003/15

d. The weakness of a claim (even if it is not hopelessly weak) may be a relevant factor to take into account when deciding if it is just and equitable to extend timethough caution is needed where the full evidence will not be available. See Kumari v Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust

[2022] EAT 132

(26 April 2022, unreported) at [63]. (3) Amendment Order of applications

[47]An out of time claim may be brought in time by an amendment application. In SakyiOpare v Albert Kennedy Trust

UKEAT/0086/20

(24 March 2021, unreported), the tribunal had held it was not just and equitable to extend time. In doing so the tribunal had failed first to determine the claimant's application to amend her claim to add reliance on new post-ET1 detriments. The EAT held that the tribunal should have determined the amendment application before assessing just and equitable arguments. The EAT stated (at [21]) that if the amendment application had been 5 The tribunal is entitled to take into account delay up to the final hearing- not just prejudice to a fair trial occasioned by the delay between the end of the 3-month limitation period and the date when the proceedings were initiated. Stott v. HMPS

[2003] EWCA Civ 1513

. 10 of 19 allowed, the existence of the new detriments would have been a relevant (but not determinative) factor in determining whether or not it was just and equitable to extend time for the original, out-of-time, claim. Discretion to allow amendment

[48]The tribunal must consider all the relevant circumstances, balancing the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. See Selkent Bus Co v Moore

[1996] IRLR 661

, EAT [paras 21-24]. There, Mummery J (P) highlighted as being among the relevant circumstances:a. the nature of the amendment - whether it is the addition of factual details to existing allegations on the one hand, or to the making of entirely new factual allegations on the other;

b. the applicability of time limits - considering whether the complaint is out of time and, if so, whether the time limit should be extended; and

c. the timing and manner of the application - including consideration of why the application was not made earlier and why it is being made now.

[49]There is discretion to allow an amendment where a claim presented at that point would be out of time. However, where the claim would be out of time (including after consideration of whether to exercise the discretion to extend time on grounds of justice and equity), then unless the new claim is closely connected with that originally pleaded (i.e. because it is a mere relabelling and/or arising out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as are already in issue), the application to amend should only be allowed in special circumstances: Abercrombie v Aga Rangemaster Ltd

[2013] IRLR 953

, per Underhill LJ at [para 50].

[50]Poor merits can lean against allowing an out of time amendment, even if the merits are not so poor as to be utterly hopeless. Gillett v Bridge 86 Ltd

UKEAT/0051/17

[51]When considering whether an amended claim is brought in time, it is deemed to be made at the time at which permission is granted for the amendment: see Galilee v. CMP

[2018] ICR 634

at [para 109(a)], where it was held there is no doctrine of ‘relation back’ in the procedure of the employment tribunal. (4) Discrimination Discriminatory constructive dismissal

[52]Section 39(2) EqA provides that an employer must not discriminate against an employee by dismissing them Dismissal will include constructive dismissal. See e.g. De Lacey v Wechseln Ltd (t/a Andrew Hill Salon)

[2021] IRLR 547

. There, it was held (per Cavanaugh J) that a ‘last straw’ constructive dismissal can amount to 11 of 19 unlawful discrimination if some of the matters relied on, even if not the last straw itself, were acts of discrimination. This, even though such matters may themselves be out of time as regards any free-standing claim that might have been based solely on them. The question he adopted, following HHJ Auerbach’s wording in Williams v. Governing Body of Alderman Davies Church in Wales Primary School, was whether “the discrimination thus far found had sufficiently influenced the overall repudiatory breach in response to which the employee resigned”. ‘Unreasonableness’

[53]The ET is not entitled to draw an inference of discrimination merely because an employer has treated the employee unreasonably and that they have a protected characteristic. Law Society v. Bahl

[2003] IRLR 640

, EAT [per Elias J para 94]. Harassment

[54]The ultimate judgment as to whether conduct amounts to unlawful harassment involves an objective assessment -albeit the claimant's subjective perception of the conduct in question must be considered. Driskel v Peninsula Business Services Ltd

[2000] IRLR 151

. Tribunals “must not cheapen the significance of [the words used in s.26]... They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.” Grant v HM Land Registry & EHRC

[2011] IRLR 748

(per Elias LJ, para 47.).

[55]Similarly, in Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

EAT it was held per Underhill J para 22 that “… dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended … it is… important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase”.

[56]When assessing the effects of any one incident of serval alleged harassments, then: “it is not sufficient really to consider each instant by itself. We obviously must consider each incident by itself but in addition, we must stand back and look at the impact of the alleged incidents as a whole” Grant. Detriment

[57]An unjustified sense of grievance (no matter how keenly felt) will not constitute a detriment for s.13 EqA purposes. Shamoon v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. (5) Strike out 12 of 19

[58]The test of 'no reasonable prospect of success' is a high hurdle to pass, with the stress on 'no'. It is not enough to show that a claim will possibly fail or is likely to fail: Balls v Downham Market High School and College

[2011] IRLR 217

[59]Discrimination cases are generally fact-sensitive, “and their proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias in favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits of its particular facts is a matter of high public interest”. Anyanwu v South Bank Students' Union

[2001] IRLR 305

[para 24, per Lord Styne].

[60]Nevertheless, where there are no reasonable prospects of success, it remains appropriate for a discrimination claim to be struck out and inappropriate for it to continue to take up the tribunal's resources. See Anyanwu [para 39, per Lord Hope]. (6) Deposit order

[61]The making of a deposit order requires a lower threshold to be passed- as Harvey puts it, “a lesser degree of certainty of failure” is needed. See further Hemdan v Ishmail

[2017] IRLR 228

, where the essential purpose of such an order -to discourage the pursuit of claims with little prospect of success- is discussed.

[62]When determining whether to make a deposit order, a tribunal is not restricted to a consideration of purely legal issues but is entitled to have regard to the likelihood of the party being able to establish the facts essential to their case, and, in doing so, to reach a provisional view as to the credibility of the assertions being put forward. Van Rensburg v Royal Borough of Kingston-upon-Thames

UKEAT/0095/07

. D. APPLICATION TO FACTS Amendment R2’s interview notes

[63]As set out above, the claimant only received the notes of R2’s 15 September 2022 interview in April 2023. The fact that she was seeking to amend the claim was raised at the 17 July 2023 preliminary hearing, the claimant having raised the allegation in her FBPs, some two month post-discovery.

[64]So, the amendment application is made out of time, albeit her ‘date of knowledge’ was more recent than 15 September 2022.

[65]The factual nexus between the already pleaded case and new allegation, and R1’s apparent delay in producing the notes for the claimant, all go in the scales in favour 13 of 19 of allowing the amendment. The claim is also at a relatively early stage (albeit the EDT is already over a year ago.)

[66]However, the apparent weakness of the new claim weighs very heavily against allowing the amendment. It is significant to note that the interview notes contain a variety of other comments about the claimant which are not challenged at this stage, or included within the amendment application. The language of R2 in the passage relied on does not contain overtly racist language (though, of course, it does not need to do so). And I find it very difficult indeed to read the notes, on any proper analysis, as reinforcing “harmful stereotypes associated with black individuals”. It reads as R2 expressing -rightly or wrongly- difficulties he perceived he had in his working relationship with the claimant, in the context of a grievance interview where he ought to have been able (within appropriate boundaries) to express and explain himself.

[67]Mr King endeavoured to persuade me that as R2’s words were articulated in a grievance meeting, I was as a matter of law precluded for making a finding of harassment. She relied on Greasley-Adams v Royal Mail Group Ltd

[2023] EAT 86

in that respect. I think her submission goes too far. But she is right to say, relying on that case and common sense, that the context matters. The fact R2 was answering questions put to him by a third party about the claimant’s grievance further militates against a finding of discrimination. I think there is (at best) little reasonable prospect of the tribunal finding that anything material which R2 said was on grounds of race; or, that what he said amounted to a ‘detriment’ (at least, properly assessed in the light of Shamoon above); or, that what he said was race-related; or, that his words had the proscribed purpose or effect. It would “cheapen the significance” of the words used in s.26 EqA to find otherwise.

[68]Putting the above factors into the balance, I reject this part of the amendment application. Harassment

[69]The application to categorise each act of direct race discrimination in the ET1 also as s. 26 EqA harassment is, as Ms King sensibly accepts, essentially a relabelling exercise- albeit of course the parameters and tests to apply under ss 13 & 26 EqA are somewhat different. I allow that amendment- although for the reasons set out below the merits of the s.26 claims look weak to me (and the lack of merit again goes against inclusion). Unfair dismissal claim against R1

[70]I find that the unfair dismissal claim against R1 was presented out of time, and that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear it. The claimant has not convinced me 14 of 19 that it was not reasonably practicable for her to bring the claim against R1 within the 3 month time limit (allowing for any EC time extension). Even if it was not practicable for her to comply with that time limit, I find that she did not bring the claimant against R1 within a reasonable period thereafter:a. The claimant left it until very late in the initial post-EDT 3 month period to approach ACAS. She was entitled to do that. But it left her with little or no time to correct any mistakes or omissions in relation to the EC process.

b. In the light of my findings above, I do not think any confusion as to the correct identity of the employer (assuming there was such confusion) made it impracticable to bring the claim in time. The claimant ought to have established (if she did not know) that R1 was her employer before the expiry of the 3 month time period.

c. R1 was not included in the first tranche of EC certificates. The claimant could and should have included R1.

d. By the time of Day A for the EC certificate naming R1, the 3 month time period had expired (on 30 November). Day A for that EC certificate came 7 days too late -and the claimant has not satisfactorily explained that 7 day time lapse.

[71]I acknowledge that the claimant’s initial approach to ACAS, in relation to R2 and R3, was within 3 months of the EDT. I also acknowledge the force of the claimant’s submission that, had she simply issued the claim against R2 and R3 and relied on the EC certificates for R2 and R3, she may have been able to amend the claim so as to introduce R1 e.g. as the appropriate respondent to the unfair dismissal claim. Cf. Drake International Systems Ltd and Others v Blue Arrow Ltd,

UKEAT/0282/15/DM

, to which I was referred in submissions. (As set out above, in that scenario the tribunal would have been entitled to look to the merits of the prospective claim when deciding whether or not to allow the amendment.)

[72]However, I do not think that avails her, given that she did in fact go through the EC process with R1-albeit (for the reasons set out above) too late- and include R1 as a respondent to her claim. I do not think the claimant is right to say that “the original claim [can now] be amended to include [R1] as a respondent”. R1 is already included. It was reasonably practicable for her to have brought her unfair dismissal claim against R1, having engaged in the EC process in relation to R1, in time. The EqA claims

[73]All EqA claims were presented out of time, in respect of each respondent, as explained below. 15 of 19 R2

[74]I will assume for present purposes that the claimant has made out a prima facie case that the various allegations against R2 amount to ‘conduct extending over a period’ for s.123(3) EqA purposes.

[75]However, most of the allegations are very stale, dating back to early 2020. The most recent in time in the ET1 for R2 was 1 June 2021. So, any ‘conduct extending over a period’ for R2 ended long before the commencement of EC and presentation of the ET1.

[76]The 19 November 2020 email which R2 sent to R3, and which is said to have prompted the claimant’s resignation, was only discovered by her in early May 2022. But that ‘date of discovery’ is still over 6 months before the EC process was commenced in R2’s case.

[77]In the claimant’s favour are the fact that:a. The ‘mistreatment’ on which the claimant relies in the ET1 was raised as part of the claimant’s June 2022 grievance - albeit not as race-related complaints (which would have been a very significant factor for investigatory purposes).

b. Several of allegations set out in the 17 July 2023 List of Issues focus on the content and interpretation of paperwork/emails, rather than relying on oral conversation etc.

c. In the light of what is said in the ET3, R2 appears to be in a position to provide a substantive reply to many of the allegations.

[78]However:a. As explained above, onus is on the claimant to persuade the tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time in her favour. The claimant has not, in my judgment, advanced any good or plausible reason for not bringing her race discrimination claims -or even a complaint of race discrimination- considerably sooner.

b. Because the claimant did not raise a grievance or a complaint of race discrimination about the 2020 and 2021 issues she apparently had with R2 or R3 at the time, or in her 2022 grievance, no enquiry was then made regarding discrimination; nor was any consideration given as regards any comparators.

c. It may be expected for memories to have already faded (and to continue to face) after so long a lapse of time. Thus, for example, the notes of R2’s 15 September 2022 interview shows various points where R2 indicates he can no longer recall certain details. This can prejudice the respondents. The ET3 does yet not address all of the allegations raised. 16 of 19

d. Though I appreciate I do not have all the evidence before me, and thus must exercise due caution, I consider all or most of the discrimination claims against R2 (and R3) have little reasonable prospect of success: i. There is scant evidence of a race connection in respect of any of the matters about which complaint is made. Most if not all of the allegations appear to amount to the claimant belatedly saying that the respondent was unreasonable, and that she is black, and that therefore she has been discriminated against. That, as explained above, is not enough. See for example items 1, 2, 4 and 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15 & 17 from the 17 July 2023 List of Issues. (The same would have applied to the allegation in relation to the 15 September 2022 notes.) ii. It is not obvious how several of the matters complained of can be said to have had, properly construed, the requisite detrimental impact. See for example items 6, 7, &15 from that List. iii. Several of the allegations on the face of them appear to have an obvious non race-related answer: see for example items 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, & 17 from that List. iv. The fact the claimant did not complain of race discrimination at the time - and has not presented a plausible reason for not doing so- in my view probably further weakens the claimant’s case. If she did not discern any ‘bad conduct’ as race-related at the time, it would probably be a challenge to persuade the tribunal of the requisite race connection. v. I think it would probably “unduly cheapen” the words of s.26 EqA to categorise as ‘harassment’ any or most of the items relied upon (viewed individually or collectively).

[79]I therefore am not satisfied that it is just and equitable to extend time in the claimant’s favour, so as to allow her claims against R2 to continue. R3

[80]As regards R3, the last alleged act of discrimination happened on 14 January 2022. I again assume for present purposes that the claimant has made out a prima facie case that ‘conduct extended over a period’ in respect of each allegation made against R3. But even so, 14 January is still the longstop- over 10 months before early conciliation began, and over a year before the presentation of her claim.

[81]As regards any ‘just and equitable extension’, see further paragraphs 78(a)-(d) above, which substantively also applies to R3. I am not satisfied that it would be just and equitable to extend time to allow her to proceed with her claims against R3. R1

[82]If the claims against R2 and R3 fall away, as well as the unfair dismissal claim under ERA, what is left under EqA against R1? 17 of 19

[83]The claimant did not argue before me that her resignation amounted to a discriminatory constructive dismissal by R1 for the purposes of s.39(2)(c) EqA. Such an argument does not appear to have been articulated at the 17.7.23 preliminary hearing, either; nor is it in the ‘working version’ of the List of Issues prepared at that hearing. However, as the claimant alleges constructive dismissal, and as she relies on the same factual allegations to found her discrimination claims as her unfair dismissal claim, it must in my judgment already be part of her case that the constructive dismissal was also discriminatory for s.39(2)(c) EqA purposes.

[84]The key date for the alleged discriminatory constructive dismissal is the EDT, rather than the date of the alleged discriminatory acts/omissions of R2 or R3 which found the claim, or the date of resignation. This brings forward the time frame considerably. However, the EC process for R1 still began 7 days after the expiry of 3 months after the EDT. So, the s.39(2)(c) EqA claim is still out of time.

[85]Should a just and equitable extension be given in this case? I bear in mind that is ‘just and equitable’ for s.123(2)(b) EqA purposes is not the same as what was ‘reasonably practicable’ for s.111(2)(b) ERA purposes. A different and more liberal statutory test applies under EqA. The mere fact that I have rejected the unfair dismissal claim does not of itself mean that time cannot be extended for the s.39(2)(c) EqA claim.

[86]Against allowing an extension, I repeat the points set out at paragraph 78 above.

[87]However:a. The claimant did engage with the EC process with the ‘discriminators’ R2 and R3 prior to 30 November 2022 (i.e. within 3 months of the EDT).

b. The claimant engaged with the EC process for R1 some 7 days later. So, she was significantly less out of time for a s.39(2)(c) claim against R1 than for her ss.13 and 26 EqA claims against R2 and R3.

c. The claimant will need to prove she was constructively dismissed. That burden lies with her.

[88]For those reasons, albeit with some hesitation, I consider that it is ‘just and equitable’ to extend time to permit the claim to proceed. Strike out/deposit order?

[89]I do not think it is appropriate at this stage for me to strike out the s.39(2)(c) claim against R1 on merits-based grounds, before the evidence is heard and the witness evidence is assessed. I remind myself that the claimant will not need to establish that each and every allegation of ‘mistreatment’ was race discrimination. “Sufficient 18 of 19 influence” [of] the overall repudiatory conduct, such that the constructive dismissal should be found to be discriminatory” will suffice.

[90]However, there appear to me to be significant weaknesses in the discrimination allegations against R2 and R3 (as explained above), on which the claim against R1 must be substantially founded. There are (at least) potential presentation difficulties in the fact that the claimant did not mention the ‘last straw’ in her resignation letterin which she simply accepted voluntary redundancy. I therefore think there is little reasonable prospect of the s.39(2)(c) EqA claim succeeding. If the claimant wishes to pursue it, she will need to pay a deposit.

[91]The claimant is presently earning about £48,000 pa gross. She told me she had no savings. She did not mention any significant debts. She indicated she could afford to pay a deposit order totalling about £700, if payable within about one month. She must pay that sum by 31 December 2023 if she wishes to continue to advance the s.39(2)(c) EqA claim against R1.

[1]The complaint of racially discriminatory constructive dismissal contrary to s. 39(2)(c) Equality Act 2010 fails and is dismissed.

[2]The complaint under s. 38 Employment Act 2002 concerning the statement of initial particulars under s. 1 Employment Rights Act 1996 is dismissed.

REASONS

Table of Contents Introduction and procedural history 2 Conduct of final hearing 3 List of issues 8 Findings of fact 18 Submissions 62 Law 65 Conclusions 81 Annex A – Hostile Witness application 112 Annex B – Additional closing submissions application 114 Introduction and procedural history

[1]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent, a local authority, as a teacher at Grafton Primary School, from 28 September 2015 until 31 August 2022 following her acceptance of voluntary redundancy on 13 May 2022.

[2]ACAS Early Conciliation took place between 25 November 2022 and 6 January 2023 with respect to Theonitsa Sergides (Head Teacher) and Andrew Turnock (Associate Head Teacher), and then between 7 December 2022 and 18 January 2023 with respect to the Respondent. The ET1 was filed on 29 January 2023 and at that time the Claimant complained of race discrimination and unfair dismissal. The claim was brought against Mrs Sergides, Mr Turnock and the Respondent.

[3]An ET3 denying the complaints was filed on 14 March 2023.

[4]The case was the subject to considerable case management prior to the final hearing. On 5 June 2023 the Claimant was directed to provide additional information, and this was provided on 26 June 2023. The Respondent filed an Amended Response on 1 March 2024.

[5]A private preliminary hearing for case management took place on 17 July 2023 before Employment Judge Macey where the list of issues was discussed and a public preliminary hearing was listed to consider whether the Claimant should have permission to amend the claim; to also consider the issue of time limits; and to consider the Respondent’s application for a strike out of the complaints.

[6]A public preliminary hearing took place on 2 November 2023 before Employment Judge Michell. At that hearing the following decisions were made:6.1 The Claimant was given permission to amend her claim to add complaints of harassment related to race for each of the allegations of direct race discrimination, however they were then dismissed as freestanding allegations of harassment but were permitted to be relied upon for the basis of a complaint of discriminatory constructive dismissal.

6.2 The claim of unfair dismissal was dismissed as it had not been presented within the applicable time limit whereas it had been reasonably practicable to do so.

6.3 The complaints of discrimination against the Second and Third Respondents were dismissed as they had not been brought within the applicable time limit and it was not just and equitable to extend time.

6.4 The Claimant was issued with a deposit order with respect to the claim of discriminatory constructive dismissal.

[7]The issue of time was resolved in full before Employment Judge Michell on 2 November 2023.

[8]The matter then proceeded to a third preliminary hearing which was for case management in private on 5 February 2024 before Employment Judge Hughes. The issues were finalised at that hearing and the case management summary records that the only remaining claim was one for discriminatory constructive dismissal comprised of the allegations of direct race discrimination and harassment related to race. This is a claim against the First Respondent only. These complaints are not free-standing complaints of direct discrimination and harassment. The Claimant also complains of a failure to provide a statement of particulars under s. 1 Employment Rights Act 1996. Conduct of final hearing

[9]At the start of the hearing, we were provided with a hearing bundle of 395 pages. We later received a significant amount of additional disclosure, almost daily. By the conclusion of the hearing, we had a first supplemental bundle of 177 pages (with a further 3 additional pages on top of that) and a second supplemental bundle of 87 pages.

[10]We received witness statements from the Claimant (35 pages) and Rosalind Porter Tibbey (2 pages) on the Claimant’s behalf. As will be explained below, Mrs Porter Tibbey was subject to a witness order

[11]We also received witness statements from Theonitsa Sergides (12 pages) and Andrew Turnock (6 pages) on behalf of the Respondent.

[12]The matter had been listed for 11 days from 2 June 2025 however it started one day late on 3 June 2025 due to lack of judicial resource. I made the parties aware that the amount of time for witness evidence would not be reduced.

[13]The Claimant gave evidence on 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 June 2025 and was recalled to give evidence on 16 June 2025. The Claimant’s internet connection was interrupted on a number of occasions on 4 June which necessitated logging in and out. We did not miss any of the Claimant’s oral evidence and she changed locations the following day and the connection was much improved.

[14]Mrs Porter Tibbey gave evidence on behalf of the Claimant on 10 and 11 June, and KM (Business Manager) was also subject to a witness order, and she gave evidence on 11 June on the Claimant’s behalf although she did not provide a witness statement. Mrs Sergides gave evidence on 11, 12 and 13 June. Mr Turnock gave evidence on 4, 5 and 6 November 2025. Closing submissions were given on 6 November 2025.

[15]We encountered a number of challenges in this hearing. First - the events giving rise to this claim allegedly occurred between three and six years earlier. Memories are fallible and it was clear that some of the witnesses found it difficult to recall some details – in some instances there were disputes as to whether certain things had happened at all, and we will address these in our findings of fact below.

[16]Second - many of the things being complained about occurred during the Covid-19 Pandemic at a school which would have been an incredibly busy environment where people were under considerable pressure to react to a fast changing situation. This meant that discussions and decisions were not always minuted, and again this had an impact upon the ability of Mrs Sergides, Mr Turnock and KM to recall matters from five years earlier.

[17]Third - there was a delay in bringing proceedings about historic matters going back to 2019/2020 which meant that not all of the documents were preserved. Whereas the Claimant suggests that material was deleted by the Respondent after the duty to preserve evidence was engaged, we have not been persuaded that was the case. The date of the ET1 is 29 January 2023 and the claim concerns matters going back up to 2019. We have not been persuaded that anything relevant was deleted (deliberately or otherwise) after 29 January 2023. The Claimant’s internal grievance in May 2022 did not mention discrimination and she accepted voluntary redundancy, therefore there was nothing to suggest that an ET1 was likely.

[18]Fourth - the provision of additional documents became a recurrent theme throughout the hearing, and it took up time and became difficult to manage. Both parties provided late disclosure, but the bulk of it came from the Claimant, often at short notice immediately before the hearing was due to commence each day. Some of the material was already in the Claimant’s possession, and some of it was material the Claimant obtained from a subject access request between the June and November 2025 hearings. The Claimant obtained some of the late disclosure from her work email account during these proceedings even though she left the Respondent’s employment some three years earlier. It was not explained to us how the Claimant managed to gain access.

[19]These documents were often presented to the Respondent’s witnesses immediately before they were due to give evidence with little time to refresh their memories of things which had happened up to five years ago. The documents were often incomplete or out of context (due to material not having been preserved in the intervening years) therefore the Respondent’s witnesses struggled to recollect precisely the background. We have made allowances for the lateness of disclosure and the impact upon memory and consistency. The Claimant has accused these witnesses of inconsistency of retrofitting their evidence on the basis it somehow did not match with the contents of the Respondent’s ET3 or their witness statements, however in many cases those documents had been produced years after the events complained of and without sight of the late disclosure we now have before us. We took all of this into consideration.

[20]The Tribunal did not refuse to allow in any of the late disclosure even though some of it appeared to have little direct evidence to the issues. I spent a great deal of time, for example two hours and twenty minutes on 4 November 2025, going through each of the new documents with the Claimant to ascertain the relevance of the 87 new pages disclosed that day. Our approach was to allow in the evidence subject to the condition we would allow witnesses time to read them, and we would intervene if the questions on them were not relevant to the legal issues in the claim. Whereas the Respondent objected to some of the late disclosure, it did not pursue those objections in the interests of not wasting time.

[21]Fifth – due to the above, the list of issues was produced on the basis of memories of events rather than contemporaneous documents. This meant that many of the dates were incorrect and I have repeatedly amended the list of issues to correct the dates and other matters described below. Given the list of issues contained the wrong dates the witness statements then duplicated this error. In some instances the wrong day was mentioned, in other instances it was the wrong month or year. This again made it difficult for us to piece together the chronology in this matter.

[22]Sixth - the Claimant was previously granted three witness orders. On 17 September 2024 Employment Judge Quill granted the Clamant a witness order for Rosalind Porter Tibbey. Mrs Porter Tibbey produced a witness statement which was supportive to the Respondent. I made the Claimant aware she could not cross examine her own witness and soon after Mrs Porter Tibbey started her evidence on day six (10 June 2025) the Claimant applied to declare her a hostile witness which we refused. Our reasons for the refusal appear at Annex A below.

[23]On 17 September 2024 Employment Judge Quill granted the Clamant a witness order for KM who is the Business Manager at the school. KM gave evidence on 10 June 2025 but did not produce a witness statement at all.

[24]On 22 May 2025 the Regional Employment Judge granted the Clamant a witness order for Katy Potts. Ms Potts did not produce a witness statement but provided emailed answers to questions which were also supportive of the Respondent. The Claimant did not call Ms Potts but asked us to accept her answers into evidence and to place full weight on them. During the reconvened hearing on 5 November 2025 the Claimant sought to challenge Ms Potts’ written evidence. When reminded that Ms Potts was her own witness and she had asked us to place full weight on her evidence, the Claimant said that was not what she had in mind. Nevertheless, the evidence was produced on behalf of the Claimant, and she asked us to place full weight on it, and we have done so.

[25]Seventh - the Tribunal had concerns about the reliability of the Claimant’s evidence and the manner in which she had obtained some of the evidence put before us in these proceedings.

[26]At the heart of this case is an email dated 19 November 2020 which the Claimant obtained from an iPad belonging to Mr Turnock, the then Associate Head Teacher, which she claims to have accessed in May 2022, some one and a half years after it was sent. The Claimant was previously a Computing Lead in the school which she had ceased to be long before May 2022. The Claimant says she found an iPad, and tried to identify the owner by going into the iPad, going into the sent items and looking to find the owner that way. The Claimant claims this is how she found an email about her, even though the email in question doesn’t name her, and following which she admits she took the iPad off site to her home, and she kept it there until August 2022 before returning it to HR during her grievance process.

[27]Whereas we have kept in mind it is theoretically possible that the Claimant stumbled upon the email in the manner which she describes, we have not been persuaded that the Claimant would have chosen the most intrusive means possible to identify the owner of an iPad whereas she could have either used the asset register at the school which she knew to have existed (but alleges was out of date) or she could have just handed it over to the Head Teacher (or anyone else senior) rather than going through it and potentially viewing sensitive personal data about Mr Turnock, the pupils, their parents and carers, and also her colleagues. We noted that this incident came after the Claimant had made a subject access request which she alleged in the grievance process was incomplete.

[28]In addition, the Claimant had provided disclosure of several other emails taken from Mr Turnock’s email account. These appeared to be poor quality photographs or screenshots of emails, but not the complete versions of them. The Claimant alleged that all of these were disclosed to her by an anonymous whistleblower in Autumn 2022 after she had resigned in May 2022. It was not established before us how these were sent to the Claimant, and it was not made clear if the Claimant knew the person or not. At times the Claimant suggested they were being kept anonymous to protect them from victimisation, and other times she suggested she did not know who they were and she even went as far as to agree it might be someone in the Respondent’s HR who had disclosed the material to her. We were not persuaded by the Claimant’s explanation about this matter either.

[29]As a result of the above, on the morning of 5 June 2025, I converted the hearing to a private case management hearing where I informed the Claimant of her rights under s. 14 Civil Evidence Act 1968 to refuse to answer any question or to provide documents which may incriminate her. I adjourned the hearing for half a day and recommended that the Claimant takes legal advice about those issues. On her return the Claimant told us that she had taken legal advice from someone legally qualified and she wished to continue.

[30]I reminded the Claimant that she did not have to answer questions about how she obtained those documents, but if she did not do so we could potentially draw an inference, and it could be a negative one. I repeated this caution throughout the hearing, including in November 2025 when the Claimant told us she had obtained more disclosure recently from her old work email account. I did not know how the Claimant had gained access, but nevertheless it was necessary for me to restate that warning against self-incrimination.

[31]We had further concerns about the reliability of the Claimant’s witness evidence to us due to the inconsistency between what she was telling us now and the sworn witness evidence she had given to Employment Judge Michell at an earlier preliminary hearing in November 2023 which considered whether the complaints had been brought in time.

[32]The Claimant’s witness statement for that hearing was put before us although she initially objected to its inclusion. In that statement the Claimant said she did not know or realise the treatment she complained of was due to her race until October 2022 which is after her employment ended and when she had spoken to someone who explained to her that the alleged treatment was due to race. That statement was made in order to persuade the Employment Tribunal to extend time for the claim to be considered on a just and equitable basis.

[33]This appeared to be at odds with the Claimant’s arguments before us that she resigned in May 2022 in response to acts of direct race discrimination and harassment related to race. We were unable to reconcile these two arguments as they were contradictory and the Claimant’s explanations, which we will address in the findings of fact, were not persuasive.

[34]In addition the Claimant misquoted some documents or things allegedly said or done to her. By way of example, Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock wrote to the Claimant in September 2020 about her conduct. The Claimant has repeatedly asserted before us that she had been accused of being aggressive in that letter and by Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock. The Claimant has been reminded several times that the letter contains no such allegation which the Claimant acknowledged briefly but then soon reverted to saying that it did.

[35]We found no evidence that the Respondent ever wrote to the Claimant that she was aggressive nor that it said to her that she was aggressive, yet the Claimant used the word 18 times in her closing submissions. Within those submissions the Claimant says that she was described as aggressive and unsafe, she was portrayed as acting aggressively, and she says that there was disagreement in the meeting which the Respondent had reframed in racially coded terms as challenging, aggressive and confrontational.

[36]In addition, during the November 2025 hearing we were made aware that Mr Turnock is neurodivergent and has dyslexia. This is not something which had been raised beforehand and we understood from Mr Turnock that it may impact how he has expressed himself on occasion. Mr Turnock repeatedly told us that he has a tendency to use vernacular which he said was regrettable and unfortunate and he provided a recent example of an innocuous but unintended comment he made at his child’s parent’s evening – the comment being made to a white male teacher.

[37]We understood from Mr Turnock’s evidence that this neurodivergence impacted his work in a number of ways, for example he liked to have questions raised in advance so that he could be prepared. Moreover there had been a meeting with the Claimant as a trade union representative in October 2020 which was conversational and in an informal environment at the library which had gone well. However the following month the meeting was in a formal environment with the Claimant sat behind a desk and laptop with papers laid out and she questioned him, and this made him feel uncomfortable as if it was a job interview. Mr Turnock subsequently described the meeting as like “walking into the lion’s den” and he attributed that manner of expression to his vernacular and his neurodivergence.

[38]Part of the complaints in this matter relate to Mr Turnock’s choice of language, including an emailed comment on 19 November 2020 written in relation to the Claimant. We have taken into consideration what impact Mr Mr Turnock’s neurodiversity may have had on his manner of expression.

[39]At the end of the hearing, after Mr Turnock’s cross examination completed on 5 November, the Claimant attempted to refer us to two pages (146-147) which had appeared in the main hearing bundle since the start of the hearing and which were partially illegible. This was raised very late, and these were not documents that anyone had been questioned on although the Claimant erroneously thought she had been questioned on them.

[40]The documents were dated 9 April and 19 June 2020 and were incomplete extracts of emails taken without consent from Mr Turnock’s email account which the Claimant says were given to her by a confidential whistleblower in Autumn 2022. The Claimant claimed to have better original copies of the emails and blamed the Respondent’s photocopying for them being illegible.

[41]I therefore read out those parts I could make out from the 9 April 2020 email, I asked the Claimant to read out the relevant part of the 19 June 2020 email, and I asked Mr Turnock if he recalled anything about these emails which he said he did not. In any event these were documents disclosed by the Claimant, it was incumbent upon the Claimant to have provided us with clear copies once she knew our copies were illegible, the Claimant did not do so and instead waited until the evidence had finished before raising this moments before the hearing was due to end, having not questioned either Mrs Sergides nor Mr Turnock on these emails during their oral evidence. The matter was therefore not advanced further.

List of issues

[42]The list of issues was identified and agreed at the hearing before Employment Judge Hughes on 5 February 2024 however it contained numerous errors.

[43]At the start of the hearing we noted that issues 3.2.7, 4.1.7 and 5.1.8 were duplicates of the issues beneath them on the list. They were instead intended to relate to a complaint about flip chart paper being placed over glass panels in the doors. This was discussed with the parties, and the correct complaint was recorded below.

[44]On hearing day 9 on 13 June 2025 the Claimant questioned Mrs Sergides about Issues 3.2.17, 4.1.17 and 5.1.18 which related to the Claimant’s application for the NPQSL course. The list of issues recorded that the complaint was that on 14 January 2022, Mrs Sergides failed to agree to the Claimant’s request for NPQSL Training, and the Claimant relied on Tara Garde and Mrs Porter Tibbey as comparators.

[45]The Claimant’s questions to Mrs Sergides suggested a different complaint about the manner of dealing with her application rather than the refusal. The Respondent objected to what it said was the Claimant running an alternative case. The Claimant insisted that she was not complaining that others got on the course and she was refused – rather the Claimant said her complaint had always been that it was rejected without being given consideration and she acknowledged that no one was put on the course at that time. The Claimant said that the list of issues was inaccurate.

[46]I therefore reviewed the original claim as set out in the ET1 and it was as the Claimant had said: “I asked my HT if I could be put onto the NPQSL training course. Many other members of staff have been permitted to go on training. The HT refused questioned why she had done this, she then looked into the requirements of the course and rejected it on this basis.”

[47]The Claimant had previously been directed to provide additional information about her claim and she had provided details about this complaint which were consistent with the pleaded claim, save that the last sentence made reference to other people getting on that course, but nevertheless the bulk of the additional information was consistent with a complaint that the application for NPQSL had been rejected without consideration.

[48]I formed the view that there was a mismatch between the list of issues and the original pleaded claim.1 It was clear to me that the Claimant had not abandoned that original pleaded claim, and it moreover the claim had not been amended to change the allegation to that which appeared under Issues 3.2.17, 4.1.17 and 5.1.18.

[49]I was mindful of recent authorities which confirm that the list of issues is not a pleading and it is not the claim, it is no more than a case management tool which helps a tribunal navigate the issues it is to decide.2 Fairness and the interests of justice required me to amend that list of issues to record the pleaded claim and I have therefore struck through the incorrect issues below and replaced them with the correct allegation.

[50]There was no prejudice to the Respondent in making this change. Mrs Sergides was able to answer the questions about how she reached her decision about the Claimant’s request to do the NPQSL, and the Respondent was able to address it in their closing submissions.

[51]In addition I had to amend the list of issues a third time with the parties’ agreement to change the date of an email from 1 April 2020 to 21 April 2020 with respect to issues 3.2.2, 4.1.2, and 5.13 below. It appeared that this had been another error with the list of issues which was not picked up earlier. 1 Mervyn v BW Controls Ltd

[2020] EWCA Civ 393

2 Moustache v Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust

[2025] EWCA Civ 185

[52]I amended the list of issues a fourth time to correct the date of an email at issues 3.2.11, 4.1.11, and 5.1.18 which should have been 9 November 2020 rather than 10 October 2020 as originally recorded.

[53]I amended the list of issues a fifth time to correct the date of an email at Issue 3.2.15, 4.1.15, and 5.1.16 which should have been 22 November 2020 rather than 1 November 2020 as originally recorded. As indicated above, these incorrect dates caused confusion which then fed into the Respondent’s witness statements which had been produced using them. Discriminatory constructive dismissal. Insofar as matters are particularised below relating to direct race discrimination or harassment on grounds of race, those matters only assist the claimant if they go to a discriminatory constructive dismissal Employee status 1. It is agreed that the claimant was an employee of the respondent within the meaning of section 83 of the Equality Act 2010. Time Limits 2. The Tribunal has already determined all relevant questions of time in the order of Employment Judge Mitchell of 12.11.2023. Direct Race Discrimination3.1 C describes herself as Black African. She compares herself with people who are not Black African.

3.2 Did R do the following things:3.2.1 On 21 March 2020, Theonitsa Sergides C’s headteacher, emailed a

3.2.2 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains about an

3.2.3 On 11 July 2020 Rs released a new organizational structure in which

3.2.4 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains of being

3.2.5 In February 2020, C applied for upper pay scale, C alleges that the and Jennifer Buckley.

3.2.6 On 11 September 2020, during a safeguarding inset day, Andrew citing health and safety (hypothetical comparator).

3.2.7 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says C was also told

3.2.8 On 17 September 2020, Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides

3.2.9 On 17 September 2020 Theonitsa Sergides emailed R1 staff to “find

3.2.10 On 8 October 2020 Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides “urged”

3.2.11 On 9 November 2020 Andrew Turnock sent a message to staff

3.2.12 On 11 October 2020 Andrew Turnock launched an investigation into

3.2.13 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says on 18 October

3.2.14 On 19 November 2020, Andrew Turnock sent an email to Theonitsa

3.2.15 On 22 November 2020, Andrew Turnock emailed a bursar to check

3.2.16 In June 2021, Theonitsa Sergides and Andrew Turnock announced started tutoring.

3.2.17 On 14 January 2022, Theonitsa Sergides failed to agree to C’s request for NPSQSL Training. C relies on Tara Garde and Roz Porter Tibbey. 3.2.17 “I asked my HT if I could be put onto the NPQSL training course. Many

3.3 Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether she were treated worse than someone else would have been treated. [The claimant says they were treated worse than the comparators named above where relevant and, in other instances, the claimant has not named anyone in particular who she says was treated better than she was.]

3.4 If so, was it because of race?

3.5 Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment? 4. Harassment related to race (Equality Act 2010 section 26)

4.1 Did the respondent do the following things:4.1.1 On 21 March 2020, Theonitsa Sergides C’s headteacher, emailed a

4.1.2 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains about an

4.1.3 On 11 July 2020 Rs released a new organizational structure in which

4.1.4 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains of being

4.1.5 In February 2020, C applied for upper pay scale, C alleges that the and Jennifer Buckley.

4.1.6 On 11 September 2020, during a safeguarding inset day, Andrew citing health and safety. (hypothetical comparator).

4.1.7 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says C was also told

4.1.8 On 17 September 2020, Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides

4.1.9 On 17 September 2020 Theonitsa Sergides emailed R1 staff to “find

4.1.10 On 8 October 2020 Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides “urged”

4.1.11 On 9 November 2020 Andrew Turnock sent a message to staff

4.1.12 On 11 October 2020 Andrew Turnock launched an investigation into

4.1.13 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says on 18 October

4.1.14 On 19 November 2020, Andrew Turnock sent an email to Theonitsa

4.1.15 On 22 November 2020, Andrew Turnock emailed a bursar to check

4.1.16 In June 2021, Theonitsa Sergides and Andrew Turnock announced started tutoring;

4.1.17 On 14 January 2022, Theonitsa Sergides failed to agree to C’s request for NPSQSL Training. C relies on Tara Garde and Roz Porter Tibbey4.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct? 4.1.17 “I asked my HT if I could be put onto the NPQSL training course. Many

4.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

4.3 Did it relate to race?

4.4 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

4.5 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. Discriminatory constructive dismissal (s39(2)(c) Equality Act 2010)

5.1 Was the claimant dismissed?5.1.1 Did the respondent do the following things

5.1.2 On 21 March 2020, Theonitsa Sergides C’s headteacher, emailed a

5.1.3 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains about an

5.1.4 On 11 July 2020 Rs released a new organizational structure in which

5.1.5 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains of being

5.1.6 In February 2020, C applied for upper pay scale, C alleges that the and Jennifer Buckley (hypothetical comparator).

5.1.7 On 11 September 2020, during a safeguarding inset day, Andrew citing health and safety.

5.1.8 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says C was also told

5.1.9 On 17 September 2020, Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides

5.1.10 On 17 September 2020 Theonitsa Sergides emailed R1 staff to “find

5.1.11 On 8 October 2020 Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides “urged”

5.1.12 On 9 November 2020 Andrew Turnock sent a message to staff

5.1.13 On 11 October 2020 Andrew Turnock launched an investigation into

5.1.14 By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says on 18 October

5.1.15 On 19 November 2020, Andrew Turnock sent an email to Theonitsa

5.1.16 On 22 November 2020, Andrew Turnock emailed a bursar to check

5.1.17 In June 2021, Theonitsa Sergides and Andrew Turnock announced started tutoring.

5.1.18 On 14 January 2022, Theonitsa Sergides failed to agree to C’s request for NPSQSL Training. C relies on Tara Garde and Roz Porter Tibbey. 5.1.18 “I asked my HT if I could be put onto the NPQSL training course. Many

5.2 Did any of the matters set out in paragraph 5.1 above relate to the claimant's race?

5.3 Did any of those matters constitute a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence? The Tribunal will need to decide:

5.3.1.1 whether the respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent; and

5.3.1.2 whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so. 5.3.2 Was the breach a fundamental one? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach was so serious that the claimant was entitled to treat the contract as being at an end. 5.3.3 Did the claimant accept voluntary redundancy in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the claimant’s acceptance of voluntary redundancy. 5.3.4 Did the claimant affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that she chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach.

5.4 Did any discriminatory matters sufficiently influence the overall repudiatory breach so as to render the constructive dismissal discriminatory? 6. Remedy for discrimination

6.1 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?

6.2 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

6.3 Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

6.4 If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

6.5 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.6 Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.7 Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?

6.8 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

6.9 Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it by a significant delay in resolving the claimant’s grievance, and by a failure to carry out an unbiased investigation?

6.10 If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?

6.11 By what proportion, up to 25%?

6.12 Should interest be awarded? How much?

6.13 When these proceedings were begun, was the respondent in breach of its duty to give the claimant a written statement of employment particulars or of a change to those particulars?

6.14 If the claim succeeds, are there exceptional circumstances that would make it unjust or inequitable to make the minimum award of two weeks’ pay under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002? If not, the Tribunal must award two weeks’ pay and may award four weeks’ pay.

6.15 Would it be just and equitable to award four weeks’ pay?

Findings of fact

[54]From the information and evidence before the Tribunal it made the following findings of fact. We made our findings of fact on the balance of probabilities taking into account all of the evidence, both documentary and oral, which was admitted at the hearing. We do not set out in this judgment all the evidence which we heard but only our principal findings of fact, those necessary to enable us to reach conclusions on the issues to be decided.

[55]Where it was necessary to resolve conflicting factual accounts, we have done so by making a judgement about the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses we have heard based upon their overall consistency and the consistency of accounts given on different occasions when set against any contemporaneous documents. We have not referred to every document we read or were directed or taken to in the findings below, but that does not mean they were not considered.

[56]The Claimant started her employment with the Respondent local authority at the Grafton primary school as a newly qualified teacher in September 2015. We have heard evidence from the Respondent that the Claimant was a good teacher, and when she took over the role of Computing Lead in 2019 she successfully set up the school and its staff on the SeeSaw online platform for learning. This meant that when the Covid-19 Pandemic arrived the following year the school was in a good position to deliver online education. The later grievance notes also record the Claimant as being very supportive of her colleagues at the same level as her. In his evidence Mr Turnock was very positive about the Claimant’s work as a teacher, and moreover her knowledge of computing which he described as superior to his at the time.

[57]Around the time of the Claimant’s resignation the school had 81 members of staff, of which 53 are said to be from a BME background. The school was ranked as outstanding, the Head Teacher was Theonitsa Sergides and the Associate Head Teacher was Andrew Turnock who is now the Head Teacher following the retirement of Mrs Sergides.

[58]Most of the facts giving rise to this claim occurred around the time of the Covid-19 Pandemic during which time the school remained open for vulnerable and key worker children. This was a difficult time for many people, particularly so for schools, and the Grafton School accrued a budget deficit at this time.

[59]The Claimant was appointed as Computing Lead in September 2019 and the Head of IT at that time was Mr Turnock. Up to this point the Claimant had good relations with Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock as was clear from the notes of a later grievance process. We also observed that Mrs Sergides would put an “x” to denote kisses on many of her emails, which indicated warmth and a friendly atmosphere at work, and this was consistent with Mr Turnock’s evidence that the school had been like a family with open dialogue with senior management. Issues 3.2.1, 4.1.1, and 5.1.2 – WhatsApp exchange

[60]Around the time of the first Covid lockdown the school set up WhatsApp group in order to facilitate communication between staff. The school closed due to lockdown on Friday 20 March 2020 and the following day members of staff sent messages to ask questions. The school was to be used to house the children of keyworkers who would continue to work. Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock decided to use the white and blue classrooms which had a connecting door between them for this purpose. The decision was communicated to the WhatsApp group by Helena Blake, an Assistant Head Teacher.

[61]The Claimant replied and said “Hope someone told the class teachers first” to which a white teacher colleague Jennifer Buckley erroneously replied no. This was an error as we were provided with a separate text message where she had been notified. The Respondent says that the Claimant’s message was an insinuation that Mrs Sergides may have done something wrong had she not consulted. We agree that with that assertion – the Claimant was not asking for information nor making a suggestion, it was a veiled criticism about lack of consultation during this incredibly busy period during what was a national emergency.

[62]After further queries on the WhatsApp group chat, later that day Mrs Sergides replied to the group and said: “blue class and white class will be used as classes for the children. Before Jenni left yesterday I texted her following enquiring about classes. Sarah A had asked if the teachers had been told first. Sarah for future information I do not have to ask anyone to use a classroom particularly under such difficult times. Thank you for wanting to know. However, I appreciate it is good manners and I did.”

[63]This message string was sent to the school staff on the WhatsApp group, it was therefore the same channel that the Claimant and Ms Buckley had used to make their comments.

[64]The Claimant says she was publicly humiliated by this, that it was dismissive and hostile and she says that colleagues told her it was unfair. The Claimant compares her treatment to Ms Buckley and who the Claimant says raised similar queries and was not subjected to public reprimand and humiliation.

[65]Whereas the messages from the Claimant and Ms Buckley were not identical, they were both veiled criticisms about a lack of consultation. Accordingly, Ms Buckley is an appropriate comparator.

[66]The Claimant promptly left the WhatsApp group and went off sick on 25 March 2020 and the GP fit note records the reason as stress at work. The Claimant in fact continued to work during her sickness absence. On 3 April 2020 Mrs Sergides emailed the Claimant to check on her welfare. In her emailed reply the Claimant explained the WhatsApp reply was the cause of her sickness absence.

[67]The Claimant told Mrs Sergides that her WhatsApp response made her feel as though she was not able to offer contributions or voice her concern and she was shocked and deeply saddened by the response and it made her question her psychological safety. The Claimant went on to explain how much she enjoyed her role and that she felt that her knowledge and expertise had been greatly appreciated and welcomed. The message ended with the Claimant saying “thank you for thinking of me and for taking the time to reach out, this is hugely appreciated. Stay safe, healthy and blessed, much love Sarah” and a kiss. There was no reference to any form of discrimination in the email.

[68]On 3 April 2020 Mrs Sergides replied and recognised the Claimant’s contribution to the school, she said the Claimant could have called her direct for the answer and it works both ways. Mrs Sergides said that there was no upset in her reply, but she referred to email disrespect from the Claimant which we understood to mean the Claimant’s WhatsApp message. Mrs Sergides said the Claimant had asked a question and she responded as the Head Teacher, and she noted that they never had a reason to disagree or to be upset before. Mrs Sergides clearly felt that this was a challenge from the Claimant as she subsequently referred to it as such in a letter on 17 September 2020 about the Claimant’s conduct later that year.

[69]In her oral evidence Mrs Sergides had some difficulty recalling all of the background at this time which is understandable due to the passage of time and moreover the Pandemic would have been exceptionally busy and fast paced at a school. Mrs Sergides told us she thought that the Claimant was expressing concern for Ms Buckley whose classroom was one of those to be used and she did not like her classroom being interfered with. Mrs Sergides did not express this at the material time, either to the Claimant in April 2020 nor in the subsequent grievance process in 2022, however this elaboration did not appear contradictory to us. Mrs Sergides’ account remained consistent that she felt the Claimant’s message was a challenge to her decision about the use of the rooms.

[70]The Claimant made no formal complaint about this matter at the time. The Claimant did not mention it at the time of her resignation in May 2022 and it was not explicitly raised in the Claimant’s grievance of 13 June 2022 but it was raised by the Claimant during the grievance investigation however she did not allege it was an act of discrimination until these Tribunal proceedings. Issues 3.2.2, 4.1.2, and 5.1.3 – emails about access to IT systems

[71]The School used software called SeeSaw to allow teachers to upload work for the pupils to do online. The Claimant had become the school’s Computing Lead in 2019 and she had successfully introduced the software to the school and getting the 1, 3 and 4 year groups onto the platform. The Claimant’s work on introducing SeeSaw to the school was important because it meant that when the Pandemic arrived this school was in a stronger position to work remotely than it would have been.

[72]We should record at this point that Mrs Sergides’ evidence on this issue was confused as she appeared to mix up various software, specifically SeeSaw. There was also software called Rav3 which was an older software used to allow staff to access school files remotely, and this was to be replaced with a newer system called FreedomToRoam. In her evidence Mrs Sergides appeared to confuse SeeSaw with Rav3 and her evidence was that at times she could not access SeeSaw as the Claimant had not provided access or working codes.

[73]Having listened to all the witness evidence, and having read the contemporaneous documents, it appears to us that Mrs Sergides has mixed up the two systems and misremembered the Claimant’s role with both of them. With respect to SeeSaw, it was the Claimant who had introduced it to the school and advocated its use, but she was not the gatekeeper for it, which meant that she was not the person who would give out passwords and logons. Staff could access SeeSaw by registering for it themselves.

[74]With respect to Rav3, the Claimant knew how to access school files remotely, and she shared with staff in 2018 how they could access the school files. The Claimant appeared to be providing this information only if asked for it by teachers, she had not engaged with the Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”) to either inform them or to remind them of this facility. By the time of the Pandemic most the SLT either did not know, or had forgotten, about the ability to access school files remotely via Rav3.

[75]During the Claimant’s sickness absence on Friday 3 April 2020 Mrs Sergides was trying to make arrangements for cover and she told the Claimant on email that “Karen Bird is ready to work with your class from home but needs access to seesaw.” It was explained that another colleague called Rose would put work onto SeeSaw and Mrs Sergides said “Please let me know what the situation is so as to pursue further arrangements with Karen or not as the case may be.”

[76]Mrs Sergides says that she asked the Claimant to give Mrs Bird a password and the Claimant refused to give to it her, and she then refused to give it to Mrs Bird when she asked her on the telephone. The Claimant disputes that she was asked to give out a password and we have accepted her evidence on that because the emails we have been referred to do not contain such a request. Moreover, as we have identified above, the Claimant was not the gatekeeper so it was not for her to give out passwords at all. Whereas we find that Mrs Sergides did not explicitly ask the Claimant to give Mrs Bird access to SeeSaw, it is clear that is what she was seeking as she said that Mrs Bird needed access – clearly Mrs Sergides expected the Claimant to provide access but she did not explicitly say that.

[77]The Claimant did not provide access and she could not do so anyway, although we do not have any record of the Claimant explaining this to Mrs Sergides at the time. In any event the Claimant told us that she continued working, however we find that Mrs Sergides would not have been aware at the time that the Claimant had been continuing to work on occasion whilst off sick as she did not tell her. Mrs Sergides was left with the impression that there was work which needed covering.

[78]We can see even at this early stage, part of the problem in this relationship. There were clearly communication issues between the two people with neither side being explicit with the other about what Mrs Sergides wanted, and that the Claimant not informing her that she could not provide access nor that she was continuing to work, therefore Mrs Bird would not have needed access anyway. We find that Mrs Sergides had formed a view that the Claimant had not been co-operative on this issue, and that view was formed due to inadequate communication between them as we have just identified.

[79]It was around this time that the tensions between the Claimant and Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock started to present themselves, some six or seven months after the Claimant became Computing Lead. In an email string between Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock of 21 April 2020 they expressed concern about the Claimant’s handling of access to some of the Respondent’s IT systems.

[80]This concern was triggered by Mrs Sergides’ earlier assumptions with respect to the Claimant not giving access to Mrs Bird, and also due to an email from a teacher, Rick Jolley, to Mr Turnock on 21 April 2020 at 12:19pm where he said that he had been accessing school files remotely but there was a problem and he shared the response from ICT with Mr Turnock copied to the Claimant as the Computing Lead at that time. We record that this email was disclosed to us late by the Claimant on 4 November 2025 following a subject access request she made earlier in the year. Mr Turnock did not know that this remote access was possible.

[81]Mr Turnock then raised with Mrs Sergides on email on the same day (21 April 2020) that it was possible for staff to access school files remotely, and she replied at 13:49 “I was not aware of either that is why I questioned it. If we knew how to access it then how comes we do not have a password?”

[82]Mr Turnock replied at 14:27 to say: “So as the plot thickens it appears that some staff know about this remote access and some do not (Bea for example doesn’t know about it, me only because Gloria told me and yourself at least whilst Rick and Gloria are aware). Just to make things more awkward this service is about to finish which having emailed Sarah, she is aware of to be replaced by FreedomToRoam. Bit of a nonsense to be honest but it worries me how much executive responsibility she is taking.”

[83]Mrs Sergides replied at 15:02 and said: “That is exactly what I mean Andy. Too much access and privileges she had not be [sic] given by us. I am very worried about this behaviour and attitude.”

[84]This is a clear contemporaneous written account of the thought processes of Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides at that time who were expressing concerns that they as senior school leaders had not been consulted on who was being given remote access to the school files. This has been described within the documents as raising safeguarding concerns because the senior leaders did not know who had access to the data. The Claimant has misinterpreted this as Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock describing her as a safeguarding concern, however that is not the case. The clear concern for both was that they did not know who was being given remote access by the Claimant, and they had not been consulted on it.

[85]The Claimant did not deny in the hearing that she had not shared with senior managers about who had access to the then system (Rav3), rather she complained that Mr Turnock did not speak to her about this rather than emailing Mrs Sergides in the terms that he did.

[86]We have been provided with a further undated extract from an email believed to be around that time (taken from Mr Turnock’s email account without consent) in which Mr Turnock appears to reply to that exchange and he says that the system was about to end and as they only had limited space on the server, the school could only offer online access to 5 members of staff. Mr Turnock said: “clearly those who need access are members of the safeguarding team, SENCo and administrator i.e. you, me, Gloria, Sarah M and Karen, which means that Sarah A will no longer have this access.”

[87]The reference to SEN means Special Educational Needs, and the reference to SENCo means Special Educational Needs Coordinator. The email exchange between Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides is incomplete. It was disclosed to the Respondent by the Claimant. This is concerning as the Claimant was not a party to the email. The Claimant told us in evidence that various emails including this one were disclosed to her in Autumn 2022 by a whistleblower who she would not name due to fear of victimisation. The Claimant later suggested she did not know who it was and even agreed that it could have been someone in HR to whom she had returned Mr Turnock’s iPad, having taken and accessed it without consent and gone through his emails, and which she kept at home from at least May to August 2022.

[88]I gave the Claimant the warning about self-incrimination which was the second time I have had cause to do so in this claim, the first will be addressed later in this judgment. As the Claimant told us that the emails were disclosed to her in Autumn 2022 which is after her resignation, accordingly the contents of the email exchange of 21 April 2020 (timed from 13:49 to 15:02) between Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock about her taking executive privileges could not have been a cause of the Claimant’s resignation in May 2022 as according to the Claimant she only received it in Autumn 2022.

[89]We were provided with late disclosure of an email from Mr Turnock to the Claimant on 21 April 2020 which shows him informing her that the replacement remote file access (FreedomToRoam) was quite restrictive due to the server and only five people could have access which would be reserved to the safeguarding and SEN teams. The Claimant did not challenge this at the time. We have also been provided with further late disclosure where Mr Turnock told Mr Jolley the same thing.

[90]Our consideration of this matter was made difficult because some of the relevant documents were produced late and then only arrived piecemeal in the hearing. It is clear from those documents that some staff knew how to access the schools’ files remotely and others did not. It is also clear that it was not just the Claimant whom Mr Turnock thought would lose remote access, it was to be everyone (including Mr Jolley) save for the five people including SENCo and Safeguarding leads and the senior managers.

[91]The Claimant now says that she was being singled out for scrutiny and her access questioned and this was part of a deliberate effort to undermine her professionally and implied redundancy of her role. In her oral evidence the Claimant accepted that it would have been appropriate for the safeguarding team (of which she was not a member) and also the SENCo to have access.

[92]It transpired that no one lost their access under the new system contrary to what was anticipated at the time by Mr Turnock.

[93]The Claimant repeatedly throughout the cross examination of the Respondent, and in her submissions, accuses the Respondent of retrofitting the evidence and accuses them of inconsistent explanations and invites us to draw negative inferences. We have looked carefully at Mrs Sergides’ evidence on this issue as she did appear in her evidence to blame or criticise the Claimant for not giving her access to things, and as we have identified these were not things for which it was the Claimant’s role to give out.

[94]We have not found Mrs Sergides to be a deliberately unreliable witness, however her memory of events is impaired. We have noted that these matters occurred over five years ago, Mrs Sergides retired in 2022 which was over three years ago, and the events being considered now occurred during a global Pandemic where back then events moved incredibly quickly and where people often did not have time to make notes or spend time getting to the bottom of issues. We have also seen evidence of the school staff working very late into the night. Taking those things into account, we did not consider that Mrs Sergides was evasive or that she was giving us deliberately incorrect evidence, we find that she has genuinely confused the systems due to the passage of time and other factors we have identified, and we have indicated where we have preferred the Claimant’s evidence.

[95]We also find that even at the material time Mrs Sergides did not fully understand the Claimant’s role with SeeSaw, and she was under the misapprehension that it was the Claimant who could give access in her role as Computing Lead, whereas it was for individual staff to register themselves on that system which she had introduced. We have therefore exercised some caution with Mrs Sergides’ evidence based upon the factors we referenced above.

[96]In her evidence Mrs Sergides told us that where there were concerns about a member of staff, her normal approach would be to speak to the individual directly rather than escalate the matter. The Claimant says that there was an inconsistent approach in her case as concerns (including this issue, but including others such as the WhatsApp exchange) were elevated prematurely, creating an atmosphere of public criticism and humiliation rather than professional dialogue. We were not satisfied that there was inconsistent treatment by Mrs Sergides not speaking to the Claimant first as we found it inevitable that a Head Teacher would speak to the Associate Head about matters of concern like this. Issues 3.2.3, 4.1.3, and 5.1.4 – Computing Lead

[97]The Claimant complains that on 11 July 2020 the Respondent released a new organisational structure in which two other members of staff were to lead computing along with her, and she compares her treatment to Sandra Hall and Rose Graham. The Claimant says that this was a deliberate move to undermine her professional standing and contributions.

[98]This occurred during the Covid-19 Pandemic and a number of changes were made to the school structure so that there would be joint co-ordinators for various teaching areas including maths, technology and computing amongst others. The Claimant has accepted that the role of Computing Lead changed during lockdown and whereas there had been emphasis on traditional matters such as the curriculum beforehand, this expanded when there became a need to ensure there could be remote learning. It was the Claimant’s early work as we have described above, which meant that when the Pandemic arrived, this school was in a better position to move to remote learning.

[99]The role of Computing Lead was something which the Claimant valued and she was clearly highly successful in that role as Mr Turnock gave evidence to the effect that her knowledge was far superior to his as he had tended to focus more on the capital side of IT. The Claimant described this as “a role that was pivotal in both my professional contributions and identity within the school.” During the grievance investigation the Claimant described herself as a pillar of knowledge and people would come to her for support, and that before lockdown she had been organising a remote system and had become the most powerful person. The Claimant clearly enjoyed both the subject matter of this role and the status it gave her within the school.

[100]As we have already indicated, there were difficulties in the relationship. The Claimant had not shared with Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock how to gain remote access, and who had it, and this had generated concerns from them. In addition, as the Respondent says, the Claimant had gone off sick for a number of weeks during this critical period which she said was due to the WhatsApp message above. In addition Mrs Porter Tibbey attended as a witness for the Claimant and gave evidence to us that she gained the impression the Claimant would not like to share the role with someone from the SLT and the Claimant would not put her camera on during meetings even when asked to do so, and that she had not shared access to systems with some colleagues.

[101]A reading of the structure shows that it was only Mr Turnock, the Associate Head Teacher, who was to be appointed as a joint Computing Lead with the Claimant, and that Mrs Porter Tibbey was only there to provide support – and this was consistent with her unchallenged oral evidence to us. Mrs Porter Tibbey had worked well with the Claimant previously and they had good relations.

[102]The Claimant accepted in her oral evidence the Respondent was entitled to bring in someone senior to help lead on remote learning and for oversight, and further that Mr Turnock was an appropriate person, and further it made sense to divide the leadership between two people given Mr Turnock’s responsibilities as the Associate Head Teacher. Mr Turnock had previously been the head of ICT.

[103]The Respondent says that the decision was made because the ICT and computing department was becoming a huge and the most demanding area of the curriculum and it was considered appropriate to develop teams for some areas to ensure good delivery and more support. The Claimant challenges this and disputes that this was the most demanding area. In cross examination the Claimant was asked to compare this to other areas such as physical education to which she suggested in her answer that physical education was just as demanding at that time because of lockdown, and that the remote access had already been established by this time.

[104]We have found the account of Mrs Sergides to be more plausible. We accept that there was a need to respond to a fast changing situation at that time during the Pandemic where there was a need to change to remote ways of working including teaching. This would inevitably have been a priority for this school like other schools, and as a result it would have been necessary to expand the number of leads on a matter like this, including bringing in a senior member of the leadership team, Mr Turnock the Associate Head teacher. Nevertheless, we recognise that there was, as a result, a lack of prior consultation with the Claimant.

[105]It is not disputed that the Claimant chose to stand down after this decision was made. Mrs Sergides told us that the Claimant refused to work with others on this role and said that she was better than them. The Claimant disputes using those words, however we find that she did as those words are of similar nature to how she described her Computing Lead role in the grievance process as we have described, moreover we have concerns about the reliability of the Claimant’s evidence, and we have found that whilst Mrs Sergides could not recall everything, she has been an honest and a reliable witness before us.

[106]The Claimant was repeatedly asked to reconsider her decision by Mr Turnock because the school needed her and she was the best qualified and experienced to do it, however she continually refused to do so but she left Computing Lead on her email signature for some time thereafter.

[107]With respect to the Claimant’s comparators, Sandra Hall was not in a similar situation to the Claimant. Ms Hall was a phase leader for years 1 and 2 which was part of the SLT, which meant that she was in a more senior position to the Claimant, and within the structure she was to provide support to the Deputy Head Teacher, Bea Symes. Ms Hall was not expected to colead. The Claimant was not a member of the SLT and Ms Hall is not an appropriate comparator.

[108]The Claimant also relies upon Rose Graham as a comparator as she was co-ordinator for physical education and she was not asked to share the role with anyone. As we have already indicated, there was a far greater emphasis on computing and online access than before compared to PE, therefore we do not find that she was an appropriate comparator.

[109]The Claimant did not raise a grievance about this at the time, and she continued to work for and be paid by the Respondent for almost the next two years. Upon resigning the Claimant made no reference to this matter although she raised it in her subsequent grievance one month later, but she made no mention of any form of discrimination. Issues 3.2.4, 4.1.4, and 5.1.5 – Teaching Assistant

[110]This complaint has changed during the history of the claim. The Claimant initially complained that her teaching assistant had been inexplicably removed from her class as part of the July 2020 structure, and further she had been initially assigned a teacher assistant with limited skills who was reassigned following the intervention of the SENCo. The Claimant’s witness statement differs slightly as to the date of the removal of the teaching assistant (September as opposed to July) however not much turns on that, although she says it was without prior warning.

[111]Teaching assistants are allocated to classes depending upon the needs of the pupils. It is possible that a teaching assistant may remain within a specific class for a number of years, or they may move with a year group of pupils depending upon need.

[112]The Claimant had been allocated a teaching assistant named Helen Williamson for in the region of two years whom she worked well with. The Claimant alleges that between July and September 2020 the SENCo, Sarah Marklew, told her that she was to be allocated a teaching assistant we shall refer to as E. E is of Turkish national origins and had been allocated to assist a child who was of Turkish descent. The Claimant alleges that E was incompetent and she had been deliberately allocated someone incompetent as an act of race discrimination.

[113]At no point did Mrs Sergides inform the Claimant that she was to be allocated E as a teaching assistant, and moreover it was not established before us in any event that E was incompetent, rather we understood from the evidence that she had a period of sickness absence due to suffering from long-Covid.

[114]In any event, E was not allocated to the Claimant and at most it appears that there may have been consideration of doing so because Helen Williamson would move classes along with the children based upon the needs of the children she was supporting.

[115]The Claimant was allocated a teaching assistant named Lauren Cabey whom the Claimant regarded as competent and whom she worked well with. Within her witness statement the Claimant said that the removal of her teaching assistant was perceived by her (and others) as a form of retaliation or punishment following lockdown events (which understand to mean the exchange on WhatsApp) and it deeply impacted her professional integrity and morale. The Claimant said it left her feeling unfairly targeted isolated within the workplace and contributed to a sense of vulnerability in disempowerment. The Tribunal formed the view that the Claimant’s description of her feelings about this matter were disproportionate as the Claimant knew that teaching assistants were allocated on the basis of the needs of the children and may be expected to move with a class on occasion if it was in the interests of the children.

[116]The Claimant did not complain about this at the time, nor did she complain about it when she resigned, nor in her subsequent grievance.

[117]Within her statement the Claimant refers to the changes made to the organisational structure, and also the issue of the teaching assistant, and she argues that the changes were made not purely for administrative purposes but were tainted by discriminatory biases and prejudices and further she says: “The label of ‘troublemaker’ attached to me, which often carries racially charged undertones, further implies that these decisions were not just personal in nature but also entrenched in racial stereotypes. This stereotyping frames me unjustly, reinforcing damaging and discriminatory tropes that have no place in a fair and equitable workplace.”

[118]We should record here that at no point was the Claimant labelled a troublemaker, and we have observed a propensity on the part of the Claimant to suggest she has been described in various ways by the Respondent which never happened, which she then invites us to draw an inference from. As we will address later, the Claimant repeatedly says that the Respondent’s attitude towards her was informed by its view that she was aggressive, and had been labelled as such. We have not found any evidence that the Respondent ever did so.

[119]Later on, after relations deteriorated following a disagreement over the conduct of trade union meetings, Mr Turnock describes the Claimant to Katy Potts as destroying what had the school had taken years to build. That comment was made in the context of staff ceasing to speak to Mr Turnock about their concerns and going via the trade union instead. That incident came later on in November 2020 which was some time after the changes being complained about here. It appeared to us that the Claimant’s views that she was seen as a trouble maker, were not present at the material time (September 2020) but rather she has since formed that view looking back in hindsight following other matters which will be detailed below. Issues 3.2.5, 4.1.5, and 5.1.6 – UPS application

[120]The Claimant alleges that in February 2020 she submitted an upper pay scale (“UPS”) application form which she says was lost either by Mrs Sergides or the Business Manager KM, and she compares her treatment to James Mather and Jennifer Buckley both of whom we understand to be white.

[121]The UPS application if granted allows for an increase in pay to reflect competence and contribution in the teacher’s role. The School Governing body makes the final decision which will take some time to consider the application and any evidence including from the Head Teacher, and HR will also provide support and guidance. If an application is granted it is backdated to the start of that academic year. Once approved the application or part of it would be sent by the school Business Manager to payroll for processing.

[122]All three teachers were granted UPS. Ms Buckley had made an application at some point believed to be years earlier. The Claimant and Mr Mather made applications in or around September 2020, and they were granted on 26 November 2020. The Claimant’s complaint is that her application from February 2020 was lost.

[123]We should record at this point that Mr Mather and Ms Buckley are not appropriate actual comparators because neither submitted applications in February 2020.

[124]The Claimant has referred us to screenshots of an application she says that she submitted on 26 February 2020. The screenshots are of an application completed by hand and the application appears to be placed on some sort of cloth which she says is at Mrs Sergides’ office. The location indicated on the screenshot says Islington. On the face of it, this screenshot would suggest that an application had been produced and photographed on that date at the school.

[125]However, it was brought to our attention that it was dated “26/3/2020” three times on the application by the Claimant and she could not have submitted it then as she was off sick. The Claimant says that this date was an error she made three times, and she maintains she submitted it on 26 February 2020 one month earlier.

[126]The Claimant’s case changed by the time of the hearing as she now argued that she had handed the application to KM the Business Manager. This was inconsistent with an earlier email from her of 7 November 2020 to Mrs Sergides where she recorded that she had handed it to Mrs Sergides personally and that KM was “informed” of this at the time. This suggested to us that the Claimant was even mistaken nearer to the material time who she thought she had handed the application to.

[127]We heard evidence from KM who was witnessed summoned on behalf of the Claimant. KM did not produce a witness statement, nevertheless we allowed her to give oral evidence as she was willing and able to do so, and the Respondent did not object.

[128]KM denied receipt of the Claimant’s application and whereas she tells us she has had some anxiety and mental health issues, her evidence which we accepted, was that she is methodical because of those conditions and she therefore makes a copy of everything she is handed, and then puts one copy in a Filofax and then passes on the original to Mrs Sergides. Had Mrs Sergides therefore lost a copy she was handed, then KM would still have had her copy, however she says she never received it in the first place and had no note of it in her system. Mrs Sergides also denies receipt.

[129]We noted that in the hearing I had to remind the Claimant to ask KM about handing her the application form as this was not one of the questions she put to her.

[130]We noted that if the application had been submitted when the Claimant said and dealt with and approved, the pay increase would have been backdated to the start of the academic year in September 2019, however the Claimant did not chase the response at all, neither at that time nor during the rest of that academic year. The Claimant simply submitted a new application on 11 September 2020. In that application it asks for the date of the last application to which the Claimant wrote “19/2/20 – was not submitted.” We note that this was the fourth time that the wrong date had been used by the Claimant. The Claimant told us that this was another error on her part.

[131]On 17 September 2020 the Claimant emailed Mrs Sergides about her application submitted on 11 September 2020 and she said that she was aware that she should, as per policy, receive notification of the name of the assessor within five working days. We note that the Claimant did not send any chaser email in February or March 2020.

[132]In her email the Claimant added “Also, I’m aware now that my original application should’ve been submitted back in Spring, does this mean that upon recommendation, I’ll be backdated for last year.”

[133]When the Claimant was informed that her application from September 2020 would not be backdated to the previous academic year, on 6 November 2020 the Claimant wrote to Mrs Sergides and said she had submitted an application to Mrs Sergides in the last academic year which had not been processed.

[134]On 7 November 2020 the Claimant wrote to Mrs Sergides and said she had submitted her application in Spring 20 to Mrs Sergides personally and KM was informed of this at the time. The Claimant attached a photograph of the first page of a letter to Mrs Sergides. The photograph is dated 26 February 2020 and the location says Islington – Holloway.

[135]Mrs Sergides denied receipt of an earlier application and advised that if granted it would be limited to the year submitted. The Claimant raised the matter with Andrew Holt in HR about backdating the application, and she continued to chase Mrs Sergides about the decision on the September 2020 application. The Claimant was notified on 26 November 2020 that the September 2020 application had been approved and it was backdated to the start of that academic year. We note that this was approved even though the school was in budgetary deficit.

[136]On 26 November 2020 the Chair of Governors, Alex Barros-Curtis, asked the Claimant to provide a copy of her earlier application together with evidence that it had been submitted by 26th February 2020. The Claimant says that she received Mr Barros-Curtis’ letter late as it was delivered to her mother’s house which was a previous address. The Claimant did not respond to Mr Barros-Curtis.

[137]We are not satisfied to the level that we need to be, which is on the balance of probabilities, that the Claimant did submit that application on 26 February 2020. This is because KM denies receipt and we find her to be an honest and credible witness who was methodical when receiving documents, whereas we have recorded our concern about the Claimant’s evidence over accessing Mr Turnock’s iPad. In addition, the Claimant misdated the application three times to 26/3/2020. Furthermore, the Claimant then gave another date of 19 February 2020 when she submitted her September 2020 application. The Claimant’s case has also changed as to who she says she submitted the application to.

[138]Finally, the Claimant did not chase up a decision on the application and instead submitted a new one. It is fair to say the Claimant is someone who is able to raise her concerns confidently as she has done before us, and did so in connection with other matters to which we have referred in this judgment. Had the Claimant made an application which had been ignored or lost then we are confident she would have raised it at the time, as she did routinely after September 2020 when she made that application.

[139]We do not therefore find that the Claimant submitted an application in February 2020, and as such we do not find that it was lost either by KM or Mrs Sergides. The Claimant raised this matter in September 2020 as we have identified, however she did not raise a grievance at the time. The Claimant did not mention this in her resignation email and nor did she allege that this was discriminatory when she referred to it in the subsequent grievance process.

[140]The Claimant has argued that the evidence of Mrs Sergides was inconsistent as she had told the grievance investigation that applications would have gone to HR whereas in her oral evidence she said that they went to the school Business Manager, KM. This is not an inconsistency as it was clear that the decision on the application would be made by the governing body with input from the Head Teacher and support from HR, thus it would have needed to have been shared with them, and ultimately it would be sent to payroll by the Business Manager, KM, for processing. There was nothing inconsistent in that evidence or that explanation. The Claimant has suggested that she has been accused of fabricating this application, however that is not correct. The Respondent has argued, and we agree, that the Claimant most likely forgot to submit the application, and we have found that to be the most logical explanation. Issues 3.2.6, 4.1.6, and 5.1.7 - Locks

[141]The Claimant’s classroom was one of two rooms which had digital locks on them due their previous use. A safeguarding officer reported in September 2020 that she had not been able to access the Claimant’s classroom as the door had been locked with the Claimant and others inside. This was raised as a safety concern that children may be able to lock themselves in the classroom, and Mr Turnock directed the caretaker to remove the locks during an inset (training day) when no pupils were present. This involved some drilling of the lock. The Claimant was not specifically told that this was going to happen or when. The Claimant has described the removal of the locks as arbitrary and targeted.

[142]The lock issue was already known to Mrs Sergides and Mr Turncock, and we accept their evidence that they were going to be removed at some point in the future, however the previous permanent caretaker had left and was replaced by a succession of temporary post holders so the task slipped.

[143]The Claimant has argued that the Respondent has provided inconsistent explanations for removing the lock, however we are not satisfied that it has done so. The Respondent has been consistent about the safety concerns of having locks on doors which could mean that children lock themselves in the classroom. In any event the Claimant has accepted the reason for removing the locks, and she accepted that senior management were entitled to remove them, her complaints were that only her lock was removed and not the classroom next door, and there was a lack of consultation with her.

[144]The matter was considered during a subsequent grievance investigation in December 2022 where Laurel Fleming-Gilmore was interviewed and gave evidence which was supportive of the Claimant. Ms Fleming-Gilmore said she thought the lock on the next door classroom had not been removed however she later checked (during the grievance process) and confirmed that it had been removed, although she did not know when it was done but thought that the Claimant’s had been done first. By this time over two years had elapsed since the lock on the Claimant’s door had been removed.

[145]It was the evidence of Mr Turnock that both locks had been removed, and that it occurred at the same time. It will not be possible for us to confirm the precise time the lock next door was removed but we have found Mr Turnock to be a reliable witness whose evidence is plausible and believable. We are satisfied that both locks were removed on or around the same time.

[146]The Claimant has described the removal of the lock (and unexpected drilling of the lock) as something deeply distressing and targeted but she did not raise a formal grievance about this at the time, and she made no mention of it in her resignation email. Whereas the matter was raised in the grievance process the Claimant did not allege that it was due to discrimination. We recognise that the Claimant had no notice that this work was going to be undertaken when it was done, leaving her surprised and annoyed about the lack of prior consultation. Issues 3.2.7, 4.1.7, and 5.1.8 - Flipcharts

[147]In September 2020 the school held inset safeguarding training. Advice was provided by the Local Authority’s Health and Safety Officer that the classroom glass door panels should be free of objects blocking their view. This was so that people could see if there was someone on the other side of the door so they are not hit when it opens, but also to protect staff and children whereby a child may be in a room on their own which could be a safeguarding issue. We have heard evidence from Mrs Sergides, which we accept, that it is important in a primary school that there is no secrecy surrounding classrooms and anyone in the classroom should be easily seen.

[148]On 10 September 2020 there was an inset (training) day at the school. Mr Turnock hand delivered training papers to some of the classrooms including the Claimant’s as it was on the same floor and very near to his. Mr Turnock noted that the Claimant had flip chart paper pinned to her door which had blocked the line of sight through the glass, and Mr Turnock removed these on 10 September because of the health and safety advice. Mr Turnock left the paper in the classroom but the Claimant was not there at the time so did not know at that time why they had been removed.

[149]The following day Mr Turnock observed that the flipchart paper had been put back up and he raised this with the Claimant which we will address below. In correspondence at the time the Claimant wrote she had only put it up on 11 September 2020 (not the day before) and it was done “as a preventative measure as members of staff had been walking into my room without maintaining social distancing for non-essential matters which made me feel uncomfortable as this posed unnecessary risks.”

[150]In the original complaint the Claimant compared herself to another teacher, Andrew Young, who is white and she said that in May 2022 he had flip chart paper on the windows and nothing was done about it. Mr Turnock disputes this and says that the Claimant brought it to his attention and he sent the Deputy Head, Anna Sutton, to go and tell him to remove it which was done. Whereas the Claimant disputes it, we have no further corroborative evidence, and moreover we believed Mr Turnock’s account not least because the Claimant did not complain about it formally at the time.

[151]On 4 November 2025 the Claimant provided further late disclosure including a photograph of Mr Young’s door allegedly taken on 18 September 2020 which she said she had forgotten about, but which showed flip chart paper on the window of his open classroom door. This was a new complaint, and Mr Turnock confirmed to us that he had not seen the door and it had not been raised with him. Mr Turnock said he would unlikely have seen it at that time as the classroom was on a floor above his, and at that time during the Pandemic unnecessary movement was being kept to a minimum, and that is why he did not see it.

[152]Whereas the Claimant now says she told Mr Turnock about it at the time, we are not persuaded that she did given the lack of contemporaneous evidence. The Claimant had written to Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock at that time in connection with an informal warning letter to her about her conduct which will be addressed below. The Claimant made no mention of Mr Young’s door at that time, and it was only raised in May 2022 as described above.

[153]The Claimant says that the removal of the locks, and the directive not to have flip charts covering the glass on the doors, caused her immense distress. The Claimant says she was so upset that she broke down in front of staff and had to leave the building and retreated to her car to cry and call her sister for support.

[154]The Claimant complained about this and the removal of locks to Mr Turnock orally on 11 September 2020. Mrs Sergides was present during the conversation. The Claimant expressed her annoyance that the lock was removed without consulting her first, and she said words to the effect that in future she expected to be consulted or informed about things effecting her classroom. Whereas the Claimant denies it, we find that she did say that even at home she would not allow her mother to enter her room without permission, or words to that effect. Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock say that these words were used, their evidence has been credible and consistent and we believed them.

[155]Mrs Sergides attempted to explain to the Claimant that it was the Head Teacher who would make decisions about the use of classrooms by reference to the earlier discussion on WhatsApp, however the Claimant would not listen, she appeared angry and walked out of the meeting which Mrs Sergides described as storming out. The Claimant told us in evidence she did not storm out but left to protect her psychological wellbeing. Irrespective of how the parties choose to describe the Claimant’s exit, we find that the Claimant walked out of the meeting whilst still being spoken to by Mrs Sergides. The Claimant did not allege race discrimination in this meeting but suggested the treatment was due to the earlier WhatsApp exchange.

[156]Shortly afterwards Mr Turnock invited the Claimant to have a discussion in his office about the Computing Lead role as the Claimant had expressed she did not wish to continue it. Mr Turnock attempted to explain why it was necessary to bolster the leadership, however the Claimant said she did not wish to continue with the role. Mr Turnock tried to explain the reasons for removing the locks to which the Claimant said that it was a matter of respect. It was clear to us that the Claimant had remained annoyed about the matter at that time.

[157]Mr Turnock then raised an issue occurring the day before where the Claimant had walked her class the wrong way around the one way system imposed as a Covid safety measure. The Claimant has confirmed in her oral evidence that she did walk the wrong way, but others had done it and not been challenged. When this was raised with her by Mr Turnock, the Claimant told him this was tit for tat, although the Claimant denies saying this we find that she did. The Claimant also walked out of the meeting and told Mr Turnock if he wished to communicate further with her in future, he should do so via email.

[158]It was clear to the Tribunal that the relationship between the Claimant and the senior management, in particular with Mr Turnock, was starting to break down. The Claimant was becoming more suspicious of management and was resistant to management requests, and likewise it was becoming more difficult for Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides to manage the relationship with the Claimant.

[159]The Claimant did not raise a formal grievance about this at the time, and she made no mention of it in her resignation email. Whilst the matter was raised within the Claimant’s grievance in June 2022, it was not alleged to be discrimination. The matter was not included in the Claimant’s original ET1 claim form but was rather included as an issue following further particulars of her claim in June 2023.

[160]The Claimant has argued that Mrs Sergides’ account is unreliable or inconsistent because she was able to remember the Claimant’s behaviour at the meeting but said she had difficulty remembering other details because it had been five years earlier. We are not satisfied that this is accurate as Mrs Sergides was clear in her evidence she remembered the Claimant’s behaviour as it was the first time it had happened, and she never had any member of staff behave in that way before.

[161]The Claimant has raised concerns about a lack of contemporaneous documents justifying the removal of the lock, and whereas this is accurate, we are not satisfied this is a relevant factor for us to consider given that the Claimant accepts the necessity of removing locks to stop the ability of children to lock themselves in classrooms. In any event we accepted Mr Turnock’s evidence about the succession of temporary caretakers following the departure of the permanent postholder which meant that the maintenance log was not maintained at that time.

[162]The Claimant has described in her witness statement the removal of the locks and flipchart paper as not having a legitimate justification and was evidence of a deliberate and a hostile approach towards her, and she says that they were not operationally necessary but were calculated measures that contributed to an environment of exclusion and hostility. The Tribunal does not agree. It was clearly established in the hearing that these matters were necessary from a health and safety and safeguarding perspective so that children could not lock themselves in classrooms and so that people could see through the panels before opening the door. Issues 3.2.8, 4.1.8, and 5.1.9 – Informal warning

[163]Following the discussions about the removal of the lock and the removal of the flip charts, Mrs Sergides and Mr Turncock wrote to the Claimant on 17 September 2020 to express concern about the Claimant’s conduct on 11 September 2020. The letter summarised the discussions to which we have already referred in this judgment and it recorded “We do not find this conduct acceptable and well below the standards expected from any teacher at Grafton. Our concern is over challenging behaviour over decisions made by Senior Leaders which have been taken for the safety of all and in addition through your actions you put out at risk by disregarding safety procedures in the school.”

[164]The Claimant was specifically told that on 11 September 2020 she had been challenging Mr Turnock and had spoken to him in a demanding manner which they found to be disrespectful and unprofessional.

[165]The Claimant was notified that glass in classroom windows must not be obscured and classroom doors must not be locked whilst adults or children are inside and further the COVID-19 arrangements must be followed in all instances unless express is permission given. The Claimant was also informed that Mrs Sergides could not agree for the SLT to communicate only by email with her. The Claimant was offered the opportunity to discuss the letter if she wished.

[166]Within her statement the Claimant has alleged that Mr Turnock accused the Claimant of displaying aggressive behaviour. The Claimant said that this accusation “falls into a harmful racial stereotype often applied to Black individuals, particularly women of African descent.” The Claimant specifically said: “This stereotype unfairly characterises Black women as hostile, aggressive, illogical, and ill-tempered, irrespective of their actual behaviour. I believe this trope was unjustly and inappropriately applied to me in this instance, and it served to delegitimise my concerns while framing me as a threat for simply questioning the removal of my classroom lock. In this instance, the characterisation of Black women as hostile and aggressive was unjustly applied to me, undermining my legitimate concerns while portraying me as a threat.”

[167]We were not provided with corroborative evidence that Mr Turnock had ever accused the Claimant of being aggressive, and when this was put to the Claimant, she confirmed the word aggressive had not been used specifically but the use of the words that she had “stormed out” was used to suggest it.

[168]Nevertheless, the Claimant continued to argue throughout the hearing that she had been accused of being aggressive or labelled as being aggressive. The word aggressive is used 18 times in the Claimant’s closing submissions even though she was never described this way by the Respondent. Within those submissions the Claimant says that she was described as aggressive and unsafe, she was portrayed as acting aggressively, and she says that there was disagreement in the meeting which the Respondent had reframed in racially coded terms as challenging, aggressive and confrontational.

[169]We record for completeness that this is incorrect. Mr Turnock did not, at any time, tell the Claimant that she was aggressive.

[170]The Claimant has alleged that she had been accused of being threatening during this meeting. This is not entirely accurate. An early draft of the letter to the Claimant described her behaviour in those meetings as threatening and we understand that was included by Mrs Sergides however it was not included in the final draft which went out. Accordingly what we infer from that is whereas the Claimant was not accused of being threatening, there had been consideration by Mrs Sergides that the Claimant’s behaviour that day may have been threatening, however there had been a change of mind.

[171]In any event the Claimant confirms she put paper on the glass panels; she confirms she walked the wrong way around the one way system; and she confirms raising the issue of the lock removal with Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock. We find the Respondent’s account of that meeting and of the Claimant’s interaction with Mr Turnock to be accurate, and specifically the Claimant was angry and walked out of the meeting and told Mr Turnock to communicate in writing in future. We further find that Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock genuinely formed the view that the Claimant’s behaviour on that day had been unprofessional. We are able to prefer the Respondent’s evidence for a number of reasons.

[172]Firstly, as we have already identified, we have approached the Claimant’s evidence with caution due to her explanation of the iPad matter. In addition, the Claimant repeatedly argued that she was accused of being aggressive even though the letter of 17 September 2020 contains no such allegation, and the Claimant even confirmed the word had not been used but she persisted in saying it in her witness statement, in the hearing, and in her submissions. We therefore prefer the Respondent’s account of this meeting and we accept their rationale for sending the letter which was to put the Claimant on notice that her behaviour was unacceptable, and to reestablish professional boundaries. We note that the Claimant did not raise a grievance at this time.

[173]The Claimant relies on Sandra Hall and Jennifer Buckley as comparators. The Claimant has denied that she displayed the behaviour she was accused of, but she alleges that Ms Hall was loud and would raise her voice and was confrontational but was not challenged by the Respondent. Mrs Sergides denies that Ms Hall displayed these behaviours but said that she was passionate about her class, they worked together well with Ms Hall as the trade union representative and that her advice had been brilliant. We were not persuaded that Ms Hall was loud and confrontational in any event. We heard no relevant evidence about Ms Buckley in this respect. Issues 3.2.9, 4.1.9, and 5.1.10 – Staff governor

[174]During June and July 2021 there were discussions within the school about potential redundancies as it had accrued a deficit during the Pandemic. During Autumn 2021 the then staff governor, Helena Blake who is black, indicated that she would be standing down from that role. The Claimant expressed an interest in putting herself forward for the role.

[175]The Claimant had become a trade union representative and the union held a meeting to discuss the possibility of redundancies. Anna Sutton, was a Deputy Head Teacher, and had been a trade union member for thirty years, attended the meeting however the Claimant asked her to leave the meeting as she was “management.” Ms Sutton sent a letter of complaint about this incident as she had been concerned about the redundancies, and she was upset that she had been ejected from the meeting.

[176]In her oral evidence before us the Claimant accepted she had done so, she told us that she was simply following orders; others would have felt more comfortable if Ms Sutton was not there; and Ms Sutton was a grown lady who knew how to contact the union direct if she wished.

[177]After the Claimant expressed an interest in becoming a staff governor, on 22 November 2021 Mrs Sergides orally asked Andrew Holt in HR for advice whether there was a conflict of interest in the Claimant standing as she was a governor at another school and also a trade union representative. On 23 November Mr Holt sought further advice from Jane Wright (the Respondent’s designated authority on governance) and he said “Judging by the results of a bit of googling it looks like there is nothing preventing this though the roles are very different.” Mrs Wright pasted some general guidance in an email to Mr Holt, the sum of which suggested that there was no conflict. The Claimant was not prevented from standing and whereas she put herself forward she lost that election. We understand that it was Ms Blake who informed her that the query had been raised.

[178]Mrs Sergides told us that she simply wanted advice on whether there would be a conflict of interest as it was the first time in twenty or more years that she could recall a trade union representative putting themselves forward.

[179]The Claimant relies upon two white comparators, Sarah Marklew who was a teacher and the SENCo and also Gloria Tofi who was a teacher and the Safeguarding Lead. The Claimant says that their appointments could have raised conflict issues because of their school roles however HR advice was not sought about them. The Claimant has also given evidence that: “The selective scrutiny I faced appears not as a legitimate concern over role compatibility but as a biased attempt to portray me as unsuitable, reflectively underpinned by racial discrimination.”

[180]It appeared to the Tribunal that neither Ms Marklew and Ms Tofi were appropriate comparators. An appropriate comparator would have been someone not of the Claimant’s race who was a trade union representative who wished to stand as a staff governor.

[181]Whereas it is correct that the work of the SENCo or the Safeguarding Lead could have been discussed or scrutinised at governor meetings, this is true of the role of any teacher in the school. The roles of SENCo and Safeguarding Lead would inevitably involve discussion with management over issues within their remits, and this could in theory lead to differing points of view or disagreement. However, the roles are aimed at representing the interests of the pupils (as distinct from employees) and look at assessing needs of the pupils or protecting their welfare and keeping them safe.

[182]The role of trade union representative is a unique role, it is a role which may involve negotiating with management on behalf of colleagues, dealing with staff rights and employment matters, and challenging management decisions. It is very different to the roles which the Claimant has compared herself to.

[183]In any event it did not appear to us that Mrs Sergides had emailed HR to find out ways of preventing the Claimant from becoming a governor, rather the query was about whether there would be a conflict as it had not arisen before. We accepted Mrs Sergides’ evidence that that was the purpose of her query.

[184]We note that the Claimant has made a mistake about the year this happened, whereas the Claimant said that it was 2020 it was actually 2021.

[185]The Claimant did not raise a grievance about this at the time although was something that she knew about at or around that time, and the Claimant did not mention it in her resignation email. Issues 3.2.10, 4.1.10, and 5.1.11 – Fulfilling objectives

[186]The Claimant alleges that on 8 October 2020 Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides urged the Islington Council Computing Lead, Katy Potts, to assert that the Claimant was not fulfilling her duties, following which Ms Potts confirmed that the Claimant had not met her objectives for 2019/20. The Claimant compares her treatment to James Mather and Jennifer Buckley. The Claimant describes this as a direct assault on her professional credibility that was done in isolation with no similar scrutiny applied to her white colleagues which she says made it clear that she was being specifically targeted.

[187]The Grafton School buys in computing support from the Respondent. The Respondent’s own Computing Lead is Katy Potts. The Claimant and Ms Potts would engage with each other about computing matters at the school. It had been agreed that Professor Miles Berry (who helped write the Computing National curriculum) would visit Islington and the Grafton School with the aim to showcase Islington children’s computing work before the Professor was to lead an assembly. The annual visit from the Professor is highly valued and many other schools had requested him to visit their school to see children’s work. The event was also important for Islington’s reputation in computing education.

[188]The visit was scheduled for Friday 12 January 2020 and it was agreed that part of that visit would be to observe the Claimant teaching a new computing program to the pupils for which Professor Berry had particular interest.

[189]In early January 2020 Ms Potts contacted the Claimant to check that the arrangements were in hand, and in her evidence she said that she gave the Claimant the option to opt out of the visit and allow another school to take the lead, if she felt there would be shortfalls in the presentation of children’s work.

[190]On 7 January 2020 the Claimant said that there had not been a wealth of responses but she could show some of the work that had been done in general since September. Ms Potts replied to suggest the Claimant send an enthusiastic note to other staff to encourage interest. On 8 January 2020 Ms Potts emailed Mr Turnock, Mr Mather and the Claimant to encourage interest from the pupils, staff and parents so the children could show their digital projects to Professor Berry. The Claimant replied almost five hours later and said “We've reminded children to finish/start projects. I'm not sure how many will be able to submit them due to the short notice. If all else fails, we have many other projects and work to show Miles.”

[191]Whereas the plan was for Professor Berry to see the children’s work between 9.30-10.30am this did not happen. The Professor arrived slightly later than planned, and the Claimant informed Ms Potts that there was no time to do the session and the children were not ready, and accordingly the session did not happen. Professor Berry was instead taken to the headteacher’s office for a drink before his assembly at 10.30.

[192]Ms Potts was disappointed and formed the view that this had been a wasted opportunity. Ms Potts raised the matter with Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides who informed her that there was nothing that could be done that day to remedy the matter, but if she wished to raise it Ms Potts should let them know.

[193]After this, the Respondent’s computing service supported a whole school event in February 2020 as a further opportunity to share children’s computing work. The Claimant had agreed to share the children’s work from this second event with the Respondent so that it could be shared with Professor Berry, however the Claimant did not do so. Ms Potts was again disappointed by this.

[194]Ms Potts then sent an email on 8 October 2020, some nine months later in which she said: “As requested, I am emailing to confirm in writing that the computing leader did not meet the objectives in relation to a main computing project planned with the school during 2019-20. Please see below, On the morning of the event Miles was not able to see computing projects and work from different classes in the school and instead met in Nitsa’s office and then launched a safer internet competition from the assembly.”

[195]It should be noted that the Claimant witnessed summonsed Ms Potts to appear as her witness. Ms Potts did not produce a witness statement, but she provided emailed answers to various questions from the Claimant. Ms Potts sent this statement direct to the Tribunal and the Claimant. These answers were supportive of the Respondent’s position, not the Claimant’s. The Claimant chose not to call Ms Potts to give oral evidence but asked us to place full weight on her emailed answers, and we have done so, noting that Ms Potts was not questioned on her evidence.

[196]At the end of the hearing the Claimant attempted to challenge Ms Potts’ written evidence however I reminded her that this was her witness (which she could not therefore cross examine) and she had asked us to place full weight on her evidence. The Claimant told us that is not what she had meant – although that is what she had said – and then she told us that the witness order was made so late she did not have sufficient time to find out what Ms Potts’ evidence was. This was an error on the part of the Claimant as the witness evidence should have been established before the witness order was applied for, not afterwards.

[197]The evidence of Ms Potts was that she had responsibility to feedback evidence and outcomes of computing projects planned with the school, including when outcomes fall short and this is why she gave feedback. Ms Potts said that when the Claimant did not fulfil the agreed activity and objectives in relation to the project planned, she raised it verbally during the spring term with Mrs Sergides and again in the Autumn term, and then offered to confirm this in writing.

[198]Ms Potts said that her email was independently offered, without being “urged” or prompted, she was not asked for the email and that she voluntarily raised issues around project implementation when she visited the school representing the computing service and planning next steps and this is something she would do with all schools who subscribe to the service. Ms Potts further recorded that she had only formally raised concern in regard to a computing lead not meeting the objectives of computing projects a handful of times in her 25 years working at Islington council, with 2 in the past 10 years; this case in Grafton being one of them (the other was a white male computing leader).

[199]The use of the words “As requested” in Ms Potts’ email was a matter of concern to the Tribunal as it gave the impression that this feedback had been solicited by either Mrs Sergides or Mr Turnock, both of whom deny that it was.

[200]Ms Potts, the author of the email, denies anything was requested. The Claimant asked for Ms Potts to be summonsed as her witness, she chose not to call her to give evidence, and her written evidence says that she was not asked to provide this feedback. The Claimant asks us to place full weight on her evidence. It appears therefore that Ms Potts use of the words “As requested” was inaccurate and it was likely intended to mean “As discussed” as that would be consistent the evidence of Ms Potts, Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock. Accordingly, we do not find that anyone urged Ms Potts to provide the feedback that she did.

[201]It was not established before us when or how the Claimant became aware of Ms Potts’ email of 8 October 2020 as she was not a party to it, however we note that the Claimant complained in her grievance in June 2022 that Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock had contacted the lead computing teacher and requested her to attest to the Claimant not fulfilling her duties. This complaint was made after the Claimant’s decision to resign in May 2022, and the Claimant did not indicate at that time that it was due to Issues 3.2.11, 4.1.11, and 5.1.12 – All staff email Issues 3.2.13, 4.1.13, and 5.1.14 – Hostile email to HR

[202]The Claimant became a trade union representative in September 2020. The previous representative had been Sandra Hall who was white. By the time of the Covid-19 Pandemic and lockdown some tensions between some staff and senior leadership team had emerged.

[203]The Claimant’s appointment coincided with the proposed restructure and potential redundancies at the school due to a budget deficit which emerged during the Pandemic. The Claimant’s approach was subject to a complaint by Ms Sutton described earlier in this judgment.

[204]Mrs Sergides asked Mr Turnock to become the member of SLT with responsibility for meeting with the trade union representative. Previously Mrs Sergides had met briefly with Sandra Hall and the relationship worked well, with Mrs Sergides describing her as passionate but she said there was no time when she came into her office with an angry attitude or stormed out. Mr Turnock had not performed the role before although he had previously been a trade union representative himself.

[205]The emails between the Claimant and Mr Turnock from 14 October 2020 onwards demonstrate differences in approach and difficulties in that relationship almost from the start. It was clear that Mr Turnock preferred an approach where he would share information with the union and he wanted meetings to follow an agreed agenda with topics agreed in advance and limited to general issues. This was in a large part due to Mr Turnock’s dyslexia and neurodivergence where he liked to have things agreed in advance and so he could be prepared and not be taken by surprise.

[206]However, the Claimant preferred an approach whereby she could raise individual cases and a more flexible or fluid arrangement. By way of example, on 14 October 2020 Mr Turnock emailed the Claimant to invite her to meet him so that they could discuss terms of reference and possible agenda items. The Claimant’s response was that she had asked the members to send in topics and she said “and as of now the agenda items are…” and the Claimant then listed four matters. There was no attempt to agree that list with Mr Turnock, rather the Claimant was telling Mr Turnock what the agenda was going to be. Mr Turnock pushed back reminding the Claimant that they would need to agree the terms of reference first. There was further emailed discussion between both of them about the way forward and we noted that Mr Turnock expressed he only had thirty minutes and so wanted to get the meetings right, and he indicated his belief that pressing matters should go to Mrs Sergides or him first.

[207]An early request for HR advice was sent by Mr Turnock on 16 October 2020 on the basis that the “new rep is also the person that Nitsa and I have had some issues with recently.” The remainder of the email asked if it was correct that union representatives could not bring individual cases that leadership had not had the opportunity to deal with first, and should they only bring issues that have been shared with and voted on by the union group.

[208]This email, like a number of others, was provided to the Claimant she says by a confidential whistleblower. The Claimant was not a party to this email, and it may have been obtained by illegal means. I therefore issued the Claimant with the caution about self incrimination before answering questions on this.

[209]Mr Holt in HR provided some brief emailed advice which he offered to discuss, and he said one of the points of such meetings was to solve issues before they become bigger and it might be better to take a flexible view of what was being discussed.

[210]Whereas the initial meeting of 16 October 2020 went ahead and was productive, the second meeting of 5 November 2020 has become a matter of contention. Prior to that meeting the Claimant emailed Mr Turnock and said she had met the members the night before and would send him the points they raised. In Mr Turnock’s reply he asked to firm up the agenda and said he assumed the focus would be about health and safety over the next period, and in a further reply he repeated that members could raise things with him directly to resolve things quickly. The Claimant did not send any agenda items in advance of the meeting of 5 November.

[211]The previous meeting on 16 October 2020 was conducted in the library and it was in an open space which Mr Turnock found informal and comfortable. Someone else was in the library on 5 November 2020 so the Claimant suggested they meet in a classroom. The Claimant confirms that she arranged the room. Upon Mr Turnock’s arrival he said that the Claimant was sitting behind a desk with a laptop open and papers spread out. Mr Turnock says he felt this was like a job interview and we accept that is how it felt to him and it was a different layout to the previous meeting, and he found it intimidating and uncomfortable.

[212]We accept that because of Mr Turnock’s underlying condition he found this set up difficult, he much preferred the more open environment of the library, the table which was between them acted as a barrier, and he found the fact that the Claimant had her laptop open in front of her was offputting for him and it most likely felt like a power imbalance to him. The meeting did therefore not start well.

[213]Mr Turnock says that the Claimant was exceptionally confrontational, she had asked the SENCo to leave the room even though it was booked for her and he had told her she could stay. Mr Turnock says that the Claimant was trying to hold him to account for things he had no responsibility for.

[214]The Claimant disputes that the meeting was confrontational but says she brought up issues raised by the members. It is not necessary for us to determine whether the Claimant was confrontational, however we do find that Mr Turnock found the meeting with the Claimant difficult, he had previously had difficult conversations with the Claimant over the lock and glass panels, following which the Claimant had walked out of a meeting with him, and clearly he was anxious about meeting with the Claimant, and he was unclear as to the conduct of those meetings as he had previously sought HR advice.

[215]We also observe that Mr Turnock found it difficult to deal with matters raised on him without prior notice, he had tried to engage with the Claimant on an agenda or points for discussion, however she had not responded, and during the meeting she raised a number of matters which he was unprepared for such as ventilation and workload. Ms King argues that the set up of the room, and the Claimant’s approach of requiring Mr Turnock to provide on the spot answers (rather than providing topics in advance) put him at a psychological disadvantage, and we agree with that assertion, not least because afterwards Mr Turnock described this meeting during the grievance investigation as for him it was like he had “walked into the lion’s den.”

[216]The Claimant’s evidence was that by comparing a professionally prepared meeting room to a lion’s den, Mr Turnock demonstrated a deeply rooted bias and his language perpetuated a harmful stereotype of black women as combative and confrontational, and it was a baseless and inflammatory characterisation that sought to undermine her credibility and professionalism. The Claimant goes on to explain she believed this was part of a clear pattern of racially motivated targeting which spoke to the deep biases that informed Mr Turnock’s actions.

[217]We accepted Mr Turnock’s evidence that around this time he formed the view that staff were no longer coming to him in relation to Covid-19 risk assessments which they had done previously. This was a matter which Mr Turnock had responsibility for and he noticed this change which he attributed to the change in trade union representative.

[218]Following the 5 November meeting the Claimant attempted to continue the discussions either at a further meeting or on email. Mr Turnock was resistant to doing so, explaining that he was happy to discuss general issues with the union rather than individual cases which he felt ought to be raised with the SLT individually first, and that the matters the Claimant was seeking to raise concerning ventilation, workload and absences, had either been or were in the process of being addressed.

[219]Following this, an email was sent to the school staff from the SLT on 9 November 2020 in which it explained the importance of open communication between staff and that the senior leadership team have an open door policy and welcomed feedback, and specifically it said in bold text “any concerns or issues are school issues and must come directly to us, that way matters can be resolved for the benefit of all.”

[220]The email further recorded that it had been noticed there had been recent differences between staff which has created some disharmony contrary to the School’s family ethos and values, and it encouraged staff to hold on to their strengths. Mr Turnock was the author of this email and it appears that the email has been repeatedly misdated in the list of issues as 10 October 2020 whereas it is 9 November 2020.

[221]The Claimant says that the email sent publicly to the entire staff body undermined her position and credibility as a union representative; it’s purpose was to discourage staff raising issues with her; it directly contradicted the purpose of the union representation; and it was unprecedented. The Claimant further says this was not about professional practice but was about isolating and silencing her in her new role and it was a signal to staff that she was not a trusted or respected member of the school community. The Claimant linked this with other treatment she says she suffered and she said that it reinforced the systemic racial bias and hostile work environment that she had been subjected to throughout her time at the school.

[222]The Claimant challenged this with Mr Turnock on 9 and 10 November 2020 and expressed concern that he (or the SLT) had chosen not to work in partnership on matters raised by trade union members. The Claimant did not complain that there was any discrimination of her, rather she said that the stance did not allow her to fulfil her role as a trade union representative and it ostracised staff who did not feel comfortable raising issues directly. The Claimant said she would pass the matter on to the district secretary.

[223]Mr Turnock sent a detailed reply on 10 November whereby he restated that issues should be raised with the SLT first which he said welcomed discussing and resolving issues collectively. In his email Mr Turnock expressed concern with the Claimant’s approach and he said she had not engaged on a draft agenda and instead raised issues in their meeting for which he had no notice so he was unprepared, and he said that he had not agreed to provide definitive answers to questions but rather the purpose of the meetings was for information sharing.

[224]The Claimant again did not respond to allege any form of discrimination but instead forwarded the exchange to the district trade union representative Mr Buttifint. Mr Turnock forwarded the exchange to the Respondent’s HR for guidance.

[225]Mr Buttifint raised this with the Respondent’s HR on 10 November 2020 and Harjit Roopray provided advice that day that the school is clear that staff are able to raise matters through the trade union representative, however she said that the school encourages staff to raise issues with the SLT so that they can be dealt with quickly, and it encourages staff to keep those channels with SLT open. The effect of the email was to correct Mr Turnock’s email to all staff on 9 November 2020 which he accepts was wrong.

[226]The Claimant says that Mr Turnock was forced to back down, and Mr Turnock says he believes that he emailed the school afterwards to withdraw his earlier email or to correct it, however no copy was provided to us. The Claimant says that he did not do so. We have not been provided with evidence of that withdrawal, and we find that it was not sent. We were also not provided with evidence of the Clamant or Mr Buttifint asking Mr Turnock to issue a withdrawal email either – the inference we draw is that the issue was resolved swiftly in any event as the Claimant had a copy of the email from HR she could share herself.

[227]During the reconvened hearing in November 2025 we were provided with late disclosure of a new email between Mr Turnock and Ms Potts from 10 November 2020. The chain is incomplete and the subject line is “tags on emails.” At 13:31 Mr Turnock wrote “Oh its horrible Katy, she is now the union rep and basically trying to destroy what we've all taken years to build!” Mr Turnock’s evidence to us, which we accept, is that he was expressing concern in private that in his view since the Claimant became the trade union representative staff had stopped communicating with management and this was becoming divisive. This email was sent around the time that HR corrected Mr Turnock about his email the day before that staff should come to the SLT first.

[228]We have also been provided with a copy of an incomplete undated email sent by Mr Turnock to HR. Whereas the Claimant tells us this email was provided to her by the confidential whistleblower in Autumn 2022 (which was after her resignation) that cannot be right as the Claimant referred to it in her 13 June 2022 grievance.

[229]In this email Mr Turnock expresses concern about the conduct of the union meetings and he said he was sharing his experience for the benefit of others and that it may be useful to agree way forward with local union representatives so that they act consistently and do not turn meetings into kangaroo courts.

[230]Mr Turnock said the union meetings he attended differed from guidance he had been given on the approach to be followed. Mr Turnock said he felt ambushed by the Claimant who he suggested had been pushing staff to take strike action, she had threatened him with the district trade union representative, he suggested that there had been some discussion between the district representative and HR, and he had been left feeling completely powerless and his impression was that as a manager and a senior leader in the school he was of a secondary importance in union relations.

[231]Mr Turnock recommended that HR draw up agreements on how the meetings should be conducted in future. Mr Turncock was clearly unhappy with the Claimant’s conduct as he described her as acting in an underhand and unprofessional manner and that she had been waving the email from HR as a flag of victory.

[232]The Claimant complains about Mr Turnock’s email which she described as hostile about her and she compares her treatment to Sandra Hall, the previous trade union representative who is white. We note that Mr Turnock did not have any meetings with Ms Hall as trade union representative and that this was his first experience of doing the meetings in place of Mrs Sergides, however he had been a trade union representative himself at some stage.

[233]We were satisfied that the email was hostile as described, given the description of the Claimant as behaving underhand and unprofessional, and ambushing Mr Turnock. The Claimant has repeatedly complained that she has been described as threatening and that this plays into a racial stereotype. We should record that Mr Turnock did not accuse the Claimant being threatening in his email to HR, he said he had been threatened with the district trade union representative which is a different matter. The email was not solely about the Claimant, it was also expressing frustration at the support provided by HR.

[234]The Tribunal was left with the clear impression that there was a significant personality clash between the Claimant and Mr Turnock, their approaches to these meetings were very different, and the Claimant’s appointment to that trade union role came at a time when the school was under enormous pressure due to the Covid-19 Pandemic.

[235]Ms King for the Respondent has repeatedly asserted in her questions to the Claimant that there was a power struggle. The Claimant denies this, however given the contents of those email exchanges, it was entirely clear to us that this was in fact a power struggle between the Associate Head Teacher and the Claimant as a newly appointed union representative who was already disgruntled due to the lock of their door being removed and her flip charts being taken down. We also note that the Claimant who had been the previous sole Computing Lead chose to stand down once Mr Turnock had been appointed to share that function with her which she was unhappy about. Whereas the Claimant now asserts that this was due to race discrimination, she did not do so at the time.

[236]It was also apparent to the Tribunal that Mr Turnock at that time was inexperienced on trade union matters as his email to the school staff of 9 November 2020 suggests. Within that email Mr Turnock had advised staff to go to management in the first instance. This, in our view, demonstrated a lack of familiarity with industrial relations. We note that once HR addressed this with Mr Turnock the directive was not enforced.

[237]The Tribunal was left unable to determine specifically when the Claimant saw this email given her evidence to us that it came from a confidential whistleblower in Autumn 2022, whereas it was clearly referenced in her 13 June 2022 grievance. The most we are able to find is that the Claimant knew of it by 13 June 2022 which was after her resignation. Issues 3.2.12, 4.1.12, and 5.1.13 – Email signature

[238]As part of Mr Turnock’s long reply to the Claimant on 10 November 2020 he also asked the Claimant to remove the reference to being ICT/Computing Lead from her email signature. The Claimant also had Apple Teacher and Google Educator on her email signature.

[239]The Claimant was also advised by Mr Turnock that the school was looking into the use of industry credentials as they may suggest some approval, interest or tie up between the school and the company which he said the Claimant would know does not exist. The Claimant was the only member of staff with Apple Teacher and Google Educator on her email signature. It was established during the hearing that Mr Turnock had been directed to look into the matter by Mrs Sergides.

[240]The Claimant replied to Mr Turnock’s message four minutes later and said that the matters would be forwarded on to Mr Buttifint. The Claimant was referring to the dialogue about staff issues being raised first with SLT. The Claimant did not address the instruction about updating her email signature and it still displayed ICT/Computing Lead.

[241]The Claimant alleges that Mr Turnock launched an investigation into her sign offs and she compares her treatment to that of Mrs Porter Tibbey. In her witness statement the Claimant said that the investigation into her email signature lacked any legitimate basis and appeared to be a targeted and antagonistic act which was deeply shocking and demoralising to have her professionalism questioned. The Claimant explained that the certifications directly benefited the school and had been consistently used without issue for years; and the investigation seemed less about policy compliance but was more about a deliberate attempt to intimidate and undermine her. As she has explained with respect to other issues, the Claimant said that she was being singled out leaving her feeling isolated, demoralised and unfairly targeted, and that she was being held to a different and discriminatory standard. The Claimant said this happened in the absence of any formal policy changes and that when viewed alongside the other incidents this investigation formed part of a broader patten of hostility and discrimination.

[242]The Claimant ceased to be Computing Lead from the start of September 2020 after objecting to the shadow structure of July 2020 where Mr Turnock was to share the role with her and Mrs Porter Tibbey was to provide support. There was no reason for the Claimant to have that as her signature after that time, and Mr Turnock was entitled to ask her to remove it so that people were not misled. The Claimant did not do so when asked, her answers in cross examination about why she did not do so were unclear and she could not tell us why she did not do so and when she eventually complied with that management instruction. Emails within the hearing bundle show the Claimant still using the sign off in the following month of December 2020 at least. Nevertheless, the Claimant confirmed in oral evidence that Mr Turnock’s request to remove that had been “absolutely OK.”

[243]As regards the use of Apple Teacher and Google Educator, Mr Turnock agreed in oral evidence that the Grounds of Resistance and his witness statement were wrong where they said the Claimant did not hold the accreditations and was asked to remove them but failed to do so. The Claimant does in fact hold them and she was never asked to remove them.

[244]The Claimant was asked in cross examination about whether there was some sort of affiliation between the school and these companies. The Claimant argued that there were however this appeared to be on the basis that she had been to a Google conference or a course with Mrs Sergides and that the school used Apple Macs. We are not satisfied that in either case there was an affiliation between the school and those companies.

[245]As regards Mrs Porter Tibbey who appeared as the Claimant’s own witness, she confirmed that she had used the NewsWise Teacher Champion sign off because in 2018 she was sent on NewsWise training by Mrs Sergides, she led the delivery of the programme to Year 5 pupils, and she was asked by the team at NewsWise in December 2018 to become a ‘Teacher Champion’ and received time out of class to attend further training and development in 2019. We understand that NewsWise is something set up by the Guardian Foundation, National Literacy Trust and PSHE Association which offers free lesson plans, and other resources, workshops and activities to schools, teachers and families.

[246]Mrs Porter Tibbey discussed this role with Mrs Sergides and it was agreed in 2019 that she should include the email sign off of “NewsWise Teacher Champion”, as this was training she had been sent on by the school and she was a key part of the programme development.

[247]Mrs Porter Tibbey told us that the school had been involved each year with developing and delivering the programme and continues to deliver workshops and training in partnership with the NewsWise team, she was released from school duties to become involved in the programme and delivered training to other UK teachers through a series of webinars and she also promoted the programme to other schools in the Islington FutureZone network.

[248]It was clear that there was an affiliation between this school, and other schools, with NewsWise which is therefore a difference between her situation and that of the Claimant. Moreover, in Mrs Porter Tibbey’s case she had discussed the sign off in advance with Mrs Sergides and obtained her agreement whereas the Claimant had not, and in addition she was not alleged to have used a sign off for a job she was no longer performing. We were not referred to any other teacher using the Apple or Google sign offs.

[249]In any event on 10 November 2020 Mr Turnock asked for HR advice on a number of matters including processing the Claimant’s UPS application but also the use of credentials on the signature which the school had not approved and he said their concern was that any email outside of the school may indicate some kind of promotion of the companies services and he asked whether those credentials should not be in place without the agreement of senior staff. Advice was provided from Mr Holt in HR was that he had not come across the issue before but when it comes to school communications and signatures on emails he said that the school has a discretion to instruct the employee to remove things where they have a legitimate reason to do so.

[250]This was the end of the matter. Mr Turnock did not instruct the Claimant to remove the credentials, and the Claimant kept them on her signature for the remainder of her employment. In her oral evidence to us the Claimant told us that she did not take the alleged investigation seriously at all, and she told the grievance investigation that this was petty.

[251]In her oral evidence to us the Claimant told us that Mr Turnock was trying to get back at her over having to backdown following HR advice about his email to school staff of 9 November 2020 about going to SLT first with any issues. This was at odds with the Claimant’s pleaded case that the reason was due to her race.

[252]The Claimant refers again to inconsistency, and we have noted the change in the Respondent’s case on this matter, including Mr Turnock’s evidence to which we have referred. We are not persuaded that this was a deliberate attempt to mislead us either by the Respondent, nor Mr Turnock. It appeared to us to be due to sloppy preparation on the part of the Respondent which was corrected at the start of Mr Turnock’s evidence. As such we do not draw an inference from this inconsistency, nevertheless it was unhelpful for this error to have remained uncorrected for so long. So much time has been spent in this case correcting numerous errors as to the dates of incidents and the facts, and both parties had a role in this confusion which we have had to unravel. Issues 3.2.14, 4.1.14, and 5.1.15 – Contract email

[253]On 10 December 2020 the Claimant made a subject access request for “all emails concerning me, both sent and received by any staff working for Islington HR from February 25th 2020 to December 10th 2020.” The Claimant said in a grievance investigation that the results were incomplete.

[254]The Claimant tells us that on an unspecified date in May 2022 she found an iPad in her classroom or near her desk which was normal as she had been the Computing Lead and people would often leave iPads for her to fix. The Claimant says that she opened it to find out who the owner was, she went to the sent items to identify the owner, and she immediately saw a sent email from Mr Turnock to Mrs Sergides of 19 November 2020 at 10:23pm which says the following: “Subject: The email from someone about pay progression Shall we take a contract out?!”

[255]Mr Turnock’s email signature appeared beneath. We were not provided with the original copy of the email. The copy we have was pasted into a subsequent grievance investigation, although it has not been alleged by either side that there was more on the email than the above.

[256]The Claimant’s evidence was that irrespective of whether this was intended as a joke or not, the comment was grossly inappropriate and disturbing, and deeply unprofessional and she said that such language has no place in a professional setting, and that it revealed an alarming level of antagonism and hostility. The Claimant said when she came across the email it had an immediate and devastating effect on her, she felt physically sick, she was overwhelmed by a sense of betrayal and deeply shaken, and it highlighted the dehumanising manner in which he had been spoken about by senior leaders, and it left her struggling to sleep and feeling isolated and humiliated. The Claimant refers to the earlier UPS application which she said had been inexplicably lost, and that when she sought resolution she was not met with support but with active hostility and inappropriate comments behind the scenes and that she was not treated as an equal but as someone to be mocked, undermined and excluded.

[257]The Claimant said the emotional impact of discovering the email was profound, that it reinjured unhealed wounds and brought into sharp focus the level of animosity she had faced from senior leaders, leaving her feeling hurt, humiliated and dehumanised. The Claimant said that the email aggravated the harm she had already suffered and reinforced the hostile and discriminating environment which flourished at the school and she told us “I was not safe, I had to leave.”

[258]The Claimant compares her treatment to two white comparators, James Mather, Jennifer Buckley, whom she says also applied for UPS at that time and that Mr Turnock did not write about them in the same way, or at all.

[259]After seeing the email at some point she says in May 2022 the Claimant took the iPad home with her and kept it in her possession until she returned it to the Chair of Governors / HR during a subsequent grievance investigation in August 2022.

[260]The manner in which the Claimant claims to have found this email is disputed. On the one hand the Claimant says she was simply looking for the owner. During the grievance investigation the Claimant was asked why she simply did not look at the asset number on the back and compare it with the asset register, and we note that the Claimant was the Computing Lead so must have been aware of its existence. During the grievance process the Claimant said that the register was obsolete and not updated when iPads change hands, however she did not say that she attempted to use it. Instead the Claimant told the investigator that would have taken a lot longer than simply looking through the iPad. The Claimant then asked questions about the asset register and when it was last updated. The Claimant denied actively accessing Mr Turnock’s emails and asked how would she know what date to look for.

[261]I have given the Claimant repeated cautions or warnings against self incrimination when she has been asked questions about these emails. I have made it clear that the Claimant does not have to answer those questions, but if she does not do so we may draw an inference and it may be a negative one, but it would depend upon all the circumstances.

[262]The Respondent argues that the Claimant has trawled through Mr Turnock’s emails looking for material to use against him.

[263]We have not been persuaded by the Claimant’s evidence on this matter. Whilst it is possible that the iPad was left in her room, and whilst it is possible that when she opened the Mail app it immediately showed an email of 19 November 2020 (some 18 months earlier) we were not persuaded by the Claimant’s explanation. Firstly, the Claimant was no longer the Computing Lead in May 2022, and she had not been for 21 months or so, therefore there was no reason to have accessed the iPad at all.

[264]Secondly, the Claimant did not even attempt to use the asset register to find the owner, nor does she appear to have made any enquiries at all.

[265]Thirdly, it seemed to us highly suspicious that someone seeking to find out the owner of a device would go to the most intrusive area (the sent folder) to identify the owner, whereas the Settings folder may have been a less intrusive means and could have achieved a quicker answer. We find it likely that as a Computing Lead the Claimant could have been expected to know this as she gave us evidence she regularly fixed devices for people.

[266]Fourthly, the odds of opening an allegedly unknown iPad and stumbling across an email from 18 months earlier about oneself must be very low.

[267]Leaving aside how the email was obtained, Mr Turnock does not recall sending the email or why but he accepts that he sent it and it was about the Claimant. Mrs Sergides did not reply to the email, nor did she have a conversation with Mr Turnock about it, and she says she does not even remember receiving it.

[268]We do not have many emails from around this time as they were not preserved, and we make it clear that they were likely deleted before the ET1 was filed and the duty to preserve evidence was engaged. We have no reason to conclude that evidence was deliberately destroyed. The email of 19 November 2020 likely still existed around the time of the Claimant’s grievance from around May 2022 as the investigation records Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides as saying it was in the email account.

[269]We have been referred to Mr Turnock’s email to Mr Holt in HR on 10 November 2020 where he asked for advice about the Claimant’s backdated UPS application. Mr Turnock had been tasked by Mrs Sergides to look into the Claimant’s application which she claimed to have submitted earlier in 2020, and if granted would have been backdated to the previous academic year. Mr Turnock was seeking advice on what to do about the earlier application which the school had not received.

[270]We note from the pay committee minutes of 18 November 2020 Mrs Sergides had advised that that there were insufficient budget funds to meet these pay progressions and the school would therefore need to look at restructuring. We noted that one member of the committee had queried whether it might be possible to ask staff to withdraw their applications which Mr Turnock advised against as it might be considered coercion. It did not appear to the Tribunal therefore that there was any hostility on the part of Mr Turnock towards anyone who had applied for the UPS even though it could result in restructuring. Clearly the email from Mr Turnock the following evening was unlikely to have been due to someone making their application for pay progression.

[271]The Claimant complained about the email in her grievance. The Claimant did not state at that time that it was discrimination or that it had anything to do with her race. The subsequent grievance investigation identified that there were numerous emails at that time between the Claimant, Mr Turnock, Mrs Sergides and Mr Holt in HR about the issue of pay progression. We have not been provided with these.

[272]It was not alleged during the grievance process, nor during these proceedings, that Mr Turnock ever acted on this email nor was there any aggressive conduct on his part for the remainder of the Claimant’s employment. Whereas the Claimant suggested during the grievance that it was a death threat, she does not do so in these proceedings. Nevertheless, she remains concerned about the contents of that email which Mr Turnock admits was written about her, and the Claimant has described reading it as traumatic for her.

[273]Mr Turnock accepts the subsequent grievance outcome that it was disrespectful and unprofessional, he admits he should not have sent it, and he says it was sent at a time when he and the school were under enormous pressure and stress during the second national lockdown. The grievance investigation also recorded that the email was not a death threat nor a threat of violence and that it was disingenuous and vexatious to have suggested that it was, and it was a private email between two colleagues written at 10:33pm during the second Covid lockdown and not intended to be seen by others. Nevertheless, the grievance investigation recorded that it was suggestive of a problematic working relationship between Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock, and the Claimant.

[274]As regards Mr Mather and Ms Buckley who are relied upon as comparators, we are not satisfied that they were in fact appropriate comparators. Whereas both are white teachers who applied for UPS, Ms Buckley applied years earlier, only Mr Mather applied at the same time as the Claimant.

[275]It was not suggested before us, by either side, that there had been numerous correspondence from Mr Mather or Ms Buckley about the pay progression at that time. Moreover, by this time relations between the Claimant and Mr Turnock were difficult, as there had been issues over sharing the Computing Lead function, as well as issues over the lock and glass panel, as well as the letter in September 2020 about the Claimant’s alleged conduct. These are all relevant factors in the overall mix.

[276]Whereas we do not find that Mr Mather and Ms Buckley were appropriate actual comparators, nevertheless the clear difference in treatment of them compared to the Claimant means that they are of assistance to us as evidential comparators which will be discussed in the decision and conclusions section of this judgment below.

[277]Whereas this is something which the Claimant knew about at the time of her resignation she made no mention of it in her resignation email. The Claimant specifically complained about the email in her grievance the following month, but she did not allege that it was any form of discrimination.

[278]The Claimant has argued that Mr Turnock has provided inconsistent explanations for sending the email. At the time the ET1 was filed the issue was still being investigated by the Respondent therefore no explanation was provided at that time. During the grievance investigation Mr Turnock did not provide an explanation for sending it, rather he was hypothesising what it may have been about, including taking out a contract or something to do with pay advice, however he did not give a reason for sending it. The Respondent found it to be disrespectful and unprofessional but not a serious threat.

[279]Within the Amended Response the Respondent said that Mr Turnock had been intemperately expressing frustration to a trusted colleague about dealing with pay progression issues whilst working very late during lockdown. It was recorded that this was a moment of ventilation of frustration or inappropriate sense of humour. In his evidence to us Mr Turnock explains he does not dispute sending it as it was in his sent items but he has no memory of sending it, he cannot therefore recall or explain why it was sent, he readily acknowledges that he is prone to use of vernacular which he attributes to his neurodiversity, and he accepts it was unprofessional and wrong to have sent the email and he says that thinking back it must have been in a moment of frustration in dealing with pay progression when routinely working late into the night during the Pandemic.

[280]Mr Turnock has not altered his account that he cannot remember sending it or why he sent it, and it is clear that he is actively hypothesising as to why he sent it and he has assumed or guessed it was due to frustration about the pay issues. Mr Turnock has provided more detail as the case progresses, including the effects of his neurodiversity and the impact upon how he expresses himself, but he has not provided an inconsistent account – rather Mr Turnock’s account has always been he doesn’t know why he sent it but he has provided an explanation of why he may have sent it. There has been no inconsistency, rather there has been an absence of a definitive explanation from Mr Turnock. Issues 3.2.15, 4.1.15, 5.1.16 – Self isolating

[281]During the second lockdown in 2020 schools were required to provide daily reports to various agencies including the Respondent local authority about how many staff and pupils had tested positive for Covid and were isolating.

[282]On or prior to 22 November 2020 a child in the Claimant’s partner bubble tested positive for Covid. At this time the Claimant was out of the school on training and Mr Turnock spoke to her at some point in the day and informed her of this. The Respondent says that at this time the rules were ambiguous in relation to teachers in partner class bubbles where the classes were located at a distance. Rose Graham, Karen Livingstone and E were in the actual bubble of the infected child. Lauren Cabey was in the Claimant’s class.

[283]On Sunday 22 November 2020 at 9:08pm Mr Turnock emailed KM the Business Manager to discuss committee meeting minutes and said “Also we need to check whether SA is actually isolating or not but I’ll talk to you about that in the morning.” This is another email taken from Mr Turnock’s email without his consent by someone who the Claimant says was her whistleblower. The Claimant was not a party to this email but referred to it in her grievance in June 2022 which is inconsistent with her arguments about having been disclosed things in Autumn 2022 by her confidential whistleblower.

[284]The Claimant describes the email as targeting and questioned her adherence to the isolation rules which were not raised about other colleagues, and there was no evidence or suggestion of non-compliance on her part. The Claimant said it demonstrated an unfounded suspicion directed solely at her which was indicative of a broad pattern of racial discrimination. The Claimant says that by targeting her specifically Mr Turnock cast doubt on her honesty and integrity and perpetuated harmful racial stereotypes that unfairly questioning the trustworthiness and compliance of black individuals.

[285]The Claimant disputes that Mr Turnock needed to check that she was isolating as she said he had called her at that time to say someone had tested positive as she was training and not in the building. The Claimant confirmed in the oral evidence that her relations with Mr Turnock were low at this time.

[286]Mr Turnock was not able to remember in any great detail the circumstances at that time given that it was over five years ago, but he gave evidence that he likely engaged with Ms Cabey and the others who were at school, unlike the Claimant who was out of the school on training. Mr Turnock was questioned about his use of the words “whether SA is actually isolating or not” and his evidence was that it was simply because the rules were ambiguous with respect to teacher’s and partner bubbles, it was not automatic that the Claimant was self-isolating and he was making a note late at night before work the next day about jobs to be done, of which checking if the Claimant was isolating was one of them. We were not provided with any other evidence whereby Mr Turnock had disputed whether the Claimant was self isolating or disbelieved her. We have found Mr Turnock’s evidence on this to be plausible and we believed him. Issues 3.2.16, 4.1.16, 5.1.17 – Private tutoring

[287]Staff had been permitted to provide private tutoring to students before and after school on the school premises. Only a small number of staff were doing so prior to the Covid-19 Pandemic. Following the return to normality after lockdown restrictions had been lifted in March 2021 there was an increase in private tutoring at the school. This was because many parents wanted to help their children catch up with their education. The Government also led and funded catch-up lessons for the same purpose. The Claimant did not undertake private tuition before the Pandemic but she started to do so upon the lifting of restrictions.

[288]Following discussions between Mrs Sergides, the Chair of Governors, and Mr Turnock, the latter informed all staff in June 2021 that the decision had been made that staff could no longer provide private tutoring on the school premises.

[289]The Claimant’s argument is that this was done because she had started to undertake tutoring whereas previously it had been permitted, and that colleagues recognised that this was the reason and resented her for it. The Claimant says that it impacted her professional and personal wellbeing, limited opportunities for professional development, and damaged relationships with her colleagues because of that resentment and she says that this created a deeply hostile and discriminatory environment.

[290]Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock disagree and say that they became aware of the increase in private tutoring and were concerned that it was creating difficulties for the cleaning staff who needed to clean the premises; they were concerned about people mixing outside of the Covid bubbles; and moreover they had health and safety concerns about pupils being left unattended when the teachers were in meetings, as well as children being in school unaccounted for. The Claimant has agreed in her oral evidence that there were instances of children left unattended when the tutoring finished, and we have also been referred to a contemporaneous email from Mr Turnock dated 24 March 2021 where he raised the issue of risk assessments and also public liability insurance.

[291]Whereas both Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock said that they had some concern about staff receiving undeclared earnings, however we find that this was not a large part of their concerns as staff had been permitted to tutor previously and we were not provided with any contemporaneous evidence of these concerns being raised before.

[292]The Claimant has challenged the consistency of the Respondent’s evidence as she says she was told by Mr Turnock that it had been a decision from the Governors but she argues they had not been consulted or informed. Mr Turnock explained in his evidence that the decision was that of the then Head Teacher, Mrs Sergides, made in consultation with the SLT and also the Chair of Governors, and we again found this to be plausible and we believed it.

[293]In any event once the decision was made to stop private tutoring on the premises this applied to everyone not just the Claimant. This is not something which the Claimant raised in her resignation email, nor her subsequent grievance, it was raised during the grievance investigation in July 2022, however the Claimant did not allege that the decision had anything to do with race. Issues 3.2.17, 4.1.17, 5.1.18 - NPQSL

[294]The National Professional Qualification for Senior Leadership (“NPQSL”) is a development course for school leaders who are, or are aspiring to be, a senior leader with cross-school responsibilities. At the material time the Claimant was not a senior leader within the school, she was a class teacher who had been Computing Lead from 2018 to September 2020. Whereas the course was fully funded at that time, undertaking the course would still involve a cost to the school in terms of releasing the teacher for a number of days for the duration of the course which would need to be covered, as well as provision of a mentor.

[295]On Saturday 8 January 2022 the Claimant emailed Mrs Sergides and asked to undertake the course, she explained that it was fully funded and that there was a deadline to apply on 21 January 2022. The Claimant included a link to the course.

[296]On Sunday 9 January 2022 Mrs Sergides responded and said “Let us have a chat on Tuesday if possible it may not be possible to do the course from school’s perspective especially if there are financial implications, although it as I understand a free course. However let’s chat tomorrow.” As appeared customary on her messages to the Claimant and others, Mrs Sergides ended the message with an “x” which signifies a kiss which is a sign of fondness.

[297]We note that at this time the school was in budget deficit due primarily to the Covid-19 Pandemic and a school restructure was under consideration which was likely to result in teacher redundancies.

[298]Late disclosure provided on 4 November 2025 includes emails from Mr Holt in HR on 10 and 11 January 2022 where he provided advice to Mrs Sergides on the application. The fact that Mrs Sergides was seeking advice after the Claimant’s email on 8 January 2020 is suggestive to us that Mrs Sergides had not already rejected the Claimant’s application. In any event on 10 January 2022 Mr Holt advised that there would be an obligation to release the applicant from the school for a placement and also to find them an individual in the school to provide guidance as well as feedback and evidence to an assessor, however it was noted that the course was for someone who was already a school leader and who could become a Head Teacher within 18 months, thus they would already be a Deputy Head Teacher which the Claimant was not. Further advice was provided from Mr Holt on 11 January 2022.

[299]On 14 January 2022 Mrs Sergides responded to the Claimant to indicate that she had looked at the course and noted that it was for school leaders who were aspiring to be senior leaders with cross school responsibilities and it was noted that the Claimant had undertaken a middle leadership course but was not yet appointed to a middle leadership role in the school. Mrs Sergides further recorded that the school was not in a position to approve the application as it would be unable to commit to school resources such as releasing the Claimant from classes or assigning senior leaders to oversee the process or projects nor to commit to financial or time resources due budgetary constraints and the financial impacts of Covid-19.

[300]We accept the evidence of Mrs Sergides that at this time she was contemplating a restructure exercise likely to involve multiple redundancies and accordingly the school would have to have re-allocated remaining teachers to ensure adequate cover and this would have made it difficult to release the Claimant from her classes and to assign other teachers to cover her. We also agree given the contents of Mrs Sergides’ email of 14 January 2022 that she had by this time accessed the course requirements as she quoted from them.

[301]The Claimant relied upon Tara Garde and Mrs Porter Tibbey as comparators. Both are white and neither were approved to go on the course at the time. We understand that Mrs Porter Tibbey went on the course at a later date, however the Claimant does not complain about that. The Claimant’s complaint is that whereas she accepts that at the time Ms Garde and Mrs Porter Tibbey’s applications were unsuccessful, hers was rejected out of hand immediately without further thought – that is the alleged difference in treatment which she says was to her detriment.

[302]The Claimant says that the decision had a profound professional impact upon her and that denying her access to the course effectively blocked the key opportunity for career progression and it signalled a lack of confidence or investment in her potential, leaving her feeling unsupported and undervalued. The Claimant says it also caused her significant reputational harm which undermined her standing amongst colleagues, and that it created an environment where her contributions were consistently undervalued.

[303]As regards the treatment of the comparators, Mrs Porter Tibbey who gave evidence for the Claimant said in her statement “I initially asked Nitsa Sergides to begin my NPQSL study in 2022. I was told this would not be possible, as it was a time of restructuring. This communication was verbal and it was not a formal request.” As regards Ms Garde, we understand that she expressed an interest at the same time as the Claimant and subsequently said she did not want to do the course and was not ready to do it.

[304]It was not demonstrated before us that any additional time was spent dealing with either of the comparators’ applications when compared to that of the Claimant, it was clear to us that on 9 January 2022 Mrs Sergides was reticent about making a decision that day but she had not rejected the Claimant’s application on that day, and once she looked into it and noted that there was no charge for the course there was still a cost in terms of time and cover, she then told the Claimant on 14 January 2022 it was rejected.

[305]On 25 January 2022 the Claimant responded to Mrs Sergides and said that the purpose of her email was not to challenge her decision but she wished to articulate her views as it affected many staff.

[306]The Claimant asserted that applicants did not already need to have whole school responsibilities, they only needed to be aspiring to be senior leaders. The Claimant referred to the budget constraints which she did not appear to dispute but said that it was saddening that not one senior leader in a management team of seven was able to support a single teacher. Whereas the Respondent argues that the Claimant meant any teacher, we find that the use of the word single here, the Claimant was referring to herself as it was not demonstrated to us that she knew about the other refusals at the time of writing.

[307]The Claimant said that other schools were supporting their teachers, a neighbouring school had offered to support her (although we understand the Claimant did not go on to do the course anyway) and she asked if no one else would be supported in any CPD or was it just her and she said that the information should really have been communicated to staff.

[308]The Claimant referred to constant targeting and bullying over two years, and she said the initial reply indicated that the decision was made before even looking at the requirements which suggested it was a personal decision. The Claimant also referred to research findings by the Runnymede Trust which outlines the ways black teachers experience barriers to promotion and career progression, and she included a link to an article she said reflects on the lack of BAME school leaders and the reasons for this.

[309]The Claimant added “I can clearly see that you've gone to great lengths to find reasons, however tenuous, to prevent my progression so thank you for putting this in writing.” The Claimant did not specifically allege in her email that the decision to refuse her application was an act of race discrimination, we find that she was saying a number of things in her email. Firstly the Claimant was saying that there needed to be better communication about what CPD would be supported. Secondly the Claimant was expressing concern that she was being targeted and that her progression was being deliberately prevented. Thirdly the Claimant was making a separate but related point about the lack of BAME school leaders, the reasons for it and what barriers BAME teachers face. The Claimant was clearly stating that the Respondent was looking for ways to prevent her progression, however she was not explicitly alleging that the specific decision here was an act of race discrimination towards her.

[310]Whereas this is the last act chronologically that the Claimant seeks to complain about, the Claimant did not raise this with her trade union when she engaged with Mr Buttifint in May 2022, nor did she include it in her resignation in May 2022 nor her grievance in June 2022 and we note that the Claimant told Mrs Sergides on 25 January 2022 that she was not intending to challenge the decision. Resignation and grievance process

[311]In early 2022 Mrs Sergides considered a restructure of the school and staff were asked if they wished to apply for voluntary redundancy. On 10 and 11 May 2022 the Claimant engaged with Mr Buttifint about making a complaint about her treatment however she made no reference to

[312]On 13 May 2022 the Claimant emailed Mrs Sergides, copied to Mr Buttifint, and said that she would like to express her interest in accepting voluntary redundancy given the full time UPS role had been deleted. There was no mention of any discrimination nor the email of 19 November 2020.

[313]On 16 May 2022 Mr Buttifint emailed the Respondent’s HR to say he was in receipt of an outline grievance from a member and he included a copy of Mr Turnock’s email of 19 November 2020 and asked the Respondent to carry out an investigation as a matter of urgency.

[314]On 23 May 2022 Mrs Sergides wrote to the Claimant to advise that her application for voluntary redundancy had been accepted and she would receive a redundancy payment of £5,670.46. The Claimant’s employment subsequently terminated on 31 August 2022. As per the Claimant’s contract of employment she was required to give notice to leave her role by 31 May and accordingly she had given slightly more notice than was contractually required.

[315]The Claimant did not raise a grievance prior to her resignation. In her witness statement the Claimant explains that having discovered the email of 19 November 2020 she knew she could no longer remain in an environment where she was treated with such hostility, but she also understood the risks of raising this issue directly with senior leadership and she feared retaliation and the possibility evidence may be destroyed to cover up their behaviour.

[316]The Claimant said her actions were therefore deliberate and considered, and she engaged with her union as well as HR and the Chair of Governors, however she said no meaningful action was taken and the cumulative impact of her experiences left her with no choice but to leave the school as the trust between her and the leadership had irreparably broken and her psychological safety was a constant risk. The Claimant said leaving was not about redundancy, rather it was about protecting herself from further harm.

[317]On 13 June 2022 the Claimant submitted her grievance. The Claimant made no explicit mention of race discrimination or any form of discrimination within her grievance. Within her grievance the Claimant complained about the lock incident following which she said she had been accused of being aggressive. The Claimant complained about Mr Turnock’s email to the staff directing them to raise issues with management in the first instance and his email to HR where he suggested she had been pushing for strike action and had behaved in an unprofessional and underhand manner. The Claimant further raised the issue over her email signature; the alleged loss of her UPS application; and she complained about requesting feedback from Ms Potts to try and show she was not fulfilling her duties; and finally she complained about Mr Turnock’s query as to whether she was self-isolating.

[318]The Claimant added “In isolation, these acts seem insignificant and perhaps a clash of personalities. However, the evidence is clear through the email correspondence I have come across. Threatening to kill/have killed a member of staff killed, which is not acceptable under any circumstance, reaffirms the treatment I have endured in my time and allows me to put forth my grievance. The last few years have had a huge impact on my mental health, I’ve considered leaving teaching many times and have had to speak to a cognitive behavioural therapist to manage the work-related stress.”

[319]In her oral evidence to us the Claimant confirmed that she had not put in an ACAS Early Conciliation form in relation to the Respondent at the same time as she had done so for Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides. The Respondent put to the Caimant that she was not tying the end of her employment relationship to Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides’ behaviour, to which she replied no. The Claimant also told us that she though that Mr Turnock was not the kind of character or person who should be leading the school and that she did not want him to stay.

[320]Whereas within the grievance the Claimant had described Mr Turnock’s email of 19 November 2020 was a threat to kill or have her killed, it was put to her in cross examination that she did not believe that the email was a genuine death threat, to which the Claimant replied that she never once asserted that it was a genuine death threat. This was inconsistent with what the Claimant had said during the grievance process, however the matter had only just come to light at that time and it is possible the Claimant was still processing what it meant at that time and how she felt about it – we did not draw a negative inference against the Claimant.

[321]The Claimant’s grievance was passed to Claire Hegarty one of the school Governors to investigate. The conduct of the grievance does not form the subject matter of this claim. Whilst there was a delay in sending the Claimant the outcome until January 2023, this was a particularly thorough investigation involving interviews with the Claimant, Mrs Sergides, Mr Turnock, and three staff members between July and December 2022.

[322]We noted that the grievance investigation expanded to address new matters raised by the Claimant in her interview, such as tutoring, her access to the server, and the shadow structure. Two matters were upheld regarding the application of the pay policy for staff generally, and the handling of the Claimant’s subject access request, neither of which are complaints before this Tribunal.

[323]Whereas the remainder of the complaints were not upheld Ms Hegarty identified instances of poor communication between the SLT and staff generally (as they did not always know why decisions had been taken), whilst noting that these matters occurred during the lockdown where there was a need to move quickly. Ms Hegarty also suggested a conflict of personalities and a power struggle between the Claimant and Mr Turnock arising after the start of Covid. The report identified that whereas the Claimant was very knowledge and supportive of her teaching colleagues, she was not cooperative in her working relationship with Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock.

[324]The Claimant appealed the grievance outcome which was heard on 13 July 2023. The Claimant was notified on 18 July 2023 that her appeal had been dismissed.

[325]During the hearing the Respondent brought to our attention the Claimant’s witness statement dated 18 September 2023. That statement was produced for the purposes of a previous preliminary hearing to determine whether the claim was in time and other related matters. Within that witness statement the Claimant said she did not initially realise she had a claim of racial discrimination because it can be challenging to recognise the subtle and systemic ways in which discrimination manifests itself. The Claimant said she only became aware the treatment she experienced may have been due to her race when speaking to an ex-senior colleague in October 2022. The Claimant said prior to this she was not aware that race may have been a factor in the treatment she received. The Claimant added that given she was not aware of the potential racial discrimination at the time it was not practically reasonable for her to submit her claim within three months of becoming aware of the information. The Claimant said this was a factor to be taken into account when considering whether her claim should be heard out of time.

[326]The Claimant was questioned about this statement before us because it is relevant to the issue of why she resigned when she did. We found the Claimant’s oral evidence to be contradictory and very difficult to follow as she was telling us she was well aware of what race discrimination is but she suggested she did not know what it meant in law or how to go about challenging it, for instance under the Equality Act 2010. It was put to the Claimant that she had been a trade union representative so she must have had some idea what race discrimination was and how to challenge it, however she said she knew what race discrimination was but she received limited initial training from the union and anything complex or of that nature would be dealt with by Mr Buttifint.

[327]Whereas that may have been the case, it was difficult to reconcile the Claimant’s witness statement to the Tribunal of 18 September 2023 saying that she did not recognise she had a claim for race discrimination until October 2022, whilst at the same time informing us that she had been discriminatorily constructively dismissed before then when she applied for voluntary redundancy months earlier in May 2022.

[328]Moreover, the Claimant’s draft grievance to Mr Buttifint made no mention of race discrimination. Mr Buttifint is, according to the Claimant, someone more experienced than her and the person who would deal with complex or discrimination claims, and yet he did not mention race discrimination either when the Claimant’s grievance was submitted in June 2022. Similarly, there is no mention of race discrimination either in the notes of the grievance interview. We also note that the Claimant emailed Mrs Sergides on 13 May 2022 and said she was applying for redundancy because her UPS role had been deleted. There was no mention of discrimination or any other reason in that correspondence.

[329]The Claimant’s resignation and grievance coincided with the retirement of Mrs Sergides and the announcement of Mr Turnock as her successor.

[330]The Claimant started a new role as a teacher the day after her employment ended and we have no evidence at all about when she applied for that role nor what she told her new employer about her reasons for leaving.

[331]Our difficulties on the discrepancy between the Claimant’s earlier witness statement and what she says now is also impacted because we were not persuaded by the Claimant’s evidence about her access to Mr Turnock’s iPad. We have therefore exercised caution with what the Claimant has told us about her reasons for resigning. There is too much discrepancy between what the Claimant is telling is now compared to what she told the Tribunal in 2023 when she claimed not to know she had been discriminated against until after her employment had ended. Submissions

[332]The parties provided closing submissions on 6 November 2025. The Tribunal received detailed written submissions extending to 81 pages from the Claimant and 26 pages from the Respondent, in addition to oral submissions. The parties delivered oral closing submissions for in the region of 45 minutes each.

[333]We have found both sets of submissions, both oral and written, to be full and helpful, and of a very high quality. The Tribunal has taken full account of all those submissions. We intend no disrespect to either party by not repeating them here as it is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to set them out in full, however, the Tribunal has considered them in their entirety and deals below with the points which are material to the determination of the issues.

[334]Sufficient time was provided to the parties for them to produce their submissions. On the evening of 6 November 2025 the Tribunal received by email an additional 22 pages of submissions from the Claimant. The Respondent objected to this and we have refused to accept them and our reasons are set out at Annex B below. No prejudice has been caused to the Claimant in doing so as the Tribunal has paid close attention to all of the evidence presented to us in the hearing, and we have provided full reasons for our findings of fact above, and our conclusions below.

[335]It is of course helpful to record a very brief overview of what we have received. The Respondent argues that that the Claimant’s claim should fail in relation to every element in that it says the Claimant did not resign in response to repudiatory conduct from the Respondent; the matters which the Claimant relies upon were not discriminatory nor serious enough singularly nor cumulatively to amount to serious breach of the implied term of trust and confidence; the Claimant’s conduct in the circumstances of her behaviour is only consistent with affirming the contract after the last act relied upon which is the discovery of Mr Turnock’s email of 19 November 2020 in May 2022.

[336]The Respondent acknowledges a difficult working relationship between the Claimant and Mr Turnock with clashes over various matters, and it says that what has emerged over the course of the hearing was Mr Turnock’s need to systematically plan and project manage in order to assimilate information in light of his dyslexia; and the Claimant’s tendency not to communicate, ignoring emails and agreed timescales, and then ambushing Mr Turnock with last minute information.

[337]The Respondent says that following HR advice the working relationship had resolved by November 2020, and the Claimant attended work and continued in her role as a trade union representative without further incident, and it refers us to one sentence in the Claimant’s grievance of 13 June 2022 where she said that these acts seem insignificant and perhaps a clash of personalities.

[338]The Respondent says the Claimant applied for voluntary redundancy on 14 May 2022 and she accepted a package calculated with reference to her continuous employment on 25 May 2022, and her resignation email (where she applied for voluntary redundancy) did not refer to any improper conduct.

[339]The Respondent says the Claimant did not undertake ACAS Early Conciliation with the Respondent at the same time as she did for Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock and when questioned on it she admitted to the Tribunal that she was not tying the end of her employment relationship to their behaviour. Accordingly, the Respondent says the redundancy package was the reason – and the only reason – for the Claimant’s resignation.

[340]The Respondent also argues that the Claimant having made a subject access request which she believed was incomplete, obtained Mr Turnock’s iPad, removed it from school, read the contents, and kept it at home without his knowledge or consent. The Respondent reminds us of the chronology whereby the Claimant waited a month after resigning before bringing her grievance using what she had obtained from Mr Turnocks’ iPad. The Respondent reminds us that at the time the Claimant was alleging that Mr Turnock was either threatening to kill or have a member of staff killed, whereas before us she accepted he had not made such a threat and further she stated before us “I never once asserted [it was] a genuine death threat.”

[341]The Respondent says the Claimant’s internal grievance was designed to bring down Mr Turnock upon hearing that he was to become Head Teacher upon the retirement of Mrs Sergides in 2022 as she gave evidence to us that kind of character/person should not be leading the school and she did not want him to stay.

[342]The Respondent says that once it became clear that it was not going to find the email had been a death threat, the Claimant spoke to colleagues and obtained documents from her whistleblower and then began to share and raise further matters in her grievance in order to have Mr Turnock removed on the basis of race discrimination. On this point the Respondent reminds us of the way the Claimant approached the issue of time before Employment Judge Michell where she explained in her witness statement that she only became aware the treatment experienced may have been due to race when speaking with an ex senior colleague in October 2022. The Respondent says that none of the allegations were a cause of the Claimant’s resignation and moreover various allegations could not have been as they were not raised within the grievance at the time of the Claimant’s employment.

[343]The Respondent says that the Claimant affirmed the contract before resigning, she continued to work after the events in 2020 without raising a grievance, she continued in her role as trade union representative, and whereas the Claimant says she accessed Mr Turnock’s email before resigning her resignation letter did not rely on his emails but only the availability of a redundancy package which was based upon her period of continuous service and was directly referrable to her continuing employment with the school, and further she worked longer than her contractual notice required.

[344]The Respondent says that whatever the Claimant’s unexpressed feelings and thoughts, her behaviour and continuing to work and receive pay and to then represent herself as an employee in order to obtain the financial package after the final act was known to her (Mr Turnock’s email of 19 November 2020), amounts to unequivocal affirmation of the contract of employment.

[345]Finally, the Respondent disputes that any of the acts relied upon were discriminatory.

[346]The Claimant in her submissions draws to our attention what she describes as 17 incidents which she says are not isolated but form a clear pattern of racialised scrutiny and exclusion. The Claimant says that the Respondent’s explanations are inconsistent and unsupported by evidence; her comparators were treated more favourably; and the language used about her was racially coded; and her treatment was based upon racialised assumptions. The Claimant invites us to find that race was a material factor in the treatment complained of.

[347]The Claimant repeats that her resignation via voluntary redundancy was a direct response to the breach of trust and confidence following her discovery in May 2022 of the email of 19 November 2020. The Claimant tells us that no credible explanation has been provided for Mr Turnock sending that email. The Claimant tell us that it was not a joke and she invites us to infer that it was a reflection of racial animus and a breach of trust and confidence.

[348]The Claimant says that white colleagues were not subjected to the same scrutiny, disciplinary action, or negative labelling that she was. The Claimant says that she was described as aggressive and confrontational for conduct that was tolerated or praised in others, by way of example Ms Hall was described as passionate about her class by Mrs Sergides.

[349]The Claimant provided numerous examples of what she says were inconsistent or changing explanations for her treatment. For example the Claimant says the Respondent’s repeated shifts from explanations such as safeguarding, to capability to personality or conduct are inconsistent and are sufficient to support an inference that the true reason for the treatment was discriminatory and to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent. We have addressed the numerous allegations of inconsistent explanations within the finding of fact section above.

[350]The Claimant argues that there were departures from the Respondent’s procedures or policies which were selectively or retrospectively applied to her, such as safeguarding or the use of email signatures. The Claimant also relies on particular instances such as the handling of her UPS application, the removal of remote access, and the end of tutoring, as evidence of misapplication of policies. The Claimant says that Mrs Sergides had a policy of speaking to staff in their first instance if there were concerns, whereas in her case this did not happen and issues were escalated prematurely. The Claimant says the departures from policy were targeting her.

[351]The Claimant says that particular words and phrases such as ambushing, lion’s den and kangaroo court, were used about her and not white colleagues and she invites us to infer that these terms reflected racialised perceptions and bias.

[352]The Claimant argues that a considerable number of key documents are missing, such as risk assessments, HR advice and contemporaneous emails, or these were disclosed late, and she invites us to draw adverse inferences that these documents would not have supported the Respondent’s case.

[353]The Claimant argues that the Respondent’s narrative evolved during proceedings, suggesting fabrication or reconstruction on its part, and she invites us to infer from this that the original actions were not based on legitimate concerns but on discriminatory motives.

[354]Finally the Claimant asks that the Tribunal views the incidents together rather than in isolation, and when viewed in that way she argues that the Tribunal should find that they support a finding of discriminatory constructive dismissal

Law

[355]We have been referred to a large number of authorities. We have taken them all into account, but it is neither necessary nor appropriate to refer to all of them in this judgment. We have cited only those authorities that we consider most relevant to the issues in dispute and to the legal principles we have applied. Burden of proof

[356]Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that if there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. However this does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

[357]Guidance on the application of the burden of proof in discrimination complaints was provided in Igen Ltd v Wong

[2005] IRLR 258

: “The revised Barton guidance 76. As this is the first time that the Barton guidance has been considered by this court, it may be helpful for us to set it out again in the form in which we approve it. In Webster Burton J (President) refers to criticisms made of its prolixity. Tempting though it is to rewrite the guidance in a shorter form, we think it better to resist that temptation in view of the fact that in practice the guidance appears to be offering practical help in a way which most employment tribunals and appeal tribunals find acceptable. What is set out in the annex to this judgment incorporates the amendments to which we have referred and other minor corrections. We have also omitted references to authorities. For example, the unreported case referred to in para (6) of the guidance may be difficult for employment tribunals to obtain. We repeat the warning that the guidance is only that and is not a substitute for the statutory language. Annex(1) Pursuant to section 63A of the 1975 Act, it is for the claimant who complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the employer has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part 2, or which, by virtue of section 41 or section 42 of the 1975 Act, is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as “such facts”.

(2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail.

(3) It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that “he or she would not have fitted in”.

(4) In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the tribunal will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal.

(5) It is important to note the word “could” in section 63A(2). At this stage the tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such *956 facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a tribunal is looking at the primary facts before it to see what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them.

(6) In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts.

(7) These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with section 74(2)(b) of the 1975 Act from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any other questions that fall within section 74(2) of the 1975 Act.

(8) Likewise, the tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant code of practice is relevant and, if so, take it into account in determining such facts pursuant to section 56A(10) of the 1975 Act. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant code of practice.

(9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the employer has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the employer.

(10) It is then for the employer to prove that he did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act.

(11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of [the protected characteristic], since no discrimination whatsoever is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.

(12) That requires a tribunal to assess not merely whether the respondent has proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that [the protected characteristic] was not a ground for the treatment in question.

(13) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof....”

[358]It is not sufficient for a claimant to merely to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude that the Respondent “could have” committed an unlawful act of discrimination. Rather a claimant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. As was held in Madarassy v Nomura International Plc

[2007] ICR 867

: “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.” [56]

[359]The court in Madarassy indicated that at the first stage the tribunal would need to consider all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint such as evidence as to whether the act complained of occurred at all; evidence as to the actual comparators relied on by the complainant to prove less favourable treatment; evidence as to whether the comparisons being made by the complainant were of like with like; and available evidence of the reasons for the differential treatment. The absence of an adequate explanation for differential treatment of the complainant is not relevant to whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination by the Respondent. The absence of an adequate explanation only becomes relevant if a prima facie case is proved by the complainant.

[360]The consideration of the tribunal then moves to the second stage whereby the burden is on the Respondent to prove that it has not committed an act of unlawful discrimination. The Respondent may prove this by an adequate non-discriminatory explanation of the treatment of the complainant. If it does not, the tribunal must uphold the discrimination claim.

[361]As regards the “something more” needed to shift the burden of proof onto a Respondent, this will depend upon the facts of each case but it may include evidence of stereotyping, statistical evidence, lack of transparency or inadequate disclosure, or inconsistent explanations. However, mere unreasonable treatment by an employer “casts no light whatsoever” as to the question of whether an employee has been treated unfavourably - Strathclyde Regional Council v Zafar

[1998] IRLR 36

. This has also been followed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Law Society and others v Bahl

[2003] IRLR 640

where it was held that mere unreasonableness is not enough as it tells us nothing about the grounds for acting in that way [94]. A similar decision was reached in Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Griffiths-Henry

[2006] IRLR 865

where it was held: “Plainly there cannot be a finding of sex or race discrimination every time an employer carries out a selection process unfairly to the detriment of someone who is black or female. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that there would be discrimination if one black woman were kept on and seven white males were dismissed provided the selection criteria were not fairly applied.” [26]

[362]Accordingly, something more than mere proof of less favourable treatment must be shown for a prima facie case of discrimination to be established for the burden of proof to shift to the Respondent employer to disprove such an inference of discrimination.

[363]It is open to a tribunal to draw an inference, including a negative one, where there is an unreasonable failure to answer a question or provide a document or an evasive approach – Dattani v Chief Constable of West Mercia Police

[2005] IRLR 327

. This may be sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the employer.

[364]Whereas a tribunal must, at the first stage, ignore any explanation provided by the employer for the treatment, the fact of inconsistent explanations (rather than the substance) may be sufficient in some cases to shift the burden – Birmingham City Council v Millwood

UKEAT/0564/11

. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that the burden will always or automatically shift in such circumstances.

[365]In Laing v Manchester City Council and others

[2006] IRLR 748

the EAT provided helpful guidance on the application of the burden of proof, and in particular the potential for a tribunal to move direct to the second stage where the evidence suggests that the employer had discriminated against the claimant: “75. The focus of the tribunal’s analysis must at all times be the question whether or not they can properly and fairly infer race discrimination. If they are satisfied that the reason given by the employer is a genuine one and does not disclose either conscious or unconscious racial discrimination, then that is the end of the matter. It is not improper for a tribunal to say, in effect, “there is a nice question as to whether or not the burden has shifted, but we are satisfied here that, even if it has, the employer has given a fully adequate explanation as to why he behaved as he did and it has nothing to do with race”.76. Whilst, as we have emphasised, it will usually be desirable for a tribunal to go through the two stages suggested in Igen, it is not necessarily an error of law to fail to do so. There is no purpose in compelling tribunals in every case to go through each stage. They are not answering an examination question, and nor should the purpose of the law be to set hurdles designed to trip them up. The reason for the two-stage approach is that there may be circumstances where it would be to the detriment of the employee if there were a prima facie case and no burden was placed on the employer, because they may be imposing a burden on the employee which he cannot fairly be expected to have discharged and which should evidentially have shifted to the employer. But where the tribunal has effectively acted at least on the assumption that the burden may have shifted, and has considered the explanation put forward by the employer, then there is no prejudice to the employee whatsoever.

77. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that it is not the employee who will be disadvantaged if the tribunal focuses only on the second stage. Rather the risk is to an employer who may be found not to have discharged a burden which the tribunal ought not to have placed on him in the first place. That is something which tribunals will have to bear in mind if they miss out the first stage. Moreover, if the employer’s evidence strongly suggests that he was in fact discriminating on grounds of race, that evidence could surely be relied on by the tribunal to reach a finding of discrimination even if the prima facie case had not been established. The tribunal cannot ignore damning evidence from the employer as to the explanation for his conduct simply because the employee has not raised a sufficiently strong case at the first stage. That would be to let form rule over substance.”

[366]The court in Brown v London Borough of Croydon and anor

[2007] ICR 909

, CA recognised that in some cases the issue of less favourable treatment is so intertwined with the “reason why” that a sequential analysis can give rise to needless problems and should be dispensed with, and a tribunal may therefore be entitled to go to the second stage and to focus on the reason for the treatment complained of.

[367]Similarly the Supreme Court has held that the burden of proof provisions require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination, but have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or another - Hewage v Grampian Health Board

[2012] IRLR 870

[32].

[368]However the EAT in Field v Pye Co Ltd & others

[2022] IRLR 948

restated the importance of applying the burden of proof provisions, noting that if a tribunal chooses to disapply them it should explain why, but it urged caution before doing so as significant evidence of discrimination should not be ignored – the danger of going straight to the reason why question risks ignoring evidence of discrimination. If the claim fails at the first stage because there is no evidence of discrimination which could have shifted the burden of proof, it remains open to a tribunal to state that it nevertheless accepted the employer’s explanation anyway.3 Direct race discrimination

[369]Section 13(1) Equality Act 2010, together with section 9 of that Act, 3 Pye [43]. provides that direct discrimination takes place where an employer treats an employee less favourably because of race than it treats (or would treat) others. Race includes national and ethnic origins.

[370]Section 39 of that Act provides that an employer must not discriminate against its employee by dismissing them or subjecting them to any other detriment. The term “detriment” should be given its broad ordinary meaning, and a detriment will exist if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to their detriment – Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah

[1980] QB 87

[371]It is often appropriate to first consider whether a claimant has in fact received less favourable treatment than an appropriate comparator, and then consider whether this less favourable treatment was because of the protected characteristic, in this case race. Under s. 23(1), when a comparison is made there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. A comparison may be made with an actual comparator, or with how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

[372]Given that a tribunal may take into account a wide range of factors including circumstantial evidence, there may be cases where there is someone who, whilst materially different to a claimant, may be of assistance as an evidential comparator. They may, depending upon the circumstances and in conjunction with other material, justify a tribunal drawing an inference that a claimant was treated less favourably than he or she would have been treated.

[373]The victim who complains of discrimination must satisfy the factfinding tribunal that, on a balance of probabilities, they have suffered discrimination falling within the statutory definition. This may be done by placing before the tribunal evidential material from which an inference can be drawn that the victim was treated less favourably than he or she would have been treated if he or she had not been a member of the protected class: - Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

. Moreover In some cases, particularly if there is only a hypothetical comparator relied upon, it may be appropriate to first consider the reason why the claimant was treated as they were [8].

[374]Comparators may constitute the aforementioned evidential material but they are no more than tools which may or may not justify the inference of discrimination on the prohibited grounds – Shamoon [109].

[375]Very little discrimination today is overt or deliberate, and those accused of discrimination are usually unlikely to accept that they have done so, and possibly will be unlikely to recognise it in themselves. Usually the grounds of the decision will have to be deduced, or inferred, from the surrounding circumstances. In order to justify such an inference the tribunal must first make findings of primary fact from which the inference may properly be drawn - Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] IRLR 572

. If the prohibited grounds had a significant influence on the outcome, then discrimination is made out.

[376]In cases of direct discrimination, an examination of the “reason why” someone was treated as they were should not be reduced to a simple “but for” question. It is therefore not appropriate to ask but for the protected characteristic (here it is race) would the Claimant have been treated better? Rather we must conduct a more rigorous inquiry into the mental processes of the Respondent to establish the underlying core reason for the treatment. This might be easier in cases where there is an overt or obvious reason for the treatment, however in other cases are more detailed analysis of the facts will be necessary.

[377]The tribunal must ensure that it looks at allegations of discrimination as a whole and it should not therefore adopt a fragmented approach – Qureshi v London Brough of Newham

[1991] IRLR 264

; Driskel v Peninsula Business Services Ltd [1999]

EAT/1120/98

[378]As per Sedley LJ in Anya v University of Oxford and another

[2001] ICR 847

: “The fragmented approach adopted by the Tribunal in this case would inevitably have the effect of diminishing any eloquence that the cumulative effect of the primary facts might have on the issue of racial grounds. The process of inference is itself a matter of applying common sense and judgment to the facts, and assessing the probabilities on the issue whether racial grounds were an effective cause of the acts complained of or were not. The assessment of the parties and their witnesses when they give evidence also form an important part of the process of inference. The Tribunal may find that the force of the primary facts is insufficient to justify an inference of racial grounds. It may find that any inference that it might have made is negated by a satisfactory explanation from the respondent of non−racial grounds of action or decision.” [9] And: “Very little direct discrimination is today overt or even deliberate. What King and Qureshi tell tribunals and courts to look for, in order to give effect to the legislation, are indicators from a time before or after the particular decision which may demonstrate that an ostensibly fair−minded decision was, or equally was not, affected by racial bias.” [11].

[379]The tribunal may therefore need to consider the mental processes of the alleged discriminator, and whereas this is often referred to as motivation, it is not to be confused with motive as this is not a relevant consideration. It is possible for an employer to discriminate unlawfully even with a benign motive – Amnesty International v Ahmed

UKEAT/0447/08

; James v Eastleigh Borough Council

[1990] ICR 554

, HL.

[380]In Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd [1980] 427 the court held: “It does not seem to us to be sufficient merely to consider whether the fact that the person is of a particular racial group within the definition of the statute is any part of the background, or is (as is said in other cases) a causa sine qua non of what happens. It seems to us that the question which has to be asked is whether the activating cause of what happens is that the employer has treated a person less favourably than others on racial grounds.”

[381]It is clear from the judgment of the court in Deman v Association of University Teachers

[2003] EWCA Civ 329

that a tribunal is required to keep in mind the possibility that the employer’s treatment of the employee could have been subconsciously (as opposed to consciously) motivated by the employee’s protected characteristic, here that is race.

[382]In Earl Shilton Town Council v Miller

[2023] IRLR 532

the court provided guidance on the approach to the reason why analysis in discrimination claims. Here HHJ Tayler noted that when considering whether treatment was due to a protected characteristic the tribunal spends much of its time considering the mental processes of the alleged discriminator in order to ascertain the reason why someone was treated as they were. However, the court held that there are at least two types of cases where it is unnecessary to consider the mental processes of the alleged discriminator, the first is where the reason was obvious, and the second is where a criterion is used which corresponds exactly with the protected characteristic.

[383]In Chattopadhyay v Headmaster of Holloway School

[1981] IRLR 487

the court noted the special nature of discrimination proceedings and that the person complaining of discrimination may face great difficulties when it comes to proof. The court held that where it may be appropriate to take into account evidence of hostility before and after the event (or act complained of) where it is logically probative of a relevant fact.

[384]Even where a Respondent’s explanation is not accepted by a tribunal, the tribunal’s own fact finding may identify an obvious reason for the treatment, including a non-discriminatory reason - Bahl v Law Society

[2004] IRLR 799

,4 the Employment Appeal Tribunal having previously held: “However, demonstrating the similar treatment of others of a different race or sex is clearly not the only way in which an employer who has acted unreasonably can rebut the finding of discrimination. Were it so, the employer could never do so where the situation he was dealing with was a novel one, as in this case. The inference may also be rebutted — and indeed this will, we suspect, be far more common — by the employer leading evidence of a genuine reason which is not discriminatory and which was the ground of his conduct. Employers will often have unjustified albeit genuine reasons for acting as they have. If these are accepted and show no discrimination, there is generally no basis for the inference of unlawful discrimination to be made. Even if they are not accepted, the tribunal’s own findings of fact may identify an obvious reason for the treatment in issue, other than a discriminatory reason.” [97]5

[385]Findings of discrimination or discriminatory intent are serious matters, and as such, care should be exercised before drawing such an inference, not least where there have been a number of interactions between the parties but only a small number are alleged to be tainted by discrimination. The Court of Appeal in Bahl observed that “It would be 4 Paragraph 101, endorsing the approach of the Employment Appeal Tribunal at paragraph 97 of that earlier judgment. 5 Law Society v Bahl

[2003] IRLR 640

astonishing for a person subconsciously motivated by discriminatory considerations only to act in a discriminatory fashion in such a haphazard way.” [127] Harassment related to race

[386]Section 40 provides that an employer must not harass an employee. Section 26 provides that a person(a) (A) harasses another

(b) (B) if it engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and the conduct has the purpose or effect of (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to, account must be taken of the perception of B; the other circumstances of the case; and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. This analysis is not required where the conduct had the purpose of violating B’s dignity or creating the proscribed environment.

[387]A similar causation test applies to harassment complaints as described above with respect to complaints of direct discrimination. The unwanted conduct must be shown to be related to the relevant protected characteristic.

[388]The Tribunal must address the issue of whether the conduct complained of was unwanted. Unwanted conduct means the same as unwelcome or uninvited, and specifically unwanted by the Claimant – Thomas Sanderson Blinds Ltd v English

UKEAT/0316/10

. A single incident may amount to unwanted conduct if it is sufficiently serious – Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby

[1990] IRLR 3

[389]The conduct complained of must be related to the protected characteristic. In Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust v Aslam

[2020] IRLR 495

it was held: “…Section 26 does not bite on conduct which, though it may be unwanted and have the proscribed purpose or effect, is not properly found for some identifiable reason also to have been related to the characteristic relied upon, as alleged, no matter how offensive or otherwise inappropriate the Tribunal may consider it to be.” [25]

[390]As regards whether the unwanted conduct is related to the protected characteristic (in this case race) it is appropriate for the tribunal to take into account the wider context and this is clear from Warby v Wunda Group Plc

[2012] UKEAT 0434/11

. The EHRC Code at paragraph 7.9 makes it clear that unwanted conduct related to a protected characteristic has a broad meaning in that the conduct does not have to be because of the protected characteristic. The recent case of Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire and another

[2024] EAT 169

provides that: “The requirement that the conduct be related to a protected characteristic is different to the requirement in a claim of direct discrimination that the treatment is because of a protected characteristic. The term “related to” is designed to cover all forms of conduct that, properly viewed, has a relationship to the protected characteristic.” [15] And “There is no requirement for a mental element equivalent to that in a claim of direct discrimination for conduct to be related to a protected characteristic. Treatment may be related to a protected characteristic where it is “because of” the protected characteristic, but that is not the only way conduct can be related to a protected characteristic, and there may be circumstances in which harassment occurs where the protected characteristic did not motivate the harasser.” [24]

[391]It is not necessary for harassment to be deliberate for it to be unlawful. If the unwanted conduct (related to the relevant protected characteristic) was deliberate and is shown to have had the purpose of violating a claimant’s dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for them, the definition of harassment is made out. There is then no need to consider the effect of the unwanted conduct.

[392]Where the conduct complained of was not deliberate, it may still constitute unlawful harassment. In such a case it will be necessary to decide whether the conduct has the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. In doing so it is necessary to consider the factors set out in section 26(4), which are the perception of the claimant; the other circumstances of the case; and whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have that affect.

[393]In Weeks v Newham College of Further Education

UKEAT/0630/11

it was held that a tribunal must be sensitive to all the circumstances; the fact that unwanted conduct was not itself directed at the Claimant is a relevant consideration but it does not prevent that conduct being harassment; the timing of an objection has an evidential importance, however caution is urged before placing too much weight upon timing as it may be very difficult for the victim personally, socially and, in particular, in some circumstances, culturally, to make any immediate complaint about it. The lack of an immediate complaint cannot prevent a complaint being justified, but it may be a factor the tribunal is entitled to consider. The fact that terms that are plainly related to a protected characteristic but which are used only once in a long period of time would not prevent (in an appropriate case, and with appropriate surrounding circumstances), such comments being found to have created the environment relied upon.

[394]In Weeks it was further held that in determining whether the unwanted conduct has created the proscribed effect, the tribunal must bear in mind that an environment is a state of affairs, but that could include one off incidents with effects of a longer duration.

[395]As to whether the conduct had the requisite effect, there are both subjective considerations – the Claimant’s perception of the impact on them – but also objective considerations including whether it was reasonable for it to have the effect on the particular claimant, the purpose of the remark, and all the surrounding context - Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Dhaliwal

[2009] ICR 724

. Conduct which is trivial or transitory is unlikely to be sufficient. In that case it was held: “A respondent should not be held liable merely because his conduct has had the effect of producing a proscribed consequence: it should be reasonable that that consequence has occurred. That…creates an objective standard … whether it was reasonable for a Claimant to have felt her dignity to be violated is quintessentially a matter for the factual assessment of the tribunal. It will be important for it to have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the context of the conduct in question. One question that may be material is whether it should reasonably have apparent whether the conduct was, or was not, intended to cause offence (or, more precisely, to produce the proscribed consequences): the same remark may have a very different weight if it was evidently innocently intended than if it was evidently intended to hurt …” [15]. and “…Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase…” [22].

[396]In HM Land Registry v Grant

[2011] EWCA Civ 769

it was held: “Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.” [47]

[397]Section 212 of the Act provides that a detriment does not include harassment. Accordingly it is not possible for impugned treatment to amount to both direct discrimination (or victimisation) and harassment at the same time. Discriminatory constructive dismissal

[398]The applicable law is found in section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 which provides that “for the purpose of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if .......the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct”.

[399]The leading case on constructive dismissal is Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp

1978 ICR 221

, CA. The employer’s conduct must give rise to a repudiatory breach of contract. In that case Lord Denning said “If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed.”

[400]There will be a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence where, looking “at the employer's conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such that its effect, judged reasonably and sensibly, is such that the employee cannot be expected to put-up' with it” - Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd

[1981] ICR 666

[401]In order for there to have been a repudiatory breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, there must have been no “reasonable and proper cause” for the employer’s actions: Hilton v Shiner

[2001] IRLR 727

[402]In Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

1997 IRLR 462

the House of Lords affirmed the implied term of trust and confidence as follows: “The employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee”.

[403]In Baldwin v Brighton and Hove City Council

2007 IRLR 232

the EAT had to consider whether for there to be a breach, the actions of the employer had to be calculated and likely to destroy the relationship of confidence and trust, or whether only one or other of these requirements needed to be satisfied. The view of the EAT was that the use of the word “and” by Lord Steyn in the passage quoted above from Malik, was an error of transcription and that the relevant test is satisfied if either of the requirements is met, so that it should be “calculated or likely”.

[404]As regards how the implied term of mutual trust and confidence may be breached, it was held in Croft v Consignia plc

[2002] IRLR 851

that “It is an unusual term in that it is only breached by acts or omissions which seriously damage or destroy the necessary trust and confidence. Both sides are expected to absorb lesser blows.” [69].

[405]In Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council

[2005] ICR 481

the court provided guidance on the concept of a “last straw.” Dyson LJ held: “The following basic propositions of law can be derived from the authorities. 1. The test for constructive dismissal is whether the employer's actions or conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment: Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp

[1978] ICR 221

. 2. It is an implied term of any contract of employment that the employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee: see, for example, Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

[1997] ICR 606

, 610 e– 611a (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead), 620 h– 622c (Lord Steyn). I shall refer to this as “the implied term of trust and confidence”. 3. Any breach of the implied term of trust and confidence will amount to a repudiation of the contract: see, for example, per Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd

[1981] ICR 666

, 672 a. The very essence of the breach of the implied term is that it is calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship. 4. The test of whether there has been a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is objective. As Lord Nicholls said in Mahmud , at p 610 h, the conduct relied on as constituting the breach must: “impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively , it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer” (emphasis added). 5. A relatively minor act may be sufficient to entitle the employee to resign and leave his employment if it is the last straw in a series of incidents. It is well put in Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law , para DI [480]: “Many of the constructive dismissal cases which arise from the undermining of trust and confidence will involve the employee leaving in response to a course of conduct carried on over a period of time. The particular incident which causes the employee to leave may in itself be insufficient to justify his taking that action, but when viewed against a background of such incidents it may be considered sufficient by the courts to warrant their treating the resignation as a constructive dismissal. It may be the ‘last straw’ which causes the employee to terminate a deteriorating relationship.”” [14]

[406]As to what might constitute a last straw specifically, it was held: “Although the final straw may be relatively insignificant, it must not be utterly trivial: the principle that the law is not concerned with very small things (more elegantly expressed in the maxim "de minimis non curat lex") is of general application.” [16].

[407]In Meikle v Nottinghamshire County Council

[2004] EWCA Civ 859

it was held that the employee’s resignation must be in response to the repudiatory act of the employer, however the fact that the employee also objected to other [non repudiatory] actions, this would not vitiate the acceptance of that repudiation. In other words, the resignation must be in response in at least in part to the fundamental breach of contract but it does not have to be the effective cause of the resignation.

[408]Subsequent authorities have followed the approach in Meikle, confirming that once a repudiatory breach has been established, provided that the breach played a part in their leaving, an employee will be able to complain of constructive dismissal – it does not therefore need to be the only reason for leaving – Abbycars (West Horndon) Ltd v Ford

UKEAT/0472/07

; Logan v Celyn House Ltd

UKEAT/0069/12

; and Wright v North Ayrshire Council

UKEAT/0017/13

[409]It was held in Weathersfield v Sargent

[1999] IRLR 94

that the reason for an employee’s resignation is a question of fact for the tribunal to determine, and there is no requirement for the employee to state their reason for leaving at that time, but there must nevertheless still be evidence that the employer’s breach was a factor in the employee’s decision to resign. A similar approach was followed in Nicholson (nee Woodhouse) v Hazel House Nursing Home Ltd

UKEAT/0241/15

although in that case the employee had provided other reasons for leaving so as not to harm their chances of a positive reference.

[410]In Mruke v Khan

[2018] EWCA Civ 280

the court held at paragraph 84 of that judgment that an inference could be made where the contract was so “egregiously performed” by the employer that it is obvious what the employee’s reasons for leaving were.

[411]In Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust

2018 IRLR 833

the Court of Appeal listed five questions that should be sufficient for the Tribunal to ask itself to determine whether an employee was constructively dismissed:a. What was the most recent act (or omission) on the part of the employer the employee says caused, or triggered, their resignation?

b. Has the employee affirmed the contract since that act?

c. If not, was that act (or omission) by itself a repudiatory breach of contract?

d. If not, was it nevertheless a part (applying the approach explained in Waltham Forest v Omilaju

[2004] EWCA Civ 1493

) of a course of conduct comprising several acts and omissions which, viewed cumulatively, amounted to a repudiatory breach of the implied term of trust and confidence? (If it was, there is no need for any separate consideration of a possible previous affirmation, because the effect of the final act is to revive the right to resign).

e. Did the employee resign in response (or partly in response) to that breach?

[412]In Hutchison v Scottish Ministers

UKEATS/0053/12/BI

it was held that whatever the claimant’s internal motives, her conduct in entering her employer’s voluntary exit scheme was only consistent with affirming the contract of employment because the scheme was only open to employees. Specifically the court held: “For the purposes of the ET hearing, it was accepted that the Respondent had acted in such a way as to entitle the Claimant to leave and make a claim for unfair dismissal. The Claimant could have done so, but she did not do so. Instead she affirmed the contract between herself and her employer by applying to take a voluntary exit package, which clearly was open only to employees. It was not open to the Claimant to enter the VES and at the same time claim that she had been constructively dismissed.” [14]

[413]Where an employee gives more notice than contractually required this may lead to a conclusion that they have affirmed the contract – Cockram v Air Products plc

[2014] ICR 1065

, however that does not always automatically follow and it will depend upon the circumstances of the case. In Cockram the fact that the employee gave seven months far in excess of the contractually required three months lead the finding of affirmation.

[414]Whereas delay may often lead to a finding of affirmation, this will depend upon the circumstances of the case. In Munchkins Restaurant Ltd and another v Karmazyn and others

UKEAT/0359/09

there had been considerable delay as the claimants had experienced intolerable conduct for many years before resigning, however it was relevant that these were migrant workers under financial and parental pressure who resigned swiftly once a manager left who had previously provided some form of equilibrium for them. The claimants had been compared to a battered wife who had put up with violence over a long time. In Leaney v Loughborough University

[2023] UKEAT 155

the court held that the delay was one factor of many, and whereas the academic claimant had delayed resigning until after the summer, it was relevant to consider the work being done over that period and the fact that it was hoped that negotiations over that period would have been fruitful.

[415]In Waltons and Morse v Dorrington

[1997] IRLR 488

the few weeks delay in resignation did not lead to a finding of affirmation as that time was spent looking for other work. In Post Office v Roberts

[1980] IRLR 347

it was held that a six week delay was not fatal whilst the employee’s trade union representative had investigated the position. In El- Hoshi v Pizza Express Restaurants Ltd

EAT/0857/03

the claimant had been an assistant manager who was forced to transfer to the kitchen to work. Whereas there was a delay of two months in resigning, this did not affirm the contract as the claimant had gone off sick and continued to protest about his treatment.

[416]In Abbey National v Robinson

EAT/43/99

the claimant had delayed resigning by almost a year however the court held it was the accumulation of the treatment culminating in a last straw, which entitled that claimant to resign and to claim constructive dismissal. The court held that it was the continued failure over so long a time to deal satisfactorily with the claimant as an employee, culminating in the last straw, whilst relatively trivial, but which eroded and finally undermined the trust and confidence with the employer. The court made it clear that “a breakdown of trust and confidence, justifying an employee treating the contract as repudiated by the employer’s conduct, may be established on the basis not only of a single event, but of a course of conduct over a period, at the end of which it is reasonable for the employee to leave and treat himself or herself as constructively dismissed.”

[417]In Meikle the Court of Appeal held that a constructive dismissal could amount to an act of discrimination even though it is the employee who terminates the contract by accepting the employer’s repudiatory breach: “... the courts should avoid attaching too much significance to form instead of substance. Whether there is a dismissal cannot depend on whether an employer says to an employee “get out” or alternatively drives him out. In the Derby case

[2001] ICR 8332

, after dealing with the arguments based on the history of the various statutes, the appeal tribunal said, at p840: “16...Whether the employer deliberately dismisses the employee on racial grounds or he so acts as to repudiate the contract by racially discriminatory conduct, which repudiation the employee accepts, the end result is the same, namely the loss of employment by the employee. Why should Parliament be taken to have distinguished between these two situations?”” [48]

[418]It is important to note that in Amnesty International v Ahmed

UKEAT/0447/08

the EAT noted that it does not automatically follow that unlawful discrimination is a breach of trust and confidence as the two tests are distinct.

[419]In Williams v Governing Body of Alderman Davies Church in Wales Primary School

[2020] IRLR 589

, by reference to Meikle (above) the EAT held that a constructive dismissal should be held to be discriminatory “if it is found that discriminatory conduct materially influenced the conduct that amounted to a repudiatory breach” (paragraph 89).

[420]In De Lacey v Wechseln Limited

[2021] IRLR 547

the EAT held: “..there can be cases in which the constructive dismissal is, overall, discriminatory, even though the last straw was not. The very essence of the “last straw” doctrine is that the last straw need not be something of major significance in itself. It need not even amount to a breach of contract, when looked at on its own. It need not have the same character as the other incidents that preceded it..” [71].

[421]The Court added that the significance of the last straw is that it tips things over the edge so that the entirety of the treatment suffered by the employee amounts to a repudiatory breach of contract, and that in a discriminatory constructive dismissal, time runs for the claim from the date of the acceptance of the repudiatory breach, not from the date or dates of the discriminatory events. Accordingly a discrimination claim arising out of a constructive dismissal may be in time even if the discriminatory events that render the dismissal discriminatory are themselves out of time [72].

[422]In Driscoll v V & P Global Limited and others

[2021] IRLR 891

the EAT confirmed that a where an employee resigns in response to a repudiatory conduct which constitutes or includes unlawful harassment, his or her constructive dismissal is itself capable of constituting “unwanted conduct” and hence an act of harassment contrary to ss 26 and 40 of the Equality Act 2010.

[423]Where a Claimant relies on discriminatory matters as the reason for their dismissal, these must sufficiently influenced the overall repudiatory breach so as to render the constructive dismissal discriminatory. This is clear from De Lacey where it was also held that: “Where there is a range of matters that, taken together, amount to a constructive dismissal, some of which matters consist of discrimination and some of which do not, the question is whether the discriminatory matters sufficiently influenced the overall repudiatory breach so as to render the constructive dismissal discriminatory. In other words, it is a matter of degree whether discriminatory contributing factors render the constructive dismissal discriminatory. Like so many legal tests which are a matter of fact and degree, this test may well be easier to set out than to apply. There will be cases in which the discriminatory events or incidents are so central to the overall repudiatory conduct as to make it obvious that the dismissal is discriminatory. On the other hand, there will no doubt be cases in which the discriminatory events or incidents, though contributing to the sequence of events that culminates in constructive dismissal, are so minor or peripheral as to make it obvious that the overall dismissal is not discriminatory. However, there will be other cases, not falling at either end of the spectrum, in which it is more difficult for an ET to decide whether, overall, the dismissal was discriminatory. It is a matter for the judgment of the ET on the facts of each case, and I do not think that it would be helpful, or even possible, for the EAT to give general prescriptive guidance for ETs on this issue.” [69] Statement of particulars

[424]Section1 Employment Rights Act imposes a duty on an employer to provide an employee with a written statement of employment particulars. The statement must be given no later than the commencement of employment and must include the principal terms of the employment such as the names of the parties, the date employment began, the job title or description, the rate and frequency of pay, hours of work, holiday entitlement, notice periods, place of work, and any relevant pension or disciplinary arrangements.

[425]Any change to those particulars must be confirmed to the employee in writing within one month. A failure to provide the statement does not in itself constitute a free standing cause of action.

[426]Where a claimant succeeds in a substantive claim, such as discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, and it is established that the respondent was in breach of the duty under section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 empowers the tribunal to make an additional award.

[427]The tribunal must, unless it considers it just and equitable not to do so, make an additional award of either two or four weeks’ pay. In determining whether the higher or lower amount is appropriate, the tribunal may take into account factors such as the length and seriousness of the default, the extent to which the absence of proper particulars may have contributed to uncertainty or misunderstanding in the employment relationship, and any mitigating steps taken by the employer.

Conclusions

[428]We set out below our conclusions with respect to each of the issues to be decided. Our approach has been to firstly determine whether the factual premise has been made out; secondly to decide whether the Claimant has proved facts from which we could conclude that she had been discriminated against, in which case the burden would shift to the Respondent to provide an explanation; thirdly we then determined whether the findings amount to either direct discrimination or harassment (noting that conduct cannot simultaneously constitute both direct discrimination and harassment in respect of the same act, although the same facts may give rise to distinct complaints); and finally, we have determined whether the act was a breach of contract; and if so, whether it caused the Claimant’s resignation either individually or cumulatively. We have also looked to see if there was a breach, whether the Claimant affirmed the contract.

[429]When dealing with the discrimination complaints, and specifically if there appears to have been less favourable treatment, we have looked to see what inferences can be drawn from all the surrounding circumstances, to see whether race was a significant influence (not necessarily the whole cause) of the treatment, so as to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent to then provide an explanation to us that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever due to race.

[430]We keep in mind the established guidance that it is rare to find evidence of direct discrimination as people will rarely admit it to themselves let alone to others that they have discriminated. We will therefore consider events before and after the acts complained of to see if there are any inferences which can be drawn to assist us in that task. In doing so we will ensure that our assessment of each issue is not a fragmented one which considers each complaint in isolation or in a compartmentalised fashion – our approach must be much wider and we will take into account all of the relevant circumstances. We have therefore considered the cumulative effect of the treatment complained of in our conclusions below.

[431]We remind ourselves that less favourable treatment involves a comparison in treatment – whether that is between the Claimant and an actual or a hypothetical comparator who does not share the relevant protected characteristic (here race). The situations of the Claimant and the comparator must be such there is no material difference between them. Where we find that someone is not an actual comparator we have kept in mind their value as an evidential comparator as their treatment may help us to show how the Respondent treated people in similar but not identical situations as this may help illuminate whether race was a factor in the treatment given to the Claimant. Comparators are useful evidential tools and ultimately we will be asking the question, if there was less favourable treatment of this claimant, was her race a factor in that treatment? Issue 3.2.1, 4.1.1, and 5.1.2 - On 21 March 2020, Theonitsa Sergides C’s headteacher, emailed a School WhatsApp group in the following terms: “blue class and white class will be used as classes for the children. Before Jenni left yesterday I texted her following enquiring about classes. Sarah A had asked if the teachers had been told first. Sarah for future information I do not have to ask anyone to use a classroom particularly under such difficult times. Thank you for wanting to know. However, I appreciate it is good manners and I did.” C compares her treatment to Jennifer Buckley.

[432]The factual premise of this allegation has been made out in that Mrs Sergides did make the comments on the WhatsApp Group.

[433]We have also found that Ms Buckley was an appropriate comparator as she was in a comparable situation to the Claimant but of a different race. Both teachers made comments on the WhatsApp group, and these comments were veiled criticisms of, or challenges to, the management decision to use the classrooms. Both teachers were suggesting a lack of prior consultation about the use of those classrooms.

[434]We have not however identified any less favourable treatment of the Claimant by Mrs Sergides in this exchange. Mrs Sergides corrected both Ms Buckley and the Claimant on that exchange. With respect to Ms Buckley, Mrs Sergides corrected her and said she had been texted about the issue before she left the day before. That corrected Ms Buckley’s assertion that she had not been consulted.

[435]With respect to the Claimant, Mrs Sergides also corrected her and told her that she (as Head Teacher) does not have to consult anyone about using a classroom, especially during the Pandemic, and she informed her that she had consulted as it was good manners.

[436]There was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant in comparison with Ms Buckley. Any difference in the response is because Mrs Sergides was referring to two separate comments. In the absence of any less favourable treatment it is unnecessary for us to consider what inferences might be drawn. We are clear that the Claimant’s race had no bearing at all on the response from Mrs Sergides. This allegation of direct discrimination therefore fails.

[437]As regards harassment, we were not persuaded that there was any unwanted conduct towards the Claimant. The Claimant chose to reply in the staff WhatsApp group and she received a reply in the same format. There was no more to it than that. The Claimant did not like to be corrected in front of her colleagues, however the Claimant chose to make her veiled criticism of management in that way, and it was therefore open to Mrs Sergides to reply in kind which she did. It was clear that Mrs Sergides found the Claimant’s message to be a challenge and her reply was to restate her authority as a Head Teacher reminding the Claimant, and the wider group, that she would decide how the rooms should be used.

[438]Nevertheless, even if this was unwanted conduct given the exchange was on an all staff WhatsApp group, it had absolutely no relationship or connection to race. We remind ourselves that the test for harassment is unwanted conduct related to race, as distinct from direct discrimination which is less favourable treatment because of race. The phrase “related to” is wide but it is not without limits and it requires that there be a demonstrable link between the conduct and the protected characteristic of race. Here there was no relationship to the Claimant’s race at all – the context and content of the exchange was purely managerial and we do not find that there was any connection with race.

[439]We do not therefore need to go on to consider the remainder of the legal test, save to note that there was no evidence that Mrs Sergides had the intention of creating the proscribed effect. We have looked carefully at what the Claimant said at the material time in the subsequent email exchange with Mrs Sergides, including her expressed fear for her psychological safety, however the Tribunal considered this to be a disproportionate response to the matter. Even if objectively the comment had the proscribed effect upon the Claimant, we did not find that it would have been reasonable for it to have had such an effect upon the Claimant as it was a brief exchange where the Head Teacher was simply asserting her authority and explaining she did not have to consult anyone over the use of classrooms, especially in the emergency situation of a Pandemic.

[440]We therefore find that there was no unwanted conduct, but even if it was, there was no relationship to race, and moreover it was not reasonable for the conduct to have had the proscribed effect. This allegation of harassment therefore fails.

[441]As regards a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the response from Mrs Sergides on the WhatsApp group falls very far below that threshold. As the court made clear in the case of Croft, the term is only breached by acts or omissions which seriously damage or destroy the necessary trust and confidence, and both sides are expected to absorb lesser blows. The comment of Mrs Sergides was one such lesser blow, and it was insufficient to breach that term. We find that this was not a breach of the implied term. Issue 3.2.2, 4.1.2, and 5.1.3 - By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains about an email conversation between Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides sent on 21 April 2020, which C says relates to “abusing my access to the school’s remote system and taking too much executive responsibility.” C says that Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides thereafter instructed R1 to remove C’s access. The email C relies upon contains the following conversation in which Andrew Turnock complained: “So as the plot thickens it appears some staff know about the remote access and some do not (Bea, for example, doesn’t know about it, me only because Gloria told me and yourself at least while Rick and Gloria are aware) Just to make things more awkward. This service is about to finish, which having had an email, Sarah is aware of to be replaced by freedom to roam.” Theonitsa Sergides responded, “This is exactly what I mean, Andy. Too much access and privileges. She has not been given by us. I am very worried about this behaviour and attitude.”

[442]We remind ourselves that the Claimant did not have sight of this email of 21 April 2020 until some time in Autumn 2022, which was after her employment ended.

[443]There are two aspects to this allegation. The first relates to concerns about who had remote access, and the second part concerns who was to have remote access going forward.

[444]The factual premise of the first part of the allegation has only been made out in part. We do not find that the Claimant was accused of abusing her access to the school’s remote system. As our findings of fact record, the expressed concern of Mrs Sergides and of Mr Turnock was the discovery that it was possible remotely access to the school files which they did not know about, they asked who knew about it, and they queried why the information was not shared, and they described this as the Claimant having too much access and privileges.

[445]As regards the second aspect which concerns the comment that future access would be limited to five users, whereas this proved to be incorrect as no one lost access, at the material time in April 2020 the decision was made that the Claimant would lose access as the new system (FreedomToRoam) only provided access for five users which would need to be limited the Head Teacher, the Associate Head Teacher, the SENCo and those working in safeguarding. The Claimant agreed with this rationale in her oral evidence, and as the documents indicate, Mr Jolley was told at the time he too would lose remote access.

[446]As to whether there was less favourable treatment of the Claimant (direct race discrimination), there is no actual comparator identified. A hypothetical comparator would be someone not of the Claimant’s race in the role of Computing Lead who had informed some staff of the ability of remote access to the school’s files. The question is whether they would have been treated better than the Claimant was? In answering that question we have looked at matters occurring before and after this incident to see if any inferences can be drawn.

[447]Prior to this time the parties had a good relationship. There was the issue over WhatsApp to which we have already referred which had nothing to do with race. There was also concern about the Claimant’s performance as Computing Lead on the part of Islington Council’s Computing Lead, Ms Potts, and she would go on later to provide unsolicited feedback about the Claimant. Race was not a factor in that treatment either. Going forwards, relations between the Claimant and Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock did deteriorate badly for a time.

[448]The Claimant was asked to share her Computing Lead role with Mr Turnock and in response she stood down. The Claimant was later issued with an informal warning about her conduct towards management after her angry response to the removal of a lock and flipcharts. There were disagreements with Mr Turnock about the conduct of trade union meetings following which he sought HR advice on how they should operate and he recorded on email he had had problems with the Claimant before. Following an incorrect attempt to get staff to come to management first with their issues, the Claimant saw this as an attempt to undermine her trade union role. HR stepped in and corrected Mr Turnock, following which he lashed out at HR and the Claimant referring to her as underhand and unprofessional, accusing her of seeking to ambush him at the meeting, and he wished to avoid a kangaroo court in future. There was a dispute whether the Claimant made an application for a pay rise in 2020 or whether it had been lost by the Respondent, following which Mr Turnock again lashed out and made an unprofessional comment on email about the Claimant – “shall we take a contract out?!”.

[449]There were further incidents around this time. The Claimant sought to become a staff governor at the school, and Mrs Sergides asked for advice on whether there was a conflict of interest. The Claimant was told by Mr Turnock that the Respondent was looking into email signatures as it did not wish to suggest a tie in with corporate entities which did not exist. Only two people were using such signatures, the Claimant who is black and Mrs Porter Tibbey who is white, but who had already asked for permission. The Respondent made a decision to end private tutoring after school, whereas this affected all staff the Claimant says it was done because she had started to tutor. Following a positive Covid case in a neighbouring classroom, Mr Turnock queried in an email with the Business Manager whether the Claimant was self isolating, no other staff were named in that email. Finally the Claimant asked to go on a professional development course which was refused, however others were also refused on the same grounds of cost.

[450]We recognise that there are a number of incidents from which we could draw inferences. We also recognise that the Claimant says she felt targeted and singled out, she felt that it was only her actions which were queried whereas white staff did not receive the same level of scrutiny. We observe that there was unprofessional behaviour on the part of Mr Turnock which we will address below, and he expressed himself poorly and allowed his emotions to get the better of him on email, not simply the 19 November 2020 about taking a contract out, but also in an undated email likely sent around 10 or 11 November 2020 to HR which we have found below to be hostile about the Claimant, although it was also expressing frustration at HR but to a lesser degree. We have found that exchange to have many triggers, including Mr Turnock’s then lack of understanding of trade union matters as well as being corrected by HR which he felt undermined him and made him feel powerless. Mr Turnock’s own neurodiversity also played a part in that exchange but also his attitude towards dealing with the Claimant who was an equally strong personality, someone who intended to hold management to account, and who would not willingly share information with management – whether that was on remote access to school files or setting the agenda for trade union meetings. It was evident the Claimant did not wish to work alongside management as she stood down as Computing Lead once she was asked to share the role with Mr Turnock for the good of the children during the Pandemic.

[451]For her part the Claimant also behaved unprofessionally on occasion – for instance the manner which the Claimant objected to the removal of a lock from her door and the removal of flipcharts, both of which were for health and safety and safeguarding reasons. When the Claimant challenged management about this at the time she went too far – she was annoyed and angry and told them even her own mother had to knock her bedroom door before entering, and she walked out of the meeting and later told Mr Turnock to communicate by email in future.

[452]The critical question for us, throughout all of this case, is what part (if any) did the Claimant’s race play in the way she was treated? The danger of dealing with each complaint in isolation, and adopting a fragmented approach, is that it risks missing surrounding evidence from which inferences might be drawn to fill in the gaps about people’s motivations and possibly also their subconscious motivations.

[453]The number of alleged incidents is a factor, however we have explored each allegation in detail. We have found that in many instances the factual premise of the allegations were not made out – things did not happen as alleged. By way of example it was alleged that Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock solicited negative feedback from Ms Potts. Ms Potts was called as the Claimant’s witness and in her written evidence she denied they asked for it. Mrs Porter Tibbey also appeared as the Claimant’s witness, and her evidence was that she did not think the Claimant wanted to work alongside management. We have found the Claimant’s UPS application was not lost, rather we found she did not submit it in the first place. With some of the incidents we did find that the factual premise were made out, and we explored these allegations in detail, noting a number of factors at play – ranging from poor communication, lack of understanding of trade union matters, working long hours and under pressure during a global Pandemic, as well as other reasons for why things happened as they did.

[454]It is for the Claimant to establish the primary facts from which we could draw inferences that her race was a factor (either conscious or subconscious) in the way she was treated. Having now read and heard all of the evidence, and having considered each of the allegations in isolation and altogether, the Claimant has not been able to persuade us this was the case. In each case where the factual premise was made out, it was clear either that there had not been less favourable treatment, or if there was, it was not due to the Claimant’s race – there were other non-race related explanations for the treatment.

[455]With that in mind we have not identified from the primary facts, the something more which could shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent to provide an explanation for the treatment as set out in the email of 21 April 2020, and we record for completeness that the Claimant has not established a prima facie case of direct discrimination.

[456]However, previous authorities such as Laing and Hewage make it clear that in some cases it may be permissible or appropriate to go to the second stage of the burden of proof and to simply ask the question why was this claimant treated as she was? In doing so we are mindful that we have not missed out any relevant facts or inferences that could have been drawn at the first stage. We have the benefit of the contemporaneous email of 21 April 2020; we have explored in a very long judgment all of the background to these matters; and we have a clear chronology of what happened in this case. We did not identify anything to suggest that the Claimant’s race was an issue in any of the treatment of her, but nevertheless we ask the question why did Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock record concerns about the Claimant’s access and privileges, and why did Mr Turnock record that the Claimant would lose her access to FreedomToRoam?

[457]We find that there were a number of reasons why that email of 21 April 2020 was sent. Firstly, Mr Turnock had discovered from Mr Jolley that staff could access their files remotely, and both he and Mrs Sergides were discussing how it was possible that they as senior leaders of the school did not know about it. Moreover, both were confused that some staff knew and others did not, and they arrived at the conclusion that the Claimant as Computing Lead had provided details to some people but not others. This lack of knowledge generated concerns about safeguarding and specifically who was accessing the school files. It was not alleged that the Claimant was the safeguarding concern. It is a matter of common sense that a Head Teacher would be concerned if they discovered it was possible for staff to gain remote access to school files which they hitherto had not known about.

[458]In addition, part of the reason for Mrs Sergides’ comments was her lack of familiarity with the systems and her mistaken view that the Claimant as Computing Lead could grant access to Seesaw – which we found to be incorrect as she was not the gatekeeper.

[459]As regards the second part of this allegation, there was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant as Mr Jolley was also informed that he would lose access. In the end no-one lost access to their files. The Claimant’s race played no part either of the two strands to this allegation and we dismiss the complaint of direct race discrimination.

[460]With respect to harassment, the email was not sent to the Claimant and it was not intended that she would ever see it, nevertheless she did see it much later in Autumn 2022 and it was about her. As a point of principle, we do not agree that an email about someone which was not sent to them and not intended they should see, is precluded from being unwanted conduct. There are a number of ways which such an email could come to the attention of the person who is the subject of that email, including perhaps most likely in a data subject access request. Looking at the contents of that email, it contains criticisms of the Claimant, these are things she does not agree with. The Claimant does not accept that she had too much access and too many privileges. In our view, the act of putting into writing comments about the Claimant which she disagrees with and which she would have a right to see (under the data protection legislation) was unwanted conduct, although we recognise that this is fact specific and each case must be judged on its own facts.

[461]Nevertheless, we do not find that this unwanted conduct related to race in any way – this was a management communication where concern was raised that senior managers did not know about the ability to remotely access school files. There was no connection with race anywhere within that exchange. In any event, we do not find that the email had the purpose of creating the proscribed effect as the email was not sent to the Claimant nor was there any intention that she would see the contents. Finally, as to whether it had the proscribed effect, there is both a subjective and an objective element. Whereas the Claimant found the email to be critical of her, we are not satisfied that she did in fact feel harassed (the subjective element) but even if she did it was not reasonable for it to have had that effect upon her (the objective element). By the time the email came to the Claimant’s attention it could not reasonably be said to have created an intimidating, hostile, degrading or offensive environment for her as she had already left the Respondent’s employment. We therefore dismiss this allegation of harassment.

[462]Finally, the email could not realistically have breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence as both Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock had reasonable excuse for discussing the issue of remote access in the way that they did, and trying to establish how some staff knew about it but they did not. Even if this was a breach of contract, the Claimant did not resign in response to that breach as she had resigned before it was even disclosed to her. Issue 3.2.3, 4.1.3, and 5.1.4 - On 11 July 2020 Rs released a new organizational structure in which two other members of staff were to lead computing along with C. C compares her treatment to Sandra Hall/Rose Graham.

[463]The factual premise of this complaint was made out only in part. Mr Turnock was appointed to lead computing with the Claimant, Ms Porter Tibbey was there to provide support only.

[464]As to whether this amounted to less favourable treatment, we find that it did not. The comparators relied upon by the Claimant were not appropriate actual comparators. Ms Hall was a member of the SLT and was tasked with providing support to the Deputy Head teacher, Ms Symes. Rose Graham was a PE teacher responsible for coordinating PE. Whereas PE was an important subject, the role of Computing Lead took on a much higher level of importance across the school not merely as a subject in itself but because of the move to remote learning which impacted how lessons were delivered across the school. The comparators relied upon were in materially different situations to the Claimant. We found no evidence of less favourable treatment and therefore the burden of proof did not pass to the Respondent to provide an explanation.

[465]However, even if the burden of proof had passed to the Respondent, there was an obvious non-discriminatory explanation which as we have already explained which was the move to remote learning which impacted how lessons were delivered across the school. Mrs Sergides wanted to ensure that a senior leader was involved in that move to remote learning, she appointed Mr Turnock to do so, and the Claimant agreed in her oral evidence that he was an appropriate choice to do so. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct race discrimination.

[466]As regards harassment related to race, whilst the Head Teacher was fully entitled to prepare a new organisation chart, we accept that the conduct was unwanted in so much as the Claimant valued her role as the sole Computing Lead, it was a role which she enjoyed and gave her a unique position in the school. We understand the Claimant did not wish to share this role and we therefore agree that this was unwanted conduct, notwithstanding that Mrs Sergides was fully entitled to act as she did.

[467]However, this decision had no relationship at all to the Claimant’s race. This was simply a reorganisation of the leadership of an important function within the school for the benefit of the pupils to ensure they could access lessons remotely. There was no relationship to or connection with race in that decision. We therefore dismiss the allegation on that basis, whilst also recording that we do not find that it was the purpose of the decision to have the proscribed effect. As to whether the conduct objectively had that effect, we recognise the Claimant was disappointed as she did not wish to share her role, however we do not find that subjectively she felt that her dignity had been violated, nor that it had created an intimidating, hostile, degrading or humiliating environment for her. Even if the conduct had that effect, we do not consider that objectively it would have been reasonable for it to have done so given this was a simple reorganisation resulting from the increase in prominence of remote learning during the global Pandemic.

[468]We also do not find that this was conduct which was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employer. This was an entirely reasonable management decision for the good of the children’s education. This was therefore not a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.4, 4.1.4, and 5.1.5 - By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C complains of being assigned in or around September 2020 a teaching assistant who she considered incompetent and was later transferred to another teacher following the intervention of SENCO. C compares her treatment to Sandra Hall/Rose Graham.

[469]The Claimant was not assigned an incompetent teaching assistant. At the very most there was consideration of who to allocate to the Claimant for new term in September 2020. The Claimant has confirmed her teaching assistant, Ms Cabey, was competent.

[470]We therefore dismiss the complaint of direct race discrimination and also harassment, and we find that there was no breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence as the factual premise of the complaint was not made out. Issue 3.2.5, 4.1.5, and 5.1.6 - In February 2020, C applied for upper pay scale, C alleges that the application was lost by the headteacher at that time/and or the school business manager at that time. C compares her treatment to James Mather and Jennifer Buckley.

[471]We have found within our findings of fact above that the Claimant did not submit that upper pay scale application in February 2020. Whereas the Claimant alleges that she has since been accused of fabricating that application, this is not correct. We do not find that the Claimant fabricated that application, at most we find that the Claimant intended to submit the application as indicated by the dates on the form which was when she was off sick, and she had most likely forgotten to submit it or has misremembered doing so.

[472]We therefore dismiss the complaint of direct race discrimination and also harassment, and we find that there was no breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, as the factual premise of this complaint has not been made out. Issue 3.2.6, 4.1.6, and 5.1.7 - On 11 September 2020, during a safeguarding inset day, Andrew Turnock instructed a caretaker to remove the locks to C’s classroom door citing health and safety (hypothetical comparator).

[473]The factual premise is made out, Mr Turnock did instruct the lock to be removed, and the Claimant has agreed with the need to remove the lock which was done for health and safety to ensure that children could not lock themselves in classrooms. Accordingly, we were not satisfied that the Claimant had suffered a detriment.

[474]Nevertheless, we have looked to establish if this was less favourable treatment. The Claimant originally relied upon a hypothetical comparator but also suggested that there was one other class with the same lock but she says that lock was not removed. A witness during the grievance process confirmed that the lock had been removed as they went to check during the grievance meeting, although they could not confirm when it happened. The Claimant’s evidence suggested she was unhappy with the lack of notice given to her.

[475]The Claimant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination here as we were not satisfied as a first step that there was any less favourable treatment of the Claimant with respect to the removal of the lock from her classroom door as the locks were removed from both classrooms.

[476]The Respondent argues that this was a trivial and transitory act totally unconnected with race, and we agree with that assessment. We find that the Claimant’s race had nothing whatsoever to do with that decision which was clearly motivated by the health and safety and safeguarding of the children, and there is no evidence from which we could have inferred that a classroom teacher not of the Claimant’s race would have been treated any differently or would have received more notice than the Claimant did.

[477]As regards harassment, and specifically whether this was unwanted conduct, we note that the Claimant received no notice of the work and she did not like the drilling. We are persuaded that this amounted to unwanted conduct solely on the basis that the Claimant would have liked more notice. However, this act (the lack of notice) had no relationship at all to race. It appears to the Tribunal that communication within the school at that busy time during the Pandemic could have been improved, however the Claimant’s race had absolutely nothing to do with the removal of the lock, nor the lack of advance notice to her, noting that this was done on an inset (training) day and not during her teaching. The Claimant was annoyed about the lack of notice and of the sound of the drilling, but we do not find that it had the purpose of creating the proscribed effect, moreover we consider that the Claimant’s expressed feelings about the incident now are disproportionate and she did not subjectively feel at the time that this violated her dignity, nor did it create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her. Even if it had done so, we find that objectively it would not have been reasonable for it to have had that effect. This was a simple maintenance job for the safety of the children, there was no more to it than that.

[478]We therefore dismiss the complaint of direct race discrimination and also harassment, and we find that there was no breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence – the Respondent had reasonable and proper cause to act as it did. Issue 3.2.7, 4.1.7, and 5.1.8 - By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says C was also told to remove flip-chart paper from her door panel on grounds of health and safety. C relies on Andrew Young as a comparator.

[479]Whereas the factual premise of this claim is made out, as the Claimant was told to remove the flip chart paper from the door on the basis of health and safety, we were not satisfied that the Claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination as we were not persuaded that she had been treated less favourably than her comparator, Mr Young.

[480]We accepted that covering up the glass panels on the doors to classrooms was a health and safety risk. Someone could open the door and not see a child on the other side. In addition, glass panels enable someone to see what is going on in the classroom on the other side, so there is also a safeguarding aspect to not covering up those panels.

[481]The Claimant did not make Mr Turnock aware in September 2020 that Mr Young, who was on a different floor to the Claimant, also had flip chart paper up. We accept that the Claimant took a photo of this flipchart paper, and we accept it is dated September 2020 but we do not find that the Claimant showed it to Mr Turnock. Mr Turnock did not know about Mr Young’s flipchart paper as he was not moving about the school at that time.

[482]The Claimant did make Mr Turnock aware in 2022 that there was flip chart paper up on Mr Young’s door, and thereupon Mr Turnock sent Mrs Sutton to tell Mr Young to take it down.

[483]There was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant and we dismiss this allegation of direct discrimination, noting that the Claimant’s race had nothing whatsoever to do with the instruction to remove flipchart paper from the glass panel of the door which was a health and safety and also a safeguarding risk.

[484]As regards the complaint of harassment related to race, we find that this was unwanted conduct on the basis that the Claimant did not wish to have her flipchart paper removed.

[485]However, this conduct had no relationship nor connection with race. The conduct was a direction to remove paper which was blocking sight into the classroom, and the direction had nothing to do with race. We would therefore dismiss the harassment complaint on that basis alone, however for completeness we record that we find that the conduct did not have the purpose of creating the proscribed effect. The purpose was to keep children safe. Whilst the Claimant was annoyed about this decision, we do not find that subjectively the conduct created the proscribed effect – we do not find that it violated the Claimant’s dignity, nor do we find that it created an intimidating, hostile, degrading or offensive environment for her either. That said, even if subjectively the direction from Mr Turnock had that effect on upon the Claimant, we do not consider that objectively it would have been reasonable for it to have done so given this was a reasonable management instruction for the safety of the children. The allegation of harassment therefore fails.

[486]As a reasonable management instruction, the direction to remove the flipchart paper from the Claimant’s door on grounds of health and safety and safeguarding, was not calculated nor likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. This was not a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.8, 4.1.8, and 5.1.9 - On 17 September 2020, Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides wrote to C to advise her that they did not find her conduct acceptable, and were concerned over her challenging behaviour over decisions made by Senior Leaders which have been taken for the safety of all. Andrew Turnock subsequently accused C of displaying aggressive behaviour. C relies on Sandra Hall and Jennifer Buckley as comparators.

[487]The factual premise of the complaint is made out in part. Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock wrote to the Claimant on 17 September 2020 and advised her that her conduct was unacceptable and it made reference to her challenging behaviour, this was in effect an informal warning about the way she had behaved. Mr Turnock did not at that time, nor subsequently, accuse the Claimant of being aggressive.

[488]As to whether this was less favourable treatment on grounds of her race, the Claimant has not established a prima facie case of less favourable treatment so as to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent.

[489]Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock both give a consistent account about the Claimant’s behaviour on 17 September and Mrs Sergides was clear that no one had ever behaved that way at work before. The Claimant had clearly been angry about the removal of the lock and the flipchart paper, she had gone to remonstrate with them and she had walked out of the meeting and told Mr Turnock that day to communicate in future on email.

[490]Whereas the Claimant has suggested that Ms Hall had raised her voice at work we were not satisfied based upon the evidence before us that she had behaved in the same or similar way to the Claimant on that occasion. Ms Hall was regarded as passionate about her class by Mrs Sergides which we took to mean she was forceful on their behalf, but it was clear from Mrs Sergides’ evidence that Ms Hall still conducted herself professionally in their dealings. We were not presented with evidence with respect to Ms Buckley, and we have found that neither were appropriate comparators. Nevertheless, we find that Ms Hall is of use to us as an evidential comparator and we do not dismiss her relevance out of hand.

[491]It is open to the Tribunal to construct a hypothetical comparator, which in this case would be a teacher who was not black who remonstrated with management about the removal of their lock and flipcharts, and who appeared angry, and who walked out of a meeting and told the Associate Head Teacher to communicate in writing. We can look to see what inferences we can draw from the conduct before, and the conduct after the event, to try and ascertain how they may have been treated.

[492]We have already addressed the issue of inferences earlier in this judgment at paragraphs 447-454. These are not repeated here save to record that we have not drawn any negative inferences for the reasons explained in those paragraphs. We have found no racial element to any of those matters either considered in isolation or in totality.

[493]We find that the use of a hypothetical comparator in circumstances such as this is not useful to us, not least because a bare difference in treatment would in any event have been insufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent, something more would have been needed.

[494]Consistent with Hewage and Laing, we have instead decided to go to the second stage of the burden of proof and simply asked the question why was the Claimant treated as she was? There is no prejudice to the Claimant in this approach as it assumes she has already satisfied the first stage of the burden of proof. The question is essentially did Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock form the view that the Claimant’s conduct was angry and challenging because of her race?

[495]We note the Claimant was unhappy about the removal of the lock and flipcharts and this caused the Claimant to speak to Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock in the first place. The Claimant does not dispute that there was a disagreement that day, and she does not deny telling Mr Turnock to communicate with her in writing or saying that this was tit for tat. We note the Claimant denied saying that even her own mother had to knock the door before entering, however we found she did say that.

[496]We have again taken into consideration conduct before this time, and afterwards, noting that there was some unfair and unprofessional behaviour from Mr Turnock, and quite clearly some venting of frustration, both of which we will address later. We have in mind the letter to staff about coming to SLT first with their issues which appeared to circumvent the Claimant as trade union representative; the email to HR in which Mr Turnock described the Claimant’s behaviour at their meeting as underhand and unprofessional, he described it as an ambush and he wished to avoid a kangaroo court. We have also in mind the unprofessional email of 19 November 2020 written about the Claimant. However, whilst there was some unfair and unprofessional conduct from Mr Turnock, we did not consider that the primary facts established were capable of supporting an inference that race was a factor in the treatment on those future occasions.

[497]An earlier draft of the letter to the Claimant prepared by Mrs Sergides included an allegation that the Claimant had been threatening. This was removed from the final version sent to the Claimant. We do not dismiss this out of hand. The word threatening is a strong word and it was at least considered by Mrs Sergides therefore it goes to her mindset even though she removed it from the final version.

[498]Mrs Sergides was clearly upset by the Claimant’s conduct that day, and her evidence was that no one had behaved that way before. We found that Mrs Sergides was taken aback by the Claimant’s behaviour, it was the first time it had happened and she appeared angry and would not listen to them. The word threatening is a strong word but we do not find that Mrs Sergides considered using it because of the Claimant’s race, rather we find that she was genuinely taken aback by the manner in which the Claimant expressed herself.

[499]The Tribunal was clear, having considered all of the relevant circumstances, including events before and after, and having considered all of the matters that the Claimant has asked to draw an inference from, that the reason for writing that letter, and the contents of that letter, were due to the Claimant’s conduct on that day and both Mrs Sergides and Mr Turnock were attempting, as the Respondent argues, to set professional boundaries with the Claimant. It was an informal warning to the Claimant that her behaviour was unacceptable and it should not be repeated.

[500]Having considered all of the facts, we were satisfied that the Claimant’s race played no part in the treatment of her. We would further add that Mrs Sergides’ description of Ms Hall as passionate, compared to her description of the Claimant as challenging, was because of the difference in the ways that both individuals conducted themselves. We are satisfied that anyone else who had behaved in the same way as the Claimant would also have been sent a similar informal warning. The Claimant’s race played no part in her treatment, and we dismiss the allegation of direct race discrimination.

[501]As regards harassment, we find that the letter to the Claimant was unwanted but it had no relationship or connection at all to the Claimant’s race. The descriptions used in that letter, such as the word “challenging” were not influenced by and had no relationship to the Claimant’s race. This was a management instruction to the Claimant to conduct herself professionally in future.

[502]Having found that the conduct was not related to race it is unnecessary to consider the remainder of the legal test, however for completeness we record that it was not the purpose in sending the letter to create the proscribed effect, it was as has been argued, an attempt to set professional boundaries. Whereas the Claimant was unhappy and upset to receive the letter, as she challenged it at the time, are not satisfied that subjectively she felt that her dignity had been violated, nor that it had created an intimidating, hostile, degrading or offensive environment for her. Nevertheless, even if the letter did subjectively have that effect upon the Claimant, we do not find that it would have been reasonable for it to have done so given the Claimant’s own conduct on the day in question. Anyone who behaved in a similar way might reasonably have expected to receive informal warning that their conduct was unacceptable. We dismiss the allegation of harassment.

[503]We further find that the Respondent had reasonable and proper cause to send the letter to the Claimant given her conduct. It was entirely reasonable to try to address that conduct informally, to try and nip things in the bud, and to restate professional boundaries. This was not calculated nor likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. This was not a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.9, 4.1.9, and 5.1.10 - On 17 September 2020 Theonitsa Sergides emailed R1 staff to “find out ways of preventing [C] from becoming a staff governor.” C compares her treatment to Sarah Marklew and Gloria Tofi

[504]The factual premise of this allegation has not been made out. Leaving aside that the Claimant made an error as to the year as the vacancy was in late 2021, and no email was sent by Mrs Sergides, the issue concerns a query from Mrs Sergides to Mr Holt as to whether there was any conflict of interest in the Claimant standing as school governor given her trade union role. This was simply a query, the response to which there was no conflict, the Claimant was permitted to stand but did not win that election.

[505]As to the act of making the query itself, the Claimant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination as the comparators relied upon were not appropriate actual comparators given their different roles. We have already addressed that in the findings section above, but in short summary the SENCo and the safeguarding lead are entirely different roles to the trade union representative. There is no useful comparison to be made with either of those people save that we note a similar question does not appear to have been asked about either of those people who wished to stand as governors.

[506]Leaving that aside, we have nevertheless asked ourselves the reason why this occurred. We have done so because of the need to avoid a fragmented approach to allegations of discrimination, we look to all of the circumstances in this case to see if some inference might be drawn as to the reasons for this query. We ask ourselves what factor (if any) did the Claimant’s race play in asking the question to HR?

[507]We have dealt with the matter of inferences at paragraphs 447-454 which are not repeated here. That exercise did not identify any racial aspect when considering the totality of the evidence in this case. We find that the reason for the treatment is clear. Mrs Sergides did not know if there was a conflict of interest as it had never come up before. What has emerged from our consideration of all the evidence, and which will be discussed below, is a lack of understanding within the senior management of the school at that time in 2020 and 2021 about the role of trade unions within the school.

[508]Had the burden of proof shifted to the Respondent we would have accepted that it has shown a non-discriminatory reason for the treatment, and that race had nothing whatsoever to do with the query to HR. The reason for the conduct was simply to get advice if there would be a potential conflict of interest in a trade union representative standing as a staff governor, this had nothing to do with race. We therefore dismiss this complaint of direct race discrimination.

[509]As regards harassment, whereas we find that this conduct was unwanted as the Claimant did not wish her decision to stand to be queried, however we find that the query had no relationship or connection at all to the Claimant’s race. Having found that the conduct was not related to race it is unnecessary to consider the remainder of the legal test, however for completeness, we record that it was not the purpose in making the query to create the proscribed effect – it was a simple management query to HR. We do not find that subjectively the query had the proscribed effect upon the Claimant, but even if it did, it was not objectively reasonable for it to have done so given this was a simple query and the Claimant was not prevented from standing in the election.

[510]We further find that Mrs Sergides had reasonable and proper cause to make the query, it was an entirely reasonable query. This was not calculated nor likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. This was not a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.10, 4.1.10, and 5.1.11 - On 8 October 2020 Andrew Turnock and Theonitsa Sergides “urged” the computing lead to “assert” C was not fulfilling her duties. Following which an external adviser Katy Potts confirmed C had not met her objectives for 2019-2020. C compares herself to James Mather and Jennifer Buckley.

[511]The factual premise of this complaint has not been made out. The feedback from Ms Potts, who was the Claimant’s witness, and upon whose evidence the Claimant asked us to place full weight, was that she was not asked to provide feedback on the Claimant’s performance, she did it of her own volition based upon her own interactions with the Claimant. We have explored in detail in the findings of fact above, why we have accepted that evidence. There was no urging to assert anything by Mrs Sergides or Mr Turnock. We record for completeness that this provision of feedback did not prejudice the Claimant as she subsequently went on to receive her upper pay scale later that year.

[512]Accordingly, as the factual premise of the allegation has not been made out, we dismiss this as an act of direct discrimination, harassment related to race, and also we record for completeness there was no breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Issue 3.2.11, 4.1.11, and 5.1.12 - On 9 November 2020 Andrew Turnock sent a message to staff advising them they must come to him, in order to circumvent C’s role as trade union representative. C compares herself to Sandra Hall.

[513]The factual premise of this complaint has been made out in part as Mr Turnock did write to staff and advised them to raise issues with management in the first instance. This had the effect of appearing to circumvent or diminish the Claimant’s role as trade union representative.

[514]We do not find that the Claimant has made out a prima facie case of discrimination as Ms Hall is not an appropriate actual comparator as it was established during the hearing that when Ms Hall was briefly a trade union representative she met with Mrs Sergides, not Mr Turnock. Ms Hall was therefore not in materially the same situation as the Claimant. Moreover, a bare difference in treatment, or unreasonable treatment alone, are not sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent to provide an explanation.

[515]However, in this case we again find it helpful to go to the second stage of the burden of proof to ask the reason why Mr Turnock behaved as he did. The reason why we have done that is because we do not consider that constructing a hypothetical comparator in this example would be of much assistance given that it was Mrs Sergides who met with Ms Hall, and it was Mr Turnock who met with the Claimant. Mr Turnock and the Claimant already had a difficult relationship, and we note the Claimant stood down as Computing Lead when asked to share with him, and the Claimant was given an informal warning after remonstrating with Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides in September 2020. A hypothetical comparator risks causing more confusion and compartmentalising the issue whereas the Tribunal needs to look at the overall picture of this relationship. We therefore ask the reason why that email was sent by Mr Turnock on 9 November 2020, and was it any way influenced by the Claimant’s race?

[516]We again rely on but do not repeat here our findings on the matter of inferences which is already set out at paragraphs 447-454 above. We did not find that looking at all the facts of this case in the entirety, that race was a factor consciously or subconsciously in the way in which the Claimant was treated.

[517]We consider that there was a combination of reasons for that email being sent by Mr Turnock on 9 November 2020. In the first instance Mr Turnock’s knowledge of trade union matters was poor, notwithstanding that he had been a trade union representative at some point. Mr Turnock accepts that this email was wrong and ought not to have been sent. The email from Mr Turnock to HR asking for advice on how the meetings should be conducted was indicative of someone who had little understanding and inadequate training and support. The advice from HR which was helpful but was limited and did not recognise Mr Turnock’s lack of knowledge. Mr Turnock’s lack of understanding about trade unions had nothing to do with race.

[518]Secondly, we accepted Mr Turnock’s evidence that staff would routinely come to him but stopped doing so when the Claimant was appointed. Mr Turnock found this frustrating and it is clear from his email to Ms Potts, and his subsequent email to HR, that he considered the Claimant to be a divisive figure as she was, in his view, pushing for strike action during the Pandemic. This had nothing to do with race.

[519]Thirdly, Mr Turnock and the Claimant already had the difficult relationship to which we have already referred and is not repeated here. Those difficulties, as we have explored had nothing to do with race.

[520]Fourthly, Mr Turnock found dealing with the Claimant on trade union matters to be very difficult. Mr Turnock’s approach was for advance notice of issues and careful planning of the agenda and meetings to take place in an informal setting, and he preferred a collegiate approach in a school he had hitherto described as being like a family. Mr Turnock’s approach was the opposite of the Claimant’s.

[521]The Claimant sought to set the agenda herself and when Mr Turnock resisted, the Claimant stopped engaging with it and instead kept the issues to herself until the meeting at which point she raised matters for which Mr Turnock felt unprepared. Mr Turnock felt ambushed in his words. The Claimant arranged the room herself into a formal setting and this was her intended approach to these meetings – they were to be formal with management held to account.

[522]The above created difficulties for Mr Turnock due to his neurodivergence. It caused him to feel uncomfortable and not in control. Moreover there was clearly a power struggle between Mr Turnock and the Claimant, both wishing to tell the other how these meetings would work. There had been prior difficulties in their previous relationship as Associate Head Teacher and Teacher, and now they were expected to work as management representative and trade union representative. Both parties are strong, confident, and highly intelligent people with fixed ideas on how things should be done. It was perhaps inevitable that this particular relationship would encounter difficulties early on.

[523]After a careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, not just limited to this issue but considering all of the issues together, we find that the Claimant’s race played no part whatsoever in Mr Turnock’s email to all staff on 9 November 2020. Mr Turnock accepts that his email to the staff was incorrect, and he is right to acknowledge that, and we find that it did cause the Claimant to feel that her role was being circumvented. However we find that the email was not sent because of the Claimant’s race. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct discrimination.

[524]As regards harassment, the email was clearly unwanted conduct. It effectively circumvented the Claimant’s trade union function, and this, like the Computing Lead role, was something which she enjoyed and which was important to her. However the email had no relationship or connection at all to the Claimant’s race, none of the language used, nor the surrounding circumstances, show any relationship to the Claimant’s race. The email did not mention the Claimant, it did not even mention the trade union, it was an email directing and encouraging staff to speak to management in the first instance. This did not relate to race.

[525]We would add for completeness that whereas we did not find that the conduct had the purpose of creating the proscribed effect, the Claimant was upset by this action as she has told us how she said it made her feel before the colleagues that she was someone who was not be trusted. On that basis we do find that subjectively it had the proscribed effect as the Claimant felt humiliated by it. That said we do not consider that it was objectively reasonable to for it to have violated the Claimant’s dignity nor created the proscribed environment because the Claimant raised it with Mr Buttifint who raised it with HR who swiftly issued the correction on email, therefore the Claimant would have known (and could have shown others) that staff were free to come to their trade union in the first instance. In any event the unwanted conduct was not related to race and therefore the harassment complaint fails.

[526]As regards breach of contract, it was not argued before us that the Claimant’s trade union activities should be viewed as separate to her employment contract. In any event we do not consider that this matter breached the Claimant’s contract of employment, it was obviously a clumsy error on the part of Mr Turnock due to his lack of knowledge, and it was very quickly remedied. We do not consider that it was serious enough to amount to conduct that was calculated or likely to seriously damage or destroy the necessary trust and confidence. Even if this had done so, the Claimant had long since affirmed the contract by not resigning for a further 18 months. Moreover, we do not find that this was part of the reason why the Claimant resigned in any event. The Claimant made no mention of this matter in her resignation email where she said her departure was due to deletion of the UPS post. Whereas an employee does not have to state a reason for resigning, where one is provided we would require considerable persuasion that was not the true reason for resigning. In this case, given the Claimant filed a grievance weeks later, we do not find that she was scared or unwilling to raise issues at that time. In any event the Claimant accepted a voluntary redundancy package which was only open to employees, and she therefore clearly considered herself an employee at that time. This complaint is therefore dismissed. Issue 3.2.12, 4.1.12, and 5.1.14 - On 11 October 2020 Andrew Turnock launched an investigation into C’s sign offs. C compares her treatment to Roz Porter Tibbey.

[527]The factual premise of this complaint is made out in part although the email was 10 November 2020 not 11 October 2020. The Claimant had ceased to be Computing Lead but kept this role on her email signature and she was asked to remove it. This an entirely reasonable management instruction and had nothing whatsoever to do with race.

[528]As regards the rest of the Claimant’s signature where she referenced Apple Teacher and Google Educator, it was Mrs Sergides who raised the issue and asked Mr Turnock to look into it. Contrary to the Respondent’s initial case that the Claimant did not hold the accreditations and refused to remove them, this was inaccurate and withdrawn as the error crept in through sloppy case preparation rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead us.

[529]The Claimant was not investigated but she was told by Mr Turnock that he was looking into the use of industry credentials as they may suggest some sort of approval or interest or tie in between that company and the school which does not exist.

[530]We do not find that the Claimant had established a prima facie case of discrimination as Mrs Porter Tibbey is not an appropriate comparator given that she did not have these credentials, rather her signature was “Newswise Teacher Champion”, she had been involved with that project, and she had asked to use that signature and permission had been given. The Claimant had not asked anyone and there was no similar project that she had been involved with. The Claimant was not asked to remove the signature and she continued to use it, and the Claimant told us that she did not even take this seriously.

[531]We remind ourselves that a bare difference in treatment is insufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the Respondent to provide an explanation. That said, as we have recorded, there are a number of allegations in this claim and we are mindful not to approach the claim in a fragmented way which could lose the eloquence of some of the evidence. We therefore ask the reason why this occurred, assuming for a moment that the burden of proof had in fact shifted to the Respondent. We take into account the matters in paragraphs 447-454 where we addressed the issue of inferences from the totality of the evidence in this case. We did not draw any inference from those matters that race was a conscious or a subconscious factor in the treatment of the Claimant.

[532]We were not persuaded that the comment about looking into signatures was motivated by the Claimant’s race. We accepted the Respondent’s reasons which were solely due to a concern that it may suggest the school was promoting the interests of a private company’s services. This was clear from an email from Mr Turnock to HR when he sought advice, it was an entirely plausible explanation and we accepted it. In doing so we have kept in mind the number of allegations in this claim and the very difficult relationship between the Claimant and Mr Turnock at that time. We queried the possibility of whether the email from Mr Turnock was in some way a retaliation against the Claimant because of their difficulties on trade union matters, however we understood from the evidence that this initial query had been instigated by Mrs Sergides not Mr Turnock who was essentially tasked with looking into it.

[533]No primary facts have been established which would cause us to infer that this had anything to do with the Claimant’s race. We therefore dismiss the complaint of direct discrimination.

[534]We were also not persuaded that this amounted to unwanted conduct for the purposes of a harassment complaint as Mr Turnock’s email was simply saying they are looking into the issue, the Claimant was not accused of having done anything wrong. Even if this was unwanted conduct, it had no relationship or connection to the Claimant’s race – the email was about referring to private companies on email signatures.

[535]In addition, have not found that the conduct was done with the intention of having the proscribed effect, it was a simple communication about the use of signatures on emails. In any event we find that the conduct did not have the proscribed effect on the Claimant as she told us in her oral evidence that she did not even take it seriously. We therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment.

[536]We do not find that the act of telling the Claimant that Mr Turnock was looking into the use of signatures was either calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. Mr Turnock had reasonable and proper cause for looking into the matter, and he informed the Claimant as he had reason to ask her to remove Computing Lead from her signature. This was therefore not a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.13, 4.1.13, and 5.1.14 - By her further particulars of 26 June 2023, C says on 18 October 2020 Andrew Turnock sent a “hostile email” to HR after the district union official had spoken to him about his message of 10 October 2020. C compares herself to Sandra Hall.

[537]The factual premise of this allegation has been made out and we have found that Mr Turnock’s email to HR was hostile although we do not have the correct date as this was a document taken from Mr Turnock’s email account without consent and is incomplete. We have found that the email must have been sent around 11 November 2020 as it references the discussion between Mr Buttifint and HR at that time. We have found the email to be hostile as alleged due to choice of language, describing the Claimant’s conduct as underhand and unprofessional, as well as Mr Turnock feeling ambushed by the Claimant and wishing for others to avoid a kangaroo court in future.

[538]We were not satisfied however that the Claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination as there is no evidence that her comparator, Ms Hall (who met with Mrs Sergides not Mr Turnock), ever conducted herself in the same manner as the Claimant – namely seeking to impose the agenda and then not engaging with discussions on it, and then bringing up matters with Mr Turnock without notice. Moreover, the Claimant had raised with Mr Buttifint the email from Mr Turnock of 10 November 2020 that staff should contact senior management first. This was raised with HR who effectively corrected Mr Turnock. The situations of Ms Hall and the Claimant were not materially similar and accordingly they are not appropriate comparators. We remind ourselves that a bare difference in treatment is insufficient to pass the burden of proof onto the Respondent, and moreover mere unreasonable treatment is not evidence of direct discrimination as it tells us nothing about the reasons for acting in that way. Something more would be needed to shift the burden to the Respondent, however given the number of complaints in this matter we have avoided a fragmented approach in our consideration of the issues.

[539]We could of course create a hypothetical comparator with a view to ascertaining how they would have been treated, taking into account whether we can draw any inferences from all the surrounding circumstances at paragraphs 447-454. For the reasons we have already given in this conclusions section of the judgment, we do not find the construction of a hypothetical comparator to be of use in circumstances such as these where there has been such a history between the Claimant and Mr Turnock.

[540]We have instead gone direct to the second stage, assuming that the Claimant has in fact set out a prima facie case of discrimination, and we have asked ourselves what is the reason for this treatment, and was the Claimant’s race an influence in the sending of this email and its contents?

[541]We find that the reason for sending this email was for similar reasons with respect to Issue 3.2.11, 4.1.11, and 5.1.12 which concerned Mr Turnock sending the email to all staff about coming to management first. We find that part of the undated email to HR was because of Mr Turnock’s lack of knowledge about conducting trade union meetings; it was also due to Mr Turnock’s frustrations with how the second meeting had gone, including not being able to agree an agenda with the Claimant and the fact she raised matters without notice to Mr Turnock which disrupted him due to his need to plan arising from his neurodiversity; and we also find that there was a power struggle between the two of them which Mr Turnock struggled to deal with.

[542]However we also find that a bigger part of the reason for that email, and the choice of some of the language was because Mr Turnock was quite obviously frustrated with the advice he had previously received from HR on how to conduct meetings, then having been corrected by HR on 11 November 2020 who were essentially saying his email was wrong. This was embarrassing for Mr Turnock and he was clearly venting about both the Claimant and HR in his email and expressing frustration that he felt powerless and of secondary importance as one of the school senior leaders.

[543]These were quite clearly the reasons for that email being sent, and the choice of language used, and we find that the Claimant’s race was not any factor in any way. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct race

[544]As regards harassment and whether this was unwanted conduct, we record the email was not sent to the Claimant, it was obtained without consent and it was not intended that she would have seen it. Nevertheless having seen it, and having seen that the comments made about her that she had acted in an underhand and unprofessional manner and engaged in an ambush, we find was unwanted conduct, as it was an email partly about her which went to the Respondent’s HR department who could have formed a negative view of her based upon it.

[545]However, there was no relationship or connection with the Claimant’s race. Whereas strong words were used in the email, such as underhand and unprofessional, ambush and kangaroo court, there was nothing in the email which related to race in any way.

[546]We do not find that the conduct had the purpose of creating the proscribed effect as it was not sent to the Claimant nor was it intended that she would see it. As regards whether it had that effect, we accept the subjectively it did. Once the Claimant saw the email by 13 June 2022 she was upset by the contents and felt distressed reading the comments which had been made about her, and she felt humiliated by what had been said to HR by Mr Turnock. Whereas we also find that it was reasonable for it to have had that effect (the objective element), nevertheless there was no connection at all with race, and we therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment.

[547]We do not that find that this influenced the Claimant’s resignation, because on her own account she received the email in Autumn 2022 from her whistleblower, after her employment ended, although as we have found she clearly knew about in June 2022 as she referenced it in her grievance. However, we are not satisfied that the Claimant knew about this email before the decision to resign due to inconsistency between what the Claimant is telling us now compared to what she was saying in June 2022. We have no evidence that the email was seen before the decision to resign was taken. In any event we did not consider that it was conduct that was calculated nor likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence. Firstly, it was not sent to the Claimant, and it was not intended that she would see it. Secondly it concerned the Claimant’s trade union function rather than her employment with the Respondent. Thirdly whereas the contents were hostile, Mr Turnock was raising a legitimate concern (in an inappropriate way) about the way in which meetings were being conducted with the Claimant not agreeing agenda items and then raising things at the meeting without prior notice. Mr Turnock’s expressed concern was that he felt powerless and he was in some way also critical of the support from HR. In any event this email was unlikely seen by the Claimant at the time, and therefore it was not a factor in her decision to resign. We dismiss that complaint as well. Issue 3.2.14, 4.1.14, and 5.1.15 - On 19 November 2020, Andrew Turnock sent an email to Theonitsa Sergides and asked whether he should take a contract out on C. C compares herself to James Mather, Jennifer Buckley.

[548]The factual premise of this allegation is made out in part. Mr Turnock sent an email late at night on 19 November 2020 in which he said “Shall we take a contract out?!”. Mr Turnock did not say “on her” and he did not mention the Claimant, rather the subject line referred to an email from someone about pay progression. The email was clearly about the Claimant who had been emailing at that time about pay progression. It was also established within the internal grievance that it was about the Claimant.

[549]This was not a death threat, nor was it a threat to have the Claimant killed. The email was a throwaway remark, an ill-judged attempt at humour, it was not a serious threat, nor was it intended that the Claimant would ever see it. It was obtained in the circumstances we have already described. Mr Turnock has not denied sending it, he says he does not know why he sent it, and he accepts that it was unprofessional and inappropriate. He is right to do so, and the Respondent came to the same conclusion in the grievance process.

[550]The contents of the email were very surprising, not least given the very senior position held by Mr Turnock in the school at the time – the second most senior leader. It was however, the one and only remark of this specific nature from Mr Turnock that has been presented to us, it was not repeated, and by the time the Claimant accessed Mr Turnock’s iPad and looked through his emails, it was 18 months old. Nothing had happened in the intervening period – the inference we draw is that things settled down in their difficult relationship after November 2020 and they worked together collegiately and professionally.

[551]We have considered whether this email was less favourable treatment of the Claimant on grounds of her race. We were not satisfied that Ms Buckley or Mr Mather were appropriate comparators. With respect to Ms Buckley her application for UPS was made years earlier. With respect Mr Mather (and also Ms Buckley) it is accurate that Mr Turnock did not make a similar comment about either of them, however neither of them had the troubled relationship that the Claimant and Mr Turnock did.

[552]Further we saw no evidence that either of them had been emailing or chasing up their UPS applications. Only Mr Mather made his application around the same time as the Claimant, which was during the Pandemic which was an incredibly busy period whereby the senior management were still working on pay issues at 10:30pm or later.

[553]Neither Ms Buckley nor Mr Mather had been in materially similar circumstances to the Claimant, therefore they are not of assistance to us as comparators, but they are of evidential assistance generally as to how they were treated as white teachers and without the difficult management relationship.

[554]As we have explained a number of times in this judgment, we do not consider that constructing a hypothetical comparator for this issue would assist us. There are too many variables and nuances in this relationship – the Claimant was also the trade union representative and that relationship got off to a very difficult start with disputes over the agenda and the conduct of the second meeting. With respect to the employment relationship, there were the issues over flipcharts and the lock on the door culminating in an informal warning about the Claimant’s conduct, and going back further in time the Claimant stood down as Computing Lead when Mr Turnock was appointed to share the role with her. Constructing a hypothetical comparator here would risk diminishing some of the eloquence of the evidence as we have indicated before.

[555]We therefore go to the second stage of the burden of proof which presupposes that the Claimant has satisfied the first stage. We simply ask the question why did this happen, and what part (if any) did the Claimant’s race play in the decision to send this email?

[556]We have no explanation from Mr Turnock. He does not remember sending it and therefore cannot tell us why, but he does not dispute sending it. The lack of explanation does not of itself automatically mean that someone is dishonest, nor does it automatically follow in the absence of an explanation that the answer must be that it was due to race. The lack of explanation is one factor of many. At this stage we consider whether we can draw any inferences from the totality of the evidence in this case and this has already been addressed and referred to many times at paragraphs 447-454. As we have already discussed, the totality of the evidence did not suggest that race had been a conscious nor a subconscious factor in the other treatment of the Claimant.

[557]The case of Bahl is clear that it is open the Tribunal to make its own mind up as to the reason(s) for the treatment arising out of its own fact finding. We are in a position to do so.

[558]It is our conclusion that the reason for sending that email was due to frustration on the part of Mr Turnock dealing with queries about the Claimant’s pay in the context of their already incredibly difficult working relationship, including what we have already identified as a power struggle between the two of them. Mr Turnock had recently been corrected by HR about his all staff email and he was unhappy that the Claimant had been correct and he had been wrong. It would have appeared that the Claimant had won that particular argument between them.

[559]We recorded Mr Turnock’s feelings of being powerless in that relationship and that he felt that he was of secondary importance. We know that he felt ambushed by the Claimant as she did not agree an agenda with him but asked him questions on the spot. We know that the second trade union meeting between the two of them went badly. The layout of the room was off putting for Mr Turnock and it put him to some disadvantage due to his neurodiversity.

[560]We also know going back further there had been earlier difficulties in that relationship going back to the reorganisation of the Computing Lead role and then disagreements about the removal of the lock and the flipcharts, culminating in the claimants informal warning about her conduct towards Mr Turnock and Mrs Sergides.

[561]We know that Mr Turnock’s neurodiversity has influenced to some degree, the manner of his communication, and he has on occasion expressed himself in ways which are emotive and intemperate. Whereas we accept that this may be explained in part by Mr Turnock’s neurodiversity, we also felt that it was also due to who he is as a person and that was part of his personality to express himself in this way. As a senior leader within a school one might have expected Mr Turnock to have shown more restraint in his language, particularly when putting it in writing as one has time to stop and think before pressing send - we have in mind not merely this email but also the undated email to HR which we have described above as hostile.

[562]At that particular time, the email was sent when Mr Turnock was working very late at night during the Pandemic which would have been a difficult period for the school. We further know that at this time Mr Turnock had some involvement in pay discussions within the school, noting the prospect of a restructure due to budgetary issues, however Mr Turnock had indicated around that time it would not be appropriate to ask those who had applied for pay progression to withdraw their applications.

[563]It is abundantly clear that the email was unprofessional and inappropriate, and it was ill judged and in poor taste. However, we were not satisfied, considering the totality of the evidence in this case, not withstanding the lack of explanation from Mr Turnock, that the Claimant’s race played any part at all in the reason for sending it. It is our finding that it was a combination of the difficult relationship between the Claimant and Mr Turnock (uninfluenced by race), the pressure which Mr Turnock was under at that time including dealing with pay queries late at night, and in smaller way due to Mr Turnock’s neurodiversity causing him to express himself in an inappropriate intemperate way. We were satisfied that the Claimant’s race played no part at all, either conscious or subconscious, in the decision to send the email. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct

[564]As regards harassment, we noted that the email was sent to Mrs Sergides in private and it was not intended that the Claimant would ever see it. However, the Claimant did see it, albeit by improper means, and the email which did not name her was nevertheless still about her. As we have indicated already, we do not agree that an email about someone which is not sent to them, but which they later read, cannot amount to unwanted conduct. This is because there are a number of ways in which an email may fall into the hands of the person it is about. The fact that someone has behaved improperly in obtaining the email, does not in our view, automatically preclude the contents of the email from amounting to unwanted conduct. In this case we find that the comment from Mr Turnock was unwanted conduct – quite clearly had it been said to the Claimant’s face or emailed to her direct the words used would have been unwanted conduct. This email is something which the Claimant could in theory have obtained legitimately under a subject access request, had she not gone looking through Mr Turnock’s emails, and as such, we find the contents of that email were unwanted conduct. However, there was no relationship or connection between that email and the Claimant’s race. The comment was not made about the Claimant’s race, there was no reference to race and nothing which might suggest any relationship to race. The harassment complaint therefore fails on the basis of not being unwanted conduct related to race.

[565]For completeness we record that the conduct did not have the purpose of creating the proscribed environment as the Claimant was never intended to read it. As regards whether it had that effect, we note that it was not intended to be taken seriously and it was a poor attempt at a joke, but nevertheless we find that it violated the Claimant’s dignity – the Claimant was shocked and upset by the contents, and whereas it would have been clear it was not intended to be taken seriously, it was nevertheless upsetting for her to read.

[566]We also find that it was reasonable for it to have had that effect, and whereas we found some of the Claimant’s reaction to some of the matters in this case to be disproportionate, it was reasonable for this particular email to have had that effect upon the Claimant, we find it did violate her dignity to be spoken about in such unprofessional terms by a senior leader to another senior leader, notwithstanding its isolated and historic nature. Nevertheless, the complaint of harassment fails because whilst it was unwanted conduct, it was not related to race.

[567]As regards whether this was a breach of the implied term, and whether it was calculated or likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence, we find that by the time the Claimant had read it in May 2022 it would not have done do so. The Claimant was upset at what she had discovered by going through Mr Turnock’s private emails, but it was also clear it was a joke albeit a very poor one, it was not intended to be taken seriously, it was historic and nothing had happened in the interim. We find that email damaged mutual trust and confidence, but it was not sufficiently serious to have seriously damaged or destroyed it – either in isolation or in conjunction with the other matters in this case. The Claimant did not mention this email in her resignation, and whilst that is a factor, it is not determinative in our considerations. The fact that it was historic and isolated were factors which weighed heavily in our consideration of whether this email destroyed trust and confidence - we find it damaged it but not to a sufficiently serious extent.

[568]In addition, and as we have already found, this was not the reason nor a reason in conjunction with others for the Claimant’s resignation. The resignation was due to the Claimant’s wish to make use of voluntary redundancy which was the only reason for her departure. We therefore dismiss this complaint. Issue 3.2.15, 4.1.15, and 5.1.16 - On 22 November 2020, Andrew Turnock emailed a bursar to check whether C was self-isolating. C compares her treatment to Rose Graham, Karen Livingstone, Lauryn Cabey and E;

[569]The factual premise of the allegation is made out as Mr Turnock emailed KM about a number of issues and recorded that they needed to check if the Claimant was actually isolating. However, the Claimant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination which would involve less favourable treatment on grounds of race. The evidence falls far short of that.

[570]Whereas the email related to the Claimant not the comparators relied upon, Ms Graham Ms Livingstone and E were in the same class as the infected child, therefore they were not appropriate comparators as there would have been no doubt about their need to isolate. The Claimant was not in school at the time as she was on training, and it has not been suggested to us that Ms Cabey was also absent, rather we understand she was likely in school. As such Ms Cabey would also not have been an appropriate comparator as Mr Turnock would have known where she was.

[571]We are not therefore satisfied that the Claimant has established a prima facie case of direct discrimination, there is no evidence that she has been treated less favourably on grounds of race and the burden of proof has not shifted to the Respondent to provide an explanation.

[572]That said, even if the burden had shifted, we would have accepted the Respondent’s explanation that the Claimant was out of school, she was not part of that class and its understanding was that adults who were not in the same class as the infected child could make their own minds up whether to isolate or not. The email was sent late on a Sunday evening and Mr Turnock was simply asking if the Claimant was going to be isolating that week or not as he was required to report on it. There was no more to the query than that, it was in no sense whatsoever connected with race. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct discrimination.

[573]As regards harassment, we understand that this was allegedly one of the emails taken off of Mr Turnock’s email and passed to the Claimant by a whistleblower. Leaving that aside, the Claimant was not a party to this email, it was not intended that she would have seen it, moreover this could not reasonably be regarded as unwanted conduct, it was a simple query so that Mr Turnock would know which teachers were isolating as he needed to report on it. In addition there was no connection with the Claimant’s race, the purpose was clearly not intended to have the proscribed effect, and whereas the Claimant describes feelings of being targeted and misbelieved, we do not consider that subjectively this had the proscribed effect on her, nor that it would have been objectively reasonable for it to have done so either. We dismiss the complaint of harassment.

[574]Whereas the Claimant says she was disclosed this email in Autumn 2022, it was referenced in her grievance of 13 June 2022 so she at least knew about it by then, but this was still after her resignation. Even if the Claimant had known about this earlier, and prior to her decision to resign, we find that this was neither calculated nor likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence, either in isolation nor cumulatively with the other matters in this case. This was a trivial routine query and nothing more. We dismiss the complaint of a breach of contract. Issue 3.2.16, 4.1.16, and 5.1.17 - In June 2021, Theonitsa Sergides and Andrew Turnock announced the end of tutoring by teachers. C believes this was done because C had started tutoring.

[575]The factual premise of the allegation is made out in part. Whereas the decision was made to end tutoring, it was a decision made by Mrs Sergides in conjunction with the Chair of Governors. Mr Turncock was consulted and had some involvement, but it was not strictly his decision albeit the communication was on behalf of the senior leaders.

[576]The complaint is misconceived as a complaint of direct race discrimination as it impacted all staff irrespective of race. Whereas the Claimant may feel the decision was unfair, it cannot amount to less favourable treatment where everyone is treated the same. In any event the reason had nothing whatsoever to do with race, it was primarily about safeguarding the children and ensuring they were accounted for and not left unattended. We dismiss the complaint of direct race discrimination.

[577]As regards harassment, the conduct was unwanted as the Claimant wished to provide tutoring and that was refused, however there was no connection or relationship to race. Moreover, the purpose of the decision was not to create the proscribed environment, the reason for the decision was as we have already found – was based upon safeguarding concerns and to ensure that children were not left unattended. There were other concerns but the main concern was safeguarding. We do not find that this had the subjective effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity, nor creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading or offensive environment for her as she knew why the decision had been taken and that it affected all staff. Even if it did have that effect, it would not have been objectively reasonable for it to have done so for the same reason – the Claimant would have known this was done for the purpose of safeguarding children in the first instance. We therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment related to race.

[578]As regards whether this was a breach of the implied term, we do not find that the decision was calculated or likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence. This was an entirely legitimate management decision taken for the benefits of the children, and it was not targeted at the Claimant. We find that this was not a breach of contract and the Claimant did not resign in response to this either in isolation or in conjunction with the other matters to which we have referred. We dismiss this complaint. Issue 3.2.17, 4.1.7, and 5.1.18 - I asked my HT if I could be put onto the NPQSL training course. Many other members of staff have been permitted to go on training. The HT refused before looking into it to see what commitment it would entail and once I questioned why she had done this, she then looked into the requirements of the course and rejected it on this basis.

[579]The allegation was essentially that the Claimant’s application to go on the NPQSL course was dismissed out of hand without giving it consideration. It is not disputed that nobody went on the course at that time. The complaint is not about the refusal of attendance on the course, it is about the way the Claimant’s request was handled.

[580]The Claimant has not established a prima facie case of less favourable treatment on grounds of race. This is because the factual premise of the complaint has not been made out. Mrs Sergides did not dismiss the Claimant’s application without looking into it. Mrs Sergides agreed to consider the application, which she then did by reviewing the course requirements and discussing it with HR. Mrs Sergides indicated to the Claimant her concerns about the cost of freeing up the Claimant and she gave an indication that it may not be granted, but she did not reject it without giving it consideration.

[581]The Claimant was subsequently informed that her attendance on the course could not be supported, and this was the same for the other people who initially expressed an interest in the course. There was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant, as such the burden of proof has not passed to the Respondent to provide an explanation. We dismiss the complaint of direct discrimination on grounds of race.

[582]As regards harassment related to race, we are not satisfied that there was in fact unwanted conduct. The refusal of an application could amount to unwanted conduct, however in this case the complaint is about the manner in which the request was handled. We have already found the factual premise of the complaint has not been made out. The Claimant’s request was not dismissed out of hand by Mrs Sergides and on that basis alone the harassment complaint would have failed given there was no unwanted conduct. Leaving aside the issue of whether this was unwanted conduct or not, the treatment in question had absolutely no relationship nor connection with race, and the complaint would inevitably have failed for that reason alone.

[583]As the factual premise of the allegation has not been made out it is not necessary for us to consider in any detail whether the conduct alleged either had the purpose of creating the proscribed environment, nor whether it was reasonable for it to have had that effect. However we record for the sake of completeness that the manner in which Mrs Sergides dealt with the Claimant’s application was open and transparent, it was not intended to create the proscribed environment and it could not reasonably have had that effect either as she simply agreed to look into the application but cautioned the Claimant that it might not be approved due to the financial constraints which existed at the school at that time, we therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment.

[584]Finally, as regards whether this was calculated or likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust in confidence, we find that it was not any of those things. The Claimant’s application was given due consideration and the Claimant was informed, like her colleagues, that her application could not be supported due to financial constraints operating at that time. This was a genuine and consistent reason for refusing the application which had been fully considered, and it was not dismissed out of hand as alleged. This was therefore not a breach of contract and we dismiss that complaint as well. Cumulative effects

[585]We have considered whether the incidents relied upon by the Claimant, taken together, amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence sufficient to justify resignation, and a course of conduct influenced by race so as to render a constructive dismissal discriminatory.

[586]We remind ourselves of the guidance in Omilaju that a relatively minor act may constitute the “last straw” when viewed against a background of earlier incidents, and in De Lacey that discriminatory constructive dismissal can arise from cumulative events even where the final act is not itself discriminatory. We also keep in mind Anya which warns against a fragmented approach.

[587]In this case, the Claimant points to 17 allegations she says comprised a course of racially discriminatory conduct against her. We have already recorded in this judgment whether the factual premise of the incidents occurred or not. We have also identified which incidents the Claimant did not know about until Autumn 2022, which is after her resignation so they could not have formed part of the reason for her resignation in May 2022. We have also identified that the Claimant referenced the hostile email to HR of circa 11 November 2020 and email about self isolating of 22 November 2020, which the Claimant suggested to us she learned from a whistleblower in Autumn 2022 which cannot be correct as she referenced them in her June 2022 grievance, but nevertheless that was after her resignation, not before it.

[588]The matters which have found occurred which the Claimant knew about on or around the immediate time are: i. the WhatsApp exchange with Mrs Sergides in March 2020; ii. the new organisational structure in July 2020; iii. the removal of the lock in September 2020 and the direction not to block glass panels with flipchart paper at the same time; iv. the informal warning to the Claimant of 17 September 2020; v. Mrs Sergides’ query about whether there was a conflict of interest in the Claimant as a trade union representative becoming a staff governor in September 2020; vi. the email from Mr Turnock in October 2020 advising staff to come to management with their issues in the first instance; vii. the comment from Mr Turnock that email signatures were being looked into in October 2020; viii. the ending of tutoring in June 2021; ix. the manner of the refusal of the request to do the NPSQL course in January 2022; and x. the late discovery in May 2022 of Mr Turnock’s email of 19 November 2020 about taking a contract out.

[589]We have focussed on these matters which the Claimant did know about before her resignation, and we have considered whether these incidents, individually or collectively, were calculated or likely to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence, and whether race was a significant influence across them.

[590]Our conclusion is that some of these events reflect a deteriorating working relationship, poor communication and poor understanding of trade union relations, combined with some reasonable management decisions. The most serious incident (which the Claimant knew about), in our view was the “contract” email of 19 November 2020, was isolated, historic, and not acted upon. It is our finding that even when aggregated, these matters fall short of the threshold required by Western Excavating and subsequent authorities, and do not amount to a repudiatory breach of contract.

[591]It is our finding that the pattern that emerges is one of operational and management pressures during the Pandemic, and personality clashes or a power struggle between Mr Turnock and the Claimant, rather than a sustained campaign of discriminatory treatment or harassment related to race. Having looked in detail at the comparators relied upon, we have not identified a pattern of less favourable treatment due to race even on a cumulative basis. Moreover, we have not identified any evidence that race was a conscious or subconscious factor linking these incidents. Accordingly, the cumulative effect does not alter our findings on direct race discrimination, harassment related to race or constructive dismissal. Section 1 Employment Rights Act 1996 – initial statement of particulars

[592]The claim has not succeeded therefore the Claimant would not in any event be entitled to recover an award under s. 38 Employment Act 2002, however we record for completeness that the matter was not pursued before us. Annex A – Hostile Witness application

[593]The Claimant makes an application for an order that Mrs Porter Tibbey be declared a hostile witness. The witness gives evidence pursuant to a witness order made on 17 September 2024 by Employment Judge Quill upon the application of the Claimant.

[594]The witness produced a witness statement dated 26 November 2024, her statement is clear, it is well drafted, and she set out in detail the precise witness evidence she wished to give, divided into the relevant parts of the list of issues.

[595]The application to declare her a hostile witness is made on day six of the hearing shortly after the start of Mrs Porter Tibbey’s oral evidence. The witness had said in her witness statement that she was concerned about how the Claimant would respond to the Respondent’s shadow structure where she was appointed to assist with computing and remote learning. The witness had also said she anticipated that the Claimant would be unhappy working in a team.

[596]The witness further said she was never privy to the details of the issues between the Claimant and the Head Teacher but it was evident that there were problems and it appeared that the relationship was strained.

[597]The witness was asked by the Claimant how did she know, and she replied that she was a member of the SLT and was part of meetings, she was aware there were issues about how the Claimant was communicating with SLT during 2020, she had heard that there were issues about getting logins for Seesaw and the Claimant would not put her camera on during some staff meetings.

[598]The Claimant alleges that the witness has changed her testimony and should therefore either be deemed a hostile witness or at least called as the Tribunal’s witness (after I had identified the possibility) so that both sides can cross examine her. The witness denies she has done so and insists her evidence has been consistent. The Respondent says the same and argues against deeming her to be hostile on the basis she has not changed her evidence or become hostile nor sought to lie or mislead the Tribunal, and it also argues against calling her as the Tribunal’s witness – in both cases the Respondent reminds us that these measures should be exceptional and it would not be in furtherance of the overriding objective to do so.

[599]It is an established principle that where a tribunal perceives that an application for a witness order seeks to compel the attendance of a hostile witness, it may exercise its discretion and refuse to make the order – Pasha v DHSS EAT 556/80. That process should only be used where the witness has relevant evidence to give on behalf of the party wishing to call them. A party cannot cross examine their own witness. I made the Claimant aware of this during the course of this hearing.

[600]Rule 41 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 provides that the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, it may itself question any witnesses, and it is not bound by any rule of law relating to the admissibility of evidence. Nevertheless, it must conduct the hearing in a manner it considers to be fair.

[601]Whereas it is not explicitly mentioned, the Tribunal may call a witness of its own volition under its general case management powers now contained within Rule 30.

[602]We are not satisfied that the witness has given hostile evidence, nor that it has been inconsistent with her written statement. It appears to us that her evidence has in fact been entirely consistent, she says that it was evident that there were problems and the relationship was strained, and she has explained why. There was nothing inconsistent with that. Mrs Porter Tibbey’s witness statement says that she was aware there were issues. At the start of her oral evidence she was asked about these, and she listed what those issues were, and said she did not know further details about them. As such her oral evidence was entirely consistent with her witness statement.

[603]The fact that the witness evidence is not that which the Claimant desired, or she would like to challenge it, does not make her a hostile witness.

[604]The Claimant has referred us to the judgment in Davis-Cawood v Royal Mail and others (2017) however that is of no assistance as it is a non-binding first instance of another tribunal of equivalent standing and moreover it does not refer to any principle of law. The fact that a judge in another case declared a witness to be hostile for reasons unspecified is of no assistance to us.

[605]We note from the judgment of HHJ Auerbach in Laing v Bury & Bolton Citizens Advice

[2022] EAT 85

that: “the fact that an opponent decides not to call an individual who a party considers has relevant evidence to give, does not entitle that party to require that they be brought under a witness order, and then cross- examined by them. Rather, a party who obtains a witness order will generally not be permitted to cross-examine that witness, unless the tribunal exceptionally grants them permission to do so.” [54]

[606]No exceptional circumstances exist in this case. The Claimant knew full well what the witness evidence would be and the witness has remained consistent with that evidence. We decline to exercise our case management powers to allow the Claimant to cross examine her as a hostile witness, and the application is refused.

[607]As to whether the Tribunal should call the witness of its own volition and to allow either or both sides to cross examine her, we note that in Arnold Clark Automobiles Ltd v Middleton [2012] ICR D36, EAT, the EAT confirmed that whereas the 2004 version of the Tribunal rules permitted a tribunal to do so, the court noted that Employment Tribunals are not investigative bodies, it is not for them to decide what issues ought to be looked into or further looked into, and it would be extremely difficult to think of circumstances where this might be appropriate and in accordance with the overriding objective. It was further held that whereas a tribunal is entitled to ask questions of witnesses to clarify the evidence given, it is not for it to run the case on behalf of either party or to embark on a case of its own making [9].

[608]We therefore decline to call the witness as the Tribunal’s own witness; there are no exceptional circumstances which would necessitate us doing so.

[609]The witness was ordered to attend upon the application of the Claimant, her evidence has been known to the Claimant since November 2024 and yet she persisted in calling her and then sought to make her application early into the witness’ oral evidence purportedly on the basis that her evidence had become hostile whereas it was nothing of the sort. Over one hour of tribunal time has been wasted in dealing with the application. We find that this was application was unreasonable conduct of these proceedings. We warn the Claimant that she is at risk of an order for costs if she continues to conduct herself unreasonably during the remainder of these proceedings. Annex B – Additional closing submissions application Claimant’s Application

[610]On the evening of 6 November 2025 the Claimant provided a further 22 pages of written closing submissions in addition to the 81 pages already provided. The Claimant wrote: “I am writing as a litigant in person to ask, with sincere apologies, if the Tribunal would permit me to submit a short omitted section from my closing submissions. I removed this section from my written version and updated it on the understanding that I would cover it orally, having been advised not to duplicate content. Unfortunately, due to time at the end of the hearing, I was unable to do so. As a result, this part of my argument was neither read aloud nor included in my final written submissions. In my rehearsal it was a great deal shorter. The section does not introduce any new evidence; it simply summarises and analyses evidence that was already heard during the hearing. I am very conscious of the importance of ensuring the Tribunal has a full picture of my case before reaching its decision. If the Tribunal is willing to allow it, I would be grateful to provide the omitted section as a short supplementary note for completeness. Thank you for your understanding and for the fairness shown to me throughout these proceedings.” Respondent’s objections

[611]The Respondent objected the following day as follows: “The tribunal is quite capable of summarising and analysing both the Claimant's submissions and the evidence it heard over the course of the trial without the need for the Claimant's further input and intervention. The Claimant was put on notice back in July 2025 that the trial would conclude on 6 November 2025, and that she would be expected to make submissions on that date. The Claimant has had the advantage of receiving the Respondent's written submissions and the additional benefit of reviewing the Respondent’s written submissions in advance of providing her own. On 6 November 2025, the Claimant submitted 81 pages of written submissions. She also made oral submissions. She confirmed at the close of the hearing that she had nothing further to add. The trial has now concluded. Permitting the Claimant now to make still further submissions in these circumstances would be wholly contrary to the overriding objective as disproportionate and in conferring an advantage on the Claimant that is not afforded to the Respondent. In the circumstances, the tribunal is respectfully invited to dismiss the Claimant's application.”

[612]The Employment Tribunal is entitled to regulate its own procedure under Rule 41. We have had regard to the Overriding Objective within in Rule 3 which provides: Overriding objective 3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) The parties and their representatives must— (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.

[613]We have concluded that the interests of fairness and finality required that the case be determined on the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing itself. To admit additional material at this stage, without affording the Respondent a proper opportunity to respond, would have risked procedural unfairness and unnecessary delay as well as additional costs. The delay would have impacted the Tribunal’s deliberation time, with the consequent impact upon other Tribunal users waiting patiently in the queue for their own hearings. This matter has already incurred 13 days of hearing time (without deliberation time) and it was not proportionate to list it for further day to continue those submissions and to allow the Respondent to respond to this additional written submission. This would also have involved additional unnecessary expense.

[614]The Tribunal therefore exercised its discretion to decline to receive or consider the Claimant’s further submissions. For completeness, the Tribunal is satisfied that its findings of fact and conclusions have taken into account all of the evidence which it has read and heard during the trial.

[615]We thank Ms Amissah and Ms King for their valuable assistance throughout this hearing, including providing oral and written closing submissions of such a high quality.

[616]We invite written submissions from the parties within 14 days of receipt of this judgment on the issue of how they invite the Tribunal to proceed with respect to the deposit previously paid by the Claimant. Approved by:

Conclusions

[1]On 2 December 2025 the judgment dismissing the claim was sent to the parties. This was a 117 page judgment which contained full written reasons for the Tribunal’s findings of fact and the conclusions reached.

[2]The Claimant has since sent a succession of emails to the Tribunal as follows:2.1 15 December 2025 3:59pm – containing the 17-page application for a reconsideration together with additional disclosure bundle.

2.2 15 December 2025 6:27pm – containing a revised application and disclosure bundle.

2.3 15 December 2025 7:02pm – attaching further disclosure.

2.4 15 December 2025 8:10pm – concerning the deposit and costs.

2.5 16 December 2025 1:40pm – concerning the deposit, costs, amendment of the claim and a re-hearing.

2.6 16 December 2025 2pm - concerning the deposit and costs.

2.7 16 December 2025 2:01pm - concerning the deposit, costs, amendment of the claim and a re-hearing.

[3]This judgment will address the application for a reconsideration only. The correspondence concerning the deposit, costs, and amendment of the claim will be responded to separately. Claimant’s application

[4]The grounds for reconsideration are contained in a 17 page application and spread out over the various emails sent on 15 December 2025, and is based upon alleged fresh evidence and material procedural irregularity, and the Claimant seeks a reconsideration in the interests of justice. The Claimant states that she is not challenging any factual findings, rather she is challenging the adequacy and transparency of the Tribunal’s reasoning. The Claimant also states that the application concerns the issues about the self isolating email query1, and also union emails2, however the application document addresses other issues in the claim.

[5]The Claimant has provided the Tribunal with additional material not placed before it during the original hearing. These documents comprise various text or WhatsApp messages between the Claimant and her colleagues about self isolating during the Pandemic; emails or extracts of emails between Mr Turnock and Mr Holt in HR about a draft letter to the Claimant and the conduct of union meetings from October 2020; a screenshot of a table from Islington Council about Covid scenarios; an email from Mr Turnock to the Claimant and Rose Graham following on from an email to Year 4 Parents and Carers on 22 November 2020 about isolating; a Governors’ briefing from October 2020; and an email between the Claimant and her Union Representative on 11 November 2020.

[6]The Claimant’s reconsideration bundle in her email of 15 December 2025 at 3:59pm contains incomplete versions of the emails between Mr Turnock and Mr Holt from October 2020. These are in the same format or style as those taken from Mr Turnock’s iPad or email account without his consent during 2020 – they appear to be either screenshots or photographs of the emails with parts missing. In the Claimant’s second version of the reconsideration bundle at 6:27pm on 15 December 2025, these incomplete emails have been removed and replaced with the full versions which appear to have been disclosed by the Respondent on 15 December 2025 at 4:13pm. The cover email from the Respondent states: “We have reviewed the emails you refer to. The relevant email chain between Mr Holt and Mr Turnock was not included in the original SAR response due to an inadvertent administrative error when reviewing email threads with similar subject headings. The omission was not intentional. For completeness, we now enclose the email chains you have requested.”

[7]The Claimant makes reference to the decisions in Mayanja v City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council

[2025] EAT 160

, and also Ladd v Marshall

[1954] 1 WLR 1489

[8]The Claimant argues that she did not receive a fair hearing as critical contemporaneous evidence was unavailable, incomplete or disclosed after the Tribunal had formed views on credibility and motive. The Claimant references a disclosure application she says she made on 25 July 2025 which was not placed before the Tribunal during the hearing. The Claimant says that this disclosure application related to HR advice.

[9]Much of the new disclosure is said to relate to a query from Mr Turnock on 22 November 2020 about whether the Claimant was self-isolating. The Claimant says that the new disclosure shows that they had spoken on 21 November 2020 and Mr Turnock knew she was self-isolating so there was no need for him to have queried her status the next day, and she repeats her arguments that she was singled out and selected for scrutiny whereas others were not. The Claimant alleges that the 1 Issues 3.2.15; 4.1.15; and 5.1.16 2 Issues 3.2.11; 3.2.13; 4.1.11; 4.1.13; 5.1.12; and 5.1.14 Tribunal misapplied the burden of proof and that it was in error by accepting simple assertions from the Respondent in the absence of cogent evidence.

[10]The Claimant refers to the new disclosure of emails between Mr Turnock and Mr Holt in HR. One email exchange of 5 October 2020 concerns HR advice on a draft letter to the Claimant about her conduct and in response Mr Turnock stated “The member of staff in question is now the NEU rep for the school after a union putsch which is going to make things interesting.”

[11]A second email exchange of 14 October 2020 concerns Mr Turnock seeking advice on a pro forma or agreed format for union meetings. The response from Mr Holt was that there was no pro forma however the areas for discussion would include staffing concerns (not just about health and safety), well-being, and also appraisals etc; and that agenda items should be sent 24 hours before the meeting; with any other business discussed at the start of the meeting should anything come up at the last minute.

[12]An email exchange of 16 October 2020 about the conduct of the union meetings was already before the Tribunal in the final hearing.

[13]The Claimant says that had this material been before the Tribunal it would have had an important influence on the outcome and at the very least it would have required the Tribunal to reassess the weight placed on the Respondent’s explanations and credibility.

[14]The Claimant goes on to ask the Tribunal to reconsider the findings regarding all events including the self-isolation incident3 as the Tribunal’s reasoning relies upon a flawed assessment of the evidence.

[15]Within the body of the two emails of 15 December 2025 at 3:59pm and 6:27pm the Claimant also argues that the Tribunal has allowed the Respondent to advance a materially new explanation for its conduct for the first time during cross examination whereas the explanation did not appear in the ET3 or witness statements. This appeared to be directed towards the issue about self isolating.

[16]With respect to the issue about self isolating the Claimant argues the Tribunal was in error by finding that she only became aware of the email query after resigning, whereas she says that the contemporaneous documents show that she was aware of it before resigning and this impacts causation in her constructive dismissal claim.

[17]The Claimant also says that the finding that she was unaware of the isolation query is now contradicted by contemporaneous documents she has now disclosed which consist of her WhatsApp messages with Rose Graham on 20 and 21 November 2020, and a newly disclosed email from the Respondent where Mr Turnock sent an email about home learning on 22 November 2020 where he tells the Claimant and Ms Graham to keep in contact and that he would stay in touch. The Claimant says this supports evidence Mr Turnock had already spoken to her and told her that she must isolate and that he knew she was isolating.

[18]The Claimant refers to Law Society and others v Bahl

[2003] IRLR 640

and argues that while a tribunal may identify an obvious non-discriminatory explanation that arises naturally from its own primary findings of fact, such an explanation must be one that was apparent from the evidence. The Claimant again argues a misapplication of the burden of proof.

[19]The Claimant states that with respect to the query about whether she was selfisolating, four comparators were in materially the same position and that the 3 Issues 3.2.15; 4.1.15; and 5.1.16 Respondent’s case depended upon her being in a different position because her isolation status was said to be uncertain. The Claimant says the Respondent failed to disclose public health advice or contemporaneous risk assessments which she says should support an adverse inference. The Claimant further alleges that the Tribunal accepted a new justification from the Respondent without examining whether it had been pleaded; whether she had fair notice; whether it had been challenged in cross-examination; and whether it was consistent.

[20]The Claimant also challenges the judgment saying the Tribunal had formed an adverse assessment of her credibility because there was no reason for her to be handling iPads, and the Claimant refers to the case of Mayanja about the danger of making an overarching assessment of credibility which is then used globally in all subsequent assessments.

[21]The Claimant says that the Tribunal accepted the Respondent’s evidence and found its witnesses were honest and reliable without distinguishing between to two Throughout the application the Claimant argues that there is a lack of reasoning in the judgment and that it is not compliant with Meek v City of Birmingham District Council

[1987] IRLR 250

[22]The Claimant also challenges the Tribunal’s findings about the reason why Mr Turnock sent his email about “taking a contract out”4 and she says that Mr Turnock could point to no explanation, whereas the Tribunal made a finding on the reasons why, and she says that the Tribunal misapplied the burden of proof. The Claimant also argues that the Tribunal failed to show it had properly considered the issue of unconscious influence, and she adds that her difficulty is not with the outcome reached but the adequacy of the reasoning and that the Tribunal’s explanation does not show how the Respondent proved that race played no part whatsoever in her treatment.

[23]The Claimant also refers to the issue about her use of credentials under her email signature5 and she argues a lack of reasoning from the Tribunal about why it made the findings it did, given she says by various explanations from Mr Turnock and a lack of evidence from Mrs Sergides on the issue. Law

[24]Rule 3 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 provide as follows: Overriding objective 3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense. 4 Issues 3.2.13; 4.1.14; and 5.1.15 5 Issues 3.2.12; 4.1.12; and 5.1.13 (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) The parties and their representatives must— (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.

[25]Part 12 of the Rules provides: Reconsideration of judgments Principles 68.—(1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. (2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked. (3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion. Application for reconsideration 69. Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of—(a) the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or

(b) the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. Process for reconsideration 70.—(1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application. Reconsideration by the Tribunal on its own initiative 71. Where the Tribunal proposes to reconsider a judgment on its own initiative, it must inform the parties of the reasons why the decision is being reconsidered and the judgment must be reconsidered (as if an application had been made and not refused) in accordance with rule 70(3) to (5) (process for reconsideration).

[26]The Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v Burton and anor

[2016] EWCA Civ 714

observed (paragraph 21) that the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open ended and should be exercised in a principled way, and it emphasised the importance of finality.

[27]In Ebury Partners UK Ltd v Acton Davis

[2023] IRLR 486

it was held: “The employment tribunal can therefore only reconsider a decision if it is necessary to do so “in the interests of justice.” A central aspect of the interests of justice is that there should be finality in litigation. It is therefore unusual for a litigant to be allowed a “second bite of the cherry” and the jurisdiction to reconsider should be exercised with caution. In general, while it may be appropriate to reconsider a decision where there has been some procedural mishap such that a party had been denied a fair and proper opportunity to present his case, the jurisdiction should not be invoked to correct a supposed error made by the ET after the parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases on the relevant issue. This is particularly the case where the error alleged is one of law which is more appropriately corrected by the EAT.” [24]

[28]Similarly in Trimble v Supertravel Ltd

[1982] ICR 440

the court emphasised that alleged errors of law fall to be corrected by the appeal tribunal. Moreover, in Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden

[2010] ICR 743

it was held: “…the view that it is unjust to give the losing party a second bite of the cherry— seems to me entirely appropriate: justice requires an equal regard to the interests and legitimate expectations of both parties, and a successful party should in general be entitled to regard a tribunal’s decision on a substantive issue as final (subject, of course, to appeal).” [17]

[29]The case of Ladd v Marshall [1954] I WLR 1489 provides guidance on the issue of admission of new evidence after the end of a hearing. The court held that the party seeking to adduce fresh evidence must show(1) that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing;

(2) that it is relevant and would probably have had an important influence on the hearing; and

(3) that it is apparently credible.

[30]The court in Flint v Eastern Electricity Board

[1975] ICR 395

addressed the issue of where evidence was alleged to have been suppressed by a party: “It seems to me that all those cases — there are others, but I will not take time to cite them all — show that in the ordinary courts, that is to say, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the county court, there is plainly a residual class of unusual case where in justice it is right that there should be a re-trial to enable fresh evidence to be given, even though to some extent it may be said that the evidence was available.”

[31]The court in Flint went on to consider the issue of the interests of justice: “First of all, they are the interests of the employee. Plainly from his point of view it is highly desirable that the evidence should be given, because it follows, from what I have already said, that there is at least some, perhaps good, chance that if it is given his case will succeed. One also has to consider the interests of the employers, because it is in their interests that once a hearing which has been fairly conducted is complete, that should be the end of the matter. Although this is a case where one’s sympathy is with the employee, because it is his claim for a redundancy payment and the employers have more money than he has, it has to be remembered that the same principles have to be applied either way because one day a case may arise the other way round. So, plainly, their interests have to be considered. But over and above all that, the interests of the general public have to be considered too. It seems to me that it is very much in the interests of the general public that proceedings of this kind should be as final as possible; that is should only be in unusual cases that the employee, the applicant before the tribunal, is able to have a second bite at the cherry. It certainly seems to me, hard though it may seem in the instant case, that it would not be right that he should be allowed to have a second bite at the cherry in cases which are perfectly simple, perfectly straightforward, where the issues are perfectly clear and where the information that he now seeks leave at a further hearing to put before the tribunal has been in his possession and in his mind the whole time. It really seems to me to be a classic case where it is undesirable that there should be a review.”

[32]Further in Outasight VB Limited v Brown UKEAT/0253 it was held: “49. More specifically, as to an application to introduce fresh evidence after the determination of a case, the approach laid down in Ladd v Marshall will, in most cases, encapsulate that which is meant by the “interests of justice”. It provides a consistent approach across the civil courts and the EAT. Should a different approach be adopted in the ET because the principles of Ladd v Marshall are no longer expressly set out in the Rules? I do not think so. Those principles set down the relevant questions in most cases where judicial discretion has to be exercised upon an application to admit fresh evidence in the interests of justice. 50. In saying that, I allow that the interests of justice might on occasion permit evidence to be adduced where the requirements of Ladd v Marshall are not strictly met, but it was ever thus. Hence, the residual category allowed by Rule 34(3)(e) 2004 Rules and the recognition of how this might then be used in cases such as Flint and Deria. As to what circumstances might lead an ET to allow an application to admit fresh evidence, that will inevitably be case-specific. It is, of course, always dangerous to try to lay down any general principles when dealing with specific facts, particularly where - as here - one party is not represented and where the point was not fully argued below. That said, it might be in the interests of justice to allow fresh evidence to be adduced where there is some additional factor or mitigating circumstance which meant that the evidence in question could not be obtained with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage (Deria). This might arise where there are issues as to whether there was a fair hearing below; perhaps where a party was genuinely ambushed by what took place or, as in Marsden, where circumstances meant that an adjournment was not allowed to a party when otherwise it would have been (there apparently because of an error on the part of that party’s Counsel).”

[33]The courts in Flint and Outasight were both addressing different and earlier versions of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure, however the principles remain valid that there may be circumstances whereby new material (which may been available during the original hearing) may justify a re-hearing.

[34]The EAT in Mayanja v City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council

[2025] EAT 160

cautions tribunals against making an overarching assessment of credibility that is then relied upon in all further assessments.6 Conclusions on application Late disclosure

[35]I will deal first with the issue about late disclosure, applying the guidance in Ladd v Marshall.

[36]Whereas the Claimant has not stated it as such, much of this new disclosure is material which was in her possession at the time of the last hearing as it comprises of messages (or WhatsApp messages) between the Claimant and her colleagues about self isolating, and also one message between the Claimant and her trade union representative.

[37]These messages would probably not have had an important influence on that hearing as Mr Turnock was unable to remember a great deal about matters allegedly occurring five years earlier during the Pandemic. The Claimant has argued that she was treated less favourably than her comparators and there was no need to check up on her as she had spoken to Mr Turnock who knew she was isolating.

[38]At paragraph 571 of the judgment the Tribunal determined that the Claimant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination, nevertheless and for the sake of completeness, the Tribunal moved to the second stage of the burden of proof and asked the question of the reason why Mr Turnock sent the email on 22 November 2020 about checking if the Claimant was isolating. The Tribunal accepted the explanation of Mr Turnock that there was ambiguity around bubbles at that time about adults not in the same class as infected children. Whereas the Claimant appears to suggest that there was no ambiguity, the Tribunal was satisfied that at least Mr Turnock believed there to have been ambiguity and he was asking the business manager to check the position in order to complete the reporting he was required to undertake. Whereas the Claimant argued that she was singled out for additional scrutiny, that was not made out on the evidence and the late disclosure of the messages with colleagues would not have altered that finding.

[39]Similarly, the Governors’ briefing of 22 October 2020 which contains a section on Covid-19 arrangements and isolating, would not have added anything to the case, and nor would it have had any influence on the hearing. The issue in this claim was about Mr Turnock’s query to KM about whether the Claimant was isolating, and as we have already found Mr Turnock considered there to be some ambiguity. 6 Paragraphs 38 and 39 The inclusion of these documents would not have had any influence on that. The same is true of Mr Turnock’s email of 22 November 2020 at 9:01pm to Ms Graham and the Claimant – at the very most Mr Turnock is updating both on a message he sent to Year 4 Parents and Carers and he asks Ms Graham and the Claimant to keep in touch. There was no further inference to be drawn from the innocuous email, even when viewed in the context of Mr Turnock’s email to KM that same evening to check if the Claimant was isolating. This appears to be entirely innocuous correspondence which would not have had any influence on the hearing had it been put before us.

[40]As regards the emails between Mr Turnock and Mr Holt of 5 October 2020 about a draft letter to the Claimant about her conduct, I am not satisfied that this was material which was also not available at the time of the last hearing. The versions in the first reconsideration bundle are in the same format or style as those documents taken from Mr Turnock’s iPad without his consent, allegedly disclosed to the Claimant in Autumn 2022 by an anonymous whistleblower. The same is true of the emails dated 14 October 2020 about the conduct of the union meetings. In the original reconsideration bundle these also appeared to be screenshots or photographs of emails, missing portions of the email, and they are the same type of capture as those emails taken from Mr Turnock’s email account potentially unlawfully. In the second version of the reconsideration bundle these documents have been removed and replaced by fuller copies which appear to have been disclosed to the Claimant by the Respondent on 15 December 2025. I am not satisfied that the Claimant did not already have these two exchanges in her possession at the time of the original hearing – the format of those documents is suggestive that they were copies of documents taken from Mr Turnock’s iPad or email account earlier and were already in the Claimant’s possession.

[41]Leaving aside whether the Claimant had these documents or not, had these been presented at the time of the original hearing I am not minded that either exchange would have had an important influence on the outcome of that hearing because it was known that Mr Turnock sought advice on the conduct of the union meetings which he found difficult, and it was known that advice was sought on a draft letter to go to the Claimant about her conduct. The contents of both exchanges do not alter the original findings nor the conclusions later in the judgment, rather both support those findings and conclusions.

[42]As regards the remainder of the new disclosure, the email or message between the Claimant and Mr Buttifint of 11 November 2020 was already in the Claimant’s possession but it would have added nothing to the case, nor would it have had any influence on the outcome had it been provided earlier.

[43]As regards the Claimant’s application for disclosure which she says was made on 25 July 2025 for disclosure of HR advice, this was not put before the Tribunal nor was it raised in the hearing despite numerous opportunities to do so. The issue of disclosure was raised daily but this matter was not raised during the course of these daily discussions. The Claimant now appears to have these emails, which as I have indicated may have been in her possession already, and they would have had no influence on the outcome of the hearing.

[44]Leaving aside the guidance in Ladd v Marshall, I am also not minded on the basis of Flint and Outasight that there is anything exceptional about this late disclosure, or that it would be in the interests of justice so as to justify the exceptional step of granting a reconsideration and a re-hearing. There must be finality in litigation, and it is not fair on the other party or the public in general, to give losing parties a second bite of the cherry by granting a re-hearing on the basis of documents that were for the most part already in the possession of the losing party. Credibility

[45]Turning now to the issue of the Claimant’s credibility and her reliance on the case of Mayanja, and whether the Tribunal adopted an approach of preferring the Respondent’s evidence over that of the Claimant.

[46]The issues in this case where whether the acts happened or not; if they did happen were they discriminatory; and if so, were they breaches of contract; and if so, did the Claimant resign in response to them?

[47]The Tribunal’s task was made more complicated due to the manner in which some of the matters allegedly came to the attention of the Claimant who argued that she had stumbled across the email of Mr Turnock dated 19 November 2020 when checking who owned an iPad, and it was further argued that some of these matters were disclosed to her by a confidential whistleblower in Autumn 2022 which was after her resignation.

[48]The Tribunal had to grapple with when each matter came to the attention of the Claimant, and it noted that it had concerns about the reliability what the Claimant was saying about her access to the iPad and when these matters were disclosed to her. Notwithstanding those concerns, the Tribunal elsewhere indicated where it preferred the Claimant’s evidence over that of Mrs Sergides, for example at paragraphs 76 and 94 of the judgment. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not adopt an approach of preferring the Respondent’s evidence over that of the Claimant, rather each allegation and each dispute of fact was tested by the Tribunal. It was nevertheless incumbent upon the Tribunal to explain why it had concerns about when the Claimant became aware of these matters due to the apparent implausibility of the explanations as to how they came into her possession. Alleged error of fact

[49]Following on from the issue of when these matters came to the attention of the Claimant, the Claimant argues in her reconsideration application that she was aware of Mr Turnock’s email of 22 November 2020 about self isolating, prior to her decision to resign. We are referred to the email from the Claimant to Mr Buttifint of 11 May 2025 where this is referred to.

[50]The Claimant’s account had always been that the emails improperly obtained from Mr Turnock’s iPad or email account (save for the 19 November 2020 email) were disclosed to her by an anonymous whistleblower in Autumn 2022. This was the Claimant’s evidence to us in the hearing. Clearly this was incorrect.

[51]The Tribunal has already addressed this matter within the findings of fact: “283. On Sunday 22 November 2020 at 9:08pm Mr Turnock emailed KM the Business Manager to discuss committee meeting minutes and said “Also we need to check whether SA is actually isolating or not but I’ll talk to you about that in the morning.” This is another email taken from Mr Turnock’s email without his consent by someone who the Claimant says was her whistleblower. The Claimant was not a party to this email but referred to it in her grievance in June 2022 which is inconsistent with her arguments about having been disclosed things in Autumn 2022 by her confidential whistleblower.”

[52]This is further considered in the conclusions section: “574. Whereas the Claimant says she was disclosed this email in Autumn 2022, it was referenced in her grievance of 13 June 2022 so she at least knew about it by then, but this was still after her resignation. Even if the Claimant had known about this earlier, and prior to her decision to resign, we find that this was neither calculated nor likely to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence, either in isolation nor cumulatively with the other matters in this case. This was a trivial routine query and nothing more. We dismiss the complaint of a breach of contract.”

[53]The Tribunal has not made an error in its fact finding as it kept open the possibility that what the Claimant had said about receiving documents in Autumn 2022 had been inaccurate as it was referred to in the grievance in June 2022. The Tribunal then considered the position if the Claimant had seen the email before her decision to resign, and the Tribunal found that it would not have been a breach whenever it was that the Claimant had seen it.

[54]The fact that the Claimant referenced the email of 22 November 2020 during May 2022 to Mr Buttifint does not impact the Tribunal’s conclusions at paragraphs 587 and 588 of the judgment as the Claimant’s race was not a factor in the decision of Mr Turnock to send that email; this did not amount to a breach of contract in any event; and we have been unable to make a finding on what this email came to the attention of the Claimant. It is not in the interests of justice for the judgment to be reconsidered on this basis as this does not impact the overall judgment, nor the Tribunal’s consideration of the cumulative effect of the matters identified. This was simply an innocuous email sent by a senior manager who was required to report on how many people were isolating. Inadequate explanations from the Respondent / burden of proof

[55]The Claimant makes a number of criticisms of the original judgment to the effect that the Tribunal misapplied the burden of proof provisions, or has made findings and reached conclusions about the reason for treatment in the absence of an explanation by the Respondent. One such example relates to the email sent by Mr Turnock to Mrs Sergides on 19 November 2020 where he inappropriately and unprofessionally joked about taking out a contract. Mr Turnock did not dispute sending the email, rather he could not recall the reason why it was sent.

[56]As set out in the liability judgment, the Tribunal determined that there had not been less favourable treatment of the Claimant on grounds of race in comparison with the two named comparators. It was open to the Tribunal to dismiss the allegation at that stage, however the Tribunal looked to see whether it could construct a hypothetical comparator. That would not have assisted in this case due to the difficult working relationship between Mr Turnock and the Claimant, therefore the Tribunal moved to the second stage and asked the reason for the treatment. This, as other cases have recorded, does not prejudice a claimant as it presupposes they have passed the first part of the burden of proof and it is to their advantage. This approach was permissible on the basis of Brown v London Borough of Croydon and anor

[2007] ICR 909

, CA and also Hewage v Grampian Health Board

[2012] IRLR 870

both referenced within the judgment, whilst noting the caution expressed in Field v Pye Co Ltd & others

[2022] IRLR 948

[57]In this case, the Tribunal explored the issue in considerable detail at paragraphs 548 – 568 of the judgment, and applying the decision in Bahl v Law Society

[2004] IRLR 799

the Tribunal found that it was able, from its own fact finding, to point to an obvious reason for the treatment. The Claimant appears either to disagree with this approach or the conclusion reached nevertheless findings of discrimination or discriminatory intent are serious matters, and as such, care should be exercised before drawing such an inference.

[58]To the extent that the Claimant seeks to argue that this approach, or any other conclusion reached, was an error of law, then the appropriate course is to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal rather than by way of a reconsideration. This is clear from the cases of Ebury Partners UK Ltd; Trimble; and Marsden. Insufficient reasons

[59]The Claimant makes repeated arguments that the Tribunal has provided insufficient reasons for its conclusions, and the judgment is not Meek compliant.

[60]Whereas the Claimant may disagree with the findings and the conclusions, all of these have been explored in considerable detail in this 117 page judgment, considering each of the allegations in isolation and cumulatively, and sufficient reasons have provided with respect to each of the legal issues that were decided.

Conclusion

[61]I have considered the Claimant’s application for reconsideration in detail and I conclude that a reconsideration of the judgment of 28 November 2025 is not in the interests of justice. None of the grounds of the Claimant’s application meet the high threshold which would justify a re-hearing. Much of the Claimant’s application seeks to re-litigate matters which have already been decided, and any late disclosure would not have had any influence on the outcome of the hearing.

[62]Both parties had a fair opportunity to present their cases during the original hearing, and whereas the Claimant is clearly dissatisfied with the outcome, I am not minded that there was any error in the findings and conclusions which would impact the overall judgment in this case that the Claimant was not discriminatorily constructively dismissed.

[63]To the extent that the Claimant maintains that the judgment contains errors of law, the appropriate way forward is for an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

[64]I therefore dismiss the Claimant’s application dated 15 December 2025 for a reconsideration on the basis that it is not in the interests of justice to grant it. Approved by